Although natural law theory and liberal political philosophy signify two realms of thought typically regarded as at loggerheads, Christopher Wolfe's provocatively titled book not only argues for their theoretical compatibility but also sets forth a new synthesis intended to furnish the basis for an inclusive American public philosophy at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Notwithstanding the fact that modern liberalism fought its way into historical existence as a radical alternative to political excesses sanctioned by traditional versions of natural law theory, Wolfe maintains that the political character of this initial confrontation has given rise to unnecessarily narrow and antagonistic understandings of the relationship between them. Natural law and modern liberalism are in fact products of two richly varied and complex intellectual traditions. By disentangling the essential features of natural law theory from the historical circumstances within which it developed, and by setting out the full array of political philosophies that constitute the tradition of liberalism, Wolfe advances a serious and thoughtful account of the way in which the objective moral principles of natural law can and ought to be reconciled with modern liberalism's distinctive commitments to liberty and equality. By challenging the underlying premises of contemporary debate about the proper relationship between religion and politics, he opens a new and constructive path for future dialogue among often polarized and combative participants.

Natural Law Liberalism is divided into two major parts. Part One begins with an account of John Rawls's influential “antiperfectionist” version of liberalism, and is followed by careful considerations of both the positive aims and characteristic blind spots of several prominent liberal theorists, all of whom in one way or another work within or enlarge the Rawlsian understanding of liberalism. Chapters on John Rawls, Stephen Macedo, Amy Gutmann, and Dennis Thompson bring to light the exclusionary tendency inherent in contemporary versions of liberalism by means of incisive analyses of the illusory aspiration to “neutral” versions of “public reason” and “reciprocity.” Chapters on Ronald Dworkin's critique of paternalism and Joseph Raz's position on trust and citizenship bring into focus contemporary liberalism's utopian aspiration to individual autonomy. Part One concludes with a chapter entitled “Offensive Liberalism.” It is devoted to Stephen Macedo's account of “liberalism's transformative ambitions,” primarily as they manifest themselves in a “liberal educative project,” which, Macedo forthrightly concedes, does and must inculcate liberal principles in its citizens (Macedo, Diversity and Distrust, 2000, pp. xi, 3). The chapter title bears especially on the problematic character of “liberal” public education: Wolfe contends that the right of religious believers to educate their children is increasingly confronted by “an offensive, crusading liberalism” (p. 113), one that poses “a significant threat to freedom” (p. 100) for many Americans (perhaps a majority) who adhere to religious views that are more traditional than those of the theoretical architects of contemporary liberalism.

Whereas the first part of the book is intended to reveal deficiencies in contemporary liberal theory that render it inadequate as a foundation for a truly representative public philosophy, Part Two seeks to establish a positive alternative, what Wolfe calls “natural law liberalism” (p. 131). He begins by placing the currently dominant expressions of liberalism into the broader historical context of political philosophies and political movements reaching back to the seventeenth century. This analysis culminates in the identification of five “core principles” (equal human dignity, consent of the governed, individual rights, effective limited government, and rule of law) and five strong “tendencies” (rationalist, reformist, individualistic, that which tends to promote either rational religion [natural theology] or secularism, and universalistic) that inform or animate most liberal thought. Wolfe provides a similar analysis of the natural law tradition by tracing its historical development, distinguishing different versions and “levels” of natural law theory, sifting out an underlying core agreement among them, and making a credible case that the core principles of natural law theory are not in fact hostile to liberalism's central preoccupation with liberty. He goes on to show the ways in which natural law theory affirms the main “principles” of liberalism, offers qualified support for its primary “tendencies,” and helps to overcome many of contemporary liberalism's blind spots. The book concludes with a chapter that applies natural law liberalism to the topic of religious liberty, and another that sketches the principled basis for a natural law public philosophy.

Wolfe's writing is often spirited, consistently incisive, and unfailingly clear. He does not stoop to caricature, is uninterested in partisan wrangling, and confines his argument to the most important issues and problems of the day. Like the interlocutors he criticizes, Wolfe is primarily interested in the future health of liberalism, and he treats those with whom he disagrees with the kind of carefulness and seriousness that bespeaks genuine respect. Although he often expresses appreciation for their efforts and the concerns that underlie them, he does not dilute his criticisms and is frank in pointing to their failures. The result is a bracing engagement that is refreshingly direct without being combative.

Nevertheless, the book is bound to be controversial. Not only is it written from a religious perspective alien to the dominant sensibilities of the academy, but its effort to forge an as-yet-untrodden path also risks criticism from both sides of the dispute—traditional natural law theorists sharply critical of the excessively secular character of contemporary liberalism and contemporary liberal theorists impatient with the persistent unwillingness of religious traditionalists to relegate religion to the private sphere. The constructive ambition animating this book (and its promised sequels) is to provoke participants on both sides of the controversy to find a common middle ground in natural law liberalism. The book makes an important contribution to this end. The extent to which he succeeds in furthering the desired dialogue, however, will depend in large part on whether those whom Wolfe subjects to thoughtful and respectful criticism prove willing to return the favor.