This is a well-argued analysis of some of the damage that civil conflicts and repressive governments do to political relationships, especially in postauthoritarian transitional societies. Based on this analysis, Colleen Murphy then goes on to suggest how these damaged political relationships among government officials and citizens can be rebuilt and possibly even transformed in a more democratic direction. Her arguments, objections, and counterarguments are philosophical in style. That is, the levels of abstraction are many, the conceptual connections complex, and the claims carefully qualified. Murphy helpfully pauses from time to time to summarize her progress, and she ties the threads of the argument together in a conclusion that highlights her most important claims and their implications.

At the most general level, Murphy argues that civil conflict and government repression are morally harmful to political relationships because of the damage they do to reciprocity and moral agency, or, as Murphy sometimes says, “reciprocal agency.” She makes this point repeatedly at different levels of abstraction, and the cumulative effect is very powerful.

Murphy begins by distinguishing her view of reconciliation from several others that she borrows from and improves on. Perhaps the most familiar view is that reconciliation depends on the forgiveness of perpetrators by victims. Given her use of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to illustrate several features of her own argument, it would be natural for her to adopt this view. Wisely, however, she reminds us that while forgiveness focuses on the elimination of resentment between victims and perpetrators, this is not the primary task of political reconciliation. Emphasis on “internal change in attitude overlooks … the conditions that facilitate and support injustice and oppression” (p. 11). A similar problem arises when reconciliation is defined as the creation or restoration of the conditions of trust. Here, too, the emphasis is too narrowly placed on “psychological attitudes and normative expectations” (p. 16) while ignoring the role that institutions must play in a theory of political reconciliation. Trust does play a crucial part in Murphy's theory, but it is not modeled on the trust of, say, husband and wife (p. 15). The dynamics of fear and (dis)trust between public officials and citizens, and among citizens themselves in transitional societies, are heavily mediated by political and legal institutions in ways that familial trust and distrust are not.

An “adequate theory” of political reconciliation, according to Murphy, is one that can explain why certain interactions damage political relationships and, more importantly, “why such damage is of moral concern” (p. 23). By analyzing how violence and repression have affected three normative frameworks (the rule of law, political trust, and the capabilities of citizens to achieve free and equal citizenship), Murphy prepares the ground for her own assessment of two strategies to repair this damage: truth commissions and international criminal tribunals.

First, Murphy positions her work alongside the classic theories of Lon Fuller and Joseph Raz. This section of the book is clear and methodical but contains few surprises. The formal requirements of the rule of law are enough to rule out the possibility of a systematically unjust legal order. Under apartheid, for example, injustice committed by government officials is incompatible with the rule of law, that is, with a “distinctive kind of social order, premised on reciprocity among citizens and officials and respect for individual agency” (pp. 61–62).

Murphy's treatment of political trust and capabilities adds additional force to this argument. Political trust, like the rule of law, should not be valued solely for its instrumental role. Unlike trust in economic transactions, which is primarily instrumental (i.e., it reduces transaction costs), political trust has a constitutive and expressive function. The absence of trust and “trust-responsiveness” (p. 76) (Murphy's way of describing trustworthiness) are signs of a deeper moral vacuum in politics. The lack of “default trust” (p. 83) means that citizens do not acknowledge the basic competence of officials and do not believe that many, if not all, of their fellow citizens are competent enough to become officials themselves. On the ground, political trust manifests itself in behaviors based on the assumed basic decency of others and the expectation of fair play. To politically trust in state officials and fellow citizens means that one does not demand that they prove their decency and commitment to fair play at every turn; to demand as much is disrespectful and insulting (pp. 81–82). Conversely, default trust-responsiveness means that citizens assume that state officials and other citizens have the right to make demands on them, just as they have a right to make demands on state officials and other citizens (p. 83). This is what Murphy means by saying that “reasonable” political trust and trust-responsiveness express the value of reciprocal agency, not just serve as a means to this moral end.

Murphy draws heavily on the writings of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum to make her argument that the damage to political relationships in many poor countries can be traced to the harm done by poverty and inequality. Unless this harm to human capabilities is repaired, the reciprocal agency that a well-functioning legal system and attitudes of political trust promise will be illusory. Unless citizens have an “effective freedom” (p. 94) to choose the human “functionings” (p. 94) they value and have a reasonable chance of being capable of functioning in these ways, then “deeper” (p. 94) harms from civil conflict and government repression to political relationships will persist. Murphy does not treat all of the capabilities that Sen and Nussbaum have identified as part of a fully flourishing human life. She singles out a short list of relational capabilities that she believes are most important for transitional societies: the capability to participate in social, economic, and political society; the capability to be recognized as a member of a political community; the capability to be respected by others; and the capability to survive and escape poverty. Together, these four capabilities provide yet another description of Murphy's fundamental moral value, reciprocal agency. Persons who have lost these capabilities have lost their ability to act as free agents in reciprocal cooperation with others (p. 100). This can happen directly to the victims of violence (e.g., rape and torture), but it also can have a more indirect impact throughout society. Here again the expressive value of the violence that accompanies civic conflict and repression is important. Family members and members of ethnic groups suffer ostracization and stereotyping, thereby “undercutting the capability to participate … in multiple ways” (p. 105). The same “expressive message” is sent when systematic civic conflict and repression such as apartheid rule in South Africa humiliate and degrade citizens so that they do not value themselves as free and equal members of a community or political society generally (p. 112).

Murphy takes this emphasis on the expressive function of normative frameworks one step further by underlining the material and psychological damage that can be done to human capabilities through the destruction of cultural institutions and practices. Just as ethnic customs, monuments, parades, drama, and art can bolster self-worth and nurture group identity, the suppression and manipulation of expressive cultural practices can be used to undermine the capability to participate in community (p. 114). Stereotyping is only the most familiar way in which this can occur. In part 2, Murphy returns to the expressive importance of noninstrumental cultural practices for the repair of transitional political relationships. What is clear at the halfway point in her argument is that political reconciliation cannot depend on just legal reform and attitudinal shifts. Without the deeper changes that remove violence, economic oppression, and social discrimination, lasting political reconciliation is unlikely.

The argument in part 2 moves quickly now that Murphy has connected her higher level values of agency and reciprocity with midlevel conceptual frameworks (the rule of law, political trust, and capabilities). The key question is this: What institutions and practices can repair the damage to political relationships done by civic conflict and repression in transitional societies? Murphy examines two familiar answers: truth commissions and international criminal trials. Murphy does not believe that either is a panacea, but she argues that both can play different important transformative, not just reparative, roles.

The South African TRC holds the most promise in this respect, despite the strong criticisms that have been made of it. To explain the transformative potential of the TRC, Murphy introduces the notions of collective memory and narrative to emphasize the expressive function of truth commissions, not their instrumental value for avoiding individual acts of revenge and organized vendettas. Stories told to the TRC “can serve to counter stereotypes implicitly invoked to rationalize injustice … and facilitate the exercise of empathy with others in a way that will make members of a political community more susceptible to the emotional address of their fellows in the future” (p. 158). Murphy makes a similar claim for international criminal trials. Properly conducted, they can play an “educative role” compared to the lack of impartiality, due process, and presumption of innocence that marked the legal processes preceding them. They can be “conducive toward reconciliation” by “cultivating decent and better judgment among lawmakers … and restoring confidence and faith in law among ordinary citizens” (pp. 181–82).

There are two areas where I think Murphy's arguments could be stronger. While Murphy calls her theory of political reconciliation a moral theory, it aspires to tell us something about the process of democratization. One wishes that Murphy would say more about what she means by democracy and democratic citizenship. Is democracy to be limited to insular societies, or should we be thinking more regionally or globally about citizenship?

Another question arises because of the stress throughout the book on the expressive function of normative conceptual frameworks and processes. Motivating empathy and educating citizens using truth commissions and international criminal trials seems unlikely without further mediating social and intellectual practices. Murphy correctly calls attention to cultural practices such as monuments, parades, drama, and art when analyzing the damage done to political relationships by civil conflict and state repression. These “cultural enactments” (e.g., Protestant parades in Northern Ireland), she argues, can solidify group identity but also harden hostilities. Similarly, if done well, truth commissions and trials can motivate political reconciliation by fostering feelings of care and empathy (p. 153). However, it is hard to imagine how these official enactments will motivate a wide enough audience. What is needed, I believe, are second-order critical re-enactments of cultural enactments such as these. Cultural practices that critically interpret and extend the reach of truth commissions and international criminal trials seem equally necessary if these processes are to repair the damage that has been done during earlier stages of the transition. In South Africa, poets, playwrights, and filmmakers such as Antjie Krog, William Kentridge, Jane Taylor, and the Handspring Puppet Company, among others, have played this mediating role.