The two books under review are serious intellectual works that ground an analysis of Asia's international politics in existing international relations theories and in so doing advance theoretical discussions in the field. They convincingly show that what is expected by some of the prominent IR theories is not observed in the region, and they offer alternative formulations that account for this nonoccurrence. Importantly, they insist that their discoveries are not necessarily sui generis phenomena limited to the region, but can be explained in terms of general theoretical frameworks that can be applied elsewhere. Thus, not only do they make precious contributions to our understandings of the fields of Asian politics and IR, but they also create an important dialogue between these fields, which, if developed further, would make their contributions even more valuable.

The dog that did not bark sometimes holds the key to an important puzzle, as Sherlock Holmes famously told a Scotland Yard detective. While it takes no active investigation to hear and see the dog that barks, it takes a fair amount of knowledge and imagination to recognize the one that did not. One of the most significant contributions that these two books make to the literature on Asian international relations and IR generally is that they have identified two dogs that did not bark: Steve Chan brings to the fore the nonexistence of “balancing” behavior by Asian nations against the United States and China, and Sumit Ganguly and William Thompson find that, despite expectations to the contrary, domestic politics did not help shape the course of rivalries in the region. As a discovery is framed, guided, and made within the context of a theory, so are their discoveries embedded in important IR theories. Chan engages balance-of-power theories head-on as he analyzes the nature of the United States–China relationship, while Ganguly and Thompson use a two-level game framework to explain the ups and downs in seven rival relationships in the region.

In Looking for Balance, Chan makes the prescient observation that, contrary to many imprecise and incorrect descriptions of balancing in Asia, the kind of behavior expected by balance-of-power theories has not materialized. He finds no balancing behavior by China or other Asian states against the United States, the most powerful state that should be the target of balancing, according to established theories. Nor are China's neighbors engaged in balancing against China, the state that is more powerful and threatening than any other in the region. Given that balance-of-power theories occupy a special, arguably central, position within IR, a finding that contradicts the expectations of these theories in itself constitutes an important contribution.

In Asian Rivalries, Ganguly and Thompson start with a two-level game framework developed by Robert Putnam and adopted by many others to explain various foreign policy behaviors of a government that finds itself on an unending mission to find a win set that would satisfy both its domestic constituencies and its foreign policy partners. Applying this framework to rivalries, defined as “relationships between two states in which the antagonistic decision-makers perceive each other as competitors who see their adversaries as threatening enemies” (p. 1), the two editors generate five phenomena that they expect to observe: factional foreign policies, rivalry outbidding, diversion, governmental politics, and threat inflation. It is a testament to their intellectual power and integrity that they admit, after seven case studies carefully conducted by the contributors, that “in the recent past, domestic politics have not been of significant salience in shaping the course of a number of key Asian rivalries” (p. 199).

As Paul Kapur notes in his case study of the Indo-Pakistani rivalry, many rivalries in fact undergird the self-images of the two adversaries. What is at stake between India and Pakistan, China and Taiwan, South and North Korea, and other rivals is the principle by which they justify the legitimacy of their state. India's conception of itself as a constitutionally secular republic based on the principles of civic nationalism, for example, stands in stark contrast to Pakistan's self-image as a state based on religion and ethnic nationalism. But even though these domestic attributes remain strong and constant, the course of their rivalry varies from one of violent confrontation to quiet acquiescence. Domestic politics or regime types thus fail to explain the variation in the behavior of the Asian rivalries studied in the Ganguly and Thompson volume.

A negative finding, whether it negates other's theories or one's own hypotheses, is an important step toward theory-building but remains unfulfilled unless it is followed by an alternative theory or hypothesis that does a better job of explaining the phenomenon. Chan takes this constructive task seriously and articulates an argument based on credible commitment, whereas Ganguly and Thompson suggest a nested game and governmental autonomy as potentially useful explanations for the unimportance of domestic politics in Asian rivalries.

Starting with the acknowledgment that adversarial and “associational” elements coexist in international relations, Chan argues that a state's choice between the two is not determined by structural conditions but is informed by ideas. Operating under the structural condition of anarchy and confronted with overwhelming power or threat, states may choose armament or alliance—or both—to ensure their survival, as balance-of-power theories suggest. But these balancing strategies incur present and future costs. Armament involves a trade-off between “guns and butter,” and today's military expenditures involve opportunity costs for diverting scarce resources away from more productive investments that could bring more benefits to future generations. Alignment strategies, too, are accompanied by various political and economic costs, including those derived from the abandonment–entrapment dilemma inherent in alliances.

Arguing against many Asia specialists who emphasize nationalism, military expansion, or ideological propagation as a driver of Chinese foreign policy, Chan suggests that East Asian elites have embraced economic performance as a basis for elite legitimacy and regime survival. In the absence of demonstrable hostility, East Asian states stop short of balancing their powerful neighbors for fear that balancing policies might forgo present and future gains that could accrue from cooperation, gains that would strengthen their legitimacy. They instead seek to expand commercial exchanges with neighbors, including China and the United States, and this in turn increases the incentive to cooperate. Their choice, benefiting their constituencies and strengthening their political legitimacy, serves as a “credible commitment” against opportunistic behavior that would jeopardize future returns. Chan thus contrasts “a virtuous cycle of demilitarization and economic interdependence” (p. 104) with “competitive armaments and countervailing alliances [that] tend to exacerbate rather than ameliorate states' security problems” (p. 238) in order to argue that most Asian states have chosen the former path.

Drawing on such examples as China's accumulation of U.S. debts and Taiwan's investment in China, Chan expands the discussion of the mechanism whereby economic transactions can contribute to credible commitment. He notes that the continuation of asymmetric commercial ties operating against a country's own interests signifies a serious and credible commitment to maintain good relations with its rival. For example, Chen Shui-bian did not act to limit Taiwan's increasing commercial ties with China. Nor did Beijing retaliate against Taiwan's business interests in China even when it was upset with Chen's pro-independence policies. These nonactions signify the country's intentions, and they are perhaps more significant than what has actually been said and done. So here is a robust domestic–international linkage: domestic bargains between leaders and constituents based on economic performance and regime legitimacy, and financial and economic relations that serve as a credible commitment to amicable international relations. The “interlocking nature of international domestic bargains … buttress[es] and sustain[s] regional stability and cooperation” (p. 220).

While Chan articulates a two-level game logic that contributes to economic welfare gains and regional cooperation, Ganguly and Thompson examine a domestic–international interaction that leads to international competition and conflict. With the case studies having disconfirmed their initial hypotheses drawn from Putnam's two-level game framework, they conclude by offering alternative hypotheses with better potential. A rivalry is usually nested in larger games that involve more actors than the rivals themselves. The inter-Korean rivalry, for example, is nested within interstate games between the United States and China, as well as two sets of patron–client relationships. Given that there are at least six different games taking place at three different levels, domestic politics within North Korea may not be the most significant factor influencing the country's foreign policy decisions vis-à-vis South Korea. The case studies point to the potential usefulness of “a triangular structure” in explaining the variation in rivalries' propensity for violence. The United States is an indispensable player in the rivalries between Taiwan and China, the two Koreas, and India and Pakistan; and the Soviet Union/Russia plays the same role in the United States–China, China–Vietnam, and India–China rivalries. Hence, the presence and propensity of a third party emerges as a critical variable in the case studies, although this variable is not given a central treatment in them.

Another important theoretical contribution made by Ganguly and Thompson is that they venture an explanation for the insignificance of domestic politics in shaping the course of the rivalries studied. They note that the polities studied in their volume are characterized by “governmental autonomy,” whereby the government is insulated from public demands and factional infighting. These polities are therefore less likely to see their foreign policymaking complicated by domestic politics than are other countries that are vulnerable to pressures from various domestic actors.

Here is room for important dialogue and future collaboration between Chan and Ganguly and Thompson. The enduring rivalries arguably are the most difficult cases for Chan. Rivals would find it difficult to develop enduring financial or economic relations because they would worry about negative political and security consequences that could result from such relations. Even if they manage to develop such economic ties, they are more likely to sever them at the first sign of political trouble. Hence it would be quite useful to test Chan's thesis against some of the enduring rivals that have developed significant economic relations: Taiwan and China, China and India, and, to a lesser degree, South and North Korea. Governmental autonomy can be treated as an intermediary variable that changes in response to economic interdependence and that, in turn, affects the government's policy choices toward its international rival. If Chan's finding is robust, one would expect to find a decrease in governmental autonomy as commercial and financial ties increase between rivals, and as such ties engender domestic interest groups with a stake in maintaining those economic ties. A decrease, in turn, is likely to be correlated with policy choices that accentuate “associational” relations. Treating government autonomy as a variable in such a manner may also give Ganguly and Thompson a more refined way to explain the variation they observe in the Asian rivalries.

While some of the rivalry relationships may confirm the hypotheses drawn from Chan's argument, more recent events have the potential to complicate them. The author cites as evidence for the absence of balancing in Asia “a general trend of declining defense burden and a reduction in U.S. military personnel deployed in the Asia Pacific” (p. 92), but recent developments raise questions about the degree to which his findings are robust and stable. The recent escalation of tensions between China and Japan challenges Chan's liberal thesis that growing economic interdependence reduces the likelihood of conflict between countries whose well-being is tied together. Despite many economic linkages built before 2008, President Lee Myung-bak easily reversed the “sunshine policy” to turn the inter-Korean relationship frosty and to strengthen both alliance and armament options.

The two books under review are exemplary works that analyze international relations in Asia in a theoretically sophisticated manner. They both challenge important IR theories and suggest alternatives in their respective ways. Their dialogues concerning whether and to what degree rivals can create economic ties and be bound by their interdependence to moderate their rivalry comprise a promising research agenda. I look forward to a follow-up study, and hopefully a collaborative one by Chan, Ganguly, and Thompson.