This book concerns an interesting question for today's world: What are the effects of globalization on international security? Norrin M. Ripsman and T. V. Paul apply a framework of analysis that differentiates across various levels of politics in the international system in order to assess whether and in what ways globalization has significantly altered the nature of state security politics. Their basic argument is that politics have not really changed much over time.

The strength of the book rests in the way the authors frame their analysis (pp. 12–16). Given globalization's seemingly systemic pervasiveness, they first analyze changes over time globally, then move to the major powers (defined as the United States, China, and Russia) and their reactions to global forces. Next, the authors differentiate between states in stable, cooperative regions, such as Western Europe, South America, and Southeast Asia, and those states trapped in unstable regions, such as the Middle East and South Asia. Finally, they present evidence that globalization may have the strongest effects within the weakest states of the world, focusing on the 42 states in sub-Saharan Africa. The presentation of this last stratum is the least satisfying piece of the conceptual framework since the states south of the Sahara are among the most heterogeneous in the world, especially when considered according to the authors' selection criteria of state capacity and regional integration.

Using their new framework, the authors argue, first, that globalization has little effect at the systemic level. Unfortunately, here they use bivariate statistics on changes in wars, military spending, international institutions, and international actors to assess possible changes, but then argue logically for overdetermination caused by other factors. A real strength of the globalization literature derives from measurement—of trade, investment, communication, and so on. Why not examine these causes with multivariate analysis? It would greatly complement the interesting case studies of major states and regions.

At the major state level, the authors provide case analysis that suggests rather mixed results for the proposition that global change affects national security in the three big states. It is interesting to note, though, that there remains almost perfect consistency across the three states for each specific proposition. Thus, while only three of 10 globalization propositions are supported overall, each state was affected by globalization in these three propositions. Similarly, the three states also moved together when propositions were determined to be inconsistent with a globalizing trend. The distance of these states from one another, their global reach, and the consistent outcomes across these trends may hint at some globalizing forces not captured by the analyses.

The strongest support for globalization was found among stable regions, and little support could be found in unstable regions. This type of conditional relationship probably affirms the globalization literature that emphasizes wealth, trade, and capital mobility. Cooperative regions are more prone to the effects of global trends. In sub-Saharan Africa, global responsiveness was found mostly in analyses of conflict—a move to post-industrial warfare and civil conflicts—as well as in the influence of the individual. The state had much less influence in globalization in this region, which probably makes sense given that they are weaker states.

The deficiencies in the authors' argument are mostly symptomatic of the true difficulty in identifying exactly what globalization means. Ripsman and Paul spend some time delineating economic, political, and cultural conceptions of the term and rightly argue against conflating the phenomenon and its effects. However, their definition of globalization is far from precise: “the expansion of socioeconomic and sociopolitical activities beyond the state on an international and transnational scale” (p. 9). This conceptual murkiness leaves the argument prone to errors of interpretation. Thus, the reader can readily disagree with the many—14 in all—propositions tested by the authors as not really consistent with the bulk of arguments in the globalization literature. For example, they argue that interstate conflict should decrease with globalization, but much of the empirical literature on conflict contends that distance is a forceful deterrent, a deterrent that could be mitigated by the growing rapidity of travel and communications. Similarly, it is not at all clear why terrorism should increase linearly with globalization; after all, the same globalizing forces that aid terrorist groups also aid law enforcement officials. The authors have to deduce the likely effects of globalization at times, especially with regard to such implications as national security doctrines, but they begin too often with dated theoretical claims and then stretch the logic of these claims too far.

Overall, Globalization and the National Security State is a quite useful, contrarian approach to a literature that touts, unblinkingly, the benefits of examining the world through the lens of ever-increasing global change. As the core concept develops more precision, this type of study could be an important addition to general theories of international relations. As it is, the book is a welcome addition to classroom debates in advanced international relations courses.