Recent literature on terrorism and so-called “rogue” proliferation states is vast, and James Lebovic's book stands out among the very finest for its original arguments, richly documented presentation, and engaging and thought-provoking discussion. Overall, it is critical of the post-9/11 view dominant in U.S. strategic thinking that the main adversaries are undeterrable. It shows that terrorists and leaders of renegade regimes are neither mindless nor irrational, but rather are often sensitive to the costs of punishment and thus susceptible to the logic of deterrence. Deterrence doctrines should therefore not be abandoned as Cold War relics, and the book makes a remarkable contribution toward bridging the doctrinal issues and debates from the Cold War (nuclear deterrence) past to the current problems of antiproliferation and counterterrorism.
The introductory chapters provide a framework for analyzing Cold War and post–Cold War (especially since 9/11) strategic policies, presenting them at the intersection of two dimensions, depending on whether the strategies are 1) offense or defense dominant and 2) primarily based on threats of punishment (by increasing the costs of an attack) or denial (by diminishing the benefits from an attack). Chapter 2 briefly evaluates Cold War nuclear strategies and places them in denial- and punishment-based groups of predominantly offensive postures. The remaining chapters analyze antiproliferation policies against rogue states (Chapters 3 and 4) and post-9/11 antiterrorist strategies (Chapters 5 and 6) within this same framework based on the offense/defense and punishment/denial dimensions. The framework is helpful in providing the analytical rigor for understanding pre- and post-9/11 periods as distinct but not entirely incomparable worlds from the strategic standpoint. The concluding chapter summarizes current policies as primarily denial based in both offensive and defensive forms, and also succinctly sums up a number of policy recommendations that the author advances throughout the book.
Preemption and national missile defense (NMD) are thoroughly covered as the principal antiproliferation options currently pursued by the United States against renegade states suspected of acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction (WMD), most notably Iraq, North Korea, and Iran. As an “offensive denial-based” strategy, preemption assumes that rogue states are ready to sustain any costs. This key premise is questioned with illustrations of instances when Iran and North Korea displayed caution whenever the costs from their policies would outweigh their benefits. Similarly, Lebovic offers an interesting angle on Saddam Hussein's mixed signals regarding WMD possession; rather than attributing it to the typical behavior of a despot, he instead interprets it as “a rational deterrent strategy based on ‘strategic ambiguity’” (p. 31). That is, disclosing the actual facts about WMD and abandoning the appearance of strength could have undercut Hussein's leverage in deterring a U.S. attack. Besides this general argument that the denial-based doctrine is all too prematurely adopted as a substitute for deterrence through punishment, there is an additional discussion of specific problems related to surgical strikes and internal intervention as implementations of the policy of preemption.
The study also raises some skeptical questions regarding national missile defense (adopted even before 9/11), pursued simultaneously with preemption against rogue states. Echoing the criticism of the Strategic Defense Initiative during the Cold War period, Lebovic makes a case that a stronger defense, such as NMD, impairs the security of others, particularly renegade nuclear states, potentially triggering their offensive postures. Moreover, in an excellent and well-designed simulation analysis, he presents findings showing that even the most effective NMD against a minimal attack (four warheads) would still leave a one-in-five chance that a warhead would reach U.S. territory. This probability increases to 50/50 should the attacker use a dozen warheads. These are indeed sobering results, to say the least, that should draw serious attention from both NMD supporters and critics alike.
Lebovic concludes his discussion of policies against rogue states by suggesting that economic sanctions are a viable alternative that can be both punishment and denial based. It is interesting to note that most of this section is concentrated on a rather long list of arguments against the effectiveness of economic sanctions. This is neither the first nor the last place where the author gives generous consideration to views that are opposite his own—a somewhat uncharacteristic but much desired trait of scholarship in the field. Despite all drawbacks related to economic sanctions, the author points to the “Libyan model” as an example of successful sanctions if limited in scope and coupled with incentives (rather than just prohibitive threats) for compliance.
Overall, instead of relying on either preemption or NMD as denial-based strategies, the author contends that the administration is best advised to exploit all possibilities of punishment-based strategies against such regimes (besides economic sanctions). This is not the case with counterterrorism, which he finds most effective in denial-based efforts of building homeland security. In this respect, the book makes perceptive statements on how homeland security can work and also be strengthened as a deterrent. The main premise is that “U.S. strategy can benefit greatly … by addressing the current threat in the broad and integrated terms of a deterrence problem” (p. 148), and he makes a convincing case for such an approach. While it is not possible to stop all terrorist attempts with certainty (and in this respect counterterrorist policies are not different from any other type of deterrence), particular combinations of defense options can credibly deter the most, and even moderately, disastrous attacks. Lebovic offers a comprehensive checklist of denial-based defensive strategies and argues that even if these measures can be imperfect from a defense standpoint, they can still work as credible deterrents. For example, although a combination of approaches, such as “partial,” “selective,” and “random” defense, can leave the United States vulnerable to some attacks, their greater value lies in impairing some, if not all, aspects of a larger terrorist attack. This could, in turn, be sufficient enough to deter major terrorist undertakings.
One of the rare soft spots in the book concerns the offense/defense notions. Aside from the criticism questioning the extent to which offensive and defensive weapons are actually distinguishable, there is a well-known argument that nuclear weapons generally favor defense. For example, assured destruction (AD) renders the adversary's first strike irrational, but, since it is not aimed at reducing the adversary's retaliatory capability, it does not give any offensive advantage to the deterrer. On the other hand, as virulently criticized by AD proponents, strong antiballistic missiles can undermine deterrence by potentially favoring the deterrer's offense. These points are not taken into account when the author classifies NMD as a strictly defense-based strategy and AD as a solely offensive one. The analytical value of the offense/defense distinction can further be questioned in the absence of their precise definitions, as is the case in this otherwise outstanding book.
None of this should detract from the significant contribution that this volume makes to both scholarly and policy-oriented literature. There is much to learn from this thoroughly researched study that should make it an essential addition to the literature on U.S. foreign policy, terrorism, proliferation, and general strategic studies of deterrence in the post-9/11 world.
