By the early 1990s, scholars and policymakers alike began voicing reservations about the ability of deterrence strategies to counter nuclear, chemical and biological arsenals as these weapons proliferated into the hands of state and nonstate actors. Some observers doubted if it was technically feasible to create credible deterrent commitments given the possibility that there might be no significant targets in the opposing camp to hold at risk, that potential opponents were irrational or suicidal, or that it might be impossible to identify the culprits who launched the attack itself (e.g., the origins of an epidemic might never be identified). Others doubted the strategic wisdom of relying on deterrence, given that the costs of policy failure were potentially catastrophic. And, as the September 11 terrorist attacks demonstrated, overwhelming military superiority cannot deter or defend against terrorist cells that are willing to sacrifice themselves to achieve their objectives. Because of the inherent limitations of deterrence, many suggested that preventive war and preemption were the best way to deal with rogue states and terrorist organizations that were acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

As Derek Smith demonstrates in this concise monograph, the theoretical and policy debate about proliferation, deterrence, preventive war, and preemption can now be assessed using recent counterproliferation efforts (the Israeli attack against Iraq's Osirq reactor, Gulf Wars I and II, the global war on terror and the ongoing North Korean proliferation crisis). Smith focuses on the interaction between the United States and Iraq and North Korea to offer conclusions about the effectiveness of deterrence, preventive war, and preemption in dealing with the proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. He does an outstanding job of describing the theoretical, moral, and legal concerns that animate debate about responses to the proliferation menace and the well-known pitfalls of embracing preventive war as the primary response to the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Smith makes fine use of the new literature on deterrence that has emerged since the end of the Cold War, a literature that is skeptical about the universal applicability of a single strategy to meet the variety of threats that populate the contemporary strategic landscape.

Smith's history offers a mixed assessment of the contemporary effectiveness of current strategies for dealing with WMD. The U.S. military failed to deter a WMD-armed Iraq from invading Kuwait, and a global international coalition was unsuccessful in its effort to compel Saddam Hussein to give up Kuwait without a fight, or to comply with the terms of the first Gulf War cease-fire by cooperating fully with the United Nations Special Commission. Iraq's possession of WMD and then suspected possession of WMD also failed to deter an international coalition from twice attacking Baghdad. Both of the Bush administrations and the Clinton administration were unwilling to tolerate an Iraq armed with WMD and undertook more than a decade of sustained military and diplomatic efforts to disarm Saddam Hussein. Smith also suggests that North Korea has been more successful in terms of deterring a preventive war, but that observation presupposes that various American administrations had reached the conclusion that they were unwilling to live in a world in which Pyongyang possessed a nuclear capability. It is hard to disagree with the author's conclusion, however, that U.S. compellent strategies have so far failed to gain North Korean's acceptance of its proper place in the nonproliferation regime.

Smith's analysis and policy prescriptions are primarily intended to address the dilemma created by international law, especially Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which takes a dim view of preventive war and preemption. If theorists and policymakers are sometimes attracted to preventive war, preemption, and aggressive counterproliferation (i.e., military attack) to eliminate nascent WMD arsenals, international law applies a break to these policies. Smith suggests that international law is often behind the times, especially when it comes to emerging technology and the social and strategic threats that follow in its wake, and that new international law and organizations need to be created to outlaw the possession and transportation of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. He suggests that a global “quarantine” against WMD, based upon existing laws of the sea and international maritime conventions, can help contain the threat in an effective, sustainable, and legal way. Once the threat that nonstate actors might acquire WMD is reduced, the international community can build a more ambitious regime to roll back the proliferation menace.

Deterring America offers an outstanding overview of recent counterproliferation efforts and contemporary thinking about the usefulness of deterrence in dealing with the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction. Smith is correct to suggest that international law and various international regimes need to be strengthened immediately to reflect the fact that individuals and nonstate actors have no right to possess, traffic in, or use chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and that governments everywhere have an obligation to stop this kind of activity with every means at their disposal. In a sense, George W. Bush's Proliferation Security Initiative is a positive first step in creating a more effective regime to police international trade and communication networks. But it also is important to remember that existing international law gives states the right to respond to attack and that the war against Al Qaeda is unaffected by many of the moral and legal dilemmas identified by the author. The ongoing fight against Al Qaeda and its minions is not a preventive war. Under these circumstances, preemption against terrorists is simply a good tactic, especially when the alternative is to risk costly attacks against civilian targets.