Carisa Showden's book is an ambitious and innovative feminist project that draws upon multiple theoretical frameworks, including feminist political and legal theory, phenomenological theory, and poststructural theory to move feminist understandings of women's agency beyond the modern/postmodern debate over subjectivity as either self-determined or socially constructed. In her analysis, Showden demonstrates how at the practical level, women's expressions of agency refuse such easy categorization of either self-determined agent or powerless victim. Situating agency not only structurally but temporally, she demonstrates the complex and varied nature of women's agency, which she sees as intimately related to the development of subjectivities that are in constant processes of becoming, not in isolation but in relations with others. In doing so, the author identifies the major weakness of the traditional liberal understanding of the relationship between autonomy and freedom that conceives of subjects as fixed entities that either possess agency or do not, which too often leads to the conclusion that there is a “right” choice to be made regardless of context. She demonstrates that this faulty assumption remains highly problematic since it continues to inform public policies that directly impact women's lives.
Showden defines agency as “a product of both autonomy (the individual capacity to act) and freedom (the conditions that facilitate action)” (p. ix). Her unique combination of theoretical approaches captures the myriad aspects of agency originating from the dialectical relationship between the subject and the conditions that shape the subject and her self-understanding to the development of agency as “both a process and a capacity that is shaped by subjects' temporal and relational circumstances” (p. ix). She argues that her combined theoretical approach to women's agency captures a more accurate portrayal of the imperfect realities of women's lives, which in turn validates their expressions of agency more than any one theoretical model alone.
In her analysis of domestic violence, for example, Showden argues that the legal system “guided by fundamental tenets of liberal individualism … makes it difficult for feminist lawmakers and legal advocates to get courts, prosecutors, and legislators to see the structural, extenuating factors shaping women's responses to violent relationships” (p. 47). She highlights the fact that the “victim” of domestic violence is often considered to exercise agency only when she leaves the abusive relationship because this behavior embodies the liberal model of the rational actor. In other words, choices women make in the context of domestic violence are often perceived as those of either victim or agent, and the possibility is not considered that claiming victim status is very often the first step toward leaving abusive relationships. In fact, women do leave abusive relationships, and the author traces examples of women developing the “internal capacities for autonomy” over time, which explains why it takes a woman an average of six to eight times to leave an abusive domestic relationship (p. 37).
To avoid criticisms of essentialism, Showden attempts to be as inclusive as possible by offering a range of multiple and cross-cutting identities that make up the category “woman.” For example, she persuasively demonstrates that simply having language interpreters in domestic violence shelters is not enough to actually help South Asian women, who may not speak about domestic violence in the same terms as native English speakers due to cultural differences in their communities. Finally, “failed” agency may be a form of resistance that simply was not successful due to structural failures rather than the individual's lack of agency (p. 75). As Showden argues, “whether or not her acts count as agentic only ever gets judged by the outcome, rather than also by the web of conflicting demands and constraints that led to her choices” (p. 77). In effect, then, she develops the argument that agency is always “partial and constrained” (p. 40).
While her criteria for judging agency are decidedly based in feminist politics, Showden never explicitly identifies the feminist political tradition or tradition(s) in which she grounds herself. What she offers instead are “abstract, guiding norms” based on “recognition, redistribution, and political inclusion” (pp. 34–35). She seeks to make the feminist understanding of agency more generous by demonstrating the various ways women express agency. This understandable reluctance to deny agency to any woman leaves her reader with either a more meaningful and flexible understanding of women's agency or an apolitical understanding of women's resistance precisely because it is not grounded in any specific political tradition. Although she argues that “[o]ne cannot simply say that anything a person does is evidence of agency” (p. xiii), she never gives the reader a firm way of making political judgments about whether or not a woman's expression of agency is furthering the project of feminism to end intersectional forms of oppression. What she does offer is the following: “The primary criterion for whether one is an agent must be whether one's actions foreclose other possibilities, not whether they make some observers squeamish or are not what we would do in the same circumstances” (p. xiii). However, this criterion does not really solve the aforementioned problem.
The strength of Showden's argument is that what “counts” as an act of agency is less important than developing public policies informed by actual forms of women's resistance. Despite wanting to avoid denying women agency, the author comes perilously close to resorting to the “false consciousness” argument herself. For example, she argues: “Those who absorb and shape their life plans around such disciplinary forms uncritically—or subconsciously—are in that regard less autonomous because the imaginary possibilities of their lives have been choked off and normative competence stunted” (p. 98). It remains unclear how one might judge if people have “uncritically” or “subconsciously” shaped their lives. Most women by necessity must negotiate the realities of intersectional oppression, but negotiation is different from resistance, and resistance is different from political agency, which Showden seems to acknowledge: “Sometimes one can act—and act in a way that makes one's life livable and endurable on a day-to-day basis—but such actions are not necessarily expressions of agency if there is no effort to disrupt or interrupt or corrupt the material weight of determinism through a creative, generative challenge” (p. xv). In other words, political judgments are obviously necessary, but Showden's criteria are not conclusive. The various forms that negotiations and resistance take can be more or less helpful to the feminist project of ending oppression as it is manifested in this particular historical moment.
Given the strengths and clarity of Showden's choice of theoretical concepts, it is unfortunate that the analysis is not connected to a specific feminist or political project that might provide the necessary foundation for her analysis. Despite the author's invaluable criticisms of liberal individualism, for example, her politics seem to remain within the framework of liberal interest-group politics, especially given the final chapter that focuses on building democratic coalitions as a way to salvage identity politics. There are far more radical implications to be made based on her chosen case studies and insights, including claims that are political in a way that might lead beyond simply reforming legal and political frameworks to increase peoples' rights.
