I appreciate the opportunity to respond to Dara Kay Cohen’s insightful review and emphasize key themes from my book. Of Cohen’s critiques, two stand out as central not only to this exchange but to the broader pursuit of research on conflict-related sexual violence and transnational advocacy: the overarching lessons learned from the development of the weapon-of-war frame and the role of social science in informing advocacy efforts and policymaking.
It is important to understand how changing ideas affect policy and programmatic agendas. This assumption is at the heart of my book. The case studies reflect key points in the trajectory of the weapon-of-war frame for sexual violence, and the frame’s impact reveals useful information about the significance of advocates’ phrasing and sensitivity to audiences’ interests and constraints. These lessons apply to the efforts to respond to wartime sexual violence and other atrocities and vulnerable populations. Still, the conditions under which specific cases gain recognition within the weapon-of-war frame merit further study, as Cohen observes. Interviews offered glimpses of an answer to this question: Put simply, the decision to frame a particular case as characterized by sexual violence used as a weapon requires evidence that sexual violence is widespread and systematic, but such evidence is difficult to obtain in the course of armed conflict, and political considerations (e.g., alliances or a state’s role in key international bodies) factor in and complicate the response.
What I have laid out in the book is an exploration of the ways in which this particular frame affected the perception of conflict-related sexual violence over time and prompted actions by two influential states and the United Nations Security Council, noting that as frequent targets of advocacy efforts, these actors are crucial to our understanding of the international response. Further research on the specific conditions that lead to recognition of sexual violence as a weapon of war in a given case and on the effects of this frame on local or grassroots actors will benefit scholarship, policy, and practice.
This brings me to Cohen’s final point: How relevant is social science to advocacy? The weapon-of-war frame and the recommendations that followed from it in recent years diverge from research on the nature of sexual violence and (in)effective responses. There are points of convergence among scholars, advocates, and policymakers working to address sexual violence. It follows, then, that the weapon-of-war frame stems not from a lack of awareness of academic work on the subject but from an understanding of the target audience’s priorities and the best way to get a seat at the table. Further, the essential role of embedded advocates is clear. Recognition of sexual violence has advanced through persistent, strategic engagement between advocates and sympathetic state or organizational actors; similar avenues exist to improve the relevance of social scientific research through dialogue with those in positions of influence. The expansion of the UN’s discussion of sexual violence to include recognition of male, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer survivors of rape suggests that there is potential to make policy and practice more reflective of complicated realities, given the opportunity for engagement.
A fundamental theme ties my book and Cohen’s to prior work on the nuances of sexual violence: The popular frame through which the world views sexual violence in war is incomplete. The quandary becomes what to make of this frame. Do the benefits of outrage-induced attention and funding outweigh the costs of obscuring the complexity of sexual violence, or is that trade-off too costly in the end? Is the weapon-of-war frame a helpful, if imperfect, way to cut through the apathy barrier and generate political will, or does it do more harm than good? My book discusses the extent to which advocates and policymakers have been able to leverage the persuasive weapon-of-war frame to generate attention for an issue they care about, and the evidence suggests that effective frames yield advantages for policy and programmatic agendas. While we must be able to see beyond the weapon-of-war frame, we would do well to learn from the changes it has generated. Through a willingness to engage the complexities of sexual violence and participate in open dialogue among scholars, advocates, and policymakers, we can improve our collective understanding of conflict-related sexual violence and the best practices for preventing, responding to, and mitigating it.
