In Remaking the Presidency: Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson, 1901–1916, Brownlow Award winner Peri E. Arnold addresses a perplexing question about the Progressive Era presidents: At a time when Congress dominated politics, presidents were passive, and an active federal government was not in vogue, “Why and how did [Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson] construct activist leadership in a context that was apparently inhospitable to such activism” (p. ix)? And, of course, the inevitable follow-up question: what should be made of William Howard Taft, whose much less regarded presidency was bookended by these two giants (p. ix)?
Biographers and historians have examined Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson many times before, but Arnold argues that a more comprehensive look will require analysis of the context in which they served and changes in the institutional presidency, as well as each man individually (p. x). Arnold begins by identifying the key contextual factors that helped create the political world occupied by Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson: among them, a loosening of political party ties, the growth of interest groups and mass media, and a public ready for change (pp. 9–13). The times challenged all three presidents to seize upon new opportunities to act boldly, which required power, skill, and the public's blessing to act (or “warrants,” to use Stephen Skowronek's term) (p. 19).
Theodore Roosevelt's “leadership project” worked (p. 20). He successfully pushed his policy agenda not just because he grabbed the reins of leadership: Also important was the fact that he was not as bound to the Republican Party as, say, his predecessor, William McKinley. To Arnold, “McKinley was a man attuned to the identities and structure of the old system. Roosevelt was a man capable of hearing the demands and seeing the opportunities unfolding in what would be called the Progressive Era” (p. 38).
William Howard Taft was not as fortunate. Tied to Roosevelt's reform program on one hand and, on the other, to the more conservative Republican Party that had pushed Taft up the professional ladder his whole life, the Ohioan was unable to keep everyone happy as president. He lacked a “coherent political vision of his own” after his prior experiences had trained him to be “an eminently adaptable functionary, a superb subordinate” (p. 72). Put slightly differently, “his leadership style did not contain the insights and tool kit he would need to successfully use the presidency of that era” (p. 203). Where Taft should have been “going public” and trying to persuade Congress, he let opportunities to push his agenda pass by (p. 203).
Woodrow Wilson, the politically savvy former Princeton professor and president, then New Jersey governor, projected a “prime ministerial” style and cared less about the substance of legislation and more about working with a legislative majority to get things done (p. 192). Unlike his predecessor, Wilson “presumed the authority to speak to the people, over the heads of his party and Congress, explaining his intentions and interpreting the people's needs,” and in so doing satisfied “the Progressive Era's expectations of a progressive president, fulfilling what Roosevelt had begun in 1901” (p. 194).
Much of Arnold's analysis is in the six chapters of the book containing case studies, with each president receiving both a chapter on his “political education” and another on several of his key experiences while president. This technique allows Arnold to effectively showcase each man's formative experiences, and to explore how those events impacted his presidential leadership style.
In chapter 2, Arnold looks at Roosevelt's path to the presidency. Roosevelt's experiences as an administrator in the Civil Service Commission and the New York City Police Commission, and as assistant secretary of the navy, were especially valuable: Arnold points out that they taught Roosevelt how to work with bureaucracies, helped him learn who to trust, and generally showed him ways to get things done (pp. 25–32). In chapter 3, Arnold explores how these and other experiences heavily influenced Roosevelt's style as president. Having established a reputation as a reformer who also understood the importance of public perceptions of his work, President Roosevelt was able to negotiate between the public's reformist impulses and the Republican Old Guard (p. 70). He recognized the tightrope between the old expectations and new demands, and walked carefully.
Arnold considers the professional experiences of William Howard Taft in chapter 4. On paper, Taft appeared to have an ideal resume for a president. His legal credentials were stellar: state court judge, solicitor general of the United States, and circuit court judge (pp. 73–80). His successful stints as colonial governor charged with installing a civil government in the Philippines and as war secretary seemed to suggest great management abilities as well (pp. 80–94). And yet, Arnold argues, Taft was not building skills essential to presidential success. He did learn that being loyal to the Republican Party was good for his career, that hard work would please his superiors, and that it made sense for his own politics to adjust to the situation in which he found himself (pp. 94–7). Things fell apart for Taft when, as Arnold documents in chapter 5, he could not follow the old script as president and achieve outcomes satisfactory to everyone. Instead of bringing together the reform-minded and Old Guard Republicans, Taft's clumsy handling of such issues as tariff reform alienated them both, and helped open the door to Woodrow Wilson's election in 1912.
Wilson's leadership style was, to Arnold, an effective match for the Progressive Era, provided Wilson enjoyed a “disciplined partisan majority” to lead (p. 200). Chapter 6 shows, among other things, that Wilson enjoyed success as leader of a supportive majority while president of Princeton, where his reform work helped him become “the best-known university leader in America” (pp. 143–4). Chapter 7 examines Wilson's leadership on tariffs, financial reform, and antitrust, and Arnold rightly characterizes his wins on these issues as having “shaped and fulfilled a large part of the Progressive Era's legislative agenda” (p. 193). Arnold stops short of claiming that he has identified the start of the modern presidency, though, suggesting in the book's closing pages that this role is rightfully occupied by Franklin D. Roosevelt (p. 207).
This book is a valuable contribution to our understanding of the Progressive Era presidents, and Arnold's command of earlier scholarship is apparent throughout. He hews closely to the academic literature, often drawing from Fred Greenstein, David Mayhew, Samuel Kernell, Jeffrey Tulis, Lewis Gould, and others. A recurring work is Stephen Skowronek's The Politics Presidents Make (1993), which reminds the reader that the context constraining a president's options matters. It also is worth noting that Arnold's writing is clear and economical, and straightforward enough for casual readers, but still rigorously detailed. Save for a few moments that dally a bit simply because of the level of detail included, the book moves along at a steady clip and wraps up in just over two hundred pages of text, excluding notes.
Remaking the Presidency: Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson, 1901–1916 would be a fine fit in a course on the American presidency or the Progressive Era, or as a supplemental text in an introductory course on American politics.
