The title of Avigail Eisenberg's book is a bit deceiving because it omits two key words that best capture its substantive focus: Canadian multiculturalism. Perhaps the marketers thought that “identity” would sell better, but such skepticism underestimates Eisenberg's ability to convey the broader significance of her concerns about the inherent tensions in multiculturalism. Navigating proficiently between optimistic advocates of multiculturalism and its staunchest opponents, Reasons of Identity offers a middle road that takes cultural claims seriously without relying upon an essentialist notion of identity. The author's middle road merits serious consideration in all countries wrestling with issues that arise within socially diverse populations, not solely those with official policies of multiculturalism.

One of the unfortunate consequences of an overly polarized philosophical debate, Eisenberg aptly argues, is the absence of feasible guidelines for decision makers working within institutions that must arbitrate culturally based claims, especially in states that accept the principles of multiculturalism. Rather than having the luxury of solely contemplating any abstract merits or limitations, policymakers and especially judges must frequently, if not routinely, arbitrate among competing demands. That is not to say that abstract principles are irrelevant, only that in practice, equally legitimate principles may often apply. How should a specific identity claim be weighted against another equally valid but incommensurable identity claim? How should an identity claim be balanced against an equally valid but incompatible nonidentity claim? It is at these moments that decision makers most need greater guidance in order to reach reasonably fair or equitable determinations. Only then will societies be able to reach legitimate, sustainable resolutions to identity-based conflicts that have the potential to undermine political stability.

According to Eisenberg, three principles should determine the parameters of such decisions: the jeopardy condition, the validity condition, and the safeguard condition. Since aspects of collective identities are not all equally significant to community cohesion, the jeopardy condition suggests the need for context-sensitive evidence so that the cultural centrality of any specific identity claim may be weighed. The validity condition recognizes the need for some metric to assess the extent to which a community, not just an individual claimant, considers a particular cultural component to be central to its collective identity. And the safeguard condition underscores that some harms are more serious than others, thus establishing a basis for possibly rejecting an identity claim in the face of other considerations.

The philosophical and pragmatic rationales for these principles are detailed in Chapter 2 (especially pp. 32–40) and then placed in the context of debates over multiculturalism in Chapter 3. Both chapters clearly and concisely survey core elements of this controversy and merit reading by both specialists and generalists. Then Chapters 4–6 explore issues surrounding claims about sexual equality, religion, and indigeneity as a way to concentrate on particular strands of the multiculturalism debate. Throughout, Eisenberg illustrates ways in which her three principles would support or undermine determinations made in controversial cases. Not all of the examples are from Canadian courts, but many are. Of course, these illustrations seem plausible since otherwise she would not have included them. What I find striking is the recurring theme of indigeneity, which overshadows other potentially salient concerns. For instance, a sustained focus on the implications for children across the three themes of sexual equality, religion, and indigeneity might provide a better, more consistent test of the utility of her principles.

This imbalance may be simply the result of legal cases available, but it also serves as a reminder that Eisenberg is a political theorist rather than a comparative policy analyst. Therefore, instead of revisiting her examples here, I put her overall argument to my standard South Africa test: Do arguments about multiculturalism (or fill in any other major claim about liberal democracy in Canada or elsewhere) still apply when transported to South Africa, the forgotten former Dominion within the British Empire? Specifically, do the assumptions underpinning the book make sense in another context of multiculturalism where race has trumped all other dimensions of identity? And would the principles that Eisenberg advocates to guide political and legal decisions hold up in an environment more explicitly charged with social and economic inequalities? Since she occasionally mentions South Africa, this test is one reasonable way to assess the scope of her claims.

First, consider her precondition of “institutional humility” (pp. 24–25, 40–41). For more than 40 years, Canada has officially espoused an ideology of multiculturalism, producing a new generation of adults who take cultural tolerance seriously, at least in the abstract. And for nearly 30 years, Canada has been working out the political and legal implications of its Charter of Rights and Freedoms, adopted in 1982. Thus, Eisenberg might be right that those working within Canadian public institutions do generally aspire to be fair. There are certainly parallels in post-apartheid South Africa, with its drastically expanded electorate and new Constitutional Court creating conditions since the mid-1990s that might also produce a new generation of decision makers committed to institutionalized transparency and fairness. In sum, Eisenberg's framework should fit.

Second, consider the author's premise that identity politics centers on minority rights. It is here that the South Africa test raises concerns. Granted, she recognizes the complexities of defining minorities versus majorities; even the majority is comprised of subgroups, such as Jews claiming minority rights of religious practice. Where, then, to draw the line, if at all? In South Africa, “minority rights” is often treated as code for the protection of white privilege, which seems to run counter to Eisenberg's normative intent. And where would her principles lead us if we view Africans in South Africa as comparable to the indigenous peoples of Canada? That analogy reinforces claims of indigenous critics of multiculturalism who argue that they are not merely another minority; their claims pose more fundamental constitutional challenges to the Canadian state. Potentially, the whole multiculturalism project that Eisenberg seeks to salvage might actually collapse if collective identity must indeed be taken seriously. At minimum, we need to recognize that identity politics is not solely about minorities.

In the end, the South Africa test suggests that we view with caution the author's broadest aspirations to inform public policy debates (p. 2). Practices in Canada, despite being the model of multiculturalism, are not likely to travel easily, and so identity advocates or adjudicators in other societies will find minimal help in the illustrations offered. For instance, polygamy, one of her recurring examples, is much less controversial, socially or legally, in South Africa. Yet this limited empirical scope need not preclude Reasons of Identity from being given serious consideration by normative political theorists or policy analysts. Eisenberg does not aspire to provide an “algorithm” for decision makers (p. 142). Ironically, the lukewarm results of my preliminary South Africa test actually reinforce her basic point: The devil is in the details of how abstract principles get translated into context-dependent political practices. And it is precisely at that juncture that we need more, not less, attention to the dilemmas that often surround legitimate identity claims.