Christina Tarnopolsky's book has two parts, one on the Gorgias and “Athenian Politics of Shame,” the other on “Contemporary Politics of Shame.” The first part focuses on “the Gorgias and the three different politics of shame that are articulated therein: flattering, Socratic, and Platonic respectful shame” (p. 143). The second part tries to show how these three “offer us helpful models for thinking about the contemporary politics of shame and civility” (p. 143).
Tarnopolsky's main argument concerning the Gorgias is that it exemplifies these three types of shame, that shame is central in it and in Socrates' refutations generally, that it supplements Socrates' understanding with a new Platonic view, and that Plato is friendlier to democratic politics than is usually thought, seeking to rescue imperialistic Athens from tyrannical indulgence in pleasure and fantasies of omnipotence.
The difference between Socratic and Platonic shame is that while Socrates' refutations are negative and seem to leave no way out, Plato's offer attractive models for emulation, employ pleasure and not merely the pain of refutation, and use alluring myths, not merely dialectical perplexities. (The third type of shame, flattering shame, is avoiding the pain of shame by telling an audience what it enjoys hearing.)
Tarnopolsky's main argument concerning shame itself is that it and other “negative emotions” can be useful and should not be altogether avoided. In making her arguments, she addresses contemporary authors with different views, and uses her analysis as the entrée into debates about the proper subjects of democratic deliberation and the boundaries between the public and private. She hopes to show the good sense of permitting emotion to permeate what some believe should be the arid rational space of acceptable deliberation, and to permit respectful shame to overturn blind allegiance to “fantastical” views of what is normal.
Tarnopolsky's arguments depend on her view of what shame is, and much of the book discusses this. Shame involves “occurent” experiences, “the moment in which a person or group experiences the discomforting and perplexing cognitive-affective recognition of the gaze of an other that reveals a certain inadequacy in the self” (p. 153). One may “react” to this recognition in several ways, depending on content, character, context, and so on. These experiences speak to a “disposition or sense of shame,” the “habitual inclinations” that are “developed in reaction to past occurent experiences of shame” (p. 154). At various times, Tarnopolsky distinguishes shame from guilt and humiliation, ties it not just to specific experiences but to conversion to a new way of life, and relates it to believing oneself to be omnipotent but seeing instead that one is needy.
Tarnopolsky's book has many virtues. It pays serious attention to the Gorgias's dramatic movement, not only to its content. It looks at Plato as if he has something to show us about phenomena, not as if he is a historical curiosity. It examines tellingly the effect of Socratic refutation. It conducts serious discussions with other scholars. It examines shame with care, and with much more detail than can be captured in a short review. It deals with work in many areas—neuroscience, for example—and not merely political philosophy. It is certainly a book that merits being read and thought about.
I do have several questions and concerns. At various times, Tarnopolsky comes close to engaging in her own “flattering” shame, using her analyses to pander to the typical center-left views of academics about Iraq, “unilateralism,” and several other matters. Readers who dispute these opinions should not let the irritating certitude with which they are pronounced prevent them from benefiting from her more considered reflections.
Tarnopolsky links her differentiating of Platonic from Socratic shame to the chronology she uses to organize the dialogues. She wants Plato to be criticizing and, as it were, shaming Socrates. Some dialogues are early, some transitional, some middle, and some late. The Gorgias is not only transitional; it transitions from a Socratic to a Platonic view while it is going on. The difficulty with this procedure is its arbitrariness: She examines the views of scholars who place the Gorgias both earlier and later than she does, with evidence no worse or better than her own. Important elements of Platonic shame that Tarnopolsky wishes to deny in Socratic shame and politics in fact appear in what for her are early dialogues, the Charmides and Protagoras, and in the Theages and Alcibiades I too. In the Protagoras in particular, Socrates identifies the good with the pleasant, something one would think impossible, given her view of Socratic refutation. If he is being ironic, her discussion of Platonic irony would need to be adjusted. Tarnopolsky is correct to point out the different methods and effects of Plato's ways of teaching. But the differences are not as great as she suggests. Fortunately, in my judgment, her substantive argument about shame and refutation in the dialogues does not depend on her questionable periodization.
I should also raise two other questions about Tarnopolsky's approach to Plato. One is the fact that her welcome emphasis on the effect a dialogue's conversation is having on its characters leads her to pay insufficient attention to the discussion's substance. What the Gorgias actually says and suggests about rhetoric, the virtues, the soul and its order, philosophy, and justice receives surprisingly little attention for a book about the Gorgias. The second issue is insufficient attention to other dialogues. When democratic politics in Plato is a theme, one needs to attend carefully to his argument in the Statesman and Republic. Distinctions among early, transitional, middle, and late dialogues get in the way of simply looking at Plato's view of the phenomenon one is examining.
The chief difficulty with Tarnopolsky's discussion of shame is its distance from sufficient substantive exploration of what is shameful. Occasional political statements do not make up for this analytic lack. She treats shame largely as if it could be occasioned by any conventional standard and has nothing natural about it. The fact that what is natural will always be expressed or distorted within conventions, however, does not change the fact that it should be central in the discussion. Can we in fact understand shame without seeing that cowardice is ugly and courage beautiful, licentiousness shameful and moderation admirable, stinginess embarrassing and generosity welcome, injustice contemptible and justice noble, and the attempt to know praiseworthy and complacent ignorance unworthy? To discuss, as Tarnopolsky does, good uses of shame that let us see our imperfections and bad uses that hide them depends on some view of the proper expressions of human possibilities, necessities, and integrity. Without examining the accuracy of such views, one cannot sufficiently grasp the discomfort in shame, or its cause. In this regard, a still more expansive discussion than the one Tarnopolsky offers of Plato's view of spiritedness (and of eros) would be helpful.
Shame is primarily the experience of vice, but it may also involve a general claim of worthlessness. We today wish to protect others and ourselves from such injustice. But how can we defend the propriety of equal dignity without at the same time treating the substance of each choice as equally worthwhile? The liberal democratic answer is equality of rights, equality under the law, and the formal distance that allows to each his or her independence and self-direction. Despite Tarnopolsky's concern with elements of this issue and her emphasis on democracy, however, she does not say enough about this liberal understanding. But on what other ground can we reasonably defend a community that both limits the effects of shame and allows us to be equally worthy of it? This and other questions notwithstanding, Tarnopolsky's admirably thoughtful, carefully argued, and energetically written book contains much on Plato, his Gorgias, and on shame that is well worth considering.
