If you want to inform yourself fully about the reasons why the coming of the Internet has not yet initiated a radically different and utopian system of political democracy and is unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future, then this is the book for you. The Prospect of Internet Democracy? Forget it, the authors say—at least if “democracy” is conceived in any bottom-up sense. The title of their second chapter, “Impossible Dreams,” hits off their thesis as well as their basic line of argument. They repeatedly juxtapose visions of an Internet-launched new democratic order against prevailing, powerful and obdurate constraints, rooted in hierarchically controlled political and economic institutions. It's sort of Rousseau versus Machiavelli, with the latter holding most of the cards most of the time.
The authors' commitment to this intellectual strategy is evidenced by the way they dramatically frame the issues under consideration: Will the Internet “transform” democratic politics? Will it “revolutionize” democratic politics? Will it achieve a “radical renewal” of American democracy? Are notions of direct democracy realizable? Will the Internet “revolutionize” policy making? Will the dynamic nature of the Internet facilitate not just rapid change but revolutionary change throughout society? Will it introduce an electronic commonwealth? Can it give ordinary people control over the political agenda? Can formerly ignored citizens be empowered at last? Will the Internet be used for civic purposes that enhance democratic values like equity and fairness?
Unsurprisingly perhaps, the authors' answers to all of these questions are resoundingly in the negative. And indeed, if these are the questions that we should be asking about the place of the Internet in democratic politics nowadays, then their argument stands up; their answers, which are developed thoroughly, do appear convincing.
They argue that the prospects for democratic transformation and renewal are obstructed by powerful obstacles: elite domination and behavior, resulting for example in a colonization of most important Internet sites; the “commodification of everything” in a capitalist society, tending to marginalize politics on the Internet and encouraging many people to think of themselves more as consumers than as citizens when using the Internet; the tendency of leaders and officials to put many more resources into e-government than into e-democracy; and the role of “human nature in politics,” ensuring that most people devote far more energy and thought to a host of everyday pursuits and pastimes than to civic affairs (as long maintained of course by such theorists of elite democracy as Graham Wallas, Walter Lippmann, and Joseph Schumpeter among others; against this last factor it can be counterargued, however, that public involvement in politics is more of a variable than a constant, differing across societies, demographic subgroups, current issues and events, and even institutional arrangements).
In my view, two of the more interesting chapters of this book are less reliant on the stark contrast of political idealism versus political realism that shapes the rest of the analysis. Chapter 4 on “Democracy, Tolerance and the Internet” offers a refreshing and nuanced discussion of how Internet-based discourse can foster both intolerance of the views of others and tolerance of them. And Chapter 6 on “The Internet and Democratic Education” considers how increasing uses of new media in universities and colleges are lowering educational standards and shortchanging the preparation of students to become critically informed citizens. The picture here is unremittingly grim—of a dystopia in the making, as it were.
But one is bound to wonder whether the central argument of this book hasn't reached its sell-by date by now. How many times must the dreams of classical democrats be punctured before turning to other issues? Can anything significant really be added to a critique that has already become so familiar? Are Margolis and Moreno-Riaño in danger of flogging, if not a dead horse, then one that is ripe for retirement?
In any case, their master conceptualization is itself open to criticism on at least three grounds. First, it is normatively unhelpful. Thinking about democracy in either/or terms (either classical or elite systems of democracy) leaves no room for attempted betterment, which, though short of the wholesale change that they rule out, might well be worth achieving in its own right. In theory and practice, progressive democrats can and do work meaningfully on a more-or-less basis—more or less participation, consultation, involvement, deliberation, public understanding, popular control, etc. Second, the conceptualization is arguably simplistic—in the sense that by bundling up all political communications into two contrasted models, it tends to overlook the many different, complex, and sometimes conflicting ways in which the Internet, especially, is, and is becoming, involved in democratic politics (so many actors, so many roles, so many relationships, so many types of political and communication efforts, so many directions of message traffic, so many consequences, etc.). The implications of these several elements for citizenship and democracy, whether positive or negative, will only be adequately understood by to some extent identifying and studying them individually. Finally, the label “Internet democracy” is questionable. Arguably, there is no such thing. Particularly since the Internet is such a multifaceted medium and houses so many different communication endeavors, its democratic impulses (as well as its less democratic ones) are also quite varied, ranging from populist to deliberative approaches to democracy, with others in between no doubt (audience democracy? hit-and-run democracy? etc.).
Let's move on therefore to a range of empirical and normative concerns about the still evolving role of the Internet in politics, aiming eventually to sum them up in conceptualizations that will be more suited to contemporary political communication conditions than classic versions of democracy can be, without accepting the rigidities of elite versions of democracy.
