Reflections on the theories of securitization

Over the last two decades, there has been increasing interest in the migration/security nexus. A vast literature has emerged that seeks to understand the transformation of migration policies and discourses, focusing mainly on the EU level.Footnote ⁸ Among this literature, the most prominent is the securitization theory of the so-called Copenhagen School, proposed mainly by Wæver and Buzan. This approach argues that, through the “speech acts” of certain actors like politicians, the media, and the public, migration can be designated as an “existential threat” to societal security/identity. It further argues that extraordinary measures, which were previously not “legitimate,” can be put into place if this securitizing move is accepted by a “significant” or “certain” amount of audiences.Footnote ⁹ Undoubtedly, the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory, which is based on the assumed role that the performative power of language plays in structuring social and political relations, builds on the “linguistic turn” in the international relations scholarship. Rather than dwelling on a materialist explanation of “realities,” it sheds light on the use of discursive practices to socially construct “realities,” both in general and in the area of security in particular. Even though the Copenhagen School has introduced a crucial intellectual space through which to explore the discursive construction of migration as a security threat, especially through the “speech acts” of politicians, its theory of securitization has been subject to criticism. At the center of these criticisms is the reduction of securitizing practices to discursive practicesFootnote ¹⁰ due to the theory’s exclusive focus on “speech acts” as a vector of securitization.Footnote ¹¹ It is contended that a given issue, without being explicitly discussed as a security issue or accepted by certain audiences, can be transformed into a security question. Scholars, especially those following a more Foucauldian approach, draw attention to the role of the context and the concrete practices of security through which migration can be securitized. More precisely, Bigo, one of the protagonists of the Paris School of Security Studies, argues that it is not discursive practices or “speech acts” that are the driving forces behind securitization processes, but rather security technology, professional security knowledge, and bureaucratic practices.Footnote ¹² In this context, by establishing a security continuum between migration and various security issues like crime, terrorism, and drug trafficking, “[i]t is possible to [securitize migration] without speech or discourse … The practical work, discipline, and expertise are as important as all forms of discourse.”Footnote ¹³

Leonard puts forward another critical contribution to the securitization approach. She posits that an analysis of discourses would be “misguided” in cases where securitization has already been institutionalized as a result of the persistent and continuous political framing of an issue as a security threat.Footnote ¹⁴ In such cases, there is no need for further discursive securitizing moves. On the contrary, the issue might be addressed through desecuritizing discourses, but it would continue to be actually dealt with using securitizing practices. Hence, again, analysis of practices in a wider context is of the utmost importance in revealing the dynamics of the securitization process.

The most fundamental contribution to securitization theory is offered by Huysmans. Drawing again on a Foucauldian approach, he directs attention to the relation between discourses and practices in the process of securitization. Huysmans argues the following concerning the Foucauldian lens that he utilizes in his analysis:

In accordance with this Foucauldian lens, he further claims that “even when not directly spoken of as a threat, asylum [and immigration] can be rendered as a security question by being institutionally and discursively integrated in policy frameworks that [emphasize] policing and defense.”Footnote ¹⁶ For Huysmans, securitizing practices that include both discursive and non-discursive practices attempt to secure the “host community” against the “collective dangerous force” of migrants.Footnote ¹⁷ In particular, he demonstrates that securitization is much “messier” than the Copenhagen School’s emphasis on “speech acts.” More precisely, for him, “the construction of immigrants, asylum seekers, and refugees into sources of societal fear follows from a much more multidimensional process in which immigration and asylum are connected to and float through a variety of important political debates.”Footnote ¹⁸ For instance, he delineates how migrants, particularly those originating from the “poor” and “underdeveloped” world, are transfigured as “threats” to societal security, including socioeconomic well-being and employment opportunities, cultural identity, and the internal security of Europe. In this way, they become subject to containment and to control-oriented practices.

In the light of these theoretical and analytical discussions about the securitization of migration, this article agrees that the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory provides an important venue for the analysis of the migration/security nexus. However, its exclusive focus on the linguistic practices of politicians, without paying due attention to the role of non-discursive practices, limits the sociological applicability of the school’s approach. In other words, securitization cannot be studied solely through the analysis of discursive practices; it is, instead, a more elaborate process that links non-discursive and discursive practices to each other. It is for these reasons that this article takes into account both discursive and non-discursive practices, inasmuch as they are mutually influential and are both constitutive in the construction of the security/migration nexus. In carrying out this analysis, securitizing (discursive and non-discursive) practices are defined as those which: (1) emphasize “control and containment,” especially in relation to societal/public security concerns (here, specifically the labor market and employment); and (2) establish a security continuum between migration and various other issues—including criminality, terrorism, socioeconomic problems, and cultural deprivation—and thereby treat migrants as “risky” outsiders.

Syrian “guests” in Turkey: legal and policy framework

Even though Turkey is one of the drafters and original signatories of the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, it signed the convention with both “time” and “geographical” limitations, on August 29, 1961. In line with these limitations, and as a Western ally, during the Cold War years Turkey received refugees from the Communist bloc countries in close cooperation with the UNHCR.Footnote ¹⁹ Later, Turkey ratified the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees and lifted the time limitation, but continued to maintain the geographical limitation, meaning that non-European asylum seekers were not granted refugee status. Since the 1994 legal changes,Footnote ²⁰ people from outside of Europe have been allowed to apply for “temporary asylum” in Turkey. Put differently, such asylum seekers are provided with “temporary protection” until the refugee determination process ends. If such asylum seekers are recognized as “refugees,” they are resettled in a third country with the support of the UNHCR. This system has attracted considerable criticism from both the international community and human rights organizations. This is mainly because, on the one hand, Turkey has been steadily transforming into a country of asylum, but, on the other hand, it also excludes thousands of asylum seekers from international protection due to the geographical limitation. Moreover, those asylum seekers recognized as “refugees” have to wait for years to be resettled in a third country, as only a small number of countries—like the United States of America, New Zealand, Canada, and Australia—accept refugees from Turkey. During this waiting period, Turkey undertakes “a very limited responsibility on the fundamental rights and basic needs of these people such as accommodation, healthcare and working … refugees were abandoned to take care of themselves in the cities they were sent to reside.”Footnote ²¹ Under such conditions, cities where refugees have been living turn into “open prisons” for them.Footnote ²² Despite the long-lasting criticisms relating to these problems, the new Law on Foreigners and International Protection (No. 6458; hereafter LFIP)—which was adopted on April 4, 2013 by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey—sticks to the geographical limitation.Footnote ²³ In accordance with this limitation, Syrians are not officially recognized as “refugees” because they come from a non-European country. The legal and policy instruments applied to the Syrian refugees can be summarized as below.

As mentioned before, the initial response of Turkey was to open the borders to refugees from Syria and providing them with shelter in camps as well as free healthcare. Here, before proceeding, some important points should be mentioned. Although Turkey still maintains the “open door” approach, various NGO reports reveal that Syrians without valid passports and Palestinian refugees from Syria who are not in possession of visa are denied entry into Turkey by the border authorities.Footnote ²⁴ What is more, since August 2012, in response to the increasing arrival of refugees, Turkey—together with Iraq and Jordan—has restricted the entry of refugees: tens of thousands have been prevented from crossing the borders.Footnote ²⁵ This means that many of the refugees are forced to resort to dangerous “irregular” routes and human smugglers to cross the border between Syria and Turkey.Footnote ²⁶ It should also be noted that this border is highly militarized with minefields, walls (such as the one in Nusaybin, Mardin), barbed wire, the deployment of military personnel and vehicles, and “push-back” operations by Turkish border guards. In such a context, all these practices are likely to clash with the highly praised “open door” policy.Footnote ²⁷

Turning to the official side of the “open door” discourse, Syrians have been considered and/or depicted, by the government and—in the beginning—by the public, as “brothers/sisters in religion,” “friends,” and “victims” who need to be welcomed with a “humanitarian” outlook. However, it is argued that this “humanitarian” approach by the government rests on a shortsighted political understanding of the Syrian crisis.Footnote ²⁸ In other words, as Kirişci states:

This argument also explains why these refugees have been referred to as “guests” from the very beginning: it was expected that Syrians would return home in the near future. However, the term “guest” does not have any legal meaning under national or international law, and thus does not provide a secure status to refugees. In relation to the problem with the term “guest,” Özden states that “the Turkish state has not carried out a policy towards Syrians based on a discourse of rights, but rather one based on ‘generosity’.”Footnote ³⁰ Taner Kılıç—the chairman of the board for the Association for Solidarity with Refugees (Mültecilerle Dayanışma Derneği), also comments that:

As the war has continued with the growing number of arrivals from Syria, a so-called “temporary protection regime” was introduced in October 2011. It was decided that all Syrians, Palestinians, and stateless persons living in Syria and seeking protection would benefit from this regime. The regime provided these refugees with indefinite residence, protection against being sent back under coercion, and emergency supplies for essential needs.Footnote ³² For those staying in the camps, the regime guaranteed access to education, water, food, shelter, and health services.Footnote ³³ However, non-camp refugees were allowed to enjoy only the right to free healthcare and medication for as long as they were registered.Footnote ³⁴ With the adoption of the LFIP, this temporary protection regime gained a more solid legal basis and clarity. Article 91.1 of the LFIP defines “temporary protection” (geçici koruma) as a protection status granted to foreigners who, having been forced to leave their country and unable to return to it, have arrived at or crossed the borders of Turkey in masses seeking emergency and temporary protection. Article 91.2 further states that the implementation of temporary protection shall be governed by a regulation to be issued by the Council of Ministers. This means that the terms of this protection were not detailed in the LFIP. Based on Article 91, an attempt was made to close this loophole with the Directive on Temporary Protection adopted by the Council of Ministers and going into effect on October 22, 2014. The document specifies the terms of protection, including the scope of temporary protection; the rights and obligations of persons under this protection; criteria for their stay in the country; and the possible limitations on their rights.Footnote ³⁵ The directive maintains the previously guaranteed rights and approaches: “(i) An open border policy; (ii) No forcible returns (non-refoulement); (iii) Registration with the Turkish authorities and support inside the borders of the camps.”Footnote ³⁶ The directive alsoFootnote ³⁷ prohibits people for being punished for irregular entry and stay (Article 5); provides for free translation services (Article 30); and removes the requirement to obtain exit visas for those slated for resettlement in other countries (Article 44). In regards to access to the labor market, Article 29 states that “Principles and procedures regarding the employment of persons benefiting from temporary protection shall be determined by the Council of Ministers upon the proposal of Ministry of Labor and Social Security after receiving the opinion of the ministry.”Footnote ³⁸ It is further noted: “Persons, who hold a Temporary Protection Identification Document, may apply to the Ministry of Labor and Social Security for receiving work permits to work in the sectors, professions, and geographical areas (provinces, districts, or villages) to be determined by the Council of Ministers.”Footnote ³⁹

This step was welcomed by civil society, as it was believed to improve the living conditions of refugees through granting identification cards and access to a range of rights and services.Footnote ⁴⁰ However, the directive has attracted criticisms as well. One of them is that it “is too focused on the regulatory aspects of the refugee influx, such as entry and registration, and that it has failed to address the needs of refugees that are essential to meeting longer-term integration goals.”Footnote ⁴¹ Metin Çorabatır, former external relations officer of the UNHCR in Turkey, further states that “the regime does not provide enough assistance and protection for those outside of the camps.”Footnote ⁴² Other criticisms are related to the vague and imprecise language that informs certain clauses of the directive. For example, Amnesty International comments that the directive “is framed principally in terms of opportunities rather than obligations; governorates, for instance, are permitted but not obliged to provide housing for at-risk groups of refugees (Article 21), or to grant refugees access to state social assistance programmes (Article 30).” Another shortfall is that the directive prevents refugees under such “temporary protection” from being considered for resettlement in third countries as “recognized refugees.” In other words, Syrian refugees in Turkey are not allowed to apply for transfer to third countries that accept “recognized refugees” from Turkey. Last but not least, the directive has been criticized for failing to “define the time frame for the temporary protection—in theory it could be repealed at any time.”Footnote ⁴³

Other steps taken by the government are the separate regulationFootnote ⁴⁴ to govern working conditions for the refugees, which was prepared by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and submitted to the Council of Ministers for approval, as well as the draft law on the employment of foreigners.Footnote ⁴⁵ Under current Turkish labor law, it is extremely difficult for Syrian refugees to obtain work permits and look for employment in the formal sector: they have to be in possession of valid passports and residence permits and the employer has to prove that a Turkish citizen does not fulfill the position.Footnote ⁴⁶ Even though both the separate proposal and the new draft law are claimed to facilitate refugees’ access to the labor market, the restrictions mentioned under the terms of temporary protection are maintained. For example, as regards to the separate regulation, Nurcan Önder, the Deputy Director General for Labor, has said: “The regulation will clearly define specific sectors and locations where Syrians can apply for work permits, and quotas will be applied in workplaces to manage the supply and demand.”Footnote ⁴⁷ On the other hand, according to the new draft law, “Syrians can only apply for work permits six months after they have received residency permits.”Footnote ⁴⁸

The legal and policy framework shows that Syrian refugees are governed under a security architecture that emphasizes containing and controlling “risky” groups. An imprecise legal framework, militarized border controls, limited secure “legal” status, restricted access to social rights, and the encampment of refugees all have preventive and security aspects. Moreover, under this framework, Syrians are seen as “guests” who must return “home” as soon as the war ends in Syria. In this context, the policies put forward as a response to Syrian refugees offer neither long-term solutions nor secure “legal” living conditions in Turkey. However, it has become clear that the war is not likely to end, and Turkey has already become a “home” for Syrians.

Non-camp Syrian refugees: the new “others” in Turkey?

As stated above, around 260,000 Syrian refugees are currently accommodated in the camps, meaning that a significant fraction of refugees—around 85 percent—are living outside of the camps.Footnote ⁴⁹ Various studies have shown that these refugees are living in precarious situations, facing human trafficking and economic exploitation, and are forced into prostitution and begging.Footnote ⁵⁰ Many of them are either living with relatives, or else on their own. Some of them are not able to afford rents, and thus have to live in parks and unoccupied or derelict buildings.Footnote ⁵¹ These problems, coupled with rising anti-Syrian attitudes and hate speech, have become salient in parallel to the increasing visibility of the refugees in urban centers. In his analysis, Erdoğan depicts the situation as follows:

This assertion should be read in parallel with the numerous demonstrations and attacks against Syrian refugees that have occurred. In Hatay in 2012, “ethnic” tensions between Syrians, mostly Sunni Muslims, and the local population, of which more than one-third is of Arab Alawite descent, resulted in anti-Syrian demonstrations.Footnote ⁵³ Following the explosion of two car bombs in Reyhanlı, Hatay, on May 11, 2013, the local population attacked Syrians’ cars. In the face of increasing attacks against Syrian refugees, some of them were transferred to Syria under police escort on May 13, 2013.Footnote ⁵⁴ Among the other violent incidents were attacks on Syrians’ shops in Adana, Manavgat in Antalya, and Küçükçekmece in İstanbul; on their tents in Şirinevler in Adana; and the burning of their houses in Altındağ in Ankara. Demonstrations in Gaziantep following the murder of a Turkish landlord by a Syrian refugee and protests in İzmir using the slogan “We do not want Syrians” were among the other signifiers of a rising anti-Syrian sentiment across the country. These are only the reported or publicized incidents; there may be other unreported events. In reference to such events, the International Crisis Group stated that “much of the problem appears to be based on misperceptions and fears—including probably exaggerated reports that rival communities are arming.”Footnote ⁵⁵ Similary, Kılıç argues that certain rumors and false reports about Syrians have served to “make them targets of a hate discourse.”Footnote ⁵⁶ For example:

Another motif structuring public and media discourses on Syrian refugees is that the crime rate is on the rise due to the increasing number of Syrians. It is believed that Syrian refugees disturb the public order and security, even though “the numbers of criminal cases in which refugees are directly involved are very low and, in most cases, Syrians living in Turkey are the victims.”Footnote ⁵⁸ Most strikingly, given their access to free healthcare and education, Syrians are seen as illegitimately living off state benefits that are perceived to belong to Turkish citizens. On the other hand, Özden’s fieldwork draws attention to the link between anti-Syrian attitudes and opposition to the government’s policies:

In short, both discursive and non-discursive practices show that Syrians are seen and administered as a “threat,” as “risky” outsiders. They are transfigured as a threat to societal and internal and/or public security. What is more, a security continuum between migration, terrorism, and criminality is evident in these representations. Among these securitarian frameworks, the most visible and emphasized is the construction of Syrians as a “threat” in the field of the labor market. The following section will illuminate this securitarian framework in detail.

Syrian refugees as a “threat” to the labor market

There are two main frameworks relating to Syrian refugees’ impact on the domestic market. One of them is twisting the securitization of Syrian refugees so as to present it as a threat to the labor market and the employment opportunities of the native population. As mentioned above, current Turkish law makes it very difficult for Syrians to work “legally.” As a result, many of them have turned to the informal labor market to make ends meet. Undoubtedly, Syrian refugees offer a cheap and flexible labor force in various sectors, such as agriculture, construction, and textiles. Employers in these sectors stand ready to take them into the (informal) workforce. As reported frequently in the media and academic research, this development has attracted a great deal of anger from native workers.Footnote ⁶⁰ In particular, Syrian refugees are depicted and/or seen as taking away or stealing jobs, abusing and exploiting the “Turkish” system through, for example, establishing tax-free businesses and depressing wages. According to a study conducted by the Hacettepe University Center for Migration and Political Studies (Hacettepe Üniversitesi Göç ve Siyaset Araştırmaları Merkezi, HÜGO), the perception that “Syrians took the jobs of local people is a serious concern.”Footnote ⁶¹ Similarly, the latest field study conducted by the Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies (Ortadoğu Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi, ORSAM) confirms this tendency by stating that “40% to 100% of the people who lost their jobs in border cities believe that they lost their jobs because of the Syrians.”Footnote ⁶² Even important public figures have voiced their concerns regarding the employment of Syrian refugees. For example, Ergün Atalay, head of the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (Türk-İş), stated: “There are enough unemployed people in Turkey. […] Let’s solve the unemployment problem and then we can look at the Syrians. First we should solve our own domestic situation.”Footnote ⁶³ Similarly, Erdal Ata, the governor of Gaziantep, a southeastern city that hosts one of the largest Syrian refugee populations, said that by not registering their businesses, Syrian refugees were fostering unfair competition that bothered small-business owners in Turkey; pointing out that unregistered businesses pay no taxes or social security fees for their employees, he went on to say: “Our citizens who do business in the same sectors are harmed by certain Syrian businesses.”Footnote ⁶⁴ In such depictions, Syrian refugees are directly framed as unwelcome “outsiders.” Rather than emphasizing possible opportunities or growth in relation to the integration of Syrian refugees into the domestic market, these discourses highlight their “possible destabilizing” effects.Footnote ⁶⁵

On the other hand, a more positive framework has also informed discussions about the Syrian refugees’ effects in the domestic market. The discourses and statements within this framework emphasize the economic benefits stemming from Syrian refugees. In various reports, it is claimed that Syrian refugees contribute to the Turkish economy by filling labor shortages in certain sectors.Footnote ⁶⁶ Especially in the textile and construction sectors, it is asserted that Syrians accept jobs that are not preferred by local populations—these are the so-called “3D jobs” that are dirty, dangerous, and difficult.Footnote ⁶⁷ Moreover, there is also an emphasis on how the Syrians, bringing their capital into the Turkish market, seem to have a positive effect on the domestic economy.Footnote ⁶⁸

Whether framed positively or negatively, both positions tend to treat Syrian refugees as outsiders, and both “share a desire to control [Syrians’ presence within the country] for the purpose of optimizing [Turkish society’s] ‘well-being’ by keeping the unwanted out and integrate the needed into the labour market.”Footnote ⁶⁹ Furthermore, as in the case of more positive portrayals, Syrian refugees are still viewed as a meta-issue to be commodified, and their presence is assessed in terms of their economic input into the economy rather than through humanitarian approaches.

The latest attempts by the government to regulate the work permits of refugees in general and Syrians in particular reflects this approach as well. As stated above, the current plan is to restrict the employment of Syrian refugees to certain sectors. This plan would be a crucial step forward in preventing the exploitation of Syrian refugees in the informal market, but this “benign” approach is also likely to control and contaminate the “destabilizing” effects of Syrians. In other words, following Bauman, Syrian refugees here constitute the “volume of humans made redundant by capitalism’s global triumph … [They are] the superfluous, supernumerary and redundant population—the excess of the rejects of the labor market, and the refuse of the market-targeted economy, over the capacity of recycling arrangements.”Footnote ⁷⁰ They are the “human surplus.” The Turkish government’s strategy here is “the mobilization of support and institutional means to reduce the destabilizing effects” of this human surplus.Footnote ⁷¹ However, this strategy and its accompanying discourses mask structural deficiencies as well as unfavorable economic policies, and provide an easy way to cover up the complexity of the problems by scapegoating refugees. For example, the problems of the boom in child labor and exploitation in the informal market are not properly discussed under the rubric of this securitization process. As the UNHCR emphasizes:

What is more, as already mentioned, Syrians are taking the so-called “3D jobs” that the native population are not willing to do. In these sectors, “those Syrians willing to take lower wages and work longer hours face a higher risk of exploitation with little recourse while provoking resentment among locals.”Footnote ⁷³ They are forced to work in inhumane conditions, are sometimes not paid, and because of the fear of deportation they cannot resort to judicial appeals should their rights be violated.Footnote ⁷⁴ To put it differently, they now constitute a kind of “army reserve,” a flexible labor force that can be exploited much more easily. This is well confirmed by Hikmet Tanrıverdi, the president of the İstanbul Textile and Apparel Export Associations (İstanbul Tekstil ve Konfeksiyon İhracatçı Birlikleri, İTKİB), who has stated:

In a similar vein, key public figures have brought forward certain proposals offering a “legal” basis for a more “formal exploitation” of Syrians in line with the rules of the market necessitating a flexible and cheap labor. For example, the Gaziantep Chamber of Commerce proposed as follows, as outlined by Kirişci:

The governor of Antalya, Muammer Türker, introduced a more controversial plan: he ordered that notifications be sent to more than 1,500 Syrian refugees demanding that they leave the province, on the grounds that they had caused social and economic tensions and damaged the tourism industry. He stated as follows:

He then added:

All of these discursive and non-discursive practices demonstrate that Syrian refugees have been framed and administered as a societal security issue. Moreover, they are associated with various different security issues, including crime and terrorism. These practices transfigure Syrian refugees as “destabilizing” and “risky” factors to be controlled and contained for the sake of Turkey’s well-being. However, this process also reveals that it is not the Syrian refugees who are abusing the “Turkish” system, but rather that they are being abused by that system. The current crisis of capitalism—characterized by high inflation and unemployment rates, an increasing gap in income levels between the poor and the rich, and sub-standard and flexible working conditions—has not been mentioned as the cause of current economic problems; instead, artificial arguments blaming refugees for all of these problems have become much more popular in the ongoing discussions on the issue.