Tomas Balkelis’s latest book chronologically extends his investigation of the formation of modern Lithuania. Whereas his earlier book, The Making of Modern Lithuania (2011), focuses predominantly on the late 19th and prewar 20th centuries, highlighting the emergence of the Lithuanian nationalist movement, this newest monograph details the building of the Lithuanian nation and state during the Great War and the subsequent “freedom fights” (laisvės kovų metas) of the immediate postwar period.

Historiographically, Balkelis’s main assertion is that “violent elements of nation-making deserve as much attention as its cultural, linguistic, religious, and ethnic attributes” (p. 165). He contends that approaching the topic of nation- and state-making through the lens of violence is important not only because it enables us to understand better the dynamics of mentally and physically mobilizing a populace, but also because such a focus is needed to explain how and why violence and “military deeds provided a foundational myth for the interwar [Lithuanian] state” (p. 11). In total, Balkelis successfully proves that all of the various forms of violence between 1914 and 1923 served as “great mobilizing events” whose most important and longest-lasting impact was on the “mental frontiers of local populations” (p. 7).

The first two chapters focus on the relationship between the collapse of states (the Russian Empire and then the German Ober Ost) and the need to hastily fashion some sort of new social and political order. In this section of the book, Balkelis argues that as the political and ideological grounds of this borderland shifted over and over again, older group identities and group solidarities were plowed under as new ones emerged. Maintaining his focus on the mental frontiers of the populace, Balkelis highlights how the people of the region went from imperial subjects to the “nationalization of various ethnicities” (p. 34). Here, he posits that the collective wartime experience of German military occupation, the formation of Lithuanian-only regiments, and the establishment of refugee relief organizations greatly accelerated this nationalization process. Furthermore, the battle for minds extended beyond nationalism to include debates about the preferred political path forward. By late 1918, the majority had embraced the idea of independence as part of the wider Wilsonian plan of national self-determination and liberal democracy. But there had been sizable support for Lithuanian autonomy within the Russian Empire, and of course Bolshevism remained for many a viable third option. All of this uncertainty and violence prompted individuals to pick sides, so to speak, and that is ultimately what led to the creation of the new Lithuanian state in 1918.

Having outlined the events that led to the announcement of Lithuanian independence, Balkelis devotes the rest of the book to the territorial conflicts between Lithuania and its new neighbors. He adeptly demonstrates that these wars were “often overlaid with ethnic and social conflicts” that hindered hopes for peace – and not only across the Baltic region but within the new Lithuanian society itself (p. 58). Chapter 3 focuses on how the disparate ethnic groups in the new state (Lithuanians, Jews, Poles, Belarusians, and Germans) responded to the state-building process, such as the call for volunteers for the Lithuanian army. Balkelis concludes that ethnic minorities did not share the notion of an ethnic Lithuania – of a Lithuanian nation-state – but were willing to participate in the project based on the legacy of the “historical space of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania” (p. 63). The exception to the general trend was the Poles. Many of them, and especially those in Vilnius, where they made up a third of the population, were eager to devote themselves to the new Polish state, and that led to increased animus and violence between Lithuanians and Poles. To be sure, the Poles’ taking of Vilnius proved to be the single most important event in motivating and mobilizing ethnic Lithuanians to defend the homeland.

Chapters 4 and 5 delve into what Balkelis calls “multidirectional war.” Chapter 4 details the advance of the Red Army and the brief existence of the Lithuanian Soviet Republic. And chapter 5 gives an overview of the violent clashes in 1919–1920 between the following groups: nationalist Lithuanians, Soviet Lithuanians/Russians, Germans, and Poles. Balkelis highlights, using telling primary sources, that Lithuanians’ actions during this multidirectional war were predominately driven by anti-Bolshevism and hatred of Poles. Without a doubt, Balkelis’s best use of primary sources comes in chapter 6, wherein he investigates the phenomenon of paramilitarism amid these conflicts. In particular, he presents a case study on the Lithuanian Riflemen Union (Lietuvos šaulių sąjunga, or šauliai). Using the writings of veterans themselves, Balkelis argues that šauliai played one of the most important roles in garnering Lithuanians’ support for the fledgling state. His rationale for this claim is twofold: (1) that the šauliai, in their efforts to protect their neighbors from violence, became widely known as the “spiritual elite of the nation” (p. 125); and (2) because šauliai was such a prolific movement (39 units by December 1919), it blurred the line between formal military activity and civilian defense, thereby informally helping the Lithuanian government gain a monopoly on violence. In the long run, that mattered a lot because, as Balkelis concludes, the fact that the Lithuanian government survived these chaotic and violent multidirectional wars “enhanced its legitimacy among the local population and laid the foundation for a modern Lithuanian identity among the masses” (p. 96).

Balkelis concludes the book by offering insightful analysis on that aforementioned modern Lithuanian identity. He convincingly argues that due to the violence-filled foundational myth for the interwar state, Lithuanian society in the 1920s and 1930s was never fully demobilized or demilitarized – a trend that was exacerbated by the ongoing tensions with Poland over Vilnius. Although this “wartime” mentality aided the group solidarity of ethnic Lithuanians, it ultimately destabilized the country in two significant ways. First, it did little to promote tolerance for and inclusiveness of ethnic minorities, who comprised a significant portion of the populace. Second, the historical memory of the Great War and freedom fights lent credence to the antidemocratic activities of the military and paramilitary groups, culminating in the coup d’état of 1926. While Balkelis sufficiently covers the second of these historical outcomes, he falls short when it comes to analyzing the former, and this is a significant problem given Lithuanians’ later involvement in the Holocaust. Unfortunately, the reader learns little about the experiences of Jews in this nation- and state-building process. For instance, it is unclear how many Lithuanian Jews signed up for military or paramilitary service out of patriotic conviction. Similarly, it remains unclear how commonplace anti-Semitism was among members of groups such as šauliai. Balkelis merely notes that “many of the rank and file were openly anti-Semitic” (p. 131). Yet, there is no meaningful investigation of this, beyond a very brief mention of two anti-Semitic incidents. This is surprising, for an investigation of anti-Jewish violence would have only further advanced his historiographical thesis about the centrality of violence to the nation-making process. Nonetheless, despite this criticism, Balkelis’s book is an excellent addition to the scholarly field.