Existing Literature

The existing literature tends to treat ethnic territorially based autonomy either as an independent variable impacting the likelihood of ethnic conflicts (Bunce and Watts Reference Bunce, Watts, Roeder and Rothchild2005; Siroky and Cuffe Reference Siroky and Cuffe2015) or as a prescriptive category to manage ethnic conflicts (Lake and Rothchild Reference Lake and Rothchild1996; Lapidoth Reference Lapidoth1997; Shaykhutdinov Reference Shaykhutdinov2010) rather than as an empirical and quantifiable fact. The question regarding “once launched, how autonomy actually works” has not been adequately addressed, which results in a lack of readily available analytical frameworks to explain autonomy as implemented outcome. [An exception is Sambanis and Milanovic’s (Reference Sambanis and Milanovic2014) political economy explanation of varying “policy autonomy” across regions.] In response, I build on Rahsaan Maxwell’s (Reference Maxwell2012) political sociology explanation (“integration trade-offs” theory), which posits that social segregation is conducive to political representation by appropriating one long-range factor, social integration, and one short-term factor, elite representation, to account for implemented autonomy outcomes. Nevertheless, I challenge an assumption underlying his explanation that inter-ethnic integration and inter-ethnic distinction are mutually conflictual by drawing upon Elise Giuliano’s (Reference Giuliano2000) insights on ethnic mobilization.

Sambanis and Milanovic’s study is pioneering in terms of measuring a subnational-level region’s degree of actually exercised autonomy by employing the “share of regional expenditures that can be financed out of regional revenues” (Reference Sambanis and Milanovic2014, 11) as a proxy for political autonomy. However, financial self-sufficiency can be treated as just one of many component aspects of an ethnic region’s implemented autonomy outcome. In addition, such aspects as overall productivity, efficiency in terms of labor use, and ability to procure financial transfers from the central state can also suggest a region’s level of political autonomy. For example, Tatarstan and Bashkortostan were largely comparable in terms of their regional financial self-sufficiency from 2010 through 2015. Does this mean Tatarstan and Bashkortostan were equally autonomous? Not quite if we take into consideration the region’s overall productivity (ability to contribute to the bursar of the central state) and developmental sustainability, since the GDP per capita of Tatarstan is much higher than that of Bashkortostan, and the size of the regional expenditure is larger as well (Russian Federation Federal Statistical Service 2017). Moreover, Yakutia’s GDP per capita was much higher than that of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan thanks to being a geographically immense, resource-rich, sparsely populated region, but its unemployment rate was much higher than that of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan (Russian Federation Federal Statistical Service 2017). In light of these issues, I use a conceptual framework that comprehensively assesses an ethnic region’s implemented autonomy outcome on three dimensions: political participation among the region’s titular population, economic development of the region, and cultural promotion among the region’s titular population.

Maxwell’s (Reference Maxwell2012, 4) “integration trade-offs” theory postulates that a higher level of social integration may undermine a minority’s ability to mobilize, which in turn may hinder its ability to bargain with the state for economic benefits and to be better politically represented in the state apparatus. He bases his argument on the assumption that social segregation can be conducive to the building of group consciousness of collective identity (Maxwell Reference Maxwell2012, 22), which in turn prepares the minority for group-based mobilization that can improve political or economic integrations. Nevertheless, the type of minorities studied by Maxwell are migrant minorities without autonomous regions designated for them, while this article focuses on titular minorities with autonomous regions designated for them. Furthermore, the institutional order of former colonial empires in Western Europe differs significantly from that of such colossal, multi-ethnic, and authoritarian regimes as Russia. In Britain or France, political representation of migrant minorities is usually realized through electoral processes, whereas in Russia, representation of elites of ethnic minority categories is usually realized through elite networks within an incumbent party, even if the incumbent party’s picked candidates may be legitimized through formal electoral processes as well. Last but not least, higher levels of acculturation and social integration do not necessarily translate into reduced group consciousness. On the contrary, inter-ethnic integration and inter-ethnic distinction can be achieved at once and combined to improve minority elites’ bargaining capacity.

Giuliano (Reference Giuliano2000), in her case study of ethnic mobilization in Tatarstan, challenges the assumption that individuals’ preferences automatically align with their ethnic affiliation. The conventional wisdom, that inter-ethnic integration and distinction are mutually exclusive, tends to have two underpinning assumptions: (1) integration erodes distinction and (2) shared identity automatically translates into intra-ethnic cohesion and shared preferences. Giuliano argues that intra-ethnic heterogeneous preferences may form despite shared consciousness of being ethnically distinct, since other types of cleavages may contribute to “varied interests within the group” (Giuliano Reference Giuliano2000, 303). She also notes that cross-ethnic, common preferences and cooperation may also exist (303). The empirical records of the three republics of Russia inform us that (1) integration does not necessarily erode distinction and (2) shared ethnic affiliation alone does not translate into improved bargaining capacity for titular elites. To the contrary, when robust consciousness of inter-ethnic distinction is treated as a given, inter-ethnic integration can be conducive to elite-level, cross-ethnic cooperation, especially through an incumbent party, as well as to building cohesion, not only within the titular population but also across ethnic populations.

Autonomy as Prescriptive Institution and as Implemented Outcome

I conceptualize ethnic, territorially based autonomy in two separate modes: “autonomy as prescriptive institution” and “autonomy as implemented outcome.” Autonomy as prescriptive institution is defined as territorially based power-sharing arrangements distinguishing an ethnoregional state from the central state, in which a specific territory is formally attached to a specific ethnic category, usually a minority category, and in which elites of that ethnic category are supposed to be adequately represented in the decision making of the ethnoregional state. Such prescriptive institution is usually embodied in the relevant, legally binding documents that legitimate and delimit the expected roles of both the central and ethnoregional states in terms of how to govern the ethnic region.

For ethnic regions in Russia, the governing documents encompass the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation and the respective constitutions of ethnic republics, such as the 1992 Constitution of the RT, Footnote ¹⁰ the 1993 Constitution of the RB, Footnote ¹¹ and the 1992 Constitution of the RS.Footnote ¹² In the case of Tatarstan, a third document, the 2007 Federal-Tatarstan Treaty, Footnote ¹³ also serves as a baseline.

I define autonomy as implemented outcome in terms of how much of what is prescribed in the legally binding documents establishing the formal autonomy for the ethnic region has been empirically implemented in compliance. To measure a region’s degree of such compliance, I devise an instrument ( Table 1) that scores a region on three dimensions: political participation among the region’s titular population, economic development of the region, and cultural promotion among the region’s titular population. Each dimension is assigned a weight of one-third, generating an aggregate score up to 100%. Scoring is reliant upon a triangulation of state-generated data, respondents’ perspectives, and cross-verifications with the author’s observations.

Table 1. Scoring schemes for an ethnic region’s implemented autonomy outcome in Russia.

^a Subdimensions considered necessary attributes of implemented autonomy can take the value of 0 if empirical evidence points to the absence of such attributes. For attributes considered concomitant but not necessary attributes of implemented autonomy, indexes can be dichotomous or trichotomous but do not take the value of 0.

For an ethnic region in Russia, the formula with which to calculate the degree of its actually exercised autonomy, A, is proposed as

$$ \mathrm{A}=( p/10\times 1/3+ e/6\times 1/3+ c/6\times 1/3)\times 100\% $$

Autonomy Outcome in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia

As summarized in Table 2, the level of implemented autonomy outcome was highest in Tatarstan, followed by Bashkortostan and Yakutia, for the first six years of the 2010s. With regard to titular political participation, the three republics are largely comparable with only minor discrepancies. Meanwhile, in terms of ethnoregional economic development and cultural promotion among the region’s titular population, the discrepancies across the republics tend to be more pronounced. In the rest of this section, I disaggregate implemented autonomy outcomes of the three republics according to different dimensions, using Tatarstan as a reference case and discussing Bashkortostan and Yakutia’s outcomes as far as how they differ from Tatarstan’s.

Table 2. Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia compared in terms of autonomy as implemented outcome (2010–2015).

Tatarstan

As Table 2 outlines, Tatarstan scores 10 on a scale of 10 in terms of titular political participation for 2010–2015. Specifically, RT has been maintaining a system of state organs separate from the federal system. The incumbent President of RT, Röstəm Mingnekhanov, is both native to and a citizen of RT no younger than 30 while knowing competently both Tatar and Russian. Thus, he meets the eligibility requirements laid in both the Constitution of the RT and the 2007 Federal-Tatarstan Treaty. The legislature of the RT, State Soviet (Dəülət Sovyete), has enacted a series of normative rules and regulations applicable to Tatarstan. Meanwhile, RT has been maintaining a representative office under the President of Russia in Moscow. As of 2016, the RT state has opened representative offices in Kazakhstan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, France, Uzbekistan, UAE, Czech Republic, and Ukraine. RT reached a treaty with the Republic of Chuvashia, another ethnic republic of Russia, on May 13, 1994, which was renewed on March 15, 2011.Footnote ¹⁴ Meanwhile, RT has been engaged in outreach activities to ethnic Tatars living outside Tatarstan or outside Russia through an umbrella organization, World Congress of Tatars (Bötendönya Tatar Kongressi).

Given ethnic Tatars’ population share in the total population of the RT as of 2010, 53.2%, at the fourth Convocation of the State Soviet of the RT (2009–2014), ethnic Tatar deputies were overrepresented at a percentage of 60.7%.Footnote ¹⁵ At the fifth Convocation of the State Soviet (since 2014), ethnic Tatar deputies are again overrepresented, at a percentage of 64%.Footnote ¹⁶ Since 2009, the proportion of ethnic Tatar ministers in the total number of ministers in the RT Cabinet of Ministers has been stable around 88.2% (15 out of 17 ministers), Footnote ¹⁷ which suggests “extraordinary” overrepresentation of ethnic Tatar ministers.

In terms of ethnoregional economic development, Tatarstan scores 5.75 on a scale of 6 for 2010–2015. Except for the hosting of the 2013 Kazan Universiade, RT has been contributing more to the federal government’s budget than it receives from the federal government in the form of fiscal transfers.Footnote ¹⁸ Thus, RT qualifies as a “donor”Footnote ¹⁹ region in Russia. In view of the structure of the 2010–2015 budgets, RT was more reliant upon revenues of its own ethnoregional sources than upon federal transfers (Russian Federation Federal Statistical Service 2017). The GDP per capita of RT has maintained the pattern of exceeding the Russia-wide GDP per capita for 2010–2015, while RT’s unemployment rate has been consistently lower than the national average of Russia from 2010 through 2015, as demonstrated in Table 3. Of all the ethnic republics in Russia, RT has consistently stood out as the economically most developed one. Tatarstan’s comparative advantages have mostly been concentrated in oil extraction and manufacturing (automotive, chemical, and machinery industries), whose infrastructural and technological foundations were laid during the post-WWII Soviet era. The KAMAZ truck plant, which is headquartered in the second largest city of Tatarstan, Yar Challı/Naberezhnye Chelny, has been prestigious internationally for its expertise in truck and engine manufacturing. Moreover, RT has been actively pursuing innovative investment policies. The first IT innovation and professional development center of Russia, Innopolis, has been established in Tatarstan, which has attracted companies that specialize in IT outsourcing, software-development, and electronic business solutions.Footnote ²⁰

Table 3. GDP per capita (in Russian rubles) and unemployment rate of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Yakutia, and of Russia as a whole compared (2010–2015).

Sources: Regions of Russia: Socio-Economic Indicators 2012; Regions of Russia: Socio-Economic Indicators 2017; Labor and Employment in Russia 2015; Basic Socio-Economic Indicators of the Republic of Tatarstan 2011–2015 (Kazan: RT Branch of the Federal Statistical Service 2017).

With regard to titular cultural promotion, Tatarstan scores 5 on a scale of 6 for 2010–2015. In meetings, sessions, or debates of the RT State Soviet, the principally used language is Russian. Even if most of the top political elites of Tatarstan are ethnically Tatar, and even if many of them are able to speak Tatar fluently, in formal political deliberations, Russian overwhelms Tatar. In the executive organs of the RT state, Russian dominates formal conversations. Court sessions are predominately conducted in Russian. In the realm of pre-tertiary education, the formal recognition of the Tatar language in Tatarstan has been promoted to such an extent that Tatar was made a mandatoryFootnote ²¹ subject in nearly all of the pre-tertiary education institutions. As of 2016, there are three types of pre-tertiary educational institutions according to languages of instruction in Tatarstan: Tatar-instructed schools, schools of mixed Tatar-Russian instruction, and Russian-instructed schools. In higher education institutions in Kazan, formal Tatar-language instruction is largely limited to those departments devoted either to the production of ethnically specific knowledge or to the training of experts with such knowledge. The Tatar language has been used to a limited extent in the publications of Tatarstan Academy of Sciences but is much more extensively used in print media, radio, TV, and internet. As of 2016, 17 magazines (of which three are for children) and 56 newspapers throughout Tatarstan were published in the Tatar language.Footnote ²² Moreover, 16 radio channels (both republic-level and county-level) and 21 TVFootnote ²³ channels (both republic-level and county-level) produced programs either fully or partially in the Tatar language.Footnote ²⁴ Overall, there has been noticeable, but not ubiquitous, informal, conversational use of the Tatar language in the public sphere in RT. Russian assumes the dominant role as the language of business transactions in the market, and Tatar is featured more often in formal, ethnocultural events.

On the “ethnogenesis” of Kazan Tatars, the debates between Tatarists, who hold that Tatars are heirs of the Golden Horde (Altın Urda), and Bulgarists, who hold that Tatars are descendants of Volga Bulgaria, date back to the early 19th century (Kondrashov Reference Kondrashov2000, 66). The official historiography of the Soviet era was biased against the Tatarist view, and the study of the history of the Golden Horde was even officially banned in 1944 (68). Following the disintegration of the USSR, the study of the Golden Horde was rekindled. As of 2016, the Institute of History of Tatarstan Academy of Sciences has become a hub for the study of the history of the Golden Horde and its successor Khanates. Tatarists’ view, that ethnic Tatars are heirs of the Golden Horde, has largely been accepted as the official historical narrative in Tatarstan, while Bulgarists’ claim has also been partially integrated into Tatarists’ historical narratives.Footnote ²⁵

The RT state has been regulating the forms and interpretations of religious practices through such organizations as the RT Spiritual Board of Muslims (Diniyə Nəzarəte). Nevertheless, the RT state does not impose restrictions regarding who is allowed to practice and who is not. In reality, minors are visibly allowed to enter mosques or churches in Tatarstan, and certain governmental officials symbolically participate in religious events.

Tatarstan’s state flag and emblem have been broadly used throughout the republic, especially over state apparatuses’ buildings, on governmental websites, or on state-issued documents. In fact, the presidential residence, located in Kazan Kremlin, has been flying only the RT flag, rather than alongside the flag of the Russian Federation, on its top as of 2016. The RT state has also been actively pushing for historical and archaeological sites of Tatarstan to be listed as UNESCO’s World Heritage Sites. By 2016, Tatarstan’s Complex of the Kazan Kremlin, Bolgar Complex, and the town-island of Sviyazhsk have been recognized by UNESCO as world heritage sites, accounting for three out of a total of 17Footnote ²⁶ sites thus far recognized in Russia.

Inter-Ethnic Boundary-Making in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia

I treat the long-range variable, an ethnic region’s inter-ethnic boundary making, as processes in which actors of both the ethnic region’s titular category and the central state’s majority category relate to existing boundaries by trying either to maintain them or to change them, either to reinforce them or to de-emphasize them in a historical context shaped by previous processes of boundary making. Such processes entail both tendencies toward integration and tendencies toward differentiation and are analyzed on three dimensions: acculturation, social integration, and psychological identification (Rumbaut Reference Rumbaut and Kivisto2005, 166–168; Wimmer Reference Wimmer2013, 104).

Acculturation connotes the processes of linguistic/cultural diffusions or changes that result in greater linguistic and cultural similarity (Rumbaut Reference Rumbaut and Kivisto2005, 167) between populations of the titular ethnic category of the ethnic region and the multi-ethnic state’s ethnic majority category. Social integration is associated with aggregating the processes of interpersonal, socioeconomic, and spatial interactions relevant to the economy, the polity, and the community among the populations of both an ethnic region’s titular ethnic category and the multi-ethnic state’s ethnic majority category. Interethnic social integration can be assessed according to such demographic indicators as levels of urbanization, educational attainments, and intermarriage rates with the ethnic majority, as well as residential patterns. Psychological identification is associated with the level of ethnic consciousness among individuals of the titular ethnic category. Notably, a robust level of ethnic consciousness among individuals of the titular ethnic category is indispensable for them to act socio-politically in ethnic terms. Weak ethnic consciousness can significantly obscure the boundary between the titular and majority populations, which can in turn render the formally designated autonomy increasingly dissociated with its intended “agents.”

According to the 2010 census, in Russia, the overall level of urbanization reached 73.7%, Footnote ³² whereas the overall level of higher educationFootnote ³³ reached 28%.Footnote ³⁴ The overall level of illiteracy in Russia was 0.32%, Footnote ³⁵ while the rate of inter-ethnic marriagesFootnote ³⁶ reached 12%. Of the total population of those ethnic minority categories for whom ethnic, territorially based autonomy has been designated, 65.3% were residents in those autonomous entities, with the rest living outside their designated ethnic regions.

To evaluate and compare the Russia-wide level of social integration for the titular population of an ethnic region according to the 2010 census, I use an instrument ( Table 4) that scores, relative to the national average, a population’s level of integration on five dimensions: urbanization, higher education, illiteracy rate, inter-ethnic marriage rate, and residential concentration within designated ethnic regions. These dimensions were informed by Maxwell’s (Reference Maxwell2012, 13) study of immigrant minorities’ integration in Western European democracies, as well as by Rubén Rumbaut’s (Reference Rumbaut and Kivisto2005, 166–168) discussion of minority “assimilation” in the US. The score of each dimension is assigned a weight of one-fifth. Scoring is mostly based on census data, cross-verified with respondents’ perspectives and the author’s observations. For an ethnic region in Russia, the formula with which to calculate the country-wide level of social integration for its titular ethnic population, SI_, is proposed as

$$ \mathrm{SI}=\left( Du\times 1/5+ De\times 1/5+ Di\times 1/5+ Dm\times 1/5+ Dr\times 1/5\right)\times 100\% $$

Table 4. Scoring schemes for the Russia-wide level of social integration for an ethnic region’s titular population.

^a When the level of urbanization for a population is approximately 50%.

The five dimensions are assessed on an ordinal scale of three categories. Accordingly, a titular population’s score on these dimensions will take one of three mutually discrete values, as listed in Table 4.

While Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia are largely comparable in terms of linguistic acculturation (knowledge of Russian) and robust ethnic consciousness among the titular population, they vary more conspicuously with regard to the level of social integration of the titular population, as summarized in Table 5. An “integration–distinction balance” is most pronounced in Tatarstan, followed by Bashkortostan and Yakutia.

Table 5. Ethnic Tatars’, ethnic Bashkirs’, and ethnic Yakuts’ Russia-wide level of social integration compared (2010).

Titular Elites’ Representation in the Ethno-Regional State of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia

The short-term variable, titular elites’ capacity to bargain with the central state, activates the link from the pattern of inter-ethnic boundary making to autonomy outcome. The bargaining capacity of an ethnic region’s titular elites is their ability to employ both material and discursive resources to influence decision making at both central and regional states. Such an ability is constituted by four dimensions: elite-level inter-ethnic relations, the central state’s perception of the ethnic region, intra-ethnic cleavage structure, and titular elites’ representation in the ethno-regional state and its most powerful positions. Proportionate representation of titular elites in the ethnoregional state is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for a higher level of implemented autonomy outcome.

To briefly sketch the mechanism regarding how an inter-ethnic “integration–distinction balance” can lead to greater autonomy outcome, I focus on Tatarstan while touching upon Bashkortostan and Yakutia tangentially. Given that the three republics feature comparably high level of linguistic Russification and robust ethnic consciousness among the titular population, the major difference consists in the extent to which an integration–distinction balance has been achieved, or rather, given similarly robust titular consciousness, how social integration shapes titular elites’ bargaining capacity. In this regard, robust titular consciousness is a necessary condition for titular elites to build their capacity to exercise formally prescribed autonomy, since they need to first and foremost be aware of their being “titular.”

In Tatarstan, a high level of linguistic Russification, combined with more solid social integration among ethnic Tatars, promotes titular elites’ capacity to build cross-ethnic political networks and more collusive, less hierarchical types of relationships with ethnic Russian elites, especially in terms of exchanging political and economic favors through the incumbent United Russia (hereafter UR) party.Footnote ⁴¹ Ethnic Tatars’ more solid social integration not only cultivates positive perceptions of Tatarstan by the central state as Russia’s “most important” ethnic republicFootnote ⁴² but also translates into less differentiated, less polarized intra-ethnic socio-economic and cultural contour. Ethnic Tatars’ more solid relationships with both the central state and their co-ethnics, coupled with a positive image of Tatarstan in the eyes of Moscow, have been jointly sufficient for heightened representation of Tatar elites in the state organs and their most powerful positions of Tatarstan. As compared to Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Yakutia have been less capable of striking an inter-ethnic “integration–distinction balance.” Neither of them keeps the title “President” for their executive head as has Tatarstan, and their levels of titular representation in the state apparatuses tend to be lower than that of Tatarstan, as demonstrated below.

Although not tracing in detail the process of how differing patterns of inter-ethnic boundary making lead to differing patterns of titular elites’ bargaining capacity for the three republics, this section applies an instrument to measure and to compare titular elites’ levels of representation in the respective ethnoregional state and its most powerful positions of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia. Titular elites’ level of representation is used as a proxy for titular elites’ bargaining capacity. Based on such a comparison, I test whether, across the three republics, the higher the level of social integration for the titular population, and the higher the level of titular elites’ representation in the ethno-regional state, then the higher the level of implemented autonomy outcome for the ethnic region.

In terms of operationalization, I calculate the “representation-by-population quotient” of an ethnic region’s titular elites by weighting the quotients of the 2015 percentages of such elites in the key posts of various ethnoregional state apparatuses divided by the 2010 percentage of the population of the titular category in the total population of the ethnic region. The instrument takes into consideration the distribution of decision making and enforcement power across different state apparatuses. I base my understanding of how decision making power is distributed across state apparatuses on what is stipulated in the constitutions of the RT, RB, and RS, and on respondents’ perceptions.

The largest weight, 35%, is assigned to the key posts in the executive organs. For Tatarstan, such organs include the Presidency, the Prime Minister, and the Cabinet of Ministers. For Bashkortostan, such organs include the Head (Bashkortostan Respublikahı Bashlığı), the Prime Minister, and the Cabinet of Ministers of the RB. For Yakutia, such organs include the Head (İl Darkhan), the Chair of the Government, and the Cabinet of Ministers.

The second largest weight, 25%, is assigned to the key posts in the legislative organ. This amount of weight is assigned in light of the prescriptive authority wielded by the legislative organ despite its lack of enforcement power. For Tatarstan, such key posts include the leadership of the State Soviet and the chairs of its law making committees (komitet). For Bashkortostan, such key posts include the leadership of the State Assembly-Kurultay (Dəülət Yıyılıshı-Koroltay) and the chairs of its lawmaking committees. For Yakutia, such key posts include the leadership of the İl Tümən and the chairs of its lawmaking committees.

A 20% weight is assigned to the leadership of the ethnoregional branch of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, since it is the major state apparatus that wields the means of coercion in law enforcements of the ethnic region, even if its authority mostly rests in law enforcing rather than decision making. It is directly subordinate to the centralized command of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Moscow, while maintaining a coordinative relationship with the region’s state apparatuses.Footnote ⁴³ A 15% weight is assigned to the Public Prosecutor of the region and to the heads of three courts: the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, and the Arbitration Court of the ethnic republic. The ethnoregional Prosecutor’s Office serves as the highest supervisory organ conducting investigations and prosecutions in the realm of law enforcement. The Constitutional Court of an ethnic region is part of the ethnoregional state, whereas the Supreme Court and the Arbitration Court of an ethnic region are parts of the federal judicial system. The smallest weight, 5%, is assigned to the key posts at the ethnoregional branch of the United Russia party, the incumbent party of not only the Russian Federation but also Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia. Those occupying such positions can be influential in the region’s executive and legislative elections while bridging the federal and the ethnoregional states through partisan links, Footnote ⁴⁴ even if they do not wield decision making power in these capacities.

For Tatarstan, as summarized in Table 6, the weighted representation-by-population quotient for ethnic Tatar elites in Tatarstan as of 2015 is 1.36, which is higher than 1 and signifies overrepresentation of ethnic Tatar elites in the RT ethnoregional state and its most powerful positions. Overall, as summarized in Table 7, of the 13 individuals who occupied the most powerful positions of RT from 2010 to 2017, nine are ethnic Tatars, thus making up the majority and overrepresented in relation to the population share of ethnic Tatars in the total population of RT.

Table 6. Titular elites’ representation in the ethnoregional state of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia compared (2015).

^a Individuals’ ethnicity is determined either from biographical information if ethnicity is explicitly indicated therein, or by referring to the titular-language websites of the relevant state apparatuses, or by looking at the individual’s given name and family name if information is available only in Russian, supplemented with cross-checking with other biographical information and respondents’ knowledge.

^b Alternative distributions of weights were also tried, and the relative positions of the weighted quotients for the three cases did not change and remain robust.

Sources: President of the Republic of Tatarstan. http://president.tatarstan.ru (accessed July 31, 2018); The Cabinet of Ministers of RT. http://prav.tatarstan.ru/pravit.htm (accessed July 31, 2018); Committees of the State Soviet of the RT. http://tat.gossov.tatarstan.ru/komitet (accessed July 31, 2018); Deputies of the State Soviet of the RT. http://tat.gossov.tatarstan.ru/deputaty (accessed July 31, 2018); Tatarstan-Branch of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation: Leadership of the Ministry. http://mvd.tatarstan.ru/rus/rukov.htm (accessed July 31, 2018); Current Composition of Judges for the Constitutional Court of RT. http://ks.tatarstan.ru/rus/structure/judge.htm (accessed July 31, 2018); Leadership of the Supreme Court of RT. http://vs.tat.sudrf.ru/modules.php?name=info_court&rid=7 (accessed July 31, 2018); Presidium of the RT Regional Political Soviet of the UR. http://tatarstan.er.ru/persons/presidium (accessed July 31, 2018); Head of the Republic of Bashkortostan. https://glavarb.ru/rus (accessed July 31, 2018); Government of the RB. https://www.pravitelstvorb.ru/ru (accessed July 31, 2018); State Assembly-Kurultay of the RB. http://gsrb.ru/ru (accessed July 31, 2018); Bashkortostan-Branch of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation. http://02.мвд.рф (July 31, 2018); Constitutional Court of the RB. http://www.ks-rb.ru (accessed July 31, 2018); Supreme Court of the RB. http://vs.bkr.sudrf.ru (accessed July 31, 2018); Presidium of the RB Regional Political Soviet of UR Party. https://bashkortostan.er.ru/persons/presidium (accessed July 31, 2018); Head of the Republic of Sakha/Yakutia. https://glava.sakha.gov.ru (accessed July 31, 2018); Government of the RS. https://prav.sakha.gov.ru (accessed July 31, 2018); State Assembly-İl Tümən of the RS. http://iltumen.ru (accessed July 31, 2018); Yakutia-Branch of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation. http://14.мвд.рф (accessed July 31, 2018); Constitutional Court of the RS. https://ks.sakha.gov.ru (accessed July 31, 2018); Supreme Court of the RS. http://vs.jak.sudrf.ru (accessed July 31, 2018); Presidium of the RS Regional Political Soviet of UR Party. https://yakut.er.ru/persons/presidium (accessed July 31, 2018).

Table 7. Those occupying the most powerful positions at the ethnoregional state of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia (2010–2017).

Sources: See Table 6.

For Bashkortostan, the weighted representation-by-population quotient for ethnic Bashkirs and Tatars combined in RB as of 2015 is 1.02 ( Table 6), which signifies proportionate representation of ethnic Bashkir and Tatar elites combined in the RB ethnoregional state and its most powerful positions. Overall, as summarized in Table 7, of the ten individuals who occupied the most powerful positions of RB from 2010 to 2017, five are ethnic Bashkirs or Tatars, largely proportionately representedFootnote ⁴⁵ in relation to the population share of ethnic Bashkirs and Tatars in the total population of RB. Compared to Tatarstan, the level of titular representation in Bashkortostan as of 2015 is lower.

For Yakutia, the weighted representation-by-population quotient for ethnic Yakuts in RS as of 2015 is 1.34 ( Table 6), which signifies overrepresentation of titular elites in the RS ethnoregional state and its most powerful positions. Overall, as summarized in Table 7, of the 12 individuals who occupied the most powerful positions of RS from 2010 to 2017, six are ethnic Yakuts, neatly proportionately represented in relation to the population share of ethnic Yakuts in the total population of RS. Intriguingly, although the Russia-wide level of social integration for ethnic Yakuts as of 2010, at 60%, and the implemented autonomy outcome for RS for 2010–2015, at 70%, are significantly lower than the Russia-wide level of social integration for ethnic Tatars as of 2010Footnote ⁴⁶ and the implemented autonomy outcome for RT, Footnote ⁴⁷ respectively, the observed level of representation of titular elites for RS as of 2015 is not significantly lower than that for RT, at 1.36, and even higher than that for RB, at 1.02. Despite the relatively low level of social integration for ethnic Yakuts Russia-wide compared to ethnic Tatars and ethnic Bashkirs, the overrepresentation of ethnic Yakut elites in the RS ethnoregional state may require an in-depth case study of autonomy building in Yakutia. Nonetheless, despite titular elites’ overrepresentation, the degree of implemented autonomy outcome for RS is lower than that for RB, which substantiates the argument that sufficiently high titular representation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a higher degree of autonomy outcome.

In this regard, incumbent elites’ agency in their actual governance matters. Such elite agency can be shaped by, inter alia, elite-level inter-ethnic relations, central state’s perception of the ethnic region, and intra-ethnic cleavage structure, in terms of ideological adaptability, mimicking skills at the regional level of Putin’s centralization reforms (Goode Reference Goode2011), lobbying skills (Sharafutdinova Reference Sharafutdinova2013, 516) for federal investment, winning contracts for federally sponsored mega-projects, attracting foreign investment, expanding state-owned enterprises, building regional comparative advantages, and framing skills of cultural interests of the titular population in ethnically inclusive terms (Giuliano Reference Giuliano2000, 303).