The Festival of Italy

The Festival took as its theme ‘100 years of Progress’ and sought to ‘bring into new focus the bonds of culture and commerce between our two nations’ (‘Festival of Italy’ 1961). The Italy–US connection was key and on 11 July 1960 Ferleger left for Italy to secure sponsors: those that came on board included Fiat, Olivetti, Motta, Esso Italiana, the Italian Institute for Foreign Trade, the Italian Government Printing Office, the Italian State Tourist Office, the Rotary Club in Ravenna, the Sicilian and Sardinian regional governments and Alitalia (‘30 Firms Share in Festival of Italy’ 1960; ‘Italian Officials Hail Plan’ 1960; ‘Commercial Museum Staff’ 1961). The Festival events comprised exhibitions, musical performances, balls, dinners, fashion parades, cooking demonstrations, wine tastings, concerts, puppet shows, operas, travel talks, motion pictures and lectures (Philadelphia Honorary Citizens Committee 1962). There were three exhibition themes: historical, industrial and cultural Italy (‘Philadelphia Festival of Italy’ 1961, 4). The historical exhibit, curated by the Italia ’61 historical exhibition committee in Turin, contained three sections: Ancient Civilisations; Renaissance; and Risorgimento, all of which pointed to the cultural richness of Italy and its legacy for democracy and contemporary civilisation. The cultural exhibit displayed ‘Italian contributions to the artistic, political and commercial life of the US’ (Ferleger Reference Ferleger1961a, 13). The industrial exhibit had seven supporting displays presenting ‘The resurgence of Italian leadership in design and manufacture of quality products which enrich the homes, businesses and lives of Americans’ (Ferleger Reference Ferleger1961a, 13). Italian industrialism was defined as the integration of the old – standards and style – and the new – industrial speed – and the presentation made a defence of the post-1948 Italian industrialisation policy that had been instituted using Marshall Funds and under the Cassa per Opere Straordinarie di Pubblico Interesse nell’Italia Meridionale (Cassa).

The Sicilian exhibit in the industrial section placed particular focus on rebirth, displaying ‘the glories of Sicily, past and present, its people, its products, its history’ (Exhibition Brochure 1961) and how they were ‘preserved and enhanced’ due to ‘regional economic development’ which ‘coupled with traditional arts and crafts have brought new prosperity’ (‘Sicily and Sardinia Featured’ 1960). Accompanying the exhibit was an essay written by Ugo Morabito, a Torinese lawyer who was the commercial counsellor at the Italian embassy in Washington DC. He focused on the benefits brought about by Italy’s ‘economic miracle’. However, he said that growth in Italy had to take into account the benefits of national and international aid programmes, thus making the point that the region was not autonomous (Morabito Reference Morabito1961, 13). The exhibit focused on these programmes, making the argument that development was a balance of central government-funded large-scale industry (such as the operations of IRI and Eni) and artisanal enterprises that benefited from ‘technical and economic assistance’ – industrial canning, bottling, preserving – and that used ‘new artistic styles which blend with and revitalise the old’ (‘Sardinian Crafts: Suggested Press Release’ 1959; ‘Sicily Exhibit Opens soon’ 1961; Blackwood Reference Blackwood1961).

Linked to the Sicilian exhibit was a trade initiative which brought together the Festival and the Cassa. Before Ferleger left for Italy in July 1960 he was approached by Andrew N. Farnese, a second-generation Italian-American who was regarded as the spokesperson for the Sicilian business community in Philadelphia (Blackwood Reference Blackwood1961). Farnese was part of the influential Philadelphian legal and business elite and friends with some of the most important men in the city, notably Mayor Dilworth and the business magnate Albert M. Greenfield. Involved in national politics, Farnese had been active in the 1948 anti-communist campaigns and in 1960 became the head of the Italian-American Committee for Better Government. Farnese also endorsed candidates in local elections, which was of note as the Italian-American vote was of increasing importance (‘Obituary: Andrew N. Farnese’ 2003).

Farnese was heavily involved in the Festival organisation and he had a particular interest in the representation of Sicily and Sicilian development. He asked Ferleger to meet with his friends Mario Fasino and Ernesto Del Giudice (Svenson Reference Svenson1960). A committed Catholic and the director of Voce Cattolica, Fasino was a Democrazia Cristiana (DC) party politician who represented Palermo in the regional assembly. He was involved in the development of heavy industry and the setting up of the regional tourist board, and in 1955 he was appointed as the Sicilian Regional Minister for Public Works and then later for Industry and Real Estate. In 1960 he picked up the Agriculture portfolio and directed the XI Commission for Agriculture and Forests, which advised on Marshall and Cassa expenditure. Del Giudice sat on the Commission in his capacity as the elected DC representative for Western Sicily in the national Chamber of Deputies and as head of viticulture at the Technical Agrarian Institute of Marsala. With Fasino and Del Giudice, Ferleger planned a trade initiative and in his trip report he proposed that the Festival include a feature on Sicilian wines: he asked for a temporary import licence for Sicilian wines to be stocked in the 640 state liquor stores throughout Pennsylvania (Svenson Reference Svenson1960).

The proposal went ahead, and included a visit by a Sicilian wine delegation from Marsala, led by Del Giudice. At the Sicilian exhibit’s official reception guests were offered traditional Sicilian aperitivi: Capo Bianco, Moscato and Marsala all’Uovo. For the toasts they were given a first taste of Alcamo Spumante, which was promoted as ‘Sicily’s new venture into the field of sparkling wine’ as it was made using the newest industrial techniques and marketed specifically for the trade (‘Sicily Wine Delegation’ 1961). Thus as visitors clinked their glasses, they symbolically toasted the re-establishment of the Commercial Museum as a trade centre, the success of the new City Charter, the successes of post-war Italian reconstruction industry and development plans and of the Sicilian and national leadership. The narrative told in the Sicilian exhibit was the one endorsed by the Italian government, the Italia ’61 Committee in Turin headed by Giuseppe Pella, the Festival organising committee and the Sicilian business community in Philadelphia. However, not everyone agreed with it, and it was for this reason that Mangione invited Dolci to speak.

Danilo Dolci

Danilo Dolci arrived in the Sicilian fishing village of Trappeto in February 1952, aged 28. Originally from Sesana in the north of Italy, Dolci remembered Trappeto from his childhood when his father had been posted there temporarily as a stationmaster. In 1943 Dolci had been arrested for anti-Fascist activity; in the immediate aftermath of the war he had worked with war orphans in Don Zeno Saltini’s utopian community in Tuscany, Nomedelfia. Dolci then went on to study architecture and at the conclusion of his degree he returned to Trappeto (Bess Reference Bess1993). He claimed that he was so disturbed by the misery that he witnessed on his arrival that he decided to hold an eight-day fast to force the municipal authorities to take direct action on child poverty and starvation and to make the regional government promise to build a pharmacy in the village, pave the streets and construct a sewerage system (Vitiello Reference Vitiello1983).

Dolci remained in Trappeto and continued to work as a social activist – he repeated the hunger strike annually. He also married a local widow, became a father and established a communal space, Borgo di Dio, on the hill behind the village. Dolci’s experiences in western Sicily led him to form the view that political corruption at a local, regional and national level and Mafia-related violence and crime were the chief causes of the problems in the area, and the reason for the continued existence of a society that he claimed remained feudal and governed by superstitious beliefs (Vitiello Reference Vitiello1983, 13). He believed that what was needed to create change was a ‘cultural and economic revolution that was non-violent and non-political and that developed through direct action at the grassroots level’: he aimed to cause this by teaching self-help and a sense of community and individual responsibility (Vitiello Reference Vitiello1983, 15).

Dolci set himself up in Sicily as a moral counterpoint to the local authorities and continued to hold hunger strikes and strikes-in-reverse, unauthorised public works. He also wrote and published on his campaigns and began to attract followers, among them Bertrand Russell and Aldous Huxley, who described him in gushing tones as ‘a new Gandhi, a modern St Francis, equipped with much more than compassion and seraphic love’ (Huxley Reference Huxley1959). In February 1956 Dolci was arrested for defamation and imprisoned for two months (‘A Trial in Palermo’ 1956). The DC maintained that he was dangerous, as did the Catholic Church, who labelled him a ‘communist sympathiser’; the Sicilian Cardinal Ernesto Ruffini later called him one of the ‘plagues’ affecting Sicily (Bess Reference Bess1993, 179; Mangione Reference Mangione1985, 55). In 1957 Dolci won the prestigious Viareggio Prize. He used the prize money to open the Centre for Study and Initiatives in Partinico, which attracted volunteer workers from Italy and overseas to teach new agricultural methods and community co-operation to local residents.

In November 1957 Dolci organised a Congress for Full Employment to generate further support for his projects and to establish a network of ‘full employment centres’ which would operate independently but in partnership with government initiatives, and run education programmes (‘Congresso’ 1957). The congress was quickly followed by another in April 1958, which was attended by René Dumont, Julian Huxley, Carlo Levi, Leonardo Sciascia and Elio Vittorini. Putting his plan into action, Dolci asked each of the international Friends of Danilo Dolci groups – in London, Paris, Geneva and Stockholm and, later, New York – to take on a centre and send volunteers who were trained community development and social workers to Sicily. Dolci built the first of these centres with the £20,000 he received when he won the 1958 Lenin Peace Prize (Doty Reference Doty1965) and having done so he decided to ‘stand down’ (Bess Reference Bess1993, 169) and apply himself to a problem: waging war on the water Mafia in western Sicily to provide a model of how development should happen. Dolci believed the Jato Dam irrigation scheme had the potential to revitalise the socio-political structures that supported the industry connected to it and ensure that ‘Sicily’s natural, agricultural and human resources are finally being used to meet authentic needs’ (Dolci in Mangione Reference Mangione1985, 14).

Dolci’s trip to the United States in 1961 was organised by the Orion Press, which had just published Outlaws (1960), the translation of Inchiesta a Palermo (Reference Dolci1956), and the Friends of Dolci in the US. The Friends shared an interest in development, aid, colonialism, peace activism and humanitarian work, and included Aldous Huxley, Edward C. Banfield, Immanuel Wallerstein, Charles Page, Michele Cantarella, Warren Staebler, Reverend John Papandrew, Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, Douglas Steere, William Robert Miller and Gelston McNeil. They secured sponsorship from, among others, the Harvard Divinity School; the Universities of Pennsylvania, Yale, Columbia, Princeton, Smith, Earlham, Haverford; the Fellowship Journal, the Community Church of New York, and the Overseas Friendship Center (‘Organising Committee for the American Visit of Danilo Dolci’ 1961). A notable member was the conservative and acclaimed American political scientist, Edward C. Banfield. In the early 1950s, Banfield and his family had lived for a year in Chiaramonte, Basilicata, and in 1958 his book The Moral Basis of a Backward Society was published. Banfield concluded that civil society had not been established in Basilicata as the society he observed was ruled by the ethos of ‘amoral familism’, which prevented peasants working in any way that did not ‘maximise the material, short-run advantage of the nuclear family’ (Banfield Reference Banfield1958, 85). Banfield argued that to bring an end to the cycle of poverty in southern Italy, aid had to be coupled with an educational programme that would teach a self-help sensibility. While Banfield’s political views differed from Dolci’s and those of others on the committee, it is this understanding of the need for, and power of, education that united Dolci and his supporters.

Dolci linked the mode of behaviour Banfield described with the Mafia and violence in western Sicily, a connection he made clear in the talk he gave on 5 March 1961 at an unofficial afternoon reception at the Sicilian exhibit. In attendance were 75 ‘leading citizens, professors, writers, and some representatives from the Italian-American community’ (Mangione Reference Mangione1961a). His talk was entitled ‘Difficulties in the Development and Stimulation of New Initiatives in Western Sicily’ (Sheeman Reference Sheeman1961b; Mangione Reference Mangione1985, 8; 134). Dolci outlined what he viewed as ‘three of the most serious aspects of the economic and social conditions in this region’. First, lack of education and training of ‘intelligent men’ who wanted to work but who were unskilled, which left available and usable resources squandered. Second, violence. Dolci showed a map identifying the locations of murders by ‘paramilitary peasant squads, led by local Mafiosi.’ He defined the Mafia as an organisation that used murder as a means for ‘re-establishing the local morality’. Third, government intervention that was ‘unorganic’ and ‘non-collaborative’ and did not respond to community needs. Instead it encouraged clientelism, which Dolci asserted had developed as a way of life and survival, and in reaction to a history of continuous invasion and domination. Clientelism thus created a situation in which ‘the political, religious and legal authorities, together with the police AND [sic] the Mafia, are more or less connected to each other.’ Furthermore, in the post-war period and in order to secure international development funds and aid to try to address what was judged to be the backwardness of the region, the government and its institutions were bound to implement a universal solution to a specific and local problem, as that would help them to prove the whole of Italy was of one particular character and identity – liberal and democratic. In his view the result of this approach was not long-term, real and infrastructural change but misspent resources and badly implemented schemes in areas where they served no need or application.

To make his point Dolci told the story of a fisherman who had returned to western Sicily after living in the US for 23 years. Despite long-term exposure to ‘developed civilisation’ the fisherman had refused worming treatment because he believed the old wives’ tale that ‘without [intestinal] worms we cannot live’. Dolci’s argument was that the problem was not that the man held fast to ancient beliefs, but that he had not been educated: it had been wrongly assumed that simply living in the environment of the US would have changed his views. Dolci said that to stop intestinal worms killing children in western Sicily ‘the distribution of ‘chocolate-flavoured worm powder is not enough […] water must be accessible […] sewage [sic] systems built’: but most of all there must be an active and targeted education campaign. Dolci argued that ‘unorganic’ leadership that ignored the grassroots and character traits that developed in response to these conditions, perpetuated the problem. Thus he concluded that financial, physical, material and human waste could only be minimised if those involved in leading investment and development had an intimate knowledge of the region and local folklore culture.

In order to understand what was needed in the South, those living there needed to be listened to, and education schemes run by and for those living there had to be implemented to allow their true character to emerge. He concluded by describing his four-stage approach to undertaking work in Sicily: 1) goodwill, a period of community integration; 2) documentation, gathering of information about the people and their lives and understanding the problems; 3) active resistance to the conditions and ways of life witnessed; 4) ‘initiating systematic work which will lead towards development’, which he was undertaking and seeking to fund (Dolci Reference Dolci1961). Dolci suggested that by making use of natural resources and teaching agricultural techniques, peasants and farmers on the island would first learn to live sustainably and become self-sufficient and later they would produce goods for export (Hutchens Reference Hutchens1961). His argument was that by not following this approach, the national and Sicilian regional governments did not respond to local needs but instead to those of the Mafia and other patron-client relationships (Hutchens Reference Hutchens1961).

Dolci’s talk contradicted the approach to development presented in the Sicilian exhibit and he raised suspicions about how the funds for the loans Morabito referred to in his essay were dispersed. In doing so he brought to the fore the two aims of his trip. First, to find support for a ‘scientific investigation of Mafia and violence’ (Hofman Reference Hofman1960) and second to influence the direction of the proposed initiative to send the just-formed US Peace Corps to set up and organise development projects in the Italian South. In contrast to Morabito, Dolci and his supporters were advising that aid should not go through governments but that the US should send a convoy of people who could be hosted by organisations such as Dolci’s (‘Italian Gandhi’ 1961). Dolci was very open about these aims, as he told the US Peace Corps director: ‘I come here … to find qualified people to help us in our development work, which is to make self-sufficient the most miserable and bloodiest part of western Sicily’ (Sheeman Reference Sheeman1961a).

In his report for the Friends of Dolci in the US, executive Mangione described the general mood of the attendees at Dolci’s talk ‘to be most receptive and [they] asked intelligent questions afterwards’. One came from ‘a certain Alex Gregorian, a Rumanian [sic] who published the Italian-American Herald’ (Mangione Reference Mangione1961a). He asked Dolci to comment on the communist situation in Sicily and – providing no reassurance for Cold War warriors – Dolci replied that before the Second World War Sicily had been largely conservative but now one-third of the island voted for the Partito Comunista d’Italia (PCI). Gregorian sat with ‘two or three hecklers in the audience’ and Mangione noted ‘they made statements, in Italian and English, attacking Danilo for his picture of western Sicily’. Although Mangione dismissed these interventions, saying ‘[t]heir effect was not important since it was quite obvious that the attack was a premeditated one,’ they were taken up in the newspapers (Mangione Reference Mangione1961a).

An editorial for the Italian-American Herald described Dolci as a ‘spiritually wormy character’ (9 March 1961) and an article on his talk was subtitled ‘“Crusading” Dolci Seen as Red Dupe in Talks Here’ (1961). Most notably, Farnese sent an ‘Anti Dolci’ letter to Il Progresso Italo-Americano (1961) which the Herald reprinted in English (‘Letters to the Editor’ 1961). Farnese began: ‘Your presentation follows very closely the Communist Party line’ and he questioned Dolci’s intentions: ‘You, a native of Trento, must try to understand that your defamatory method does not help Sicily anywhere […] Because I know Sicily better than you I have an obligation’ to correct. He also accused Dolci of wilfully ignoring the ‘reassuring figures’ in the national and regional budget and the results of programmes such as the Cassa. Farnese then bolstered his argument with statistics from the ‘Italian Trade Topics’ bulletin issued through the office of the commercial counsellor at the Italian Embassy in Washington. It showed a general rise in living standards by mapping consumption. Farnese also criticised Dolci’s use of examples:

Farnese agreed that Dolci’s ‘poor people’ were real but his view was that the current progress indicated standards of living would keep increasing. Thus, Farnese argued, it was ‘not necessary to adopt the well-known Communist methods’ Dolci was using to gain support, and in doing so damaging the reputation of Sicily and the Sicilians and reinforcing a view that they were backward (‘Letters to the Editor’ 1961).

Mangione’s response opened by accusing the Italian-American newspapers of ‘dishonest journalism’ and Farnese of deception in the way he reported progress in Sicily and discussed Dolci. Mangione challenged the figures and projections that Farnese relied on by pointing to the appendices in Spreco (1960). He also dismissed Farnese’s accusation that Dolci did not look and behave as a missionary should, with the assertion that such stereotypes were precisely the ones that, when applied to Sicily, Farnese resisted. Finally, Mangione defended Victoria Bawtree, Dolci’s translator, and stated that she had denounced neither the Catholic Church nor the Italian government. Bawtree was only trying to communicate the message that Dolci had consistently repeated: ‘We have remained outside politics … we invite all parties, without exception, to study the problem concretely.’ Thus she – and Dolci – spoke of a commitment to a politics of cooperation or consensus, not communism (‘Letters to the Editor’ 1961).

In a letter to his friend Gene, Mangione suggested the only reason those like Farnese were questioning Dolci’s motives was because he contradicted the view of Sicilian development that had been chosen by those in power. Mangione’s ‘proof’ was that the negative reaction to Dolci came from within the Italian-American community. In the wider world, Dolci’s visit had been positively reported in Republican and Democratic newspapers and the funding he had received to come to the US was from prestigious sources (Mangione Reference Mangione1961b). Despite this, Mangione believed that it was important to defend Dolci’s position because while ‘intelligent and educated Italian-Americans’ would discount the ‘propaganda of such dishonest elements in the community […] who will stoop to any dishonest means to defend the status quo in Italy’, the problem as he saw it was that ‘on the whole the Italian-American community in any large American city cannot be called an enlightened group […] they are either politically ignorant or reactionary’ and likely to swallow the line of ‘frauds’ like Farnese, ‘hook, line and sinker’. In Mangione’s view holding on to these beliefs resulted in ‘waste’ as it prevented societal development and progress through cooperation, and ‘shady operators’ remained undetected. He argued that for the Italian community to be united they did not all have to behave the same way and uncritically accept their leaders’ views on what Italy and Italians should be (Mangione Reference Mangione1961a).

‘Renascence’ or repetition?

The pleas made by Farnese and Mangione came as allegations of corruption, embezzlement and fraud were being lodged against the new Philadelphia leadership. The first signs of trouble were in 1959 when the radio broadcaster and print journalist, Donald Rose, blew the whistle on a radio DJ payola scandal, which was followed by the city controller Alexander Hemphill making public the Frankford Elevated Line refurbishment scandal (‘The Need: A Grand Jury Probe’ 1961; Rose Reference Rose1961). These allegations raised questions about clientelism and what sort of ‘renascence’ the 1952 Charter heralded for the city. Throwing the city administration into question did the same to the activities of the Commercial Museum. Many of those on the Festival of Italy organising committee and the new Commercial Museum board were also Democrats who belonged to the ADA, which brought together WASPs and leaders of ethnic and minority communities. These groups represented the ‘new’ leadership. In the post-war period Italian-Americans were active and respected participants in civic life and in the upper ranks of the Democrat and Republican parties as well as charitable and business organisations (Luconi Reference Luconi2001).

Questioning the nature of the Philadelphian ‘renascence’ potentially connected clientelist and dishonest political practices to Italians and suggested they were the cause of the problems in the city council. It was an easy allegation to make, as by 1960 the perception that organised crime networks were synonymous with the Mafia had firmly taken hold. The Kefauver hearings in the US Senate a decade earlier had endorsed it, thereby shifting responsibility for the existence of organised crime and corruption linked to governing authorities squarely onto the shoulders of Italians (or indeed Sicilians), and had found evidence that governance in Philadelphia was manipulated by a ‘political-police-gambler tie up’ (US Senate 1951, 46; Duggan Reference Duggan1989, 3). The findings of Kefauver were echoed in works such as Brotherhood of Evil: The Mafia (1959). Written by Reader’s Digest journalist Frederic Sondern in consultation with the head of the US Federal Bureau of Narcotics, it was an instant success, sitting on the New York Times bestseller list for 15 consecutive weeks. Sondern reinforced the Mafia-Sicilian-crime networks link and his preface began: ‘There have been many secret societies devoted to evil-doing, but nothing like the strange combine of Sicilian families which forms this company of born lawbreakers’ (7). Sondern attributed ‘their peculiarly Sicilian mentalities, characters, personal habits and lives’ to a predilection for involvement in Mafia activity but he also cautioned: ‘the terms Mafia and Sicilian are not synonymous’ (8). Nevertheless, trade, Sicilian, corruption, violence and Mafia, were presented as inextricably linked, and potential blocks to the successful operation of government.

It was this subject that the British development scholar Margaret Carlyle addressed in The Awakening of Southern Italy (1962). She commented that Sicilians in government had long been suspected of being mafiosi who use ‘their membership to defeat the ends of justice’ (112) and that operations of the octopus-like Mafia (Duggan Reference Duggan1989, 38) were the cause of the island’s problems:

Carlyle ended her chapter with a comment on Dolci, whom she described as an ‘unpractical saint’ (Carlyle Reference Carlyle1962, 113). But from what she had observed when doing her research in 1957–1958 she thought his approach was the only one bringing about change and development in western Sicily and operating outside clientelist networks, thus independent of the government, Church and Mafia. She also noted an important distinction between Mafia, mafia and brigands, which Carlo Levi had also made in Words are Stones (1958).

Levi argued that post-war policies had prevented development and land reform was needed to give peasants control and to bring an end to the violence and corruption in western Sicily. In Part Three of his book he defined the Mafia as a ruling organisation neither natural nor organic to Sicily but which had developed as a ruling body in response to the ‘foreign’ government: the Mafia ‘take the place of the absent government in a code of honour’ and rule. Accordingly a ‘fundamental pact of impunity between the Mafia and the government’ developed (157). Levi saw this arrangement as the cause of the hunger, illiteracy and unemployment he witnessed and he suggested that if those like Dolci could be in charge there would be hope for Sicily (171–172) On his way back to Palermo to return to Rome Levi discussed politics with his taxi driver, who told him: ‘Something social is needed, [...] because people can’t go on with the sort of poverty there is at present’ (211). Understanding that the DC would not fulfil this, the driver had considered voting for the neo-fascist Italian Social Movement (Movimento sociale italiano, MSI) or the Socialist Party. Levi thus questioned the efficacy of the programmes introduced by the post-war government and as he crossed back onto the mainlandhe concluded that Dolci and his work represented the best hope for Sicily: ‘Sicily was far away [from] Rome, Rome that is both too conscious and too ignorant, asleep in her limitless history and in the torpor of a hot summer day’ (212).

Levi’s warning foreshadowed the national, political and social crisis of late June and July of 1960 that was the Tambroni Affair. On 24 February 1960 Fernando Tambroni was appointed prime minister following a vote of no confidence in Antonio Segni’s government. A lawyer in his late 50s and a former member of the Fascist militia who joined the DC after 1945, Tambroni was a second-rank politician with flexible politics. To make up a government and reach an absolute majority Tambroni invited the MSI, which was led by former Fascists Giorgio Almirante, Arturo Michelini and Pino Romualdi, into an informal coalition. It was a contentious move (Silveri Reference Silveri2008, 500, 503, 527; Cortesi, Reference Cortesi1960, 1; Mammarella Reference Mammarella1966, 324–326). However, the majority of ministers supported it, as did the US government (Scoppola Reference Scoppola1991, 363–364) and Pius XII (Bosworth Reference Bosworth2011, 239). The Tambroni government characterised the alliance as a ‘non-political “business administration”’ (‘Senate Approves’ 1960) but despite measures taken (lower prices for domestic goods) to win popular approval, there was still social unrest (Silveri Reference Silveri2008, 520). Tambroni’s past also meant the government was accused of being pro-military, a charge reinforced when they ordered police intervention and sanctioned the use of force in response to strikes and demonstrations called by the PCI in May (Ginsborg Reference Ginsborg1992, 257). Tensions remained strained but were pushed to breaking point when, to thank the MSI for their support, Tambroni granted them permission to hold their annual congress in Genoa in the first week of July (Mammarella Reference Mammarella1966, 326–327). Carlo Emanuele Basile, who as a prefect in Genoa during the Italian Social Republic had approved deportations and for which in 1945 he had been sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment (later reduced), was a named speaker at the Congress (Ginsborg Reference Ginsborg1992, 256).

In response a strike was held on 19 June, and on 28 June a massive demonstration was organised in Genoa to announce the intention to strike and protest on 30 June unless permission for the MSI was withdrawn (Behan Reference Behan2009, 142). However, it was not, and so, at the command of the trade and labour unions, general strikes went ahead in Milan, Ferrara and Livorno, as did a protest march through the streets of Genoa. There were violent clashes across Italy between the parties involved: the MSI, anti-fascist protesters, workers, students and finally police. The prolonged presence of protesters on the streets and the industry strikes forced Tambroni to make two public announcements. First, and with the mayor of Genoa, he revoked the MSI conference permission. Second, he called in the police to control the strikes and protests and gave them permission to shoot in ‘emergency situations’. Tambroni’s actions inflamed rather than resolved the situation (Mammarella Reference Mammarella1966, 328) and in the days that followed there was further unrest (‘Riots End’ 1960) which continued until the crisis was brought to an end on 19 July 1960 with the resignation of Tambroni and his government (Behan Reference Behan2009, 143).

The Tambroni Affair represented a massive failure for the DC and how the story was told to the outside world was carefully controlled. The New York Times special correspondent, Arnaldo Cortesi, an anti-communist ‘Fascist apologist’ (‘Mr Cortesi’ 1945) asserted that Tambroni’s ‘fall’ had been caused by the ‘Communist-inspired and Communist-led riots’ (Cortesi Reference Cortesi1960). This was also the view taken up by Manlio Brosio, the Italian ambassador to the United States, and he cautioned against the formation of a new government through alliance with the left (‘L’Amb Brosio’ 1961; Silveri Reference Silveri2008, 17; 525). They also agreed that it was not Tambroni who had failed, but the system, a view reinforced by the president of Fiat S.p.A., Vittorio Valletta, who thought Tambroni an ‘excellent administrator’ who had ‘accomplished a great deal’ (Foreign Service Despatch 1960, 1). The new interim government appointed on 22 July 1960 was centre-left and led by the sometime Fascist economist and committed Catholic, Amintore Fanfani, with the help of Aldo Moro. The new executive was composed of only DC ministers and Tambroni was offered a ministry. Although he declined, it sent a clear message that the tumult had resulted from causes external to the DC style of leadership.

Sending such a message was important as the national DC government was not the only one in trouble and which appeared out of touch with voters’ needs. In January 1960 a crisis had hit the Sicilian regional government when the coalition government that supported the regional president, Silvio Milazzo, fell apart following his attempt to pass a controversial budget. Milazzo held a special interest in agricultural development and as a DC politician had first stood for Catania in 1948. In 1958 he split from the DC and formed his own party, the Union of Christian Socialists (Unione Siciliana Cristiano Sociale, USCS), which angered the DC and the Catholic Church (Bayne Reference Bayne1961). His view was that it was time for Sicilian constitutional autonomy and control of the future of Sicily to be reclaimed from the national DC (Bayne Reference Bayne1959, 12). A debate continued about leadership in Sicily and whether the combination of autonomy and increased funding would simply further serve the interests of Sicilian elites and encourage clientelist practices. US government officials kept a close watch over how Marshall Plan money was spent.

In the late 1950s it was becoming increasingly clear that development policies were directing the Italian economy towards a ‘sensational’ boom and that the regions benefiting were mostly in the north. It was suggested that the reason regions like Sicily were not booming was because local DC leaders in Sicily had misused development funds and systematically plundered resources for their own ends (Chubb Reference Chubb1982, 28–34). Milazzo did not believe the problem was with Sicily and Sicilians but instead with a government who were working to serve their own interests. One particular accusation was that Eni was being used as a ‘private fiefdom’ by national DC minister Enrico Mattei and ‘clientelistic practices were rife throughout the organisation […] Public money was used habitually and without scruple to bribe clients and officials’ (Ginsborg Reference Ginsborg1992, 164). Milazzo was joined by other renegade politicians from the DC and the Socialist Party in Sicily (‘Sicilian Political Rebel’ 1959). He was elected president of the region of Sicily on 30 October 1958 on a mandate protesting incomplete regional autonomy and frustration over the slowness of development in Sicily.

The new ruling coalition was composed of the PCI, the Socialist Party and right-wing dissidents – neo-fascists and ex-monarchists (Bayne Reference Bayne1961, 2). Defending the mix, Milazzo asserted: ‘What may appear a democratic marriage in one area of Italy, may not appear so in another’ (Bayne Reference Bayne1961, 3). Thus Milazzo made the argument that Sicilian specificity demanded autonomy, not only in leadership but also in development. Milazzo’s term as president was tumultuous as he was continually contesting the DC national leadership (‘Sicilian Regime’ 1958; Casserly Reference Casserly1960). In February 1960 he resigned and he was replaced by his friend, Benedetto Majorana (‘Red-backed Chief Resigns’ 1960). The coalition supporting Majorana collapsed following a vote of no confidence in early 1961 (‘Rightist Elected As Sicilian Chief’ 1961) and it took 78 days for a new majority to form, which once again raised questions over autonomy and backwardness in Sicily (‘La crisi siciliana’ 1961). From the point of view of those like Milazzo and Majorana the problem was that there was no unity of vision between the regional assembly and the national government. They raised concerns about the DC style of rule and governing practices, which they implied were clientelist and Mafia related.