INTRODUCTION
Negotiation is ‘a process of potentially opportunistic interaction by which two or more parties with some apparent conflict seek to do better through jointly decided action than they could otherwise’ (Lax & Sebenius, Reference Lax and Sebenius1986: 11). As negotiators may encounter the risk of being exploited when they disclose information, such as their settlement preferences (Dees & Cramton, Reference Dees and Cramton1991; Murnighan, Babcock, Thompson, & Pillutla, Reference Murninghan, Babcock, Thompson and Pillutla1999), deception, or the ‘deliberate act taken by one party with the intention of creating or adding support to a false belief in another party’ (Cramton & Dees, Reference Cramton and Dees1993: 361), is a common practice in negotiations (Lewicki, Saunders, & Barry, Reference Lewicki, Saunders and Barry2006). When negotiators deliberately misrepresent information to the other party, they employ informational deception (O’Connor & Carnevale, Reference O’Connor and Carnevale1997; Tenbrunsel, Reference Tenbrunsel1998). When negotiators intentionally display emotions without real experience to influence others, they use emotional deception (Barry, Reference Barry, Bies, Lewicki and Sheppard1999; Fulmer, Barry, & Long, Reference Fulmer, Barry and Long2009). Relatively speaking, informational deception verbally conveys feelings and intentions explicitly, while emotional deception nonverbally signals them implicitly (Keltner & Kring, Reference Keltner and Kring1998; Putnam & Jones, Reference Putnam and Jones1982).
As deception hinders effective information exchange, decreases joint gains, and endangers the relationship among parties (Aquino, Reference Aquino1998; Murninghan, Babcock, Thompson, & Pillutla, Reference Murninghan, Babcock, Thompson and Pillutla1999; Steinel & De Dreu, Reference Steinel and De Dreu2004), scholars have investigated the antecedents of deception in negotiations (Cohen, Reference Cohen2010; Ma & McLean Parks, Reference Ma and McLean Parks2012; O’Connor & Carnevale, Reference O’Connor and Carnevale1997; Olekalns & Smith, Reference Olekalns and Smith2009). One of the prominent arguments is that mutual trust may prevent deception (Cramton & Dees, Reference Cramton and Dees1993; Dees & Cramton, Reference Dees and Cramton1991). Trust is the willingness to expose one's vulnerability to the other party (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, Reference Mayer, Davis and Schoorman1995), and when negotiators have reasons to trust their opponents, they are willing to be honest (Dees & Cramton, Reference Dees and Cramton1991). McAllister (Reference McAllister1995) further differentiated cognition-based trust and affect-based trust. Cognition-based trust develops among parties who share confidence in each others’ knowledge-based reliability and credibility (Butler, Reference Butler1991; Cook & Wall, Reference Cook and Wall1980; Zucker, Reference Zucker, Staw and Cummings1986), and affect-based trust grows among individuals who find each other likeable and connectable emotionally (Drolet & Morris, Reference Drolet and Morris2000; Lewis & Weigert, Reference Lewis and Weigert1985; Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, Reference Rempel, Holmes and Zanna1985). Interestingly, as a recent study conducted in Western societies has suggested (Olekalns & Smith, Reference Olekalns and Smith2009), cognition-based trust and affect-based trust have distinct effects on informational deception in negotiation. Moreover, the effects of these two types of trust are also contingent upon other factors, such as power and opponenet's motivation (Olekalns & Smith, Reference Olekalns and Smith2007). Such findings have highlighted the importance of building a fine-grained theory when exploring the relationship between trust and deception by carefully specifying the dimensions of the core constructs and by taking contextual actors into consideration (Olekalns & Smith, Reference Olekalns and Smith2009).
Despite these invaluable insights, one critical contextual factor, culture, has still received limited attention in this literature. Culture is ‘the way in which a group of people solves problems and reconciles dilemmas’ (Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, Reference Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner1997: 6), and people from different cultures may follow distinct norms to judge appropriateness in both informational and emotional interactions (Kopelman & Rosette, Reference Kopelman and Rosette2008; Ma, Reference Ma2010). For example, collectivists such as Chinese who lie to outgroup members for the benefit of the ingroup are thought to be fulfilling obligations, whereas such obligations are less likely to propel individualists such as Americans to use deception (Triandis et al., Reference Triandis, Carnevale, Gelfand, Rubert, Wasti, Probst, Kashima, Dragona, Chan, Chen, Kin, Kim, De Dreu, Van de Vlieut, Iwao, Ohbuchi and Schmitz2001). Similarly, the norms of expressions of emotion in negotiations may also vary across cultures. Collectivists such as Chinese are unwilling and regard it socially inappropriate to express negative emotions such as anger (Adam, Shirako, & Maddux, Reference Adam, Shirako and Maddux2010). In contrast, individualists such as Americans are more experienced and comfortable with expressing negative emotions as personal feelings (Chentsova-Dutton & Tsai, Reference Chentsova-Dutton and Tsai2010), and consider emotional deceptions acceptable (Fulmer et al., Reference Fulmer, Barry and Long2009).
Incorporating these discussions into negotiation, we theorize and empirically examine culture as an important contextual factor that influences deception. Our study has two objectives. First, we explore how culture may influence negotiators’ perceived appropriateness of both informational and emotional deceptions. Most previous studies on deception in negotiations are conducted in Western cultures without considering the impact of culture. Although scholars have started comparing negotiators from different cultures (e.g., Ma, Reference Ma2010), the scope of such comparisons is limited to informational deception. Such a limitation reflects a recent critique that most negotiation studies have paid much attention to cognitively driven behaviours but only little to emotion (Barry, Fulmer, & Goates, Reference Barry, Fulmer, Goates and Thompson2006). In the present study, we examine both informational and emotional deception by comparing negotiators from China and the U.S., two countries with distinct cultural and institutional settings. Such an extension can provide a more comprehensive examination of how culture influences deception.
A second objective of the current study is to investigate the relationships between two types of trust (cognition-based and affect-based) and two types of deception (informational and emotional), taking a contextualized view (Tsui, Reference Tsui2004, Reference Tsui2006, Reference Tsui2007; Whetten, Reference Whetten2008). Although trust is generally assumed to prevent deception (Dees & Cramton, Reference Dees and Cramton1991), its function may be contingent upon situational factors (Olekalns & Smith, Reference Olekalns and Smith2007, Reference Olekalns and Smith2009). As people from different cultures endorse different norms regarding information-exchange and emotion-laden behaviors (e.g., Hwang, Reference Hwang1987; Markus & Kitayama, Reference Markus and Kitayama1991; Mesquita & Frijda, Reference Mesquita and Frijda1992; Tung, Worm, & Fang, Reference Tung, Worm and Fang2008), understanding deceptions during negotiation and the role of trust in attenuating deceptions under various cultural contexts is critical.
Using Chinese and US samples to illustrate distinctive cultural profiles among negotiators, we propose that culture affects the prevalent forms of deception, and moderates the relationships between trust and deception. The culturally divergent effects of cognition-based versus affect-based trust provide theoretical and practical implications on how to manage deception in negotiation under different cultural contexts. Our findings highlight the importance of culturally sensitive processes of trust building that facilitate deception management in negotiations.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
The defining properties categorizing the two types of trust are the psychological processes grounding ‘good reasons’ for trust (Chua, Morris, & Ingram, Reference Chua, Morris and Ingram2009; Lewicki & Bunker, Reference Lewicki, Bunker, Kramer and Tyler1996; Lewis & Weigert, Reference Lewis and Weigert1985; McAllister, Reference McAllister1995): cognition-based trust centres on the knowledge of others’ dependability and reliability (Butler, Reference Butler1991; Cook & Wall, Reference Cook and Wall1980; Zucker, Reference Zucker, Staw and Cummings1986), whereas affect-based trust hinges on the emotional ties among people (Drolet & Morris, Reference Drolet and Morris2000; Lewis & Weigert, Reference Lewis and Weigert1985; Rempel et al., Reference Rempel, Holmes and Zanna1985). The two types of trust are not exclusive, and cognition-based trust often precedes affect-based trust, which is regarded as a deeper form of trust (McAllister, Reference McAllister1995, Reference McAllister, Lewicki, Bies and Sheppard1997).
Trust influences deceptions through cost-benefit analysis (Olekalns & Smith, Reference Olekalns and Smith2007, Reference Olekalns and Smith2009). Deceptions, on the one hand, may gain favourable outcomes for negotiators (e.g., O’Connor & Carnevale, Reference O’Connor and Carnevale1997). On the other hand, negotiators have to face the risks and consequences if deceptions are detected (Ma & McLean Parks, Reference Ma and McLean Parks2012). Once deception is detected, the deceptor may face economic loss from retribution during negotiation, and relational and reputational loss afterward. According to mutual trust perspective (Cramton & Dees, Reference Cramton and Dees1993; Dees & Cramton, Reference Dees and Cramton1991), when the other party is trustworthy, the focal person may decrease the usage of deception because of decreased fear of exploitation. We propose that culture not only directly influcences two types of deception through concern for harmony, likelihood of detectability, and consequences of deception, but also moderates the relationships between cognition- and affect-based trust and deception.
Culture and Deception
Culture is ‘the way in which a group of people solves problems and reconciles dilemmas’ (Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, Reference Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner1997: 6). In other words, culture shapes the concerns for personal utility and group welfare, emotional display preferences, and norms for harmony in social interactions (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, Reference Markus and Kitayama1991; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, Reference Oyserman, Coon and Kemmelmeier2002), all of which may influence people's intention to deceive (Triandis et al., Reference Triandis, Carnevale, Gelfand, Rubert, Wasti, Probst, Kashima, Dragona, Chan, Chen, Kin, Kim, De Dreu, Van de Vlieut, Iwao, Ohbuchi and Schmitz2001). Culture also represents institutional factors, such as availability of industrial information and explicitly codified legal systems, which also influence the likelihood and consequence of a deception (Tung et al., Reference Tung, Worm and Fang2008). For example, the availability of industrial information in a certain society influences the detectability of dishonesty (Tung et al., Reference Tung, Worm and Fang2008), whereas institutional policies aggravate the seriousness of dishonesty (Mazar & Ariely, Reference Mazar and Ariely2006).
In particular, culture influences the acceptability of negative emotional deception. The interpersonal consequence of negative emotional deception include estrangement of the other negotiator (Mesquita & Frijda, Reference Mesquita and Frijda1992). People from different cultures have various degrees of relationship concern (Markus & Kitayama, Reference Markus and Kitayama1991). The norm of harmony regulates social interactions and cultivates interpersonal relationships among collectivists (Leung, Brew, Zhang, & Zhang, Reference Leung, Brew, Zhang and Zhang2011). To Chinese, harmonious interpersonal relationships not only provide affective comfort, but are also used to acquire desirable resources (Hwang, Reference Hwang1987). Chinese usually refrain from expressing negative emotions or aggressive outbursts toward others for fear of disrupting harmony (Hwang, Reference Hwang1987; Markus & Kitayama, Reference Markus and Kitayama1991; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, Reference Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner1997). Averting negative emotional expressions maintains a harmonious atmosphere (heqi 和气) because destructive emotions may hurt relationships and even lead to the disintegration of interpersonal relations (Leung et al., Reference Leung, Brew, Zhang and Zhang2011). The consequence can be especially devastating in an institutional environment where businesses rely heavily on personal relationships (Tung et al., Reference Tung, Worm and Fang2008). Thus, expressing anger in negotiations is culturally inappropriate and uncomfortable for the Chinese (Adam et al., Reference Adam, Shirako and Maddux2010). However, to some extent, using negative emotional deception is not psychologically or culturally accessible to Chinese negotiators. Tung et al. (Reference Tung, Worm and Fang2008) reported that in the ‘clannish’ Chinese commercial society, such deviant behaviours are unusual and can be easily detected, and the performer of such behaviours loses not only potential benefits but also damages critical relationships by, for example, losing critical social connections among one's guanxi networks (Tinsley, O’Connor, & Sullivan, Reference Tinsley, O’Connor and Sullivan2002).
In contrast, Americans have little social concern for expressing ego-focused negative emotions (Markus & Kitayama, Reference Markus and Kitayama1991) that may offend and create social separation from others. Such behaviour does not necessarily mean that Americans feel more comfortable with interpersonal disharmony; it just carries relatively less social consequences. The individualistic cultural context makes the expression of negative emotions more socially acceptable, and members of individualistic cultures have opportunities to practice such skills. Americans are relatively less dependent on personal relations to conduct business, and therefore have less social concern in offending others by using negative emotional deception for individual gain. Compared with informational deception, emotional deception is more difficult to detect and verify (e.g., Fulmer et al., Reference Fulmer, Barry and Long2009; Olekalns & Smith, 2006). According to Fulmer et al., (Reference Fulmer, Barry and Long2009) American negotiators consider emotional deception to be more ethically acceptable than misrepresentation of material facts. Hence, the use of negative emotional deception are more culturally available and accessible for American than Chinese negotiators.
Hypothesis 1a: Chinese negotiators will approve the use of negative emotional deception less than American negotiators.
Culture also influences the acceptability of informational deception. Informational deception can be considered as a kind of indirect tactic to influence others. To achieve the goals of both harmony and personal gain, informational deception offers Chinese negotiators an opportunity to grant the other party ‘face’ for yielding and claim a bigger piece of the ‘pie’. Furthermore, the powerful position gained through informational deception by one party reduces the cycles of harmony-damaging haggling. Chinese people maintains harmony by reciprocating ‘face’ and often favor instrumental reasons (Hwang, Reference Hwang1987). To gain favour, instrumental means are mixed with the premise of harmony. Confrontation in a negotiation will sabotage harmony among negotiators. During a negotiation, positional bargaining is likely to strain the relationship among parties, and haggling often taints the harmonious atmosphere. Thus, Chinese negotiators are more often found to use compromise, indirect communication, and avoidance (e.g., Briley, Morris, & Simonson, 2006; Friedman, Chi, & Liu, Reference Friedman, Chi and Liu2006), all of which facilitate a harmonious norm. The high context and indirect communication styles used by Chinese negotiators may make detecting informational deception more difficult. At the same time, institutional factors such as a lack of industrial information, or the tenuous legal system, make deceptions difficult to detect, and potential sanctions for detected deceptions even more ambiguous (Tung et al., Reference Tung, Worm and Fang2008). Debunking the lie means others lose face, and thereby affects harmony. Sometimes, when Chinese negotiators deceive for the welfare of the collective group (Triandis et al., Reference Triandis, Carnevale, Gelfand, Rubert, Wasti, Probst, Kashima, Dragona, Chan, Chen, Kin, Kim, De Dreu, Van de Vlieut, Iwao, Ohbuchi and Schmitz2001), the deceiving individual is disengaged from moral responsibility (Mazar & Aggarwal, Reference Mazar and Aggarwal2011). As a result, the detection of informational deception may not taint the deceiver's reputation in Chinese society. According to Triandis et al. (Reference Triandis, Carnevale, Gelfand, Rubert, Wasti, Probst, Kashima, Dragona, Chan, Chen, Kin, Kim, De Dreu, Van de Vlieut, Iwao, Ohbuchi and Schmitz2001), vertical collectivists, such as Chinese negotiators, tend to lie more than horizontal individualists, such as American negotiators.
Compared with Chinese, Americans prefer direct approaches to communication, such as arguments and debates (e.g., Brew & Cairns, Reference Brew and Cairns2004; Morris et al., Reference Morris, Williams, Leung, Bhatnagar, Li, Kondo, Luo and Hu1998; Tinsley & Brett, Reference Tinsley and Brett2001; Wang, Lin, Chan, & Shi, Reference Wang, Lin, Chan and Shi2005), and striving to be honest, thereby reducing cognitive dissonance resulting from lies (Markus & Kitayama, Reference Markus and Kitayama1991). The established institutional environment and legal systems are conducive for detecting and punishing lies or misrepresentation of material facts. Individualists must assume the consequences of their own behaviour if deception is detected, and individualized moral sanctions hold them back from informational deception (Mazar & Aggarwal, Reference Mazar and Aggarwal2011). Compared with collectivistic negotiators, individualists are less likely to consider informational deceptions appropriate (Triandis et al., Reference Triandis, Carnevale, Gelfand, Rubert, Wasti, Probst, Kashima, Dragona, Chan, Chen, Kin, Kim, De Dreu, Van de Vlieut, Iwao, Ohbuchi and Schmitz2001).
Hypothesis 1b: Chinese negotiators will approve the use of informational deception more than American negotiators.
Culture, Trust, and Deception
Although trust can reduce deception (Cramton & Dees, Reference Cramton and Dees1993; Dees & Cramton, Reference Dees and Cramton1991), the way that trust affects deception in negotiation may be contingent upon cultural contexts. Next, we provide specific arguments for the culturally divergent effects of cognition-based trust and affect-based trust in reducing deception in negotiation.
Cognition-based trust
Cognition-based trust is rooted in the trustor's knowledge or evidence regarding the trustee's credibility, competence, reliability, and reputation, which motivates the trustor's further action toward the trustee (Chua, et al., Reference Chua, Morris and Ingram2009; McAllister, Reference McAllister1995). For Chinese, the nature of harmony ranges from genuine harmony to superficial harmony, depending on their judgment of the other party (Huang, Reference Huang1999). The tendency to be other-focused (Markus & Kitayama, Reference Markus and Kitayama1991) makes Chinese more sensitive to interpersonal information and more flexible in behaviour. When they perceive trustworthy signals from the other party, they believe that their risk of being exploited is low (e.g., Olekalns & Smith, Reference Olekalns and Smith2009) and that they can meet each others’ expectations (Triandis et al., Reference Triandis, Carnevale, Gelfand, Rubert, Wasti, Probst, Kashima, Dragona, Chan, Chen, Kin, Kim, De Dreu, Van de Vlieut, Iwao, Ohbuchi and Schmitz2001). The reciprocation of sincere goodwill cultivates genuine harmony that further improves and consolidates relationships. Chinese negotiators are highly sensitive to reciprocity and harmony-building (Liu, Friedman, & Chi, Reference Liu, Friedman and Chi2005). The detection of dishonesty by the other party may degrade genuine harmony to superficial harmony, which is reflected in a decrease of benevolent reciprocity, conflicts, and damaged relationships, all of which are of high concern for Chinese (Earley, Reference Earley1997; Friedman et al., Reference Friedman, Chi and Liu2006; Holtgraves, Reference Holtgraves1997; Leung et al., Reference Leung, Brew, Zhang and Zhang2011; Ting-Toomey et al., Reference Ting-Toomey, Gao, Trubisky, Yang, Kim, Lin and Nishida1991). As discussed earlier, negative emotional deception is less culturally acceptable among Chinese than Americans. When Chinese negotiators share a high level of cognition-based trust among one another, they are more confident on each other's competence and dependability, and consequently the use of negative emotional deception becomes unnecessary to achieve desirable outcomes. Deceiving for the benefits of the collective is understandable for Chinese, but their face and social connections will suffer even more damage if they violate the norm of reciprocity in honesty. Chinese consider it disastrous to be verified that they are not worthy of being treated with honesty. Thus, a higher level of cognition-based trust, which already brings the benefit of reliability of the other party, will further deter Chinese negotiators from using negative emotional deception.
With a clear distinction between ingroup and ourgroup circles, Chinese deem the maintenance of harmony as conditional. They will break the harmony if the benefit calculation and risk assessment do not make it worth their while to maintain harmony, especially with outgroup members (Hwang, Reference Hwang1987). When less cognition-based trust exists, Chinese negotiators can legitimately deceive other parties, and even use the harmony-destroying negative emotional deception more. Therefore, if Chinese negotiators place cognitive trust on others, they tend to decrease the usage of both informational and negative emotional deception; conversely, if cognitive trust is low, more deception might be expected.
Americans have less concern for interpersonal harmony-building. The individual-focused tendency motivates them to seek instrumental means that enable the attainment of personal goals (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, Reference Markus and Kitayama1991; Oyserman & Markus, Reference Oyserman, Markus and Suls1993; Triandis, Reference Triandis1995). The trustworthiness of a negotiation opponent signals predictability in behaviour (Rempel et al., Reference Rempel, Holmes and Zanna1985) and, therefore, the opponent becomes susceptible to deception tactics. Americans are more likely to perceive a negotiation as a competitive situation (Ting-Toomey, Yee-Jung, Shapiro, Garcia, Wright, & Oetzel, Reference Ting-Toomey, Yee-Jung, Shapiro, Garcia, Wright and Oetzel2000), which provides an optimal opportunity to take advantage of the more cognitively trustworthy opponent to promote self-interest through deceptions. Individualists in pursuit of self-interest may even use more informational deception (O’Connor & Carnevale, Reference O’Connor and Carnevale1997; Schweitzer, DeChurch, & Gibson, Reference Schweitzer, DeChurch and Gibson2005). When Americans negotiators obtain the knowledge or evidence that the other side is reliable with high cognitive trust, they tend to perceive the situation to be more exploitable with both deceptions, but more negative emotional deception due to lower risk of being detected (Olekalns & Smith, Reference Olekalns and Smith2009). On the other hand, when they have knowledge or evidence of the other party being less trustworthy, negotiators are more cautious of the risk of deception (e.g., Olekalns & Smith, Reference Olekalns and Smith2007). Therefore, we hypothesize a moderating effect of culture on the realtionship between cognition-based trust and deception.
Hypothesis 2a: The negative relationship between cognition-based trust and the approval of negative emotional deception will be stronger for Chinese negotiators than for American negotiators.
Hypothesis 2b: The negative relationship between cognition-based trust and the approval of informational deception will be stronger for Chinese negotiators than for American negotiators.
Affect-based trust
Affect-based trust is rooted in the emotional connection between the trustor and trustee (McAllister, Reference McAllister1995). Emotional affiliation with others is culturally embedded (Chiu & Hong, Reference Chiu and Hong2006; Keesing, Reference Keesing1974). In Chinese culture, an emotion-laden social relationship does not reject instrumental consideration, but is used to procure instrumental benefits (Luo, Reference Luo2011). Chinese people tend to mix emotional and instrumental concern (Chua et al., Reference Chua, Morris and Ingram2009; Sanchez-Burks, Reference Sanchez-Burks2002; Sanchez-Burks, Lee, Choi, Nisbett, Zhao, & Koo, Reference Sanchez-Burks, Lee, Choi, Nisbett, Zhao and Koo2003). Paradoxically, while people ‘utilize the affective tie as an instrument to procure some desired material resource. . .its expressive component always claims precedence over its instrumental component’ (Hwang, Reference Hwang1987: 949). A dispassionate negotiation renders the perception of social distance (Ting-Toomey & Cocroft, Reference Ting-Toomey, Cocroft and Ting-Toomey1994), which is inconsistent with the genuine harmony expected in close ties. When an emotionally charged episode occurs, negative emotional deception is difficult to detect, and informational deception can be a more peaceful and efficient way to secure power, serve the purpose of saving face, (DePaulo & Bell, Reference DePaulo and Bell1996) and maintain harmonious relationships than honest and direct bargaining (Ho, Reference Ho1976).
When there is a high level of affect-based trust among Chinese, concern for each other's welfare (McAllister, Reference McAllister1995) making them emotionally safe (Rempel et al., Reference Rempel, Holmes and Zanna1985), and in turn results in the relatively stable and permanent relationship (Hwang, Reference Hwang1987), and therefore there is less concern to disengage from the other party due to the detection of deceptions. On the other hand, cognitive trust emerges from the trustor's rational knowledge and evidence on the trustworthiness of the trustee (McAllister, Reference McAllister1995); therefore the relationship based on cognitive trust may be more professional than personal. When there is affective trust, even if the other parties are aware of potential deceptions, the negotiators may not be willing to debunk the deceptions and accuse deceivers of lying because their affective relationship is personal. The affective affiliation with the deceiver can be socially contagious – Chinese negotiators believe that concession in this negotiation will be traded for the deceiver's yielding in their future interactions.
In the American culture, people have more relational concerns in non-work settings (Sanchez-Burks et al., Reference Sanchez-Burks, Lee, Choi, Nisbett, Zhao and Koo2003), where affect-based trust develops. The communal nature of affect-based trust means to sacrifice one's own needs to respond to a partner's needs (McAllister, Reference McAllister, Lewicki, Bies and Sheppard1997). Thus, when American negotiators affectively trust others, they tend to be honest. The betrayal of affective trust is inconsistent with the Western belief of communal relationships, and produces cognitive dissonance. Communal relationships lead to less deception (e.g., Schweitzer & Croson, Reference Schweitzer and Croson1999), and therefore affect-based trust lessens informational deception (Olekalns & Smith, Reference Olekalns and Smith2009) and negative emotional deception. Conversely, in the case of less affect-based trust, Americans, who have fewer social concerns, face a low likelihood of being detected, assume less of the consequences, and tend to use more deceptions for individual gain. Hence, we hypothesize a moderating effect of culture on the realtionship between affect-based trust and deception.
Hypothesis 3a: The positive relationship between affect-based trust and the approval of negative emotional deception will be stronger for Chinese negotiators than for American negotiators.
Hypothesis 3b: The positive relationship between affect-based trust and the approval of informational deception, will be stronger for Chinese negotiators than for American negotiators.
METHOD
Sample
The hypotheses were tested on data collected using the same experiment in the U.S. and in China. The participants of the present study consisted of 124 Chinese (62 males, 62 females) and 136 American (64 males, 72 females) undergraduate students. The effect of the reference group may conceal the cultural differences between individualism and collectivism using self-reported questionnaires in respective cultures (Heine, Lehman, Peng & Greenholtz, Reference Heine, Lehman, Peng and Greenholtz2002). Individualists may cherish some values more than collectivists (Triandis, McCusker & Hui, Reference Triandis, McCusker and Hui1990). Therefore, the subjects were asked to fill out Schwartz's (Reference Schwartz and Zanna1992) culture value scales before they read the background material in order to test directly whether the participants were culturally representative.
Among the 10 individual-level values, universalism, achievement, and stimulation are most relevant to the present research questions, and therefore appropriate for a validation check of the subjects’ cultural profiles. According to Schwartz (Reference Schwartz and Zanna1992, Reference Schwartz, Kim, Triandis, Kagitcibasi, Choi and Yoon1994), the value of universalism suggests understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature. Those with high universalism often value broadmindedness, wisdom, social justice, equality, a world at peace, and protecting the environment. The value of achievement indicates the importance of personal success through demonstration of competence according to social standards. Those who value achievements highly often aspire to be successful, capable, ambitious, and influential. The value of stimulation means that excitement, novelty, and challenge are of high importance in life. Those who value stimulation highly often emphasize a daring, varied, and exciting life. These three values were considered as most influential on a person's beliefs and behaviours related to trust, deception, and the potential for ethical considerations. Universalism is related to tendencies of trusting others and taking care of social justice (Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, Reference Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner1997); achievement and stimulation might motivate individuals to take risks and demonstrate unethical behaviour for individual gains (Morris et al., Reference Morris, Williams, Leung, Bhatnagar, Li, Kondo, Luo and Hu1998; Schweitzer et al., Reference Schweitzer, DeChurch and Gibson2005). The analysis of variance (ANOVA) on universalism (α = 0.77) indicated a significant variance in cultural profiles of the two samples (F = 198.68, df = 258, p < 0.001). Universalism was significantly higher for Americans (mean = 5.10) than for Chinese (mean = 3.97). The value of achievement (α = 0.69) also showed variation in cultural profiles, F = 106.26, df = 258, p < 0.001. Achievement was significantly higher for Americans (mean = 5.50) than for Chinese (mean = 4.69). A significant difference (F = 375.42, df = 258, p < 0.001) was observed in the value of stimulation (α = 0.76) between Americans (mean = 5.34) and Chinese (mean = 3.03). The results are consistant with previous studies (e.g., Morris et al., Reference Morris, Williams, Leung, Bhatnagar, Li, Kondo, Luo and Hu1998; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, Reference Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner1997).
Procedure
For the negotiation, and to elicit different levels of affect-based trust, the current research recruited either friends or individuals who were then paired up with a stranger in order to create differences in trust levels in the dyads. Upon arrival, each friend or stranger dyad was sent to a room. Each dyad was given a maximum of 25 minutes to negotiate. At the onset, participants were welcomed and given instructions. They were then asked to read the negotiation materials and to complete a pre-negotiation questionnaire. Once the negotiation was over, participants filled out a post-negotiation questionnaire. For their participation, the Chinese students received 15 RMB, and the American students received extra course credits.
Negotiation Task
An integrative negotiation task (Gelfand & Realo, Reference Gelfand and Realo1999) was modified to serve the purpose of the current study. The negotiation concerned a brochure-printing contract that involved four issues. To meet the urgent demand of a client for advertising brochures, two representatives occupying organizational boundary positions, one from the Red Star Advertisement Company and the other from Blue Sky Advertisement Company, needed to reach agreements on four issues. In each of the four issues, negotiators were given five alternatives, with each representing certain values for negotiators (in terms of points). Two issues (paper quality and the number of colour pages) were distributive (i.e., one party's gain is the other party's loss), in which buyers and sellers had perfectly opposite interests. Integrative potential was present in the other two issues (i.e., the number of copies and the billing date). Failure to reach an agreement resulted in zero points for each negotiation party.
Measures
Trust
We adopted previously established measures for two reasons. First, they allowed our findings to be compatible and comparable with previous findings. Second, we were able to adjust the established measures to fit our current research context. Our measure of cognition-based trust consisted of a modified calculus-based trust scale (α = 0.78) with 5 items is adopted from Lewicki, Stevenson, and Bunker (Reference Lewicki, Stevenson and Bunker1997). For example, the original item ‘I hear from others about this person's good reputation’ was modified to ‘This person should deserve good reputation’ because we want to record the subjects’ trust judgement in the negotiation process. We measured affect-based trust with a five-item scale developed by McAllister (Reference McAllister1995) (α = 0.88). We modified the scale by deleting ‘at work’ from the original items to fit the negotiation context. To lower the effect of the measurement problem on the outcomes (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, Reference Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee and Podsakoff2003), temporal separation of measurement was used by measuring affect-based trust before negotiation, and assessing deceptions after negotiation, thereby preventing affect-based trust from the impact of negotiation. Cognition-based trust is measured after negotiation, which is proximally separated from deception items. This measure enabled negotiators to know each other better in the negotiation context in line with the definition of cognition-based trust, thereby mitigating the problem of potential covariance between the measures of cognition-based trust and deceptions. In addition, the common method variance was not problematic in terms of interaction effects (Evans, Reference Evans1985).
Culture
In the main test, country proxy was used with 1 for China and 0 for US. In robustness test, an average values score was calculated to measure culture.
Deception
The seven-item scale with different response formats (α = 0.72) (Fulmer et al., Reference Fulmer, Barry and Long2009) was used to measure the negotiator's approval of using negative emotional deception. A misrepresentation scale of four items (Fulmer et al., Reference Fulmer, Barry and Long2009) was used to measure the negotiator's approval of using informational deception (α = 0.86).
Consistent with previous approach (e.g., Fulmer et al., Reference Fulmer, Barry and Long2009), the present study measured the behavioral judgement of the participants, rather than real behaviors, for both negative emotional and informational deceptions. Subjects were asked to judge the appropriateness of the deception tacitcs if negotiating with the same person again.
Control variable
A better relationship leads to higher trust and less deception. To control the effect of friendship on the outcomes, the type of recruited dyads (friends vs. strangers before negotiation) were assigned as a control variable (relationship condition).
RESULTS
Table 1 describes the means, standard deviations, and correlations among the variables.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations
Notes: * p<0.05, **p<0.01, two-tailed test. † For variable of “relationship condition”, 1 = friends, 0 = strangers.
‡ For the variable of “culture”, 1 = Chinese, 0 = Americans.
Correlation coefficients were based on the dyadic-level data (N = 130).
We ran hierarchical linear regressions to test the hypotheses (Table 2). Hypothesis 1 predicts that culture has main effects on negative emotional deception and informational deception. Results showed that the variable ‘culture’ (American = 0, Chinese = 1) had a significant effect on the approval of negative emotional deception (Model 1 in Table 2, B = −0.27, p < 0.001) and informational deception (Model 3 in Table 2, B = 0.93, p < 0.001). Thus, Hypotheses 1a and 1b were supported.
Table 2. Regression analysis of culture and trust on deception
Notes: All coefficients presented were raw coefficients.
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***<0.001, two-tailed test.
† For variable of ‘relationship condition’, 1 = friends, 0 = strangers.
‡ For the variable of ‘culture’, 1 = Chinese, 0 = Americans.
Hypothesis 2 predicts the interactive effects between culture and cognition-based trust. The regression showed that culture and cognition-based trust had a significantly interactive effect on the approval of negative emotional deception (Model 2 in Table 2, B = −0.23, p < 0.01). To examine the interactive pattern, we include Fiure 1, which provides a simple slope analysis (Aiken & West, Reference Aiken and West1991), and shows that cognition-based trust was significantly negatively related to the approval of negative emotional deception for Chinese negotiators (t = −5.52, p < 0.001), but was non-significantly positively related to the approval of negative emotional deception for American negotiators (t = 0.98, p = 0.33). Thus, Hypothesis 2a is supported.
Culture and cognition-based trust also had significantly interactive effects on the approval of informational deception (Model 4 in Table 2, B = 0.22, p <0.01). Figure 1 also shows that cognition-based trust was significantly negatively related to the approval of informational deception for Chinese negotiators (t = −5.58, p < 0.001), but was non-significantly positively related to the approval of informational deception for American negotiators (t = 0.74, p = 0.46). Thus, Hypothesis 2b is supported.
Figure 1. Effects of the interaction between culture and cognition-based trust on deception H2a: Approval of negative emotional deception as dependent variable H2b: Approval of information deception as dependent variable.
Hypothesis 3 predicts the interactive effects between culture and affect-based trust. The regression showd that culture and affect-based trust had a significantly interactive effect on the approval of negative emotional deception (Model 2 in Table 2, B = 0.14, p < 0.05). Figure 2 shows that affect-based trust was positively (though not significantly) related to the approval of negative emotional deception for Chinese negotiators (t = 1.45, p = 0.15), but was negatively (but not significantly) related to the approval of negative emotional deception for American negotiators (t = −1.38, p = 0.17). The significant interaction term and the different signs of the two groups suggest support for Hypothesis 3a.
Figure 2. Effects of the interaction between culture and affect-based trust on deception H3a: Approval of negative emotional deception as dependent variable H3b: Approval of information deception as dependent variable.
Culture and affect-based trust also had a significantly interactive effect on the approval of informational deception (Model 4 in Table 2, B = 0.17, p < 0.05). Figure 2 also shows that affect-based trust was significantly positively related to the approval of informational deception for Chinese negotiators (t = 2.85, p < 0.01), but was non-significantly negatively related to the approval of informational deception for American negotiators (t = −0.34, p = 0.74); thus supporting Hypothesis 3b.
Robustness test
We also conducted robustness tests to examine whether the effect of culture (as a proxy variable) could be explained by cultural values. The three cultural values, Universalism (U), Achievement (A), and Stimulation (S), were highly correlated (rUA = 0.60, rUS = 0.76, rAS = 0.68, p < 0.001), and therefore an average values score was calculated as the index of cultural values. We put the cultural values score into regressions to test our hypotheses, controlling for country proxy. The results were consistent with the those reported in the hypothesis-testing section. In addition, affect-based trust was significantly and negatively related to negative emotional deception for American negotiators (t = −2.03, p < 0.05).
DISCUSSION
The findings show that Chinese negotiators approve of the use of negative emotional deception less than Americans while Chinese approve of the use of informational deception more than Americans. However, the tendency of accepting both deceptions among Chinese negotiators is weakened by a high level of cognition-based trust, but the tendency of accepting informational deception is intensified by a high level of affect-based trust. Conversely, the tendency to accept negative emotional deception among Americans is weakened by high affect-based trust. We propose that these results are based on cultural and institutional differences toward concern for harmony, detectability of deceptions, and seriousness of consequences. Culture moderates the relationship between trust and deceptions derived from the culture-specific effects of cognition- and affect-based trusts on harmony, detectability, and consequences.
Theoretical Contributions
The current study contributes to several research streams. First, the findings expand the literature on ethics in negotiation (Dees & Cramton, Reference Dees and Cramton1991) by addressing the potential ways to diffuse two types of deception, which is done by intervening with two types of trust in negotiation across cultures. The diffusion of deception in negotiation is contingent on the form of trust, which is affective trust for Americans and cognitive trust for Chinese. Counter-intuitively, trust increases deception, which differs from previous theoretical predictions (Cramton & Dees, Reference Cramton and Dees1993; Dees & Cramton, Reference Dees and Cramton1991). Second, our findings provide potential links between the perceptions of affect-based trust and the approval of using negative emotional deception for American negotiators. This finding is important because negative emotional deception is regarded as a negotiation tactic that is, at the very least, marginally ethically questionable (Fulmer et al., Reference Fulmer, Barry and Long2009). Specifically, this finding sheds light on affective trust as an antecedent of the likelihood of expressing negative emotions in negotiation. Third, the results expand the study of trust and deception in negotiation into a cross-cultural settings, providing evidence of culturally divergent patterns of those relationships, and enhancing the richness of the negotiation and ethics research in China and comparative contexts.
Specifically, the understanding of the Chinese deception phenomenon from the perspective of normative harmony maintenance is enriched. Approval for deceptions by Chinese may partly stem from the good intention of face-saving for others or harmony-building among parties in affective relationships. Therefore, in addition to an advocacy for honesty, a culture-specific ethics viewpoint should be adopted in judging the ethicality of Chinese behaviour. The findings are consistent with the framework that indicates how Chinese influence others depending regarding judging types of relationships (guanxi) with others (Chen, Chen, & Huang, Reference Chen, Chen and Huang2013; Hwang, Reference Hwang1987; Luo, Huang, & Wang, Reference Luo, Huang and Wang2012). The present study has depicted how the two types of trust are related to deceptive influence tactics.
Our findings suggest that cognition-based trust decreases the tendency of using negative emotional deception for Chinese negotiators, whereas affect-based trust increases the tendency to use information deception for them; but for American negotiators, affect-based trust reduces the approval of the use of negative emotional deception. These findings provide evidence for the importance of culture-specific studies in negotiation. The culturally divergent findings on trust and deception indicate the dynamic role of cultural context in interpersonal and social transactions.
People from different cultures vary when they manage intrapersonal and interpersonal inconsistencies (Markus & Kitayama, Reference Markus and Kitayama1991). Deception is one type of inconsistency between the internal psychological state and external attitudes and behaviour. Informational deception involves inconsistency between the inner cognitive state and the outer presented behaviour, such as lying about the reservation price in negotiation. Negative emotional deception occurs when expressing emotions not being experienced are expressed, giving rise to inconsistency between the inner emotional state and the outer expressed emotion. Our findings show that other-focused Chinese are more flexible to respond to the contextual cues in interpersonal interactions than Americans.
The attitudes of people from different cultures toward dealing with emotional and instrumental concerns are different. The Chinese often mix emotional and instrumental concerns, whereas Americans separate these two purposes (Chua et al., Reference Chua, Morris and Ingram2009; Sanchez-Burks, Reference Sanchez-Burks2002; Sanchez-Burks et al., Reference Sanchez-Burks, Lee, Choi, Nisbett, Zhao and Koo2003). Our findings show that affect-based trust reduces the approval of Americans to use negative emotional deception. However, the American work culture often discouraged emotion-laden relationships by emphasizing professionalism and separation of work and life. The paradox is worth exploring with future research that investigates the convergence and divergence of affect and professionalism at work. At the same time, the finding that cognitive trust can reduce deception among Chinese can also illuminate future studies. This finding suggests that instead of building congenial relationships, Chinese negotiators should establish cognitive trust based on reliability and credibility in order to manage potential deceptions from the other party in negotiation. Future research should explore the potential balance between relationship building and the role of cognitive trust among Chinese.
Limitations and Future Research
There are several limitations of this research, which suggest meaningful directions for future research. First, this study did not directly manipulate the cognition- and affect-based trust. Future research may do so by controlling contextual and causal factors because it would be helpful in pinpointing the underlying dynamics between trust and deception. Second, the current study only measured approval or judgement of behaviours rather than real deceptive behaviours. According to the theory of reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen, Reference Fishbein and Ajzen1975), behavioural intentions and real behaviours are usually positively correlated, and empirical studies suggest positive relationships between ethical judgements and ethical behaviours (Honeycutt, Glassman, Zugelder, & Karande, Reference Honeycutt, Glassman, Zugelder and Karande2001; Rallapalli, Vitell, & Barnes, Reference Rallapalli, Vitell and Barnes1998). However, future studies should directly measure deceptive behaviours through observations or other methods to confirm our predictions. Given the effect of trust on deception in negotiation, ways of building trust to lower levels as a means of curtailing negotiatior's own tendency for deception are worth exploring. Finally, studies investigating the link between deception and the economic, relational, and moral outcomes of negotiation should be fruitful as well. Future research may also observe responses to deceptions and ethical evaluations, especially in a cross-cultural context.
Practical Implications
The results offer practical strategies for practitioners in cross-cultural negotiations, where potential deceptions from the other side can be daunting. Chinese negotiators can reduce potential deceptions from the other party by actively build cognition-based trust with the other party. American negotiators need to cultivate emotional connections and build affective trust with their opponents to mitigate potentially deceptive situations. Furthermore, Chinese negotiators need to be aware that affect-based trust can give rise to more deception; thus, they need to detach emotion from the cognition-based analysis of the situation. Our findings point to the merits of cognitive trust for Chinese negotiators as well as the perils of too much emotion-involved guanxi for Chinese, and the benefits of affective trust for Americans. Therefore, individuals need to be consciously aware of the merits and traps of their own culture to make more culturally sensitive decisions in interpersonal interactions.
CONCLUSION
Deception in negotiation is not only a crux of business ethics, but an unavoidable phenomenon that negotiation scholars need to understand and explore further. People deceive and trust for culturally different reasons. A reduction of deception, as well as an increase in deception, may depend on culture and the nature of trust. Trust has many well-documented benefits, as well as an equivalent meaning of virtue, at least in China. The emergence of the ‘second face’ of trust (McAllister, Reference McAllister, Lewicki, Bies and Sheppard1997) points to the dark side of trust in negotiation and business ethics. Both sides of trust deserve scholarly attention to develop a more comprehensive theory of ethics in negotiation, including the dynamic role of cultural and institutional contexts. The knowledge and skills of marshalling culturally sensitive types of trust to diffuse deceptions will allow us to gain more efficiency and confidence while navigating complex multicultural encounters.
