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DISCOUNT FACTORS AND THRESHOLDS: FOREIGN INVESTMENT WHEN ENFORCEMENT IS IMPERFECT

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 2000

Elizabeth Asiedu
Affiliation:
University of Kansas
Anne P. Villamil
Affiliation:
University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign
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Abstract

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We consider a model that provides insight into the well-known Folk theorem in economics that when the discount factor β is sufficiently close to 1, expropriation will never occur. Although this Folk theorem is true in our model, our perspective is different. The discount factor β often is described as a “deep structural parameter” that is difficult to alter at a point in time. In contrast, we analyze the determinants of two thresholds β and β* that segment the unit interval on which β is defined into three subintervals. These subintervals correspond to the three possible equilibria for investment flows: autarky, underinvestment, and unconstrained optimal investment. These thresholds are of interest because they can be altered by specific policy interventions. As a consequence, even if β is small, some level of foreign investment can be supported. We construct measures of β for 40 countries, characterize β and β*, and discuss recent trends in investment flows.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© 2000 Cambridge University Press