1. Introduction
In June 2014 the US Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari submitted by the Republic of Argentina against NML Capital,Footnote 1 a vulture fund that specializes in the purchase of debts of sovereigns and corporations in distress at a discounted price on the secondary market. The petition was filed by Argentina in August 2013, after the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the appeal against an order issued in February 2012 by Judge Griesa of the Southern District Court of New York that enjoined Argentina from making payments on its restructured debt without making ratable payments to NML. Under this decision, Argentina was not allowed to make full payment on its restructured debt without also making full and contextual payment to the holdout vulture funds. The enforcement of the decision was stayed pending a writ of certiorari before the Supreme Court but, following the Supreme Court decision to dismiss the case, the judgment of the Court of Appeals became enforceable. This enforcement has led to a dramatic outcome as Argentina does not have the funds to pay all the holdout creditors on the basis of the nominal amount of their credits.
This article explores the lawsuits brought by vulture funds before US courts, discusses the role of abuse of rights under the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Principles on Responsible Lending and Borrowing in blocking these lawsuits, and concludes that the most viable route to stop vulture fund litigation coincides with the insertion of specific provisions within the proposal of the United Nations to establish a multilateral legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring.
2. The vultures
The holdout creditors made their appearance on the sovereign debt scene in the late 1980s in connection with the creation of a secondary market for loans of debtors in distress.Footnote 2 Their policy was to buy, at a discounted price, debt instruments owed by sovereigns, semi-sovereigns, and corporations in default, and then avoid taking part in restructuring workouts in order to secure a better treatment. An evolutionary step in this phenomenon was brought by the so-called ‘vulture funds’, i.e. funds buying these instruments for the specific purpose of getting their full nominal amount in court.Footnote 3
Sovereign debtors tried to neutralize this legal action by resorting to the defence of Champerty. Champerty is an ancient common law rule which prohibits instrumental recourse to the courts of justice.Footnote 4 The reluctance of US tribunals to apply Champerty in this field is epitomized by the divergent decisions given by the New York federal courts in Elliott v. Republic of Peru and Banco de la Nacion. In the first instance, the Southern District Court of New York found an infringement of the New York Champerty law on the grounds that the intention and purpose to sue could be inferred from the fact that no serious steps were taken towards reaching agreed restructuring.Footnote 5 Nevertheless, the judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on the grounds that Elliott's intention to bring a lawsuit was incidental and contingent: incidental as its primary goal was to be paid in full, and contingent as its lawsuit followed the refusal of the debtor to pay its dues.Footnote 6 The Court relied upon a policy argument to support its interpretation of the New York Champerty law, namely that should the Champerty defence prevail, the lenders would encounter difficulties in selling their credits and the secondary market of sovereign loans would be disrupted.Footnote 7
Had the outcome of this defence been different, it would have put an end to the strategy of exploiting sovereign debt litigation for speculation. As a result, a second chapter of the saga was opened whereby the vulture funds tried to enforce victorius judgments against sovereign debtors on the basis of the pari passu clause.Footnote 8
2.1. Pari passu
The pari passu clause is a covenant generally incorporated into the terms of sovereign loans, intended to avoid discrimination among the borrower's unsecured external creditors.Footnote 9 This clause originates from municipal bankruptcy law where it is used to ensure parity of treatment among unsecured creditors.Footnote 10 It can be drafted and/or interpreted either narrowly or widely: under the narrow meaning all the creditors ‘rank pari passu’, while under the wider meaning they are to be paid pro rata when a payment in favour of one of them is made.Footnote 11 This divergence in understanding has an impact in practice. In 2000, Elliott, a vulture fund having in its holding unrestructured commercial loans, submitted a motion to the president of the Tribunal Commercial of Brussels to prevent the Morgan Guaranty Trust from applying any payment received by Peru to the Brady Bonds. The motion was dismissed, but Elliott appealed to the Cour d’Appel of Brussels, which reversed the decision of the lower court and granted the injunction. The Cour d’Appel, in granting the requested remedy, followed an interpretation of the pari passu clause contained in the affidavit of Professor Lowenfeld, according to whom the clause implied that each creditor must be paid pro rata instead of each creditor ranking pari passu.Footnote 12 Following this ruling, Peru was obliged to seek a settlement with Elliott which realized a nearly 500 per cent return on its purchase.Footnote 13
In December 2011, the Southern District Court of New York granted a partial summary judgment in favour of certain non-exchanging creditors, finding that Argentina had infringed the pari passu clause in lowering the rank of the bonds in the plaintiffs’ hands below that of any other unsecured and unsubordinated external debt.Footnote 14 In October 2012, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the District Court dated February 2012 under which Argentina was obliged to make specific performance of its obligations under the pari passu clause in connection with payments on the exchange bonds.Footnote 15 In terms of the pari passu clause, the Court did not firmly emphasize the payment limb of the clause, but rather relied on its subordination element.Footnote 16 While Argentina had paid the exchange bonds regularly, it had not done this in relation to the old non-exchanged bonds. Furthermore, it had never appropriated the necessary sums in the national budget, and had stated in the exchange offer prospectuses that it had no intention to resume payments on them. Finally, the Lock Law precluded Argentine officials from paying defaulted bondholders and Argentine courts from recognizing foreign default judgments.Footnote 17 By contrast, in relation to default on the exchange bonds, foreign judgments could be recognized by the Argentine courts.Footnote 18 Against this background, the Court ruled that the debtor was in breach of contract even under Argentina's proposed interpretation of the clause.Footnote 19
The case was remanded to the District Court for the determination of the third parties and the payment formula. On 21 November 2012, the District Court ruled on these two points. In relation to the payment formula, the Court held that the reference to the ‘ratable payments’ contained in the 23 February 2012 order was to be understood as follows: if paying 100 per cent of the interest on the exchange bonds in December 2012, Argentina was to pay 100 per cent of the accelerated principal and accrued interest on the old bonds.Footnote 20 In the face of the firm intention by Argentina to pay the exchange holders but not the holders of the old bonds, the District Court ordered the debtor to pay into an escrow account the total amount due as of 15 December 2012.Footnote 21
The orders of November 2012 were subsequently challenged before the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which dismissed the appeal in August 2013.Footnote 22 In June 2014, the Supreme Court denied the petition for the writ of certiorari and Argentina was faced with the impossibility of paying the exchange holders without paying the non-exchange holders in full.Footnote 23
2.2. Debt restructuring and voluntary participation
In the absence of contractual clauses providing for the possibility of modifying the terms of payment for the loan, any amendment may take place solely with the unanimous consent of all the holders; therefore, the participation in an exchange offer remains fundamentally a question of free will.Footnote 24
In Allied Bank II the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit laid down the general rule that, pending a restructuring process, the obligations connected to the credits remain valid and enforceable.Footnote 25 As affirmed in National Union Fire Insurance, non-restructuring creditors maintain the right to pursue legal remedies; if this were not the case, their right to choose freely between joining a restructuring process and enforcing their obligations would be seriously impaired.Footnote 26 This point received further clarification in Pravin Banker IV where, after weighing up the two competing policies of debt restructuring and creditor rights, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit came to the conclusion that the latter must prevail over the former.Footnote 27 This rule, a corollary of the doctrine of the sanctity of contracts,Footnote 28 has been followed by the US courts,Footnote 29 even during financial crises.Footnote 30 Along the same lines, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Elliott v. Banco de la Nacion held that, should the restructuring concerns prevail, the short-term benefits for the borrower would be counterbalanced by the long-term difficulties in securing further resources.Footnote 31
Nevertheless, a suspension of the proceedings pending a restructuring process could be justified under certain circumstances. In Pravin Banker IV, the Court of Appeals emphasized that an indefinite suspension of the proceedings pending the outcome of a restructuring process would contradict the prevailing principle that creditors’ rights should be safeguarded, implicitly leaving the door open to a circumscribed suspension of the proceedings on the verge of a definition of the restructuring process.Footnote 32
The point was subsequently restated in E.M. LTD v. The Republic of Argentina, where the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the lower court was correct in using its discretion on vacating the remedies in order to avoid a substantial risk to the restructuring process which was ‘of critical importance to the economic health of a nation’.Footnote 33 Apparently, this decision would add a new element in the balancing test between free participation and the restructuring process. However, a deeper analysis reveals that this novelty is not to be overestimated. The contractual rights of the holdout creditors were ‘frozen’ solely in so far as they were capable of endangering the restructuring rights of the exchanging holders and the restructuring process was close to its end, which is in line with the view previously expressed in Pravin Banker IV.Footnote 34
In NML Capital v. Argentina, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that the insertion of collective action clauses (CACs) in bonds governed by New York law would prevent recurring lawsuits by vulture funds.Footnote 35 Until recently, bond issues governed by New York law did not contain CACs which provide, inter alia, for the amendment by majority of all the terms of the loan, including the payment terms.Footnote 36 The UNCTAD Principles, acknowledging the lack of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism in the present stage of development,Footnote 37 have focused on CACs as a consensus-driven restructuring process to limit the room for manoeuvring of holdout creditors.Footnote 38 However, even in the presence of CACs, in small issues the holdout creditors may purchase a quantity of bonds large enough to create a blocking minority capable of neutralizing any adverse modification of the terms of the loan.Footnote 39
3. Abuse of rights under international law
The doctrine of abuse of rights (abus de droit) establishes that each right is to be exercised in a manner that does not impair the rights of others.Footnote 40 However, whether the abuse of rights is accepted as an autonomous general principle of law remains uncertain. In the view of certain scholars, it would be a mere application of other principles, such as good faith or equity.Footnote 41 Substantively, the defence of abuse of rights may present itself in three different scenarios: (i) when a state exercises its rights in a manner hindering the rights of another state, such as in cases of misuse of shared resources; (ii) when a right is exercised for a purpose other than that for which it was created; and (iii) when a state causes injury to other states by arbitrarily exercising its rights even where this does not constitute a violation of their rights.Footnote 42
Although it has been referred to in several cases, the principle has not been used as a basis for condemnation.Footnote 43 In the Case Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) found that Germany's alienation of a nitrate factory at Chorzów (Polish Upper Silesia) did not amount to an abuse of right as it was a normal act of administration not intended to prejudice Poland's rights.Footnote 44 In the Free Zones of the Upper Savoy and Gex Case the PCIJ emphasized that France could not evade its obligation to maintain the free zones by erecting a customs barrier, but neither could an abuse be presumed by the Court.Footnote 45 In the Shrimp-Turtle Case, the WTO Appelate Body underscored that ‘[a]n abusive exercise by a Member of its own treaty right thus results in a breach of the treaty rights of the other Members and, as well, a violation of the treaty obligation of the Member so acting’.Footnote 46
The interdependence of rights and obligations is not confined to treaty law but plays a role even within the domain of general law. This is so as every right is subject to those limitations necessary to make its exercise compatible not only with the specific contractual obligations of one party, but also with its obligations under general law.Footnote 47 However, to file a lawsuit is an action so permeated with discretion that under international law it could be characterized as an abuse of rights solely when an ‘unlawful intention or design can be established’.Footnote 48
3.1. Abuse of rights under UNCTAD principles
In January 2012 UNCTAD, following a Resolution by the UN General Assembly that stressed the importance of responsible financing under which public and private creditors and sovereign debtors share responsibility for preventing unsustainable debt situations,Footnote 49 adopted the Principles on Promoting Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing.Footnote 50 Formally, the Principles have not been incorporated into a binding instrument for two reasons: first, this choice is coherent with the soft law character of international financial law;Footnote 51 second, their purpose is not so much to establish rights and obligations but rather to identify basic rules and best practices. The second reason reflects the dynamic and flexible nature of the Principles,Footnote 52 and is also indicative of their non-uniform legal status.Footnote 53
With particular reference to abuse of rights, Principle 7 affirms that when a sovereign debtor is clearly unable to service its debt, all lenders must behave in good faith and with a co-operative spirit towards a restructuring process, and that creditors should operate in favour of a quick and orderly resolution of the problem. This implies that a creditor who purchases a debt instrument of a sovereign in distress with the aim of forcing a preferential treatment outside a consensual workout process is acting abusively.Footnote 54 However, this implication must be carefully appreciated – the abuse does not lie in the mere purchase of the debt instrument, but in the attempt to secure a more favourable settlement of the claims. This involves not just a mere lack of participation in the restructuring process, but any attempt to enforce preferential claims by filing lawsuits in court.
4. UNCTAD principles in US courts
In Lightwater, Argentina played the abuse of rights card, arguing that plaintiff would have been barred from suing on bonds as the debtor was facing a severe economic crisis.Footnote 55 However, the District Court dismissed the defence as it found no merit in it.Footnote 56 The UNCTAD Principles set out as a general rule the requirement to behave in good faith in consensual debt workouts (Principle 7) and as a corollary, a creditor that acquires a debt instrument of a sovereign in distress with the purpose of securing better treatment outside a restructuring process is acting abusively. Against this background, the question is whether and to what extent the applicability of this principle could have changed the outcome of the NML decision.
4.1. Abusive behaviour
Broadly speaking, the US Constitution does not put customary law and the general principles of law on the same plane. Customary international law is considered the supreme law of the land in so far as the law of nations is comprised in the laws of the United States (Article VI, clause 2).Footnote 57 General principles are not covered by this umbrella and, although federal courts have on more than one occasion made reference to principles of customary law, these are altogether different from general principles of law.Footnote 58
With particular reference to abuse of rights in relation to sovereign debt, under the UNCTAD Principles it is uncertain whether the rule that holdout litigation must not impair sovereign debt workouts is a general principle of law or rather a guiding principle.Footnote 59 In either case, it may be used to interpret and supplement the governing law (in the case, New York law as the governing law of the loan agreement).Footnote 60 But it is unlikely that it can overturn the rule under which a suspension of proceedings pending a restructuring process may operate solely within a reasonable lapse of time.
The guiding nature of this principle is implicitly acknowledged in the Human Rights Council (HRC) Guiding Principles on Foreign Debt and Human Rights.Footnote 61 The HRC Principles deal with these problems under two regards: upstream, loan agreements should contain legal restrictions on the assignment or sale of credits to third parties without the informed consent of the debtor (point 59) and, in any case, credits cannot be sold to holdout creditors (point 62); downstream, the amount recoverable by those who have acquired sovereign debts after the failure of negotiations cannot surpass what laid down in the terms of the loan (point 60), and in any case, as far as highly indebted poor countries (HIPC) are concerned, cannot exceed that received by other creditors (point 61).
The rules within the HRC Guiding Principles reflect a number of national legislative initiatives. In 2007, a bill was introduced in the French parliament under which a French judge would have discretion in enforcing payments against a foreign sovereign debtor in default.Footnote 62 In 2008, the Belgian Parliament passed legislation designed to prevent funds appropriated by the Belgian government for international development co-operation from becoming objects of attachment.Footnote 63 More extensively, in 2010 the UK Parliament passed the Debt Relief (Developing Countries) Act 2010. Under this piece of legislation, a UK court cannot render a judgment or enforce a foreign judgment or arbitral award against HIPC under which private creditors are enabled to recover their credits in excess of the sustainable level as calculated under the HIPC Initiative.Footnote 64 The Act, originally intended to remain in force for one year, was adopted after a public consultation strongly backed by the Jubilee Campaign.Footnote 65
In the same vein, in 2009, a bill was introduced in the US House of Representatives to prevent speculation and profiteering in the defaulted debt of certain poor countries.Footnote 66 In contrast, in June 2010 the Judgment Evading Foreign States Accountability Act was introduced in the House of Representatives and this denies access to US capital markets to middle-income and wealthy countries and their corporations in default for more than two years on US court judgments totalling US $100 million or more.Footnote 67
All these pieces of national legislation, both passed and aborted, are too few, too limited, and too controversial in scope to indicate the emergence of a norm of truly international public policyFootnote 68 capable of blocking the enforcement of loan agreements or related foreign judgments and awards in national fora. In effect, their purpose is not so much to set a limit on holdout litigation, but rather to protect the financial resources of bilateral and multilateral creditors.Footnote 69
5. Towards a global restructuring mechanism
In the absence of a contractually driven debt restructuring mechanism or in the presence of a bondholders’ blocking minority impeding its operation, the status of abuse of rights under the UNCTAD Principles is unable to overturn the interpretation of a term of the loan (say the pari passu) given by the seized forum under the applicable law. To overrule this problem, the UN General Assembly resolved in September 2014 to elaborate through an intergovernmental process a Multilateral Legal Framework for Sovereign Restructuring Processes.Footnote 70 To this purpose, the General Assembly decided to establish an ad hoc committee composed of all the member states and observers of the United Nations. Participation in the committee is open to bodies and organizations of the UN system, with particular reference to the World Bank and the IMF, as well as other intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, the private sector, and academia.Footnote 71 The committee is entrusted with the task of elaborating, as a matter of priority, a multilateral legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring with the aim of increasing ‘the efficiency, stability and predictability of the international financial system and achieving sustained, inclusive and equitable economic growth and sustainable development, in accordance with national circumstances and priorities’.Footnote 72 The outcomes of this process are expected by the end of 2015.
Such a proposal is not a novelty in the landscape of international debt. In 1939, the Committee for the Study of International Loan Contracts created by the League of Nations produced a report recommending that loan contracts should include an arbitration clause and suggesting the establishment of an arbitration tribunal composed of three persons appointed by the President of the PCIJ from a panel of nine persons. In the same report, the Committee indicated that the most workable solution to this problem would be achieved through the creation of a proper ‘International Loans Tribunal’, with competence for all international loans, composed of three judges appointed by the PCIJ.Footnote 73 Although the outbreak of the Second World War caused the proposal to be set aside, the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, which had worked along with the Committee, pursued the work and formalized a proposal for the establishment of a proper Tribunal des Emprunts Internationaux.Footnote 74 However, such a tribunal would also have been characterized by an intrinsic limit – it would have enjoyed the competence to decide on the rights and obligations of the parties without the power to modify the terms of a loan.Footnote 75
The project fell into oblivion and was resumed at the beginning of the new millennium when the IMF launched the proposal to establish a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM), focused on a Sovereign Debt Dispute Resolution Forum (SDDRF).Footnote 76 Under this scheme, a debt restructuring agreement would have been binding for all the registered creditors once the vote had received certification by the SDDRF. The certification would not bind non-registered creditors, although the SDDRF might issue an order providing for a stay of enforcement in contracting fora pending a restructuring process.Footnote 77 The SDRM should have been established through an amendment to the IMF Articles of Agreements accepted by three fifths of the members that have 85 per cent of the total voting power (Article XXVIII). Unfortunately, the SDRM encountered the opposition of the United States, which, having nearly 17 per cent of the voting power, was able to block any amendment of the IMF Articles of Agreement.Footnote 78 This impasse marked the passage from a statutory approach based on the SDDRF to a contractual approach based on the adoption of CACs. This precedent casts a shadow over the outcome of the UN project.Footnote 79
5.1. A barrier to holdouts
The problem of the holdouts may not be solved under a debt restructuring framework as long as registered creditors taking part in the restructuring process are bound by it while non-registered creditors are merely affected by a temporary stay of enforcement. Against this background, the capacity of the UN multilateral legal framework to rebut the action of the holdouts depends on the presence of specific rules capable of binding them all. To be effective, these rules presuppose that the legal framework be formalized as a multilateral convention.Footnote 80
In this framework, the starting point would consist of the assignment to the IMF of the task of certifying that a debt restructuring plan is consistent with the debt sustainability analysis of the country at issue.Footnote 81 When the restructuring plan received such a certification, it would need to be approved with at least 50 per cent of the outstanding value of each class of debt (e.g., bonded debt). This majority is calculated on the whole aggregate amount of a class, with the result that in each single loan facility the threshold of 50 per cent might not be met.Footnote 82 Under an IMF certification, this relatively low approval threshold is termed as an overriding mandatory provision.Footnote 83 This means that it can be applied in a state party to the convention encapsulating the legal framework irrespective of the law governing the loan agreement. A similar escamotage was used under the Greek debt restructuring of spring 2012, where the Greek Bondholder Act 2012 (Law 4050/2012) introduced ex post CACs in domestic bonds issued under Greek law, specifying that relevant provisions, amounting to overriding mandatory provisions (Article 1(10)), were of the highest public interest.Footnote 84 This approach would solve the holdout problem as long as the seized fora belong to contracting states, but leaves the issue unaffected with reference to lawsuits brought in the fora of non-contracting parties. To deal with this point, the draft convention should be completed by a provision establishing that judgments rendered in non-contracting parties’ fora, contrasting with this mandatory rule, cannot be enforced in contracting parties fora as contrary to public policy.Footnote 85 This second provision sounds particularly significant as the United States, a very important litigating forum for sovereign debt, is unlikely to join an international instrument on multilateral debt restructuring.Footnote 86
6. Conclusions
The final episode of NML v. Argentina has shown that the interpretation by US courts of a contractual clause in sovereign loan agreements governed by New York law is capable of disrupting the financial system by imposing on sovereign debtors the burden to pay non-restructuring creditors, in this case vulture funds, in full. Although this problem may be largely overcome through the widespread adoption of CACs, which permit the modification by majority of payment terms, in small bond issues a vulture fund may be able to raise a sufficient number of bonds to block the proposed amendments. This problematic scenario cannot be solved under the UNCTAD Principles on Responsible Sovereign Financing as the prohibition on abusive behaviour by these funds has an uncertain legal status whose concrete appreciation and application is deferred to the seized court.
To address the problem, the UN General Assembly has established an ad hoc committee to elaborate a multilateral legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring. To be really effective, the outcome should be captured in an international convention. Two provisions should be acknowledged in that context. The first is centred on the qualification of the restructuring, certified as debt sustainable by the IMF and approved with a voting quorum of at least 50 per cent of the value of each class of loan, as a mandatory rule for each contracting party. The second is focused on the indication that a judgment against a restructuring debtor rendered in a forum of a non-contracting state cannot be enforced in a forum of a contracting state as contrary to the international public order of that forum. Even though this machinery cannot extend to decisions rendered and enforced in non-contracting state fora, the judgments delivered in contracting fora may contribute towards establishing this rule as one of truly international public policy and thereby constitute a benchmark for non-contracting fora.