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Judicial Independence in the International Criminal Court

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 March 2004

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Abstract

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Judges in international tribunals have historically been subject to political pressures which might influence the independence of their position. The Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court has created a system in which judges are selected by political representatives of state parties, without any independent screening process. Furthermore, judges will have a high degree of control over the fundamental decisions as to who should be prosecuted, an area which normally falls in the province of the Prosecutor. There are legitimate reasons to fear that this system will fail to provide the necessary safeguards to ensure that judicial independence is maintained.

Type
HAGUE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS
Copyright
© 2002 Kluwer Law International