The decision of Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court (ICC) on the admissibility of the case against Germain KatangaFootnote 1 was the first ruling on a challenge to admissibility in over six years of the Court's operation. While the principle of complementarity is one of the founding principles of the Court and had been the subject of extensive academic commentary and debate,Footnote 2 judicial consideration of the admissibility provisions had been limited and had previously taken place only in the context of proprio motu reviews by the Chamber.Footnote 3
Decisions on admissibility are one of the few interlocutory decisions which may be appealed as of right under the ICC Statute.Footnote 4 Given the lack of any precedent or settled jurisprudence and the importance of the subjects addressed, it is thus not surprising that the Trial Chamber's decision was not the last word on this matter. Katanga appealed, initiating another substantial round of arguments, with the prosecution, legal representatives of four separate groups of victims, and the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) all filing responses to or observations on Katanga's appeal.
In the end, some 140 pages of submissions were before the Appeals Chamber. Yet the Chamber delivered a limited judgmentFootnote 5 which is characterized primarily by its restraint, exhibited in three ways. First, the Chamber dealt only with those questions which were necessary to dispose of this particular appeal. Second, the Chamber confined itself to interpreting the language of the ICC Statute and applying it to the case before it. Third, the Chamber took a restrained and realist view of the role of the Court as a judicial institution, and of the relationship between the Court and states.
Many academics and commentators, and indeed some practitioners, may be disappointed that the Appeals Chamber left so much unsaid in its judgment. However, this restraint is broadly consistent with the judicial philosophy evident in much of the Appeals Chamber's jurisprudence to date. In addition, despite the cautious and conservative approach, the judgment nevertheless clarifies some key issues in the admissibility regime. The Appeals Chamber clearly set out the structure of admissibility determinations and confirmed that the plain language of Article 17(1) of the Statute applies even in cases of self-referral. Finally, the restraint with which it approached a determination of the admissibility of a case provides insight into how the judicial branch of the Court views the relationship between ‘positive’ and ‘classical’ complementarity.
1. Background
The Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber arrived at the same conclusion, that the case was admissible. Nevertheless, the reasoning which they applied differed significantly, and the contrast highlights the restraint shown by the latter.
1.1. The proceedings before the Trial Chamber
Germain Katanga argued that the case against him was inadmissible because the DRC had been investigating him, prior to closing that investigation in order to surrender him to the ICC.Footnote 6 He recognized that if the national state was not acting, then the case would be admissible before the ICC.Footnote 7 However, he disputed that, for the purposes of this assessment, the Court should limit itself to examining ‘whether the same person is being investigated or prosecuted in respect of the same conduct’ – the ‘same conduct’ test which had been applied consistently by ICC Pre-Trial Chambers.Footnote 8
On the facts, Katanga argued that the DRC authorities had been investigating him at the time that he was surrendered to the Court. He claimed that this investigation covered his alleged responsibility for crimes against humanity in relation to attacks in the Ituri district of the eastern DRC, and did not exclude the village of Bogoro (the site of the attack which was the basis for the ICC charges);Footnote 9 and that even if the ‘same conduct’ test was applied, this investigation included the attack on Bogoro as it was mentioned in the dossier.Footnote 10 All of this, he argued, rendered the case inadmissible under Article 17(1)(a) of the Statute.Footnote 11 Katanga subsequently expanded his challenge to argue that when the prosecution applied for an arrest warrant, it had failed to produce to the Pre-Trial Chamber certain documents which he alleged were relevant to admissibility and that the Trial Chamber should revisit the issuance of the warrant on that basis.Footnote 12
The prosecution opposed the challenge and maintained that the case was admissible. On the preliminary question of the issuance of the arrest warrant, the prosecution submitted that it had followed the prior jurisprudence of the Appeals Chamber and had brought all necessary information to the attention of the Pre-Trial Chamber.Footnote 13 Turning to the substance of the admissibility challenge, the prosecution argued that the ‘same conduct’ test was well founded in the language, the context, and the object and purpose of the Statute.Footnote 14 Any other interpretation, including those proposed by Katanga, would deprive the admissibility regime of the objectivity which states had sought to instil, and would lead to inconsistent results.Footnote 15 The prosecution maintained that the DRC had not been investigating Katanga in relation to the attack on BogoroFootnote 16 – a position confirmed repeatedly by the DRC government itself, both in writing and at the hearing.Footnote 17 The case was therefore admissible before the Court.
1.2. The Trial Chamber's decision
In contrast to the restraint subsequently shown by the Appeals Chamber, the Trial Chamber commenced its decision by addressing a procedural question which had not been raised by either party, and ultimately decided the admissibility of the case on a ground which had not been argued before it.
Neither the prosecution nor any of the other participants had objected to Katanga bringing his challenge to admissibility at the time that he did.Footnote 18 However, the Trial Chamber questioned the timing of the challenge at the hearing held on 1 June 2009, noting that under Article 19(4) of the Statute any challenge to admissibility which is not based on ne bis in idem must be brought prior to the commencement of the trial.Footnote 19 Both the prosecution and the defence submitted that the term ‘commencement of the trial’ has been interpreted as being the opening statements by the parties.Footnote 20 Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber devoted over one-third of its decision to examining whether Katanga's challenge to admissibility was itself admissible, ultimately holding that the challenge had been filed out of time, as the ‘commencement of the trial’ for the purposes of Article 19(4) was the moment that the Trial Chamber is first constituted.Footnote 21
Despite this ruling, the Trial Chamber went on to consider the substance of Katanga's challenge.Footnote 22 It first addressed the issuance of the arrest warrant, finding that the documents which Katanga complained should have been placed before the Pre-Trial Chamber were not ‘decisive’, and therefore did not raise the type of ‘ostensible cause’ which under the Appeals Chamber's jurisprudence would have warranted a decision on admissibility at that stage.Footnote 23 On the admissibility of the case itself, although the parties had focused their submissions on the existence and extent of any domestic investigation of Katanga and whether the ‘same conduct’ test was appropriate for determining inadmissibility, the Trial Chamber found the case to be admissible on a different basis. It did not consider the actions of the DRC authorities under the rubric of activity or inactivity; rather, it conducted its examination based on a ‘second form of “unwillingness”, which is not expressly provided for in article 17’ and which applies where a state ‘chooses not to investigate or prosecute a person before its own courts, but has nevertheless every intention of seeing that justice is done’.Footnote 24 The Trial Chamber thus found the case to be admissible based on ‘the clear and explicit expression of unwillingness of the DRC to prosecute this case’.Footnote 25
2. Restraint in the scope of the judgment
The first expression of the Appeals Chamber's restraint was in its selection of the issues on which it ruled substantively. Of the five grounds which Katanga raised on appeal, the Appeals Chamber dismissed three without considering the substance of the arguments. It also expressly declined to consider the ‘same conduct’ test which had been at the core of the debate before the Trial Chamber.
The Appeals Chamber did so for various reasons. In some cases, its ruling on one ground of appeal rendered a subsequent argument or ground of appeal redundant.Footnote 26 However, many of the issues which the Appeals Chamber declined to consider illustrate the focused approach that the Appeals Chamber takes to interlocutory appeals which it considers to be a confined procedure the purpose of which is restricted to reviewing and correcting any error in the decision under appeal.Footnote 27 One consequence of this approach is that the arguments on appeal must demonstrate that the relevant Chamber erred in the decision under appeal.
In Katanga's second ground of appeal, he challenged the Trial Chamber's finding that the prosecution had not been obliged, as part of its application for a warrant of arrest, to place before the Pre-Trial Chamber a particular document which made reference to Bogoro.Footnote 28 However, one of the bases on which the Appeals Chamber dismissed this ground of appeal was that it effectively asked the Appeals Chamber to review the Pre-Trial Chamber's decision to issue the warrant of arrest, more than two years previously. This, it held, was not the purpose of an appeal against the Trial Chamber's decision on admissibility.Footnote 29 Indeed, allowing an appeal to challenge, by reference or implication, the correctness of earlier decisions might allow participants to circumvent the strict deadlines for appealing an interlocutory decision in the ICC.Footnote 30
The nature of interlocutory appeals has another consequence: in order for the Appeals Chamber to exercise its corrective function, the alleged error must not only have been in the decision under appeal, but it must also have materially affected that decision.Footnote 31 This factor further supported the Appeals Chamber's dismissal of the second ground of appeal, as even if the Pre-Trial Chamber had erred, and the prosecution should have provided certain documents to the Pre-Trial Chamber back in 2007, Katanga had not demonstrated how this error could have affected the Trial Chamber's decision in 2009 that the case was admissible.Footnote 32
This principle was also the basis on which the Appeals Chamber rejected Katanga's first ground of appeal, which addressed the Trial Chamber's finding that his challenge to admissibility was formally out of time because it had been brought after the Trial Chamber was constituted (and therefore after ‘the commencement of the trial’ for the purposes of Article 19(4)). As Katanga acknowledged on appeal, he had suffered no prejudice from the alleged error because the Trial Chamber had proceeded to consider the merits of his challenge to admissibility.Footnote 33 As a result, any error could not materially have affected the decision under appeal: even if the Trial Chamber was wrong in its interpretation of Article 19(4), this would not be a ground on which the Appeals Chamber could have overturned the finding that the case was admissible.Footnote 34
Given the express decision of the Trial Chamber to consider the merits of the challenge despite its interpretation of ‘the commencement of the trial’, the Appeals Chamber considered that ruling on this question would be analogous to rendering an advisory opinion,Footnote 35 a practice which the Chamber has eschewed.Footnote 36 The refusal to rule on questions in the abstract, or to entertain hypothetical arguments, is consistent with the past practice of the Appeals ChamberFootnote 37 and reflects the tight focus on the corrective scope of the appeal before the Chamber. In this case, the reluctance to rule on this issue may have been enhanced by the fact that the lack of impact on the decision under appeal had led the prosecution not to make substantive submissions on the interpretation of ‘commencement of the trial’.Footnote 38
While the general practice of the Appeals Chamber is to focus only on those questions which are necessary to dispose of the issue before it, this approach has not been universal. The Appeals Chamber has previously provided guidance on issues which were not strictly necessary for the disposition of the appeal because the appealed decision has already been overturned on a previous ground, if the arguments or the findings in question risk leading to further errors in the future.Footnote 39 In this case, such a risk of future error arguably did exist. Although the Appeals Chamber stressed that the Trial Chamber's interpretation was ‘mere obiter dicta’,Footnote 40 the existence of different interpretations of when a challenge to admissibility must be filed creates a situation of uncertainty.Footnote 41 The risk here is not that Trial Chamber II's interpretation is wrong – in that case, the error could be remedied on appeal. The risk is rather that Trial Chamber II's interpretation may be correct, but that given this uncertainty a future suspect may base his or her challenge on the competing interpretation pursuant to which the trial commences when the opening statements are delivered, only to find that the challenge is held to be time-barred.
In addition to the three grounds which the Appeals Chamber did not consider in substance, the Chamber also declined to rule on the proper interpretation of ‘the case’ in Article 17(1)(a) and (b) of the Statute, in particular whether the ‘same conduct’ test applied by Pre-Trial Chambers to date is correct. This question, which remains key for admissibility determinations, had been at the core of the debate before the Trial Chamber. However, the Trial Chamber did not address this test in its decision, as it found that the case was admissible on the basis that the DRC was unwilling. Katanga thus did not raise this issue in his appeal, although the prosecution did make submissions supporting the application of this test. The Appeals Chamber also declined to examine the test, which presented many of the factors identified above: it was not alleging any error in the decision under appeal, which had not ruled on this question; this issue thus could not materially have affected the decision; this issue was not required to dispose of the appeal;Footnote 42 and the other party had not made submissions on the issue.
The range of issues which the Appeals Chamber declined to consider may appear striking, in the light of the importance of the appeal, the extensive submissions before the Chamber, and the potential implications of some of these questions.Footnote 43 Yet, as demonstrated above, this is broadly consistent with the approach taken by the Appeals Chamber to judicial determinations across a range of issues and cases.Footnote 44
In addition to these principled reasons, however, the restraint exercised by the Appeals Chamber may also reflect pragmatic considerations which militated in favour of a swift resolution of this appeal. This appeal was indeed resolved quickly by the standards of the ICC appellate proceedings: despite being one of the most important issues to come before the Chamber, the judgment was delivered just two and a half months after the appeal brief was filed, and barely two weeks after the pleadings closed.Footnote 45 Given that the trial was scheduled to open in September 2009,Footnote 46 it may be that the Appeals Chamber was even more inclined to address only those issues which were truly necessary to dispose of the appeal, to avoid the risk of delaying the trial.
3. Restraint in interpreting the law, and focus on the case at hand
The judicial restraint of the Appeals Chamber is equally evident in the grounds of appeal in which it did examine and rule on the merits. The core of Katanga's appeal centred on the argument that the Trial Chamber's interpretation and application of ‘unwillingness’ was contrary to the object and purpose of the Statute and the values underlying the principle of complementarity.Footnote 47 The prosecution, in response, urged the Appeals Chamber not to follow the structure of the Trial Chamber's analysis, but rather to return to the plain language of Article 17(1)(a).Footnote 48
In resolving this central aspect of the appeal, the Appeals Chamber took a strict and primarily textual approach to the interpretation of Article 17(1), which provides that ‘a case is inadmissible where (a) the case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State . . . unless the State is unwilling or unable’. In contrast to the approach of the Trial Chamber, the Appeals Chamber commenced its analysis with the observation that ‘according to the clear wording of article 17 (1) (a) and (b) of the Statute, the question of unwillingness or inability of a State having jurisdiction over the case becomes relevant only where, due to ongoing or past investigations or prosecutions in that State, the case appears to be inadmissible’.Footnote 49
This focus first and foremost on the plain wording of the Statute is consistent with the predominantly positivist approach to questions of interpretation which the Appeals Chamber has taken. It has repeatedly stated that the Statute must be interpreted in accordance with the standard rules of treaty interpretation,Footnote 50 and has looked at the wording of a given provision, placing weight on the ordinary meaning of those terms, read in their proper context.Footnote 51
After examining in detail the wording of each of the first two paragraphs of Article 17(1), which were at issue in this appeal, the Appeals Chamber concluded that
in considering whether a case is inadmissible under article 17 (1) (a) and (b) of the Statute, the initial questions to ask are (1) whether there are ongoing investigations or prosecutions, or (2) whether there have been investigations in the past, and the State having jurisdiction has decided not to prosecute the person concerned. It is only when the answers to these questions are in the affirmative that one has to look to the second halves of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) and to examine the question of unwillingness and inability.Footnote 52
The text of Article 17(1) may contain elements where the wording allows room for interpretation: what is required for a case to be ‘investigated’ or ‘prosecuted’, for the purposes of paragraph (a), especially in the context of traditional or alternative justice mechanisms; what is the scope of ‘the case’ which is being investigated or prosecuted;Footnote 53 or when the closure of an investigation results from the state having ‘decided not to prosecute the person concerned’, in the context of paragraph (b).Footnote 54 However, the Appeals Chamber considered that the wording of this provision led inexorably to the conclusion that if the state is not conducting an investigation, then that is the end of the matter under Article 17(1)(a) and (b):
[I]n case of inaction, the question of unwillingness or inability does not arise; inaction on the part of a State having jurisdiction (that is, the fact that a State is not investigating or prosecuting, or has not done so) renders a case admissible before the Court, subject to article 17 (1) (d) of the Statute.Footnote 55
This approach led to two key consequences. First, the test for admissibility under Article 17(1)(a) is framed in the present, whether ‘the case is being investigated or prosecuted’. Admissibility, under this paragraph, depends primarily on the investigatory and prosecutorial activities of state authorities, and these actions may change over time.Footnote 56 The question is not whether the case was being investigated or prosecuted; whether the case was admissible or inadmissible. Rather, the admissibility of a case is determined on the basis of whether it is being investigated or prosecuted. As a result, the admissibility of a case must be determined based on the facts at the time of the challenge.Footnote 57
Second, the Chamber focused solely on the objective facts: on the action or inaction of the state, rather than on the subjective reasons why the state may not have been acting. Article 17 ascribes a specific role to determinations of unwillingness and inability.Footnote 58 Because these criteria only become relevant if the state is investigating or prosecuting,Footnote 59 the Appeals Chamber considered that Article 17(1)(a) provides no basis to examine the reasons why the state was not investigating or prosecuting the case.Footnote 60 This means that the motives for the state to decline to exercise its power or duty to provide accountability at the national level are not relevant to the admissibility of a case which has been initiated before the ICC.Footnote 61
Applying these principles to the case at hand, the DRC had closed its investigation on the transfer of Katanga to the ICC. There were thus no domestic proceedings taking place at the time of the challenge. The question whether the DRC was willing or unwilling to prosecute him, whether it was able or unable to prosecute him, therefore simply did not arise.Footnote 62
As a result, the Appeals Chamber rejected Katanga's attempt to impugn ‘burden sharing’ between the ICC and the state, or otherwise to force the Court to judge why a state was not investigating a case, through an admissibility challenge.Footnote 63 The Appeals Chamber emphasized that Articles 17 and 19 created a limited procedure with a particular purpose.Footnote 64 The factors which were relevant, and the specific assessment that the Chamber was required to make, in order to determine the admissibility of a case were set out in those provisions. The Chamber refused to import new criteria or bases for inadmissibility which were not set out in the Statute, or to expand the scope of admissibility proceedings to serve other objectives.
The Appeals Chamber also declined to allow admissibility proceedings to become a forum to debate the impact of self-referrals on the admissibility regime.Footnote 65 While self-referral may not have been actively contemplated when the Statute was drafted,Footnote 66 the Appeals Chamber did not speculate whether the admissibility provisions might have been drafted differently if states had been focused on self-referrals, and, if so, how. The Chamber could apply Article 17 to the situation before it without any obvious conflict or absurdity. Nothing indicated that the mere fact of a self-referral must necessarily alter the existing regime, and the Chamber thus took the provisions of the Statute and applied them to the facts of the case.
The Chamber's primary focus on the text of Article 17 rather than on broader policy questions is not to say that it ignored how its interpretation related to the object and purpose of the Statute and of the principle of complementarity. It expressly examined this question. However, in line with its restrained approach to the judicial function, the Chamber approached it through the lens of the case before it. The Chamber concluded that if a case was inadmissible even when no domestic authority was investigating or prosecuting it, then this would itself conflict with a purposive reading of the Statute. The objective of the Statute is ‘to put an end to impunity’.Footnote 67 While the Appeals Chamber agreed that the Statute recognizes a duty on states to exercise their criminal jurisdiction over international crimes,Footnote 68 the recognition of a pre-existing duty on states does not mean that it is incumbent on the Court to enforce compliance with this duty, let alone that any attempt by the Court to enforce this duty should trump the fundamental aim of the ICC.
It must be recalled that for a Chamber to rule a case inadmissible has serious consequences. It is not a question of approving or disapproving of the actions of a state. A finding of inadmissibility is a ruling that the ICC is prohibited from exercising its jurisdiction over a case involving serious international crimes. The Court cannot assume that declining to exercise its jurisdiction over a case would lead to previously inactive states suddenly being spurred into action: ‘It is purely speculative to assume that a State that has refrained from opening an investigation into a particular case or from prosecuting a suspect would do so, just because the International Criminal Court has ruled that the case is inadmissible.’Footnote 69
There can be no doubt as to the importance or merit of promoting national proceedings as a policy objective. But when faced with a case which is not being investigated or prosecuted by any other competent authority, it is difficult to argue that the fight against impunity is best served by the one Court which is addressing the case deciding that it must divest itself of jurisdiction.Footnote 70 However important the goal of promoting national proceedings may be, it is unrealistic to expect a judicial chamber to pursue this by interpreting a provision in a way that leads to the direct and concrete result of impunity in the instant case.
4. Restraint in the role of the court
The restrained interpretation of the admissibility provisions in question also reflects a conservative approach to the Court's position vis-à-vis states. The Trial Chamber had held that ‘the fact of the matter is that a challenge to admissibility by the Defence can only be made within the scope of the expression of the sovereignty of the State in question’.Footnote 71 The Appeals Chamber did not put it in quite these terms, but the same deference to the sovereign decision of the state on whether to exercise its jurisdiction in a given case underpins the judgment.
The Appeals Chamber was clear that the Statute gives the Court the final word on the determination of admissibility.Footnote 72 However, it was equally firm that the admissibility of a case must be determined on the facts presented to the Court.Footnote 73 This included focusing first and foremost on the objective actions of the state:Footnote 74 the Court would not delve behind these facts into the motivation of the state, unless the state was obstructing the operation of the Court and the Statute provided clear authority and criteria to do so.Footnote 75 Admissibility, at least under Article 17(1)(a) and (b), was not viewed as a means for impugning the sovereign decision of a state not to assert its jurisdiction in favour of allowing the Court to proceed instead.
In addition, the Appeals Chamber did not attempt to forecast what might happen, or what might have happened, if either the state or the Court made different choices. As the Appeals Chamber stated,
[A]n accused person does not have a ‘right’ under the Statute to insist that States or organs of the Court behave in a manner that would render a case inadmissible. The admissibility of the case must be determined on the basis of the facts as they are, not on the basis of how they, in the view of the Appellant, should be. While he has the right to challenge admissibility, he has to accept that the Court will determine the admissibility on the basis of facts as they present themselves.Footnote 76
The theoretical willingness and ability of a state to investigate or prosecute a case in respect of which it is not actually taking any action, or the willingness and ability of a state to prosecute other, similar, cases, thus cannot in itself render a case inadmissible.
Underpinning much of the judgment is the Appeals Chamber's recognition that ‘under the Rome Statute, the Court does not have the power to order States to open investigations or prosecutions domestically’.Footnote 77 While the Court judges the legal effect of the facts, in essence it is the state that defines those facts.Footnote 78 It is this reality, when combined with the focus of the Chamber on doing justice in the case before it, which played a key role in the Chamber's reconciliation of its interpretation and application of Article 17 with the object and purpose of the Statute: if a state is not acting, the Court cannot force it to act; it is purely speculative to assume that an inactive state would commence proceedings just because the Court has declared a case inadmissible;Footnote 79 therefore the course which is most consistent with the objective of combating impunity is to continue with the prosecution of the case by the Court.
This restrained interpretation of the admissibility provision and realist view of the Court's powers vis-à-vis statesFootnote 80 will, in certain circumstances, grant the state a choice of jurisdiction.Footnote 81 While it was argued that this is inconsistent with the principle of complementarity or that it will discourage states from investigating or prosecuting cases themselves,Footnote 82 the impact of the Court's rulings should not be overstated. At the theoretical level, the Appeals Chamber was careful to note that it would not automatically act on a state relinquishing its jurisdiction in favour of the Court.Footnote 83
More importantly, a state only gets to ‘choose’ between the ICC and its domestic authorities prosecuting a case if the ICC Prosecutor decides to take on that case. A state cannot refer a particular case to the ICC, only a situation,Footnote 84 and even then the Prosecutor will make an independent determination whether to open an investigation.Footnote 85 Given the limited number of cases that the ICC will prosecute,Footnote 86 this ‘choice’ is thus of limited practical effect. National authorities are not given a free pass simply to wait in the hope that the ICC might take on a particular case. Further, if the ICC has investigated a serious case,Footnote 87 then if the state chooses to allow the ICC to pursue that case and instead devote the law enforcement and legal resources that this releases – resources which will almost inevitably be scarce and stretched in the situations of mass criminality before the Court – to investigating and prosecuting other crimes which might otherwise go unpunished, how does this conflict with the objective of ending impunity?
5. Restraint in action: the role of the chamber, admissibility, and positive complementarity
In addition to the reality that the Court cannot force a state to investigate or prosecute a case, the Court is also faced with the reality that in most situations of mass atrocity it will be unable to investigate and prosecute all the alleged perpetrators itself. This second reality has led to discussion of the concept of ‘positive complementarity’.Footnote 88 The traditional, or ‘classical’, understanding of complementarity was as a protection for states, to prevent the Court from overriding genuine and sovereign efforts to achieve accountability.Footnote 89 This aspect of complementarity regulates when the Court may step in to exercise its jurisdiction, and envisages a binary system where the Court becomes active only on a failure of the state. ‘Positive’ complementarity takes a more interactive view of the Court and the state, seeing them not in a competitive relationship but jointly pursuing shared objectives.Footnote 90 It envisages the Court encouraging and facilitating domestic investigations and prosecutions where possible, in addition to conducting international proceedings where necessary.
So what does this appeal judgment indicate about the relationship between ‘positive’ and ‘classical’ complementarity? Does the restraint shown by the Appeals Chamber undermine the notion of the Court encouraging states to investigate and prosecute cases themselves? At first glance, it might appear so: the Appeals Chamber did not examine the motives of the state in favouring the Court exercising jurisdiction, or use the admissibility provisions to compel the state to take action. However, nothing in this judgment is inconsistent with a strong and effective principle of positive complementarity: both the Trial and Appeals Chambers have acknowledged that states have a duty to exercise their criminal jurisdiction over international crimes.Footnote 91 Rather, the judicial restraint of the Appeals Chamber paints a more nuanced and ultimately constructive picture of the relationship between ‘classical’ and ‘positive’ complementarity.
Article 17 on admissibility is the core provision of the Statute implementing the principle of complementarity. But not every aspect of Article 17 relates to complementarity: 17(1)(a) and (b) specifically address complementarity, but 17(1)(c) operates to protect the rights of a suspect or accused under the principle of ne bis in idem as well as its complementarity dimension, and 17(1)(d) governs the admissibility of a case on a completely distinct ground, that of gravity.Footnote 92 Similarly, not every aspect of complementarity is necessarily embodied in Article 17. Admissibility is the means by which complementarity is implemented and enforced in the judicial aspects of the Court's activities.Footnote 93 Article 17 governs the admissibility of ‘a case’; it encapsulates the manner in which the principle of complementarity operates once a case has been initiated.Footnote 94
The Appeals Chamber has previously described the admissibility criteria in Article 17 as ‘barriers to the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Court’ and has stated that ‘[t]he presence of any one of the aforesaid impediments enumerated in article 17 renders the case inadmissible and as such non-justiciable’.Footnote 95 In this function of regulating when the Court may assume jurisdiction and when it is precluded from doing so, admissibility embodies ‘classical’ complementarity. The Appeals Chamber implicity recognized that the policy objectives of positive complementarity cannot be transformed into a statutory bar to the Court's exercise of jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, the Chamber's refusal to import the policy aspects of positive complementarity into the admissibility regime – to judge the admissibility or inadmissibility of an ongoing ICC case based on the objectives of positive complementarity – does not detract from the existence and importance of positive complementarity in the Court's operations. It is simply to say that this dimension of complementarity is not one which is enforced by judicial decisions.Footnote 96 Rather, positive complementarity operates through the actions of the executive organs of the Court, in particular the Prosecutor, whose mandate and prosecutorial discretion has been described as providing ‘considerable leverage to encourage and activate national judiciaries’.Footnote 97 In addition, positive complementarity will apply much earlier than strict determinations of admissibility: not only before the initiation of a particular case, but often even before the opening of an investigation.Footnote 98 The locus and timing of positive complementarity therefore places primary responsibility for it within the Court on the Prosecutor,Footnote 99 in his interaction with external partners, including states, and in the exercise of his discretion to initiate investigations and cases.Footnote 100
In addition, positive complementarity is not compromised by the Chamber's conservative and realist approach to the division of powers between the Court and states. In explaining how its interpretation of Article 17 supports the principle of complementarity, the Appeals Chamber recognized that the Court cannot force states to investigate or prosecute a case. But positive complementarity has never been based on the Court forcing states to take action. Rather, this aspect of complementarity revolves around the Court, and other international actors, encouraging domestic proceedings. The principle can apply when the Court prosecutes some cases in a situation, focusing on those most responsible, which may facilitate the state in providing accountability for other alleged perpetrators. The appeal judgment may actually facilitate the implementation of positive complementarity in such situations, as it confirms that, even where the state is willing and able to prosecute other cases, the motives for a state in declining to investigate or prosecute a given case do not render that case inadmissible before the ICC.
6. Conclusion
In upholding the conclusion that the case against Katanga is admissible, the Appeals Chamber declined to impose any policy preferences, whether its own or those of the parties, on the language of the Statute. A Chamber is primarily charged with deciding the case before it, and the Appeals Chamber therefore avoided engaging in the debate on the relative merits of local versus international justice or imposing value judgments regarding the preferred venue for trial. The realist recognition that the Court cannot force a state to act – not even in the specific case before it, let alone more broadly – supports this focus on ensuring justice in the present case, wherever that can be achieved.
The Chamber thus did not seek to expand the ambit of admissibility proceedings to address alleged burden sharing between the ICC and states. Nor did it contemplate that the basic architecture of the admissibility provisions should be rewritten by judges in the light of the practice of self-referrals. It recognized the role and competence of the Chamber with regard to admissibility: to judge the facts of the case before it in accordance with the provisions of Article 17. The Appeals Chamber took the facts as they existed at the time, rather than trying to use the judgment to create new facts which might have been more in line with the ideals of complementarity. And to these facts it applied the law as written: the law as it is, not as the appellant wanted it to be.
Just as the admissibility regime is not the solution for every issue that faces the Court, so the Court cannot be the solution for every challenge facing a state struggling to ensure accountability for mass-atrocity crimes. Each is part of a system, and must be seen in that context. The Court can, should, and does work with national authorities to encourage and facilitate domestic accountability,Footnote 101 but these objectives should not allow the Court or its partners to lose sight of the fact that its primary function is to combat impunity by investigating and prosecuting serious international crimes where necessary. There will always be scope to discuss policy choices or particular examples of prosecutorial discretion. However, this discussion should not obscure the fact that the paradigmatic example of why the Court was created, and where it should exercise this primary function, is where serious international crimes are not being investigated or prosecuted by any state with jurisdiction. The Appeals Chamber's judgment reflects the fact that, regardless of the reasons that led to such a situation, admissibility cannot be interpreted in a way which prevents the Court from fulfilling its core mandate.