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THE VALUE OF COMMUNITY, OR HOW BURKE COMPROMISES DWORKIN

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 September 2003

Emran Mian
Affiliation:
Corpus Christi College, Cambridge
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The import and intentions of Ronald Dworkin's work are fairly grand. Dworkin does not propose a plain theory of law. Indeed, his theory of law is one part of a grand architectonic that also encompasses a theory of liberal equality and an important discussion of community. Though it is the last component that this essay is most interested in, it is impossible to consider one part in isolation from the others. Dworkin believes that community can serve as a go-between for authority and autonomy; or, to use a different rubric, community can explain and justify obligation. The authority must present a legal system that is true to the value of integrity. If a legal system displays integrity, the political community becomes amenable to personification. Personification of the community allows for the formation of feelings of veneration and attachment towards it. These feelings are critical to the well-being of the individual. Hence if authority abides by the demands of community, it deserves allegiance from the individual. The tension between authority and autonomy is in this manner resolved.

Type
ARTICLES
Copyright
© 2003 Cambridge University Press