Analytical Framework

My analytical framework draws on three important elements that characterize Shaffer’s approach to the study of transnational legal processes. First, Shaffer conceives of transnational legal processes as relating to the construction and diffusion of legal norms by a heterogenous array of public and private actors, institutions, and networks that operate across borders (Shaffer Reference Shaffer2012). This pluralist conception of law defines legal norms as “norms that lay out behavioral prescriptions issued by an authoritative source that take written form, whether or not formally binding or backed by a dispute settlement or other enforcement system” (234). A transnational legal process may thus involve a diversity of forms of law, including international treaties, model laws, regulations, and guidelines promoted by transnational actors; standards or codes of conduct developed by private actors; or rules emanating from a domestic legal system (Halliday and Shaffer Reference Halliday, Shaffer, Halliday and Shaffer2015a, 15–17).

Second, Shaffer treats the processes through which transnational legal norms are constructed and conveyed as multidirectional (Reference Shaffer2012, 235–36). Rather than focus on the processes through which international legal norms are internalized within states (Koh Reference Koh1996), this perspective recognizes that legal norms can travel “horizontally” from one domestic legal system to another as well as “vertically” across transnational, national, and local institutions (Twining Reference Twining2004, 34). Moreover, the development, interpretation, and application of legal norms is understood as generating “recursive” cycles of lawmaking within and across multiple legal systems and institutions (Halliday and Shaffer Reference Halliday, Shaffer, Halliday and Shaffer2015a, 38–39). This view emphasizes that transnational legal processes are often contentious, as different actors compete with one another over the formulation and application of transnational legal norms (Dezalay and Garth Reference Dezalay and Garth1996; Meidinger Reference Meidinger, Brüutsch and Lehmkuhl2007; Halliday and Carruthers Reference Halliday and Carruthers2009). The natural ambiguity of legal norms, the path dependence of existing legal institutions, and the particularities of different domestic political contexts all create potential for differences in interpretation and application to arise between actors and institutions (Krook and True Reference Krook and True2010; Shaffer Reference Shaffer2012, 248–57). These conflicts help explain why the migration of legal norms frequently leads to their translation, rather than to their transplantation, across different legal institutions and systems (Merry Reference Merry2006; Goldbach, Brake, and Katzenstein Reference Goldbach, Brake and Katzenstein2013; Jodoin Reference Jodoin2017, 23–25).

Third, Shaffer argues that recursive cycles of lawmaking across transnational, national, and subnational legal systems can, over time, lead to the emergence of a transnational legal order in which shared understandings and related legal practices are taken for granted by actors in a particular field (Halliday and Shaffer Reference Halliday, Shaffer, Halliday and Shaffer2015a, 37–42). Transnational legal orders vary considerably in the extent to which they are effectively institutionalized. This can most notably be assessed along two main dimensions: the extent to which legal actors and institutions in a given transnational, national, or local site of law share a common interpretation of legal norms and behave accordingly (normative settlement) and the consistency between legal meanings and practices present in different transnational, national, and local legal orders (concordance) (Halliday and Shaffer Reference Halliday, Shaffer, Halliday and Shaffer2015a, 42–46).

Sociolegal scholars have identified a number of factors that can account for the emergence, evolution, and effectiveness of transnational legal processes and orders, emphasizing, among other things, facilitating circumstances and contexts, asymmetries in power between actors, the properties of transnational legal norms and their relation to domestic legal systems, and the different forms of influence exercised by and through global institutions and transnational interactions (Koh Reference Koh1996; Halliday and Osinsky Reference Halliday and Osinsky2006; Merry Reference Merry2006; Halliday and Carruthers Reference Halliday and Carruthers2009; Shaffer Reference Shaffer2012; Jodoin Reference Jodoin2017). While some of these explanations acknowledge the relevance of discourses (Shaffer Reference Shaffer2012, 250; Halliday and Shaffer Reference Halliday, Shaffer, Halliday and Shaffer2015b, 481–85), I argue that an in-depth analysis of discourses is essential for understanding the complex and shifting dynamics that animate the construction and conveyance of legal norms in a transnational legal process. In doing so, I draw on a rich body of literature that has uncovered the influence of competing discourses in the governance of environmental issues and the development and implementation of environmental policies (Hajer Reference Hajer1995; Hajer and Versteeg Reference Hajer and Versteeg2005; Bäckstrand and Lövbrand Reference Bäckstrand and Lövbrand2006). While law may in of itself be recognized as a particular form of discourse (Humphreys Reference Humphreys1985), I am more interested in unpacking how discourses can influence the perspectives and actions of actors that are involved in the generation, interpretation, translation, and application of legal norms in a transnational context (Gillespie Reference Gillespie2008). I adopt Hajer and Versteeg’s definition of discourse “as an ensemble of ideas, concepts and categories through which meaning is given to social and physical phenomena, and which is produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of practices” (Hajer and Versteeg Reference Hajer and Versteeg2005, 175). A discursive approach to transnational legal processes thus focuses attention on how actors and institutions are embedded in structures of language and knowledge that shape, in profound and implicit ways, their understanding of the problems that law seeks to address and the range of possible solutions that it offers (Kim and Boyle Reference Kim and Boyle2012; Halliday and Shaffer Reference Halliday, Shaffer, Halliday and Shaffer2015b, 482).

In particular, I use a variant of discourse analysis known as discursive institutionalism, which examines how discourses shape and become instantiated in social and institutional practices, while also recognizing that institutional contexts constrain and enable the emergence of different discourses (Schmidt Reference Schmidt2008). When a particular discourse becomes institutionalized in a given site of authority, this empowers certain actors and perspectives over others and limits the ability of actors to develop and promote discourses that diverge from those that are now dominant (Hajer Reference Hajer1995). At the same time, the institutionalization of a discourse is always contingent since actors retain the ability to challenge or create institutions by generating proposals for change and framing them in light of existing discourses in ways that make them persuasive to other actors (Vijge et al. Reference Vijge, Brockhaus, Gregorio and Muharrom2016; Allan and Hadden Reference Allan and Hadden2017) as well as by constructing new shared understandings through discursive interactions with others (Schmidt Reference Schmidt2008; den Besten, Arts, and Verkooijen Reference den Besten, Arts and Verkooijen2014). Contests between different discourses ultimately lead policy actors to form “discourse coalitions,” which are defined as an “ensemble of a set of story-lines; the actors who utter these story-lines; and the practices in which this discursive activity is based” (Hajer Reference Hajer1995, 64). The ability of a discourse coalition to influence institutions in a given domain hinges on a number of factors, including the stability of its core frames and actors, intracoalition commitment to shared ideas and unity against opposing coalitions, its ability to mobilize resources and support, and the consistency of the story lines that it promotes (Rantala and Gregorio Reference Rantala and Gregorio2014).

Accordingly, a discursive approach focuses attention on the role that discourse coalitions play in efforts to develop and apply legal norms across borders. Discourse coalitions advance competing understandings of a problem and related solutions and seek to influence the generation, interpretation, and implementation of legal norms and practices in different fields of transnational law (Kim and Boyle Reference Kim and Boyle2012). Analyzing the emergence, influence, and demise of discourse coalitions at different stages and levels of a transnational legal process is useful for understanding the dynamic process though which one or more discourses become institutionalized within the legal norms and practices that are constructed and diffused across multiple legal systems. As legal norms are promoted and applied across transnational, national, and local legal orders, they may introduce new ideas and empower new actors—classic examples of these sorts of effects can be found in the spread of human rights norms. This can give rise to discursive conflict in which discourse coalitions will compete with one another to define legal problems; demarcate the range of potential solutions; and shape the legal institutions that must be abandoned, modified, or created as a result. Because these struggles take place in the context of existing discourses (Hajer Reference Hajer1995, 60) already present in a site of law, they are likely to generate “hybrid” legal practices that reflect shifts in meaning that are aligned with existing norms (Merry Reference Merry2006). This period of discursive competition may then be followed by the institutionalization of particular discourses, which is characterized by a settlement in how legal norms are understood and applied within a site of law. In turn, the institutionalization of one or more discourses in a site of law will shape the future development, interpretation, and application of legal norms, promoting certain ways of understanding problems and solutions, narrowing the terms of the debate, and entrenching power asymmetries. However, due to the tensions inherent in transnational legal processes (Halliday and Carruthers Reference Halliday and Carruthers2009, 17–19), the institutionalization of discourses in a site of law may nonetheless be challenged in the future by a discourse coalition promoting an alternative discourse, thus generating a new period of discursive conflict (den Besten, Arts, and Verkooijen Reference den Besten, Arts and Verkooijen2014).

Methodological Framework

The discourse analysis that I carry out in this article aims to provide a critical examination of the complex and evolving relationship between discourses, coalitions, and legal norms in the transnational legal process for REDD+ over time.

I first review the role that competing discourses and related coalitions have played in the development of core legal norms for REDD+ and the way that this has shaped transnational legal ordering across multiple forms and levels of governance. In accordance with Kim and Boyle’s work, I assume that discourses not only influence the development and circulation of legal norms at the global level, but also shape the perspectives, positions, and activities of actors engaged in efforts to interpret and apply transnational legal norms at the domestic level (Kim and Boyle Reference Kim and Boyle2012). I then provide an in-depth case study of the influence of these discourses and the discourse coalitions that reflect them on emerging legal practices relating to REDD+ in Tanzania, specifically in the context of the development of a national REDD+ strategy from 2009 to 2013. I selected Tanzania as a case study country for two principal reasons. First, its REDD+ readiness efforts had reached an advanced stage by this period, making it possible to study its initial legal outcomes, specifically key decisions made regarding the design and governance of REDD+ that are included in a country’s national REDD+ strategy. Second, the pursuit of REDD+ in Tanzania has featured several important disagreements between actors relating to the way in which REDD+ should be understood, developed, and implemented, making a discursive approach particularly useful (Rantala and Gregorio Reference Rantala and Gregorio2014; Rantala et al. Reference Rantala, Kontinen, Korhonen-Kurki and Mustalahti2015).

I drew on multiple methods and sources of data to carry out my discourse analysis of the transnational legal process for REDD+ in Tanzania. The bulk of my discourse analysis relies on careful scrutiny of primary materials related to the REDD+ readiness process in Tanzania, principally policy reports, submissions, drafts, and final documents that I collected during my fieldwork.Footnote ² I also rely on semistructured interviews that I completed in Tanzania in July 2013 as well as remotely throughout 2014 with civil servants, Indigenous and civil society activists, conservation and development practitioners, experts, and private sector representatives working on or knowledgeable about the pursuit of REDD+ in Tanzania.Footnote ³ These interviews enabled me to understand the context in which REDD+ was being implemented in Tanzania and to identify the nature of different discourse coalitions and their approach to the development and interpretation of legal norms for REDD+. Finally, I also refer to a number of secondary sources on the REDD+ readiness process, the governance of forests and lands, and Indigenous Peoples in Tanzania. By triangulating across these different sources, I seek to offer an in-depth analysis of the extent to which different discourses of climate governance are reflected in the interpretation, creation, translation, and avoidance of legal norms for REDD+ in Tanzania.

The Origins and Scope of the Transnational Legal Process for REDD+

Throughout the 1990s and early 1990s, efforts to address carbon emissions from tropical deforestation were stymied by disagreements over the respective roles, burdens, and responsibilities of developed and developing countries in the fight against climate change as well as technical and scientific concerns over measuring changes in forest carbon sequestration. As a result, few mechanisms of climate governance, whether in the context of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) or the voluntary carbon markets, were geared toward significantly curbing carbon emissions from forest-based sources in developing countries (Jodoin and Mason-Case Reference Jodoin and Mason-Case2016, 264–65). These initial experiences and debates over the linkages between deforestation and climate mitigation did however increase technical knowledge and legitimize the idea of forests serving as carbon sinks (Boyd Reference Boyd2010). This opened the door for the Coalition of Rainforest Nations, an umbrella group led by Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica, to propose that the provision of new revenue streams based on the market value of forests could significantly reduce carbon emissions from deforestation (RED) in developing countries. In 2005, the coalition succeeded in getting state parties to the UNFCCC to initiate discussions on approaches and methodologies for implementing their proposal (Pistorius Reference Pistorius2012, 640). This initial proposal for what was then known as RED was quickly supported by a broad coalition of governments, scientists, and NGOs from both North and South who framed it as a “triple-win solution” for curbing 17 percent of the world’s carbon emissions, protecting forests and their ecosystems, and contributing to sustainable development in the developing world (Jodoin and Mason-Case Reference Jodoin and Mason-Case2016, 266).

After two years of consultations and discussions, REDD+ was formally included as an agenda item of the Bali Action Plan to negotiate a long-term agreement on climate change (UNFCCC COP 2008, ¶ 1(b)(ii)). By 2007, the concept had been expanded from “RED” to “REDD+” to encompass additional activities focused on the reduction of emissions from forest degradation as well as the enhancement of forest carbon sequestration (Pistorius Reference Pistorius2012, 639). This increased its relevance to, and support from, a range of developing countries with different forest ecosystems and rates of forest loss and not simply those with high levels of deforestation (639–45). The launch of negotiations over REDD+ in the UNFCCC catalyzed the creation of a large array of multilateral, bilateral, and nongovernmental initiatives to support developing countries in creating institutions and technical capabilities to manage international payments for REDD+, track changes in carbon emissions from forest-based sources, and experiment with pilot initiatives for doing so at the local level (Corbera and Schroeder Reference Corbera and Schroeder2011). In turn, with the funding and support provided by international organizations, bilateral aid agencies, and NGOs, a significant number of developing country governments in Asia, Africa, and Latin America initiated “readiness” efforts to prepare for the operationalization of REDD+ at the domestic level (Cerbu, Swallow, and Thompson Reference Boyd2011).

The launch of these efforts marks the emergence of a transnational legal process in which public and private actors have constructed, conveyed, and applied legal norms for REDD+ across a variety of legal systems (Jodoin and Mason-Case Reference Jodoin and Mason-Case2016; Jodoin Reference Jodoin2017). At the transnational level, legal norms for REDD+ have been constructed and diffused through the decisions adopted within the UNFCCC, the rules and guidance set by two influential multilateral programs, the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) and the UN-REDD Programme, and the standards and methodologies developed by nongovernmental organizations such as VERRA, including the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) and the Climate, Community & Biodiversity (CCB) Standards (Van Asselt and McDermott Reference van Asselt, McDermott and Voigt2016; Jodoin Reference Jodoin2017, 39–44). In particular, Recio has argued that the process of developing and signing grant agreements with multilateral institutions to access and receive finance for REDD+ readiness and demonstration activities has served as a key vector for the conveyance of legal norms in developing countries (Recio Reference Recio2018). At the national level, legal norms for REDD+ have been adopted and adapted in the context of the national strategies, policies, and laws that developing countries have developed as part of their REDD+ readiness efforts (Jodoin Reference Jodoin2017, 44–45). Finally, at the local level, legal norms for REDD+ have been developed and implemented through the REDD+ projects designed and carried out by governments, NGOs, private firms, and local communities in line with transnational certification standards as well as relevant domestic laws and regulations (Jodoin Reference Jodoin2017, 45–46). While some of these projects aim to feed into efforts to develop national strategies and technical capabilities at the national level, other projects have instead been undertaken with the goal of generating certified emissions reductions that can be sold and traded on voluntary carbon markets (Cerbu, Swallow, and Thompson Reference Cerbu, Swallow and Thompson2011).

The Emergence of a Transnational Legal Order for REDD+

The generation, interpretation, and application of legal norms around the world after 2007 was soon accompanied by the launch of countless initiatives, meetings, and dialogues seeking to enhance coordination between different multilateral, bilateral, and nongovernmental initiatives for REDD+ as well as build consensus among governments, international organizations, NGOs, local communities, and the private sector (Gupta, Pistorius, and Vijge Reference Gupta, Pistorius and Vijge2016; Jodoin Reference Jodoin2017; Recio Reference Recio2018). By 2010, this complex and dynamic transnational legal process had led to some degree of normative settlement concerning the concept and basic rules that should govern the pursuit of REDD+ by developing countries, leading Bodansky to allude to the formation of an “incipient” transnational legal order (Bodansky Reference Bodansky, Halliday and Shaffer2015, 304). The primary legal norms at the heart of the transnational legal order for REDD+ were gradually settled not only through the decision making taking place within the UNFCCC, but also through the legal standards emerging from multilateral institutions, bilateral agreements, and private standard-setting bodies (Streck and Costenbader Reference Streck and Costenbader2012).

Five important sets of legal norms have come to define the scope of the transnational legal order for REDD+ in the past decade and have been formally institutionalized by the UNFCCC COP in the Cancun Agreements (La Viña, de Leon, and Barrer Reference La Viña, de Leon, Barrer and Voigt2016) and in the Warsaw Framework for REDD+ (Recio Reference Recio2014). First, developing country participation in REDD+ is undertaken on a voluntary basis; dependent on national circumstances, capacities, and capabilities; and subject to the provision of adequate levels of international support and finance, including public, private, bilateral, multilateral, and market-based sources (UNFCCC COP 2014, decision 9). Second, REDD+ activities carried out by developing countries have a jurisdictional focus, which means that they aim to reduce carbon emissions by addressing national drivers of deforestation (UNFCCC COP 2014, decisions 11 and 15), as opposed to the local scale that is the standard basis of forest carbon sequestration projects.Footnote ⁴ Third, the scope of activities eligible for recognition and funding as jurisdictional REDD+ include: (1) reducing emissions from deforestation; (2) reducing emissions from forest degradation; (3) conservation of forest carbon stocks; (4) sustainable management of forests; and (5) enhancement of forest carbon stocks (UNFCCC COP 2011, ¶ 70). Fourth, REDD+ activities are meant to be supported through results-based finance that requires that their effectiveness in reducing carbon emissions can be fully measured, reported, and verified in accordance with international guidance (UNFCCC COP 2014, decision 9). Fifth, the domestic operationalization of jurisdictional REDD+ in a developing country should proceed in three phases, starting with the development of national strategies or action plans, policies and measures, and capacity building, followed by an initial implementation of national policies and demonstration activities and additional capacity building, and leading to results-based actions subject to measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV) (UNFCCC COP 2011, ¶ 76).

In addition, the transnational legal order for REDD+ has converged around legal norms that establish the conditions of “REDD+ readiness” that developing countries must achieve in order to carry out and receive funding for jurisdictional REDD+ activities, namely: (1) the adoption of a national strategy or action plan; (2) the establishment of a forest emissions level; (3) the development of a system to measure changes in forest-related carbon emissions; and (4) the creation of a system for social and environmental safeguards (UNFCCC COP 2011, ¶ 71). Of particular relevance from a legal perspective is the fact that multiple institutions require, in different ways, that developing countries participating in REDD+ ensure the full and effective participation of Indigenous Peoples and local communities in the pursuit of REDD+ initiatives and develop safeguards that recognize and protect their rights in their implementation (Jodoin Reference Jodoin2017, 54–86). I shall briefly discuss each of these conditions, as they have shaped domestic preparations for REDD+ carried out by developing countries; influenced the development of national strategies, policies, and laws; and become the principal focus of ongoing efforts to generate, interpret, and apply legal norms for REDD+ around the world. These conditions also reveal the extent to which the operationalization of REDD+ is entangled with complex and divisive legal issues that concern how forests should be managed, to what ends, and for whose benefit (Brockhaus and Gregorio Reference Brockhaus and Gregorio2014).

The adoption of a national REDD+ strategy or action plan is meant to set out a governance framework and related initiatives and milestones for creating institutions, adopting or reforming laws and policies, and establishing enabling conditions for the successful implementation of REDD+ at the national level (Minang et al. Reference Minang, Van Noordwijk, Duguma, Do, Bernard, Agung and Robiglio2014). In setting up a national REDD+ framework that is tailored to its particular circumstances, a developing country must determine: which types of landscapes and activities are eligible for REDD+ funding; which sources of international funding for REDD+ should flow into the country, including whether this should include market-based sources of finance; whether and how the benefits derived from REDD+ activities should be shared with different stakeholders within the country; how to ensure the full and effective participation of Indigenous Peoples and local communities; and whether the clarification or revision of land and forest tenure and rights is required by different REDD+ activities, potentially including by creating “carbon rights” to own or benefit from the carbon stored in forests (Angelsen Reference Angelsen2009).

The development of a reference level and the creation of an MRV system are not merely technical exercises but are also intimately connected to law and governance. Reference levels serve as a benchmark against which the performance of a REDD+ in reducing carbon emissions is measured and thus determines which actors, sectors, ecosystem, and regions will be the focus of efforts to reduce emissions and the extent to which they will have to do so (Chagas et al. Reference Chagas, Costenbader, Streck and Roe2013). MRV systems provide the information base upon which REDD+ interventions are initiated, evaluated, and managed and related payments are allocated and disbursed at various scales (Devries and Herold Reference Devries, Herold, Lyster, MacKenzie and Mcdermott2013) and differ significantly in the extent to which they recognize the potential contributions of community-based approaches (Larrazábal et al. Reference Larrazábal, McCall, Mwampamba and Skutsch2012). As such, the design of MRV systems may privilege certain actors, forms of knowledge, and sets of values and objectives. Some approaches to MRV “may serve to marginalize local actors, obscure local differences, and/or promote carbon over other forest values,” while others “can be used to mobilize counter-expertise and activate agency in diverse ways, both of global scientific elites and local actors” (Gupta et al. Reference Gupta, Lövbrand, Turnhout and Vijge2012, 730).

Finally, the adoption of social and environmental safeguards and the development of systems for reporting information on their implementation have obvious implications for law and equity (McDermott et al. Reference McDermott, Coad, Helfgott and Schroeder2012). The recognition and protection of the rights of Indigenous Peoples and local communities in this context has proven to be contentious, especially since international, regional, and domestic legal systems differ significantly in whether, how, and to what extent they respect, understand, and apply these rights (Savaresi Reference Savaresi2012; Jodoin Reference Jodoin2017). More broadly, differences in the design of safeguard systems adopted for REDD+ can have very tangible implications. Emphasizing the mitigation of risk and negative impacts through “do no harm” safeguards implies a “trade-off between economic growth, sustainable forest management, the social and cultural value of forests, and carbon sequestration” that may limit the extent to which REDD+ initiatives yield positive outcomes for ecosystems and local communities (Bastakoti and Davidsen Reference Bastakoti and Davidsen2017, 12).

While the transnational legal order for REDD+ has been characterized by a high degree of normative settlement and concordance in terms of the basic rules of REDD+ and elements of REDD+ readiness, actors have continued to contend with one another over the development, interpretation, and application of legal norms for REDD+ across different legal systems. Within the UNFCCC, negotiations have focused on the identification of drivers of deforestation, methodological standards for MRV systems, financial incentives for noncarbon benefits, market-based sources of funding, and reporting on safeguards information systems (UNFCCC Secretariat 2016). Differences in the standards for funding REDD+ activities have also emerged across different multilateral, bilateral, and private initiatives whose conditions and safeguards are elaborated on the basic of existing legal norms (Streck and Costenbader Reference Streck and Costenbader2012; Roe et al. Reference Roe, Charlotte, Pritchard and Costenbader2013). At the national level, the transnational legal process for REDD+ has also led to heterogenous outcomes, which is to be expected not only because of the enduring influence of domestic legal norms, but also because of the notion that jurisdictional REDD+ activities should be aligned with the national priorities and capabilities of developing countries (McDermott and Ituarte-Lima Reference McDermott and Ituarte-Lima2016; Vijge et al. Reference Vijge, Brockhaus, Gregorio and Muharrom2016). More fundamentally, as I will explain in the next section, the nature and prevalence of normative conflict in the transnational legal process for REDD+ is tied to the competition that it has engendered between discourse coalitions in this complex and dynamic field of lawmaking.

Discourse Coalitions in Transnational Legal Ordering for REDD+

At the global level, the initial emergence of REDD+ was closely tied to a discourse of ecological modernization reflecting a narrow and technocratic understanding of REDD+ as a climate finance mechanism providing results-based payments to shift economic incentives away from activities that contribute to forest loss toward those that increase forest cover, with little consideration of other social and environmental issues (den Besten, Arts, and Verkooijen Reference den Besten, Arts and Verkooijen2014, 42–43). However, the inclusion of REDD+ as an agenda item in the Bali Action Plan in 2007 rapidly generated discursive struggles over the scope, purposes, and rules of REDD+. For one thing, the advent of REDD+ attracted the attention of governments, Indigenous Peoples, and NGOs who were skeptical of its purported benefits for climate mitigation and concerned about its potentially negative implications for ecosystems and local communities (Nielsen Reference Nielsen2013, 12–13; den Besten, Arts, and Verkooijen Reference den Besten, Arts and Verkooijen2014, 43–44). For another, the spread of REDD+ across multilateral, bilateral, and nongovernmental legal systems provided new venues for the development of alternative discourses and norms emphasizing other priorities, most notably in terms of the recognition and protection of the rights of Indigenous Peoples (Wallbott Reference Wallbott2014, 6–7).

After 2008, the transnational legal process for REDD+ has thus featured competition between three principal discourse coalitions that den Besten, Arts, and Verkooijen refer to as: REDD+ advocates, REDD+ critics, and REDD+ reformists. Embracing a discourse of ecological modernization, REDD+ advocates have been primarily concerned with ensuring that the funds channeled through REDD+ lead to significant and measurable reductions in carbon emissions and have therefore emphasized the need to safeguard the efficiency of REDD+ as a results-based mechanism and the importance of building robust and scientifically sound systems for tracking carbon emissions (Nielsen Reference Nielsen2013, 12–13). The discourse of ecological modernization promoted by REDD+ advocates has most notably been reflected and instantiated in the World Bank’s FCPF, which provides funding and support for the operationalization of REDD+ in developing countries, including by channeling public and private funds to test results-based payments for REDD+ activities. The memo that led to the creation of the FCPF in 2008 explicitly recognized that it “is, first and foremost, a climate change mitigation instrument, and that REDD will not solve all the problems affecting forests, including loss of biodiversity, poverty, etc.” (FCPF 2008, 36). The FCPF has thus been criticized for its embrace of market-based approaches to REDD+, its narrow focus on carbon accounting, and its failure to protect the rights of Indigenous Peoples in its operational policies (Dooley et al. Reference Dooley, Griffiths, Martone and Ozinga2011).

By contrast, REDD+ critics have espoused a discourse of climate justice and have actively opposed the very notion of REDD+, which they view as being incapable of addressing deforestation, as overemphasizing carbon sequestration to the detriment of other important social and environmental values (Dooley et al. Reference Dooley, Griffiths, Martone and Ozinga2011), and as implying a commodification of nature that is incompatible with the traditional values of Indigenous Peoples and forest-dependent communities (Fincke Reference Fincke2010). REDD+ critics have criticized the construction of legal norms within multiple legal systems for REDD+, while limiting their direct engagement in official intergovernmental processes to avoid providing REDD+ with any further legitimacy as a result (Long, Roberts, and Dehm Reference Long, Roberts and Dehm2010, 237–38). REDD+ critics have nonetheless played an important role by pressing REDD+ advocates to recognize the importance of other social and environmental objectives and thereby creating opportunities for REDD+ reformists to support their integration in the legal architecture for REDD+. REDD+ critics have collaborated with one another in promoting a critical discursive understanding of REDD+ through transnational networks like the Accra Caucus (Accra Caucus 2009) as well as spaces that are tied to broader movements committed to the promotion of climate justice (Long, Roberts, and Dehm Reference Long, Roberts and Dehm2010) and the rights of Indigenous Peoples (Wallbott Reference Wallbott2014).

Like the REDD+ critics, REDD+ reformists have had doubts about the ability of REDD+ to effectively tackle deforestation and have been concerned with its negative social and environmental implications (den Besten, Arts, and Verkooijen Reference den Besten, Arts and Verkooijen2014, 642). However, promoting a weaker variant of the civic environmentalism discourse, REDD+ reformists have sought to maximize its potential as a mechanism to protect forests, empower local communities, and improve governance for sustainable development. REDD+ reformists have played a critical role in supporting the construction and conveyance of legal norms that seek to deliver multiple environmental and social benefits through REDD+, including, for instance, by emphasizing the importance of land tenure reform, social and environmental safeguards, and community-based approaches to carbon accounting (REDD+ Safeguards Working Group 2014). The discourse of civic environmentalism in the field of REDD+ has been most notably been reflected in the work of the UN-REDD Programme and the REDD+ SES Initiative. While the UN-REDD Programme has provided support and guidance regarding the development of MRV systems and financial mechanisms to operationalize REDD+, its other areas of work have included national REDD+ governance, stakeholder engagement, multiple benefits, benefit sharing, and the transformation of forestry and land use (UN-REDD Programme 2012, 10–11). The REDD+ SES is a multistakeholder program that provides a voluntary set of social and environmental standards that countries can use to build their own safeguards systems and that “respect the rights of Indigenous Peoples and local communities and generate significant social and biodiversity benefits” (REDD+ SES 2012, 3). Both the UN-REDD Programme and the REDD+ SES Initiative have most notably promoted safeguards and related guidance that go beyond those adopted in the Cancun Agreements or those used by the FCPF in recognizing and respecting the rights of Indigenous Peoples and local communities (Jodoin Reference Jodoin2017, 54–86).

To a large extent, the core legal norms that have come to define the transnational legal order for REDD+ and are enshrined in the Cancun Agreements and the Warsaw Package for REDD+ can be seen as representing a compromise between the discourses of ecological modernization and civic environmentalism and respond to, without fully addressing, the claims of the climate justice movement (Nielsen Reference Nielsen2013; den Besten, Arts, and Verkooijen Reference den Besten, Arts and Verkooijen2014). They accord importance to efficiency and methodological accuracy in their focus on forest emissions levels and MRV systems and their use of the language of safeguards appears to privilege carbon sequestration over other social and environmental values. Yet, their focus on developing a national strategy for REDD+ and a system of social and environmental safeguards also suggests the necessity of addressing issues that go beyond the management of results-based payments for carbon sequestration, opening the door to tackling complex problems tied to the governance of lands, forests, and resources in developing countries and the recognition of the rights and participation of Indigenous Peoples and local communities (Brockhaus, Di Gregorio, and Mardiah Reference Brockhaus, Di Gregorio and Mardiah2013).

While these legal norms have led to a certain settlement of the core legal norms relating to REDD+, they have not put an end to discursive struggles altogether. REDD+ advocates, reformists, and critics have continued to compete with one another in consolidating or challenging the ways in which different discourses have been instantiated in lawmaking for REDD+. As a result, the field of REDD+ has grown more fractious as these competing discursive understandings of REDD+ have led to the generation of diverging legal standards, approaches, and tools (Jodoin Reference Jodoin2017, 56–63). As I will show in the subsequent section, another important venue for discursive competition over REDD+ has been in developing countries themselves, where governments have moved forward with the complex exercise of interpreting, developing, and applying legal norms to operationalize REDD+.

Background and Context

Close to 40 percent of Tanzania’s landmass is made up of forests, primarily comprising dry woodlands that are not amenable to large-scale logging, and nearly 30 percent of the country is covered by wildlife reserves and national parks (Kashwan Reference Kashwan2015, 101). Tanzania’s forests support the livelihoods of forest-dependent and rural communities who use them for food, medicines, shelter, subsistence agriculture, firewood and charcoal, livestock grazing, and small-scale logging (Burgess et al. Reference Burgess, Bahane, Clairs and Danielsen2010, 341–43). These local activities, along with the conversion of lands for agriculture, biofuels production, and human settlements; illegal logging and mining; and infrastructure development, have resulted in high rates of deforestation and forest degradation in Tanzania (Mbwambo Reference Mbwambo2015, 1–2). Given the small-scale nature of some of the drivers of forest loss and their underlying causes such as poverty, energy needs, and food insecurity, community-based approaches to forest management have long been seen as a promising avenue for tackling deforestation in Tanzania (Blomley et al. Reference Blomley, Edwards, Kingazi, Lukumbuzya, Mäkelä and Lauri2017). However, while Tanzania has developed an advanced regime for supporting communities in governing their forests, this has not resulted in a meaningful devolution of authority over forests in practice (Goldman Reference Goldman2003; Nelson and Blomley Reference Nelson, Blomley and Nelson2012).

This paradoxical state of affairs reflects the role and influence of two competing discourses, green governmentality and civic environmentalism, in how forests have been managed in Tanzania for several decades. The discourse of green governmentality can be traced back to Tanzania’s colonial history when British authorities centralized the management, conservation, and exploitation of forests in accordance with prevailing scientific practices and with the ultimate objective of maximizing the returns from forest resources (Hurst Reference Hurst2003, 359–61). With a view to protecting forests from local consumption, the British established forest reserves and evicted pastoralist and forest-dependent communities from their traditional lands (Nelson et al. Reference Nelson, Gardner, Igoe, Williams, Homewood, Kristjanson and Trench2009, 301–03). Upon achieving independence in 1961, Tanzania inherited this colonial forest regime, with the government forest administration controlling large state forest estates (Kashwan Reference Kashwan2015, 100).

Green governmentality endured in the policies adopted by the authoritarian socialist regime of Julius Nyerere. In a 1961 speech known as the Arusha Manifesto, Nyerere famously proclaimed that the “conservation of wildlife and wild places calls for specialist knowledge, trained manpower and money” (Neumann Reference Neumann1995, 366). The Nyerere government increased the number and scope of protected forest areas (Nelson et al. Reference Nelson, Gardner, Igoe, Williams, Homewood, Kristjanson and Trench2009, 303–05) and placed forests under the management of specially trained bureaucrats, with the ultimate goal of supporting Tanzania’s development at the national level and little consideration of the interests of local communities (Hurst Reference Hurst2003, 364–66). In a contemporary context, Tanzanian forest governance has continued to emphasize the importance of statist control over forests through decentralization measures that have reinforced and legitimated state authority and the proliferation of data collection, monitoring, and analysis (Scheba and Mustalahti Reference Scheba and Mustalahti2015). Another manifestation of the discourse of green governmentality in Tanzania has been the marginalization of the rights of pastoralist communities, whose status as Indigenous Peoples is rejected by the government (Laltaika Reference Laltaika2013) and whose traditional grazing lands have been alienated to make way for wildlife conservation areas (Neumann Reference Neumann1995).

At the same time, Tanzanian forest policy has reflected the influence of civic environmentalism since the early 1990s, when international donors, conservation NGOs, and Tanzanian officials began experimenting with community-based approaches to forest management (Nelson and Blomley Reference Nelson, Blomley and Nelson2012, 85–88). This new commitment to participatory forest management (PFM) (Mustalahti Reference Mustalahti2014, 201) led to the adoption of the Village Land Act in 1999 and the Forest Act in 2002, which enable communities living in or adjacent to forests to control and manage or comanage their forests through the establishment of Village Land Forest Reserves (VLFRs). VLFRs are meant to give local communities statutory rights to manage, control, and benefit from forests and their resources (Nelson and Blomley Reference Nelson, Blomley and Nelson2012, 83). Indeed, by 2011, 11 percent of Tanzania’s forestland was managed under PFM, and 18 percent of all villages had PFM institutional arrangements (Blomley et al. Reference Blomley, Edwards, Kingazi, Lukumbuzya, Mäkelä and Lauri2017, 7).

However, the process for establishing VLFRs has been beset by the imposition of a standardized set of technical and administrative requirements that require the expertise, funding, and engagement of external actors—district officials, development experts, and conservation NGOs (Scheba and Mustalahti Reference Scheba and Mustalahti2015). The establishment of VLFRs has also been stymied by district officials reluctant to approve new VLFRs due to concerns over losses of tax revenue and bribes associated with the exploitation of forest resources (Nelson and Blomley Reference Nelson, Blomley and Nelson2012, 89–91). Finally, the forest-dwelling and pastoralist communities that identify as Indigenous Peoples have been unable to establish VLFRs because they do not generally hold statutory tenure over their traditional lands or meet the requirements for establishing villages under Tanzania’s land administration system (IFAD 2012, 14) and their customary lands have remained subject to coercive conservation practices (Laltaika Reference Laltaika2013). More broadly, ambiguities over the recognition of different rights to lands and forests has generated conflict between villages, Indigenous communities, and government officials (Kashwan Reference Kashwan2015, 103). Although it reflects the rhetoric and promise of civic environmentalism, the pursuit of community-based forest management in Tanzania has thus been affected by the enduring influence of green governmentality discursive practices that emphasize the role of expertise and bureaucratic rule in managing forests (Goldman Reference Goldman2003; Brockington Reference Brockington2017).

Discourses in the REDD+ Readiness Process in Tanzania

The influence of multiple competing discourses can also be discerned from the very outset of the pursuit of REDD+ in Tanzania. Tanzania’s efforts to implement REDD+ began in 2008, with the conclusion of a bilateral agreement with the government of Norway. With funding provided by Norway and the UN-REDD Programme, Tanzania created a National REDD+ Taskforce to oversee the preparation of a National REDD+ Strategy, the organization of multistakeholder consultations, and the selection of REDD+ pilot projects. The discourse of governmentality was clearly reflected in the appointment of the taskforce itself, which was composed of government officials and did not include any civil society representatives (URT 2010, 50–51). In addition, the first draft of a national strategy released by the taskforce envisaged the creation of a national trust fund, guided and staffed primarily by government representatives, to manage and channel funding for REDD+ received from abroad (URT 2010, 14–17). The draft national strategy also emphasized the importance of national institutions for MRV and situated carbon accounting in the realm of experts, repeatedly acknowledging the need for increased technological and human capacity to set baselines and to monitor and verify carbon stocks (URT 2010, 64–71). Finally, even as it recognized the importance of the rights of forest-dependent communities, the draft strategy specifically denied that the concept of Indigenous Peoples applied to pastoralist and forest-dwelling communities in Tanzania (URT 2010, 11).

The discourse of civic environmentalism was also manifest in the early activities of the National REDD+ Taskforce. For one thing, the taskforce carried an initial set of consultations with stakeholders across Tanzania in order to prepare the first draft of a national REDD+ strategy (IRA 2009). For another, the draft national strategy identified enhanced support for participatory forest management as an important pathway for reducing carbon emissions in Tanzania. The strategy explained how lessons learned from Tanzania’s experience with community-based forest management could be integrated with the implementation of REDD+ and envisaged several strategic interventions for REDD+ that would reduce poverty and support livelihoods among rural communities, strengthen forest governance, and enhance participatory land-use planning and conflict resolution (URT 2010, 36, 83, 84, 87).

Finally, ecological modernization was only present to a limited degree in the draft national strategy, with a vague acknowledgment the potential role of carbon-trading mechanisms among other sources of funding for REDD+ (URT 2010, 43–44). However, these propositions remain speculative and were not discussed in concrete terms. With the release of the first draft National REDD+ Strategy in December 2010 and the organization of a further series of multistakeholder workshops in the first quarter of 2011, two competing discourse coalitions began to form around the pursuit of REDD+ in Tanzania. On the one hand, a group consisting primarily of government actors espoused a discourse of green governmentality. Motivated to capitalize on REDD+ as an opportunity to obtain long-term funding for forest management,Footnote ⁵ this governmental discourse coalition advocated in favor of a more statist administration of REDD+ finance and activities in the countryFootnote ⁶ (Rantala and Gregorio Reference Rantala and Gregorio2014, 4–5).

Another discourse coalition consisting primarily of domestic and international NGOs piloting REDD+ projects in Tanzania with the assistance of Norwegian funding coalesced around a weak version of the discourse of civic environmentalism (Rantala and Gregorio Reference Rantala and Gregorio2014, 5; Rantala et al. Reference Rantala, Kontinen, Korhonen-Kurki and Mustalahti2015, 202–03). These NGOs most notably released a series of briefs and statements that emphasized the importance of including civil society in the governance of REDD+, strengthening participatory forest management, recognizing community rights to manage forests outside of VLFRs, and pushing for the national REDD+ strategy to include a set of social and environmental safeguards (Campese Reference Campese2011; MJUMITA and TFCG 2011; TFCG 2011). In addition, this coalition opposed the adoption of a national approach to financing REDD+ activities and advocated for the creation of decentralized benefit-sharing mechanisms. This position was largely based on previous negative experiences with centralized benefit sharing in Tanzania and the concern that REDD+ could pose a threat to communities’ land and forest rights,Footnote ⁷ exacerbating preexisting issues of state capture of forest benefits (Rantala and Gregorio Reference Rantala and Gregorio2014).

In early 2012, the National REDD+ Taskforce responded to the feedback received in the stakeholder consultations by naming a civil society representative to the taskforce and creating a technical working group for legal, governance, and safeguards issues, which included a representative of “Pastoralists and Hunter Gatherer Organisations” (Nordeco and Acacia 2014, 8, 11). In spite of these nominations, the National REDD+ Taskforce continued to ignore the perspectives of stakeholders and the experiences generated through the pilot projectsFootnote ⁸ and reflected instead the views of government representatives on REDD+ (9).

This is clearly reflected in the second draft National REDD+ Strategy released in June 2012. While it acknowledged the role that the allocation of land and tenure rights for local communities and the establishment of VLFRs could play in the pursuit of REDD+ in Tanzania (URT 2012, 10, 12, 22, 35, 43), this second draft strategy did not recognize the customary rights of villages to manage their forests on unreserved lands (22) and continued to privilege a national funding mechanism for managing international payments for REDD+ and channeling related benefits to local communities (37). The second draft strategy also omitted all references previously included in the first draft to the terms Indigenous Peoples, pastoralists, hunter-gatherers, or the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. In line with the changing requirements for REDD+ readiness established in the Cancun Agreements, the second draft strategy included new commitments to adopting a set of social and environmental safeguards for REDD+ (35) and undertaking a strategic and social impact assessment that would “give special consideration to livelihoods [and] resource use rights (including those of forest dependent Peoples)” (48). The release of the second draft strategy prompted a number of international and domestic stakeholders to reiterate their concerns and recommendations regarding the need to further recognize and engage with Indigenous Peoples,Footnote ⁹ to explicitly recognize and clarify the land and tenure rights of villages in relation to unreserved forests and the carbon stored in village forests (TFCG et al. 2012, 2), to consider adopting a nested approach for the management of international REDD+ payments and the sharing of benefits derived therefrom (5), and to systematically integrate social and environmental safeguards into the very body of the strategy (3).

After one last set of consultations, the National REDD+ Taskforce produced a third and final draft of the National REDD+ Strategy, which was formally approved in March 2013. On the whole, the National Strategy reproduces the underlying storyline associated with the global emergence of REDD+, namely that it provides “an exceptional opportunity for Tanzania to benefit from financial mechanisms that take cognizance of the increasing importance of sustainable forest management in reducing emissions and increasing storage of CO2 to mitigate climate change and its impacts” (URT 2013, 3). Yet, the specific ways in which legal norms for REDD+ have been interpreted and developed in the National Strategy demonstrate how aspects of ecological modernization and civil environmentalism have been shaped by, and incorporated into, a logic of green governmentality. My analysis below considers, in turn, the extent to which these discourses are manifest in discussions of the drivers of forest loss and the solutions thereto, the coordination of REDD+ activities, the management of finance and benefit sharing, carbon accounting practices, and social and environmental safeguards.

The National Strategy identifies the following as direct drivers of deforestation and forest degradation in Tanzania: agricultural expansion, human settlements, population increase, overgrazing, firewood and charcoal production, uncontrolled mining, timber extraction, infrastructure development, and biofuel production (URT 2013, 14–15). The strategy goes on to discuss two underlying causes of forest loss that suggest the overriding importance of green governmentality and civic environmentalism. To begin with, the strategy addresses a number of “policy failures” responsible for deforestation: “inadequate capacity of the government to implement strictly the instituted centralized and decentralized management systems due to inadequate financial and management capacity, which result into inefficient management of forest resources; inability of government to adequately define resource tenure rights thereby subjecting forests to ‘open access’ with the consequent risk of over-exploitation and general resource degradation and inability to create the right investment incentives in forest activities; and inadequate mechanisms to charge a sufficiently high forest rent which reflects the real financial cost of managing forests” (15).

While the language of incentives in this passage is reminiscent of ecological modernization, it forms part of a broader diagnosis suggesting, in line with green governmentality, that forest loss is ultimately driven by lack of governmental control over natural resources. Given the way in which the problem of deforestation has been framed, it is not surprising that the strategy states that it “has put considerable emphasis on capacity building and infrastructure development at the national and sub-national levels” (URT 2013, 17). The majority of the strategic interventions for addressing drivers of deforestation and forest degradation are indeed focused on expanding and strengthening the ability of the government to govern forests by: enforcing laws and regulations, strengthening forest management at all levels, developing effective land-use planning mechanisms, increasing monitoring capacity, practicing integrated decision making across governmental sectors, and developing bureaucratic knowledge and expertise (48–51). It is striking that quite a few of the strategic interventions contemplated in the strategy are designed to govern local communities themselves, including measures to strengthen “mechanisms for controlling traditional/taboos activities,” “educate and advocate abandoning of unfriendly environmental, social and economical [sic] traditions and cultural beliefs,” “[c]ontrol migrants,” and “[s]upport and monitor family planning programme” (48–51).

In addition, the National Strategy also recognizes “population growth, urbanization, and rural poverty” as underlying causes of deforestation in Tanzania (URT 2013, 16). This acknowledgment of the relationship between underlying socioeconomic vulnerability and forest loss echoes the weak civic environmentalist discourse, as does the importance accorded to PFM in the strategy. The strategy states that PFM “has emerged as a central element in ensuring sustainable management and conservation of Tanzania’s forests” and thus “provides a value basis for rapid REDD+ readiness” (9). The strategy accordingly features several strategic interventions that could enhance the ability of local communities to manage their forests, including clarifying forest tenure and land rights, accelerating participatory land-use planning, and concluding benefit-sharing agreements with forest adjacent communities (48–51).

Yet, the way that PFM is deployed throughout the strategy is a far cry from stronger conceptions of civic environmentalism or the claims of Indigenous PeoplesFootnote ¹⁰ and ultimately reinforces the importance of state administration and expertise (Rantala et al. Reference Rantala, Kontinen, Korhonen-Kurki and Mustalahti2015, 209). In fact, the strategy frames local communities as responsible for forest loss, rather than agents that have the potential to manage their resources sustainably: “While some traditional rural communities have developed comparatively sustainable forms of resource use, poverty-led environmental degradation is still responsible for much of the deforestation and forest degradation taking place in the country” (URT 2013, 16). The emphasis that is placed on the role of communities in driving deforestation appears to be somewhat misplaced, given the evidence that forests governed through PFM have had lower rates of forest loss than those that are managed by central authorities (Blomley et al. Reference Blomley, Edwards, Kingazi, Lukumbuzya, Mäkelä and Lauri2017, 8). Moreover, the strategy conceives of PFM not as means of empowering communities, but as a program that has “helped to integrate communities into forest management” (URT 2013, xii). Finally, the strategy fails to expand on the obstacles that stand in the way of expanding the scope of PFM in Tanzania, such as bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption in the central and central government. Instead, its focus lies with the incapacities of villages to implement PFM and the need for state intervention to assist them in doing so: “To improve governance at local level that will eventually facilitate sustainable PFM, the village institutions need capacity development in areas such as planning, mobilization, finance management, good governance, and lobbying. The local/central government needs to provide the different skills through various training programmes done at village level” (19).

The National Strategy’s discussion of the coordination of REDD+ activities reveals a similar emphasis on the central role of government intervention and control. The logic of green governmentality is clearly illustrated in a figure included in the strategy (reproduced here), which delineates a hierarchical structure of REDD+ governance that situates, from top to the bottom, the central government, the forest department, the district government, and villages (see Figure 1 below). Invoking the language of bureaucratic organization and expertise, the strategy explains that the pursuit of REDD+ requires a “coherent and credible institutional framework with well informed and capable personnel to manage and coordinate REDD+ activities at national and sub-national levels” (URT 2013, 22). Elsewhere, the National Strategy alludes to civic environmentalism by including the engagement and active participation of local government authorities, the private sector, and CSOs as a key strategic action for the implementation of REDD+ (42). However, rather than consider public participation as an asset or matter of justice or equity, the involvement of multiple stakeholders is framed in the strategy as something that “invokes challenges on effective coordination, decision making and governance” and “possible sources of inefficiencies” requiring “capacity building, political will, and awareness raising” (22).

FIGURE 1. Chart of the Institutional Structure for REDD+ in Tanzania (URT 2013, 22)

The sections on the management of REDD+ finance and benefit sharing in the National Strategy also reveal the overriding influence of green governmentality. Rejecting calls to adopt a decentralized approach to finance and benefit sharing, the National Strategy commits Tanzania to continuing preparations toward establishing fund-based financing options (URT 2013, xx, xiv, 17). This strong preference for the development of a national fund for REDD+ is not only consistent with the discourse of green governmentality and its concern for increasing governmental resources and capacity in the environmental realm,Footnote ¹¹ but also reflects an implicit “mistrust”Footnote ¹² of market-based mechanisms that is tied to Tanzania’s socialist past.Footnote ¹³ In comparison with earlier drafts, the National Strategy includes fewer explicit references to the language and practices associated with ecological modernization, save for a brief overview of forest carbon-trading mechanisms that apply internationally (16–17) and two vague commitments to employing payment for environmental services schemes (41, 49). On the other hand, responding to the concerns expressed by CSOs espousing a discourse of civic environmentalism, the National Strategy does refer to the importance of equitable benefit sharing, which is presented as being critical to ensuring the participation of communities in the pursuit of REDD+ activities (10–11). However, the strategy merely includes it as one of the enabling conditions for the effective implementation of REDD+, without providing further particulars on the way in which equitable benefit sharing might be achieved in practice (44). The strategy also refers to the possibility of employing a nested approach to REDD+, but it is striking that it is reformulated in a way that reinforces the primacy of the central government, being defined as a way to “enable the state to account in a fair way for gains and losses and to reward stakeholders who are responsible for reductions in carbon losses” (xviii).

The carbon accounting practices that are outlined in the National Strategy also demonstrate a clear commitment to privileging administrative and technocratic rationalities that are associated with green governmentality, with some minor concessions to civic environmentalism. The strategy anticipates the creation of a national forest-monitoring and MRV system that emphasizes the importance of technology and expertise and values reliability, accuracy, and efficiency (32–39). The determination of reference emission levels is envisaged as a nested process, requiring the development of “an interlocking set of baselines that cover the whole country and aggregates to the national baseline” (38). This approach is required to enable the central government to redirect finance to incentivize different stakeholders that could contribute to REDD+ and recognize that “national parks, forest reserves, village forest, community forests, and private forests could account for their carbon levels” (38). As such, the strategy provides, with respect to the measurement and monitoring of forest carbon stocks and emissions that “[t]he methods to be applied are also expected to be participatory in order to ensure engagement of local communities in the MRV process” (39). Nevertheless, this participatory aspect of carbon accounting is not elaborated upon in the strategy and does not appear as a component of the activities formulated for the full implementation of REDD+.

Finally, the National Strategy includes few details regarding the substance of its social and environmental safeguards for REDD+, which were ultimately developed through the methodology and multistakeholder process provided by the aforementioned REDD+ SES (Jodoin Reference Jodoin2017, 139–43). The discussion of safeguards reflects a weak form of civic environmentalism that is embedded within a broader logic of green governmentality. To begin with, the strategy does recognize that REDD+ can generate multiple benefits, including “poverty alleviation, maintenance of forest dependent communities’ rights, improved community livelihoods, technology transfer, sustainable use of forest resources and biodiversity conservation” (URT 2013, 52). After summarizing the different standards on REDD+ safeguards provided by the UNFCCC, the World Bank, and the UN-REDD Programme, the strategy emphasizes that “Tanzania’s own national legal and policy framework provides important environmental and social safeguards that apply to REDD+ including laws and policies relating to land and forest property rights, and environmental impact assessment” (54). The strategy is signaling here, among other things, that Tanzania’s safeguards policies will not recognize the status and rights of Indigenous Peoples on its territory, which is consistent with Tanzania’s historical resistance to this concept and current policy position.Footnote ¹⁴ Indeed, the strategy itself uses the term “forest-dependent peoples” instead (xi, xxii, 5, 8, 48, 52, 54), which was the term eventually employed in the safeguards policy adopted in 2013 (URT Vice-President’s Office, 2013). Moreover, the strategy actually proposes several interventions that could potentially have negative impacts on Indigenous Peoples such as pastoralists, given their existing political and economic marginalization. For example, it commits to reviewing “livestock policy and strategies to reduce overgrazing and nomadic pastoral practices” as drivers of deforestation, and it also supports “commercial livestock destocking campaigns” (URT 2013, 50). This once again reinforces the view that local communities are responsible for deforestation and that REDD+ could be employed to place their behavior under government control.

Overall, the foregoing analysis suggests that the interpretation and application of legal norms for REDD+ in Tanzania can be understood as flowing from the interplay of discourses that have defined REDD+ at the global level and preexisting discourses that have shaped forest and land governance and the treatment of different communities in Tanzania for several decades. Importantly, these domestic discourses were shown to have shaped the terms of the discursive struggle itself. While global debates over REDD+ have been animated by discursive struggles opposing ecological modernization to civic environmentalism, the emergence of the transnational legal process for REDD+ in Tanzania has engendered a competition between discourse coalitions committed to green governmentality or civic environmentalism. Lawmaking for REDD+ in Tanzania has primarily reflected the logic of green governmentality, with a few concessions to aspects of civic environmentalism. Within this context, the discourse of ecological modernization has been minimized, and in some cases subsumed within these two discourses. Meanwhile, the discourse of climate justice promoted by forest-dependent peoples and Indigenous rights organizations has been completely marginalized in Tanzania, with the very status of Indigenous Peoples not being recognized (Jodoin Reference Jodoin2017, 149–50). The relegation of Indigenous Peoples is also evident in practical aspects of the REDD+ readiness process, including in their exclusion from the consultations that were held by the National REDD+ Taskforce (Nordeco and Acacia 2014, 11) as well as the selection of pilot projects that were carried out at the local level (Jodoin Reference Jodoin2017, 163–64).

What is more, the ways in which green governmentality and civic environmentalism have been deployed in the context of REDD+ in Tanzania have been intimately tied to its distinctive history and institutions of forest governance. Recognizing the role played by domestic factors in mediating the influence of transnational legal discourses helps explain two important features of the REDD+ lawmaking process in Tanzania. For one thing, Tanzania’s long-held commitment to green governmentality and the distrust that it has engendered between government officials and local communities assists us in understanding both the government’s resistance to decentralized funding mechanisms as well as the unexpected faith that domestic civil society actors have placed in market-based finance for REDD+. For another, the key governmental and civil society actors involved in the REDD+ readiness process have all conceived of community participation through the lens of Tanzanian forest policies and the language of village-based governance, from which Indigenous Peoples are largely excluded. As such, paying attention to the interplay between global and domestic discourses in the transnational legal process for REDD+ reveals the incomplete nature of legal norms and the ways that their transmission across borders can generate ongoing discursive struggles over the diagnosis of problems and the solutions adopted to resolve them, in ways that privilege the ideas and interests of some actors over others.