Introduction
This article tells the story of how legal elites transformed the corporate law sector in Brazil—well before present‐day developments involving modern globalization. Scholars have carefully discussed the subject of lawyers, foreign markets, and globalization (see, e.g., Cone Reference Cone1996; Dezalay and Garth Reference Dezalay and Garth1996, Reference Dezalay and Garth2002; Silver Reference Silver2009, Reference Silver2014; Terry 2012, Reference Terry2013, Reference Terry2014 Reference Terry2013). As these works suggest, there is variation in what foreign lawyers can and cannot do within markets that are not their own (see also Friedman and Perez‐Perdomo Reference Friedman and Perez‐Perdomo2003; Wilkins and Papa Perez‐Perdomo Reference Perez‐Perdomo2006). With respect to Brazil, in particular, foreign lawyers and foreign firms today are allowed to have a presence, although there are restrictionsFootnote 1 (Persky Reference Persky2011; Tauil Reference Tauil2011; Almeida and Nassar Reference Almeida and Nassar2012; Castro Reference Castro2012; Terry Reference Terry2013, 489). As of 2014, there were thirty‐one foreign law firms in Brazil, with twenty‐six of them having arrived from 2004 on.Footnote 2
This article adds another layer to the discussion by bringing in a theoretical and historical approach, and by drawing on key scholarship in this area (see, e.g., Dezalay and Garth Reference Dezalay and Garth2002, Reference Dezalay and Garth2010). Few have reflected on, or even know about, how foreign lawyers—specifically those who were US business lawyers—worked quite easily in Brazil beginning nearly a hundred years ago. Up until 1963, when legislation regulating the legal profession was introduced (Castro Reference Castro2012, 11), there was an absence of regulatory details from the Brazilian Bar regarding foreign lawyers practicing within the country.Footnote 3 In fact, by uncovering over 1,000 pages of rare archival data (in both Portuguese and English), the authors of this study discovered how as early as 1913 US lawyers, working with their domestic counterparts, helped influence changes within the Brazilian corporate bar.
As this study argues, the evidence provided here fits into a broader theoretical framework (discussed below) on the role elites play in shaping professional landscapes. To be sure, there was a range of motivations that prompted US lawyers to travel to Brazil. Service on behalf of the US government was the initial impetus for the first emigrant. Next, the Americans who came during the late 1920s and 1930s were living through the Depression, and thus sought new employment opportunities (Vianna Reference Vianna2012; interview with S. Demarest, February 28, Reference Demarest2014). Those who came in the 1950s were energized and motivated by the possibility of making money within a market that was seen as having enormously new potential (interview with A. Boscoli and N. Rotenberg, February 13, Reference Boscoli and Rotenberg2014).
But beyond these instrumental reasons, the story below has broader implications for those who study globalization and corporate law firms. Namely, that it is crucial to consider the significance of preceding historical developments and the activities of early legal pioneers who assisted in paving the way for what is seen today. Those US lawyers who came to Brazil beginning in 1913 saw it as essential to partner with Brazilian lawyers (who themselves were among the country's elites). Once established, these Americans, working with their Brazilian counterparts, became the key brokers for US businesses seeking to enter Brazil and for Brazilian companies wanting to internationalize. (These US and Brazilian lawyers also became strong advocates for opening Brazil's economy to foreign investment and, perhaps not surprisingly, many of the firms they founded together continue to prominently exist to this day [albeit with different names.]) In sum, the historical data support the theory that by establishing meaningful relationships, developing mutual bonds of trust, and serving as intermediaries for interested stakeholders, legal elites helped transform the corporate legal market in Brazil.
Elite Theory and the Relevance to Brazil's Corporate Law Sector
A wide range of scholars from law, sociology, and political science, among other fields, have contributed to the literature on elite theory (see, e.g., Hunter Reference Hunter1953; Mills Reference Mills1956; Schattschneider Reference Schattschneider1960; Putnam Reference Putnam1976). Underlying much of this work is the concept that societies—irrespective of their system of governance—have groups of elites present who have power and influence and shape governmental policy decisions (Michels Reference Michels1962; Pareto Reference Pareto1963; Mosca Reference Mosca1966). Such elites are neither homogenous, nor are they always in alignment, and they may or may not be formally tied to the state (Kaltwasser Reference Kaltwasser2009, 1–5).
In his important work on elite theory, Kaltwasser shows how in postcolonial Latin America elites have been able to control the political and economic agendas of states such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico for long stretches of time. Yet Kaltwasser—drawing particularly on Pareto's (Reference Pareto1963) circulation of elites theory—hastens to note that such control is not in perpetuity and eventually gives way to new sets of elites who come to the fore (Kaltwasser Reference Kaltwasser2009, 25–26; Pareto Reference Pareto1963). That this type of “elite circulation” (Kaltwasser Reference Kaltwasser2009, 25–26; Pareto Reference Pareto1963) occurs even in a region famously known for entrenchment of the status quo highlights that elite actors cannot be totally insulated and are subject to having their position and influence change.Footnote 4
As it relates to the development of the legal profession, the notion of elite circulation is one that this study argues is at the heart of what occurred in Brazil regarding the corporate bar during the first half of the twentieth century. Building on valuable previous scholarship (see, e.g., Dezalay and Garth Reference Dezalay and Garth2002, 47–51), the data below support the theory that elite lawyers from the United States circulated into Brazil, embedded themselves within Brazilian legal culture, and then ably represented US businesses wishing to establish a market presence. Furthermore, these foreign legal elites brought with them skill sets, familiarity with the Western common law and international law, technology on how to run an efficient legal practice, and knowledge of how best to structure cross‐border, transactional deals—all talents that US businesses found valuable as they expanded into Latin America (Dezalay and Garth Reference Dezalay and Garth2002, 47–51).
Yet this framework of legal elites—with such expertise—arriving into a new environment to do business needs another component. This study will argue that it was also necessary for the US lawyers to make alliances with key Brazilian lawyers and Brazilian state actors. These Brazilians were the ones with the connections, networks, and relationships; if the Americans wanted to be successful, it was essential that they join forces with local elites. In other words, this story must be seen as the “coming together of [Brazilian] local know‐who with U.S. local know‐how” (Dezalay and Garth Reference Dezalay and Garth2002, 49). Or, in Bourdieu's terminology, the Brazilian elites had the necessary social capital vis‐à‐vis domestic clientele and the state, which enabled them to serve as crucial and necessary bridges—and even “pioneers” (Dezalay and Garth Reference Dezalay and Garth2002, 49)—for those Americans circulating into the Brazilian market (Bourdieu Reference Bourdieu1985, Reference Bourdieu and Richardson1986 Reference Kay and Hagan1999, 527; see also Kay and Hagan Dezalay and Garth Reference Dezalay and Garth2010, 1–19).
Indeed the exporting of US corporate law norms and practices into Brazil—and then the subsequent interaction between US and Brazilian lawyers—fits into a broader narrative of Western legal‐elite expansion (Krishnan Reference Krishnan2004; Dezalay and Garth Reference Dezalay and Garth2010). For example, colonies of European countries often saw expatriate lawyers enter in order to further the interests of the empire; thereafter, these lawyers formed firms and hired local talent as a means of accomplishing this objective (Dezalay and Garth Reference Dezalay and Garth2010; Krishnan Reference Krishnan2010). After independence, many of these firms in these environments continued operating—often retaining their colonial names—but with local lawyers now fully in charge (Dezalay and Garth Reference Dezalay and Garth2010; Krishnan Reference Krishnan2010). In the narrative below, this framework applies as well—but with a twist. Rather than acting as lawyers who were de facto agents of the colonizing state, the US legal elites who went to Brazil were market driven and viewed their entrepreneurial success as contingent on finding local counterparts who shared their values and worldview. As discussed below, the evidence shows that this US cohort who circulated in as early as 1913 succeeded in achieving this goal.
Methodology
Before proceeding to the historical analysis of the interaction between the Brazilian Bar and the early US lawyers, the methodology used for this project is outlined here. Two of the three authors are bilingual in Portuguese and English and are fully proficient in reading both languages. One of the authors served as a visiting professor in Brazil at a prestigious university where early research on this topic was conducted. The sources on which this study relies are listed in detail in the references section. Briefly, the authors consulted volumes of documents located in the archives of the Wisconsin Historical Society (WHS), which contained extensive information on the first US corporate lawyer to be licensed to practice in Brazil, Richard Paul Momsen. Momsen's children donated his personal and professional papers to the WHS, which included over six boxes, containing letters, scrapbooks, clippings, speeches, announcements, correspondences, and memoranda that total approximately 1,000 pages.
In terms of the two Depression‐era emigrant lawyers, several original sources were examined. The authors received the personal diaries from the daughter of the lawyer who went to São Paulo in the early 1930s, Kenneth Demarest. Demarest would eventually cofound the corporate law firm Demarest & Almeida, which today is considered among the most prestigious of its cohort in Brazil.Footnote 5 The authors also gained access to an internally circulated historical account of the Demarest firm, which was provided to them by current partners who knew and worked with Kenneth Demarest. For the other corporate lawyer, Carl Kincaid, who established Kincaid Mendes Vianna Advogados, the authors received a detailed, unpublished written lecture from the firm's current managing partner that was given at an eightieth anniversary celebration. (The lecture documents how the firm came into being, and the authors also interviewed this managing partner.)
For all three lawyers—Momsen, Demarest, and Kincaid—as well as for the two key post‐World War II US émigrés, Ulysses Grant Keener, Jr. and Paul Griffith Garland, a range of secondary sources from those times was referenced, including bar journal articles, newspaper clippings, and legal and business periodicals. The Revista do Instituto dos Advogados Brasileiros, or the Journal of the Institute of Brazilian Attorneys, was also studied, as this publication had within it speeches of US and Brazilian lawyers from the relevant periods. Secondary academic sources and the scholarly literature relevant to these historical moments were also vital for the study. In addition, the Web sites for each of the firms to be discussed below were researched. Finally, several extensive interviews were conducted with the children and colleagues of the above‐mentioned lawyers. Although many of these respondents were quite senior in age, they were still vibrant in terms of their recollections and provided valuable information. The only US lawyer from this history alive and in good health—P. G. Garland—granted the authors an interview as well.
The First of the US Legal Elites in Brazil: Richard Momsen
Richard Paul Momsen was born in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in 1891 and earned his law degree from George Washington University in 1912 (George Washington University 1923). Following graduation, Momsen worked as Secretary for Republican Congressman William J. Cary from Wisconsin's Fourth District (Momsen Reference Momsen1912a). Later that same year Momsen received an offer from the US State Department to join the US Consulate in Rio de Janeiro, which he accepted on December 16, 1912 (Momsen Reference Momsen1912b).
On January 11, 1913, Momsen set “sail from New York to Rio de Janeiro” (Momsen Reference Momsen1913). For the next four years Momsen devoted his professional life to his position at the US Consulate, but it was not his only focus. Although an exact date is not known, Momsen began studying law at the Faculdade Livre de Sciencias Juridicas e Sociaes do Rio de Janeiro—the current Federal University of Rio de Janeiro Faculty of Law. Typically, the time to complete a Brazilian law degree was five years, but on December 24, 1917, Momsen sat for the Brazilian bar exam, which included a formal oral examination. (There is evidence that the Faculdade gave him credit for his LLB earned at George Washington University [Momsen Reference Momsen1918a.])
Momsen learned he had passed his exam four days later and thereafter he was awarded his diploma (Momsen Reference Momsen1918a), becoming the first holder of a “legal degree ever conferred upon an American in Brazil” (Momsen Reference Momsen1918a). This feat was nothing short of impressive. Momsen completed his legal studies, completed his oral examination, and wrote a comparative law thesis, which discussed commercial, civil, criminal, and constitutional law, all in Portuguese. There is no evidence in any of his personal and professional papers that he had ever rigorously studied the language prior to arriving in Brazil.
As a young attorney in Rio, Momsen was mentored by Francisco Cavalcanti Pontes de Miranda, a brilliant lawyer who would later become one of Brazil's foremost judges and scholars (Momsen Reference Momsen1918a). Momsen was also tutored by Ruy Barbosa, another prominent Brazilian lawyer who was a fierce defender of civil liberties and an outspoken critic of Brazil's system of slavery (Momsen Reference Momsen1918a). These important connections helped Momsen become active within Brazilian civil society. In 1916, for example, he was a leader in forming the American Chamber of Commerce in Brazil (Brazilian Business Review 1959, 26–28). His work for the US government did not suffer either. Following the disappearance on the high seas of Alfred Louis Moreau Gottschalk, the sitting US Consul General in Rio, Momsen was appointed to this post in February of 1918 (Momsen Reference Momsen1918b).
On to Private Practice
Momsen's stint as Consul General was short‐lived, lasting only about a year. He subsequently decided to focus on his career as a private lawyer in Brazil. To that end, Momsen recognized that despite his Brazilian education, his Brazilian law license, and his Portuguese language skills, it would be impossible to accomplish this objective without working closely with—and learning from—Brazilian lawyers themselves. Beginning in 1919, Momsen started down a path that would make him and his Brazilian colleagues arguably among the most influential private law lawyers for generations to come. His first move was to establish a partnership with Edmundo Miranda Jordão and Pedro Americo Werneck, two highly regarded, domestically licensed corporate lawyers in Brazil.Footnote 6
Together, Momsen, Jordão, and Werneck formed a law firm that focused on litigation and corporate law. Such a move was extremely unusual because litigation was handled almost exclusively by solo practitioners (Gonçalves Neto Reference Gonçalves Neto2005, 29). It was also during this time period that Momsen began an interesting parallel career path. Along with focusing his efforts on corporate law matters, he decided to train himself on the nuances of Brazilian patent and trademark law. Brazil had been a leader in this area dating back to 1809, when Portugal's King João VI's government enacted legislation (only the fourth of its type in the world at that time) protecting intellectual property rights for his country and colonies (Barbosa Reference Barbosa2010; Malavota Reference Malavota2011; Economist 2012; Cruzeiro/Newmarc Intellectual Property n.d.).
Momsen saw an opening where he could become a cross‐border expert in a field in which he knew his corporate clients from the United States, who were expanding into Brazil, had a deep interest. While continuing to build his practice with Jordão and Werneck, Momsen spent the next five years becoming a patent and trademarks expert. Indeed, Momsen viewed corporate law and intellectual property law as inextricably linked. There were over two dozen US companies that Momsen represented in Brazil, many of which were exporting goods into the country that these businesses wanted sold—and protected from imitation (Momsen and Leonardos 1994).
Additionally, in 1924, Momsen was granted permission to sit for the New York bar, which he subsequently passed. Licensed now in the most important commercial market in the United States, Momsen began what would become a full‐scale international law career that would span the rest of his professional life. In 1924, Momsen opened a second law firm, but this time in the state of New York. He partnered with Leslie E. Freeman, who had served as a representative to the American Chamber of Commerce in Brazil. Their firm, Momsen & Freeman, sought to leverage both lawyers’ connections and client bases in the United States and Brazil in order to be a preeminent international law firm that was truly unique in terms of serving client needs.
Momsen clearly had a penchant for being an entrepreneur. Just one year after forming Momsen & Freeman, and six years after partnering with Jordão and Werneck, he entered into another critical partnership—this time with Simeon W. Harris—to form an intellectual property law firm (Momsen Reference Momsen1925a). The firm was based in Rio, and Harris, who was Brazilian by birth, was the son of a US couple that had migrated to rural São Paulo during the US Civil War. Little is known about Harris, except that he was born in the city of Americana, which was a haven for whites from the US South who continued to exploit slave labor (Harter Reference Harter1987). In Americana—as in other parts of Brazil—slavery had continued to exist and it was only in 1888 that the Brazilian government formally outlawed it (Harter Reference Harter1987).
Harris's own views toward slavery remain unknown. It is difficult to imagine that Momsen, a northerner from Wisconsin who so abhorred “bigotry and hatred” (Momsen Reference Momsen1912b), who was mentored by the abolitionist Ruy Barbosa, and who prided himself on being a polyglot and internationalist, would associate himself with someone who supported the horrors of slavery. But the archival data on this relationship are silent. What is known is that just one year after forming his firm with Harris, Momsen continued his entrepreneurial ways by establishing two more firms in 1926—a second corporate law firm in Rio and a new corporate law firm in the city of São Paulo (Momsen n.d.).
This second firm in Rio was a partnership Momsen had with Eurico de Albuquerque Raja Gabaglia and William Monteiro de Barros. These Brazilians were lawyers who Momsen befriended and were part of Rio's high society during this era. Eurico Raja Gabaglia, in particular, was especially influential and he later would become the president of the Instituto dos Advogados Brasileiros. Momsen also sought to expand his corporate law reach by moving north to São Paulo, Brazil's other key city of business, politics, and international commerce. In São Paulo, Momsen partnered with three Paulistas,Footnote 7 Arnaldo Olinto Bastos Filho, Manoel Carvalho Tavares da Silva, and Frank Harold Weiss. These three lawyers sat on multiple boards of corporations, including the Brazilian subsidiary of the Columbia Broadcasting System and the powerful Tratores do Brasil, S.A., the Brazilian subsidiary of the LeTourneau‐Westinghouse Company.
Clearly, Momsen had friends with great social, economic, business, and political capital. Moreover, this entrepreneurial drive only continued. In 1928, Momsen partnered with Walter Carlos Becker to start an office in Porto Alegre, the capital of Rio Grande do Sul (Momsen Reference Momsen1928b). The firm Momsen and Becker founded together in Rio Grande do Sul engaged in corporate transactions. Such a plan would not have been surprising given that the state had historically been prosperous and a hub for industries—both domestic and international (Herrlein Reference Herrlein2000)—and many international clients with whom Momsen had relationships sought to work in Rio Grande do Sul.
By the end of the 1920s, Momsen's vision for legal practice in Brazil was becoming a reality—namely, to work intensely with local Brazilian lawyers in establishing specialized offices in major markets in which he and his partners could draw on their international legal experience to serve clients’ needs and earn substantial profits. In a little over a decade after leaving his post as Consul‐General, Momsen had established six offices in Brazil in three different cities, along with an office in New York with Freeman and an office in Buenos Aires that he and Freeman started with three Argentine lawyers in 1928 (Momsen Reference Momsen1928a).Footnote 8
Momsen did not create one mega‐law firm with different satellite offices, but instead, and uniquely, formed distinct entities that operated as independent partnerships. It is true that these offices would occasionally work with one another; after all, they were linked by a common founder. But they were each their own firm. Momsen made this choice partly because of the context of Brazil's legal landscape. Most lawyers then were solo practitioners, and where firms existed they were no larger than just a few lawyers (Cunha et al. Reference Cunha, da Glória Bonelli, Luci de Oliveira and da Silveira2007; Demarest Advogados Reference Demarest and Cavalcanti2013; interview with A. Boscoli and N. Rotenberg, February 13, Reference Boscoli and Rotenberg2014; interview with D. Trubek, March 25, Reference Trubek2014). Trying to build one large law firm would have flouted existing norms of legal culture, and it is unclear even whether such a move would have been permitted by the bar. Yet Momsen also chose this boutique‐firm route because it allowed the Brazilian partners at each respective firm to have a greater say in the operations of the business. Momsen recognized that he could not succeed without both intensely involving his local colleagues and delegating power to them (Brazilian Business Review 1959). This type of entrepreneurial, coequal, deferential partnership model existed perhaps nowhere better than with the patent and trademarks firm he started with Harris, but that made its imprint after 1927.
The Momsen‐Leonardos Relationship
In just the first year that it was founded, the Rio‐based Momsen‐Harris law firm served as legal counsel for the registration and renewal of more than 200 trademarks (Momsen Reference Momsen1925b). Momsen's ties to the two dozen US companies that were his clients—in addition to his presidency of the American Chamber of Commerce for Brazil and connections to local Brazilian businesses—help explain why this firm was so busy from its inception. This upward trajectory only continued as the firm added a lawyer who would become Momsen's most important professional colleague: Thomas Leonardos. Leonardos joined Momsen & Harris on August 1, 1927, shortly after he received his law degree from the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (Leonardos Reference Leonardos1964; Momsen and Leonardos 1994; interview with M. Leonardos, April 7, Reference Leonardos2014).
Thomas Leonardos was hired to serve as the head of the legal department at Momsen & Harris. In 1944, Simeon Harris died; subsequently, Momsen asked Leonardos to join as a copartner and the firm's name was changed to Momsen & Leonardos. Over the next six decades, Momsen & Leonardos would become the preeminent intellectual property law firm in Brazil. As a sign of the reputation and influence they had developed, Momsen and Leonardos formed an interest group in 1950, Associação dos Agentes de Propriedade Industrial, which worked closely with Brazil's first Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)—INPI—to shape public policy. For Momsen, it was crucial that clients who sought intellectual property protection have an influential lawyer within an organization that could advocate on their behalf to the government beyond standard administrative proceedings (interview with M. Leonardos, April 7, Reference Leonardos2014). This development underscores Momsen's immense social capital and networks within and outside of the state. That he was able to establish a good working relationship with the government, help create intellectual property law policy, and serve his firm's financial needs—but as he also believed, the needs of innovators and designers throughout Brazil (Leonardos Reference Leonardos1964)—illustrates the enormity of influence that he possessed.
Thomas Leonardos was also equally invested in the firm. He believed in growing the firm through the diverse hiring of professionals beyond just lawyers, which was unique for the time.Footnote 9 Engineers, accountants, physicians, and science and technology experts were all part of the firm (Momsen and Leonardos 1994). In addition, during the 1950s, Leonardos's three sons became partners. Luiz Leonardos was the only lawyer of the three; Maurício Leonardos was a chemical engineer and Tomaz Leonardos was a civil engineer. Later, in the 1990s, four other members of the Leonardos family joined. The firm also continued to expand during the next several decades. By the mid‐1990s, it had nearly 150 employees and had opened an office in São Paulo (Momsen and Leonardos 1994). Between 1996 and 2001, the firm nearly doubled in size, and over the past two decades it has been involved in tens of thousands of administrative proceedings (mainly in the trademark and patent areas) with the Brazilian PTO.Footnote 10 However, in 2012 divisions emerged within the firm and that year it split into two: Luiz Leonardos Intellectual Property Firm and Kasznar Leonardos Propriedade Intelectual.
As for Momsen, he departed Brazil in February 1964, one month before the military takeover of the government (interview with B. Momsen, March 4, Reference Momsen2014). It is unclear from the archival and interview data whether he left because he feared the political instability that was underway, or whether he simply wished to reduce his personal workload. (By that time, he was seventy‐two years old.) He returned to New York but shortly thereafter died after becoming ill from pneumonia.
In reflecting on all that Momsen established, interestingly not one of the above‐mentioned firms has retained his name to this date. The firms have either transformed into differently named entities or closed. Ironically, the most prominent and international of the firms—Momsen & Leonardos—during its split had as one of its main points of contention a disagreement on who would keep the Momsen name. (The parties agreed that neither would [interview with M. Leonardos, April 7, Reference Leonardos2014.])
By immersing himself in the culture, politics, language, and law of Brazil—and by working intimately with Brazilian lawyers, businesspeople, and state officials—Momsen established himself as a pioneering globalizer well before the twenty‐first century's era of globalization. Never mind that his name is no longer visible on the placards of the institutions he founded. His legacy clearly lives.
Seeking Refuge from the Great Depression for two US Legal Elites
Demarest Advogados and Kincaid Mendes Vianna Advogados are two highly regarded corporate law firms in Brazil today. Demarest has 260 lawyers (forty‐four of whom are partners) working in the firm, with offices in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Brasília, and New York (correspondence with P. Coelho da Rocha Reference Coelho da Rocha2014). Kincaid has more than forty lawyers who work in four different offices in the country (São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Brasília, and Vitória) (correspondence with P. Coelho da Rocha Reference Coelho da Rocha2014). Indeed Demarest and Kincaid are considered two of Brazil's truly global law firms.
Therefore, it may come as a surprise to many that the history of each of these firms dates back to two US lawyers. Both Kenneth Demarest and Carl Kincaid reached Brazil in the early 1930s. For both men, “Dick Momsen” (Demarest Reference Demarest1947) served as a key mentor for how to work within the country. However, Demarest and Kincaid also had their own worldviews on the best ways to navigate and integrate into Brazilian legal society, and in fact their strategies resulted in creating the distinctly global firms that are seen today.
The Story of Kenneth Demarest
Demarest was born in the US state of New Jersey in 1897 (interview with S. Demarest, February 28, Reference Demarest2014). Demarest graduated from Princeton University in 1920, after having his undergraduate studies interrupted by his service in World War I (Princeton Alumni Weekly 1985). He then enrolled at the New York Law School and subsequently became licensed to practice law in both New York and New Jersey.Footnote 11 But life was hard during these years. Bryant Garth (Reference Garth2013) has described the difficulty that Depression‐Era lawyers faced during this time, and there was little difference for Demarest. Moreover, coinciding with the crash of the markets in 1929, Demarest's father died, which placed the young Demarest in the position of having to support his mother and younger siblings (correspondence with G. Demarest, February 26, Reference Demarest2014).
With few prospects for attaining sustainable employment, Demarest eventually found an in‐house counsel job in the early 1930s with the Electric Bond and Share Company, which posted him to Brazil to work in its subsidiary in Rio, the American and Foreign Power Company (Demarest Advogados Reference Demarest and Cavalcanti2013).Footnote 12 This Brazilian subsidiary was in the midst of a legal dispute with a rival industry, the Sao Paulo Railway Company, and Demarest was asked to focus his efforts on this matter. Family members’ recollections and existing data suggest that Demarest worked in Brazil for much of the 1930s, until he was called on to serve in the US Navy during World War II (interview with S. Demarest, February 28, Reference Demarest2014).
Following the war, Demarest returned to New York, where he took a position as a lawyer with the elite corporate firm of Willkie Farr & Gallagher (correspondence with H. Chu, April 22 2014). He was at the firm for less than two years, however, before he decided to return to Rio in January 1947 to work as in‐house counsel for the company where he had been previously employed (Demarest Advogados Reference Demarest and Cavalcanti2013).
Demarest was ambitious and, like Momsen, he was entrepreneurial. Although Rio's legal and business markets had been expanding, Demarest saw great potential for growth in São Paulo. He traveled frequently to São Paulo and during one of his visits he met with a lawyer who would prove influential to him and to how the corporate law scene would develop in Brazil over the next several decades—João Batista Pereira de Almeida.
Almeida was a 1940 graduate from the University of São Paulo Faculty of Law. He worked at his cousin's law firm for a short time before leaving to serve as legal counsel for both the Federation of Industries of São Paulo—Federação das Indústrias de São Paulo (Federation)—and the São Paulo office of the American Chamber of Commerce (Demarest Advogados Reference Demarest and Cavalcanti2013). At the former, Almeida became friends with Manoel Garcia Filho, who was the director of the Federation and an important executive affiliated with the multinational company Goodyear. At the Chamber, Almeida became familiar with Demarest through Momsen, who was prominent within this organization in both Rio and São Paulo.
Over the course of the next several months, Almeida, Demarest, and Filho had discussions about how São Paulo needed more law firms to handle the expansion of corporate work being conducted within the city. In 1948, just one year after returning to Brazil, Demarest formally organized a partnership with Almeida, Demarest & Almeida, where both men sought to draw on their various contacts and past legal experiences to build what they envisioned would be an international, global law firm (Demarest Advogados Reference Demarest and Cavalcanti2013). Both Demarest and Almeida believed they could strategically complement one another to achieve this goal. Demarest's strengths were in his ability to network, form and nurture professional and personal friendships, and leverage his knowledge of US law and US businesses (interview with A. Boscoli and N. Rotenberg, February 13, Reference Boscoli and Rotenberg2014). He would eventually become the firm's main “rainmaker” (Demarest Advogados Reference Demarest and Cavalcanti2013). At the same time, his Portuguese language skills, while passable, were never fluent, and unlike Momsen, he was not a Brazilian‐certified lawyer (interview with S. Demarest, February 28, Reference Demarest2014). Almeida, on the other hand, was locally licensed and a well‐connected Paulista. In addition, he was a good day‐to‐day manager of the office, with sharp financial knowledge and the keen ability to judge local talent that the firm should hire (interview with P. G. Garland, March 17, Reference Garland2014).
Nevertheless, Demarest & Almeida initially struggled. Finding clients beyond those who came from the Federation and the Chamber was difficult, and even more challenging was locating work that would be ongoing. There were few repeat clients and, as a result, reliable, baseline profits were low as well. As one lawyer who was hired as a junior associate by the firm in 1951 recalled, his wages at that time consisted solely of money to cover his food and transportation costs (Cristo Reference Cristo2013). Moreover, soon after the partnership formed, Almeida became terribly ill and was out of work for various stretches of time, which hampered business development and disrupted the internal administration of the firm (Cristo Reference Cristo2013; Demarest Advogados Reference Demarest and Cavalcanti2013).
The fortunes of the firm changed, however, with a shipping accident that occurred in the port city of Santos, just outside of São Paulo. One of the parties involved was the US oil company, Texaco. Texaco had been in Brazil since 1915, and by the 1950s it was a major supplier of petroleum products for the country's burgeoning auto industry (Chevron 2014, 3). It was during this time that one of its ships collided with another vessel; Texaco thereafter hired Demarest & Almeida to represent it on this case and on subsequent legal matters (Cristo Reference Cristo2013; Demarest Advogados Reference Demarest and Cavalcanti2013). The fees that derived from the shipping case approximated nearly $7,000—the equivalent of $68,859.09 todayFootnote 13 —which helped the firm stabilize its finances (Demarest Advogados Reference Demarest and Cavalcanti2013). Furthermore, there was an important reputational boost that accompanied the relationship with Texaco. Other US companies began calling on Demarest & Almeida to represent them. In addition, throughout the 1950s the firm's domestic client base grew as well (interview with A. Boscoli and N. Rotenberg, February 13, Reference Boscoli and Rotenberg2014). Indeed, by the end of the decade, Almeida was on the board of more than fifty US and Brazilian companies, illustrating how high in demand he was among corporate executives (Cristo Reference Cristo2013; Demarest Advogados Reference Demarest and Cavalcanti2013).
By the late 1950s, Demarest and Almeida had achieved their goal. They had become global lawyers with an international client base who had skills to serve the needs of those requiring legal services in more than one jurisdiction. In 1963, Demarest, who was sixty‐six years old, decided to retire and return to the United States. Although he was not particularly old and would live for two more decades, he left Brazil in large part because he had saved enough money to spend his remaining years residing in the scenic state of Vermont (Demarest Advogados Reference Demarest and Cavalcanti2013). The political climate (including the agitation of the military) and uncertain economic conditions within Brazil also played a role in his decision to depart (Demarest Advogados Reference Demarest and Cavalcanti2013). Finally, Demarest was emotionally drained. Colleagues reported that he was tired and that he felt he had “accomplished his objective” (interview with A. Boscoli and N. Rotenberg, February 13, Reference Boscoli and Rotenberg2014). In fact, during his retirement, he was repeatedly contacted to serve as a consultant on different legal matters, but he refused all professional work obligations (interview with S. Demarest, February 28, Reference Demarest2014).
At the time of Demarest's departure, the firm had five lawyers. This number might seem small, but in a country where almost all lawyers were solo practitioners, the presence of a law firm of this type was novel. As for Almeida, he continued to serve as the firm's leader for the next several years. He worked in tandem with Naum Rotenberg, the above‐referenced lawyer who was hired in the early 1950s, to lead the firm until 1975. During the first half of the 1970s, the size of the firm tripled. Thereafter, Altamiro Boscoli joined the two, making it a tripartite leadership structure (correspondence with A. Boscolli, May 4, Reference Boscoli2014). Boscoli was hired by the firm in 1965; he had completed his studies at the University of São Paulo in 1962, and then had earned an LLM at Harvard Law School shortly before joining. It was during Almeida, Rotenberg, and Boscoli's tenure that the firm became a powerhouse within Brazil's corporate legal market.
Boscoli and Rotenberg, who were interviewed together for this project, recalled that by 1980 the firm had between sixty and seventy lawyers and that over the next two decades it grew even more rapidly (interview with A. Boscoli and N. Rotenberg, February 13, Reference Boscoli and Rotenberg2014). By 2007, the firm had seventy partners, 310 associates, over 2,000 clients, and approximately 70 million dollars in revenue (Onaga Reference Onaga2007). (Since then, the firm has reduced its size due to a strategic decision to discontinue its mass litigation business, which resulted in approximately 140 lawyers departing [correspondence with P. Coelho da Rocha Reference Coelho da Rocha2014.]) Even though Boscoli and Rotenberg are seen as among Brazil's most talented corporate lawyers who transformed the firm into what it is today, they both attribute the firm's success to the “visionary” leadership of Kenneth Demarest (interview with A. Boscoli and N. Rotenberg, February 13, Reference Boscoli and Rotenberg2014).
In 2013, the firm dropped Almeida's name from the official title, calling itself simply Demarest Advogados. It had conducted a branding exercise among its constituents, and as a brand name, Demarest was how lawyers, judges, law students, and clients from around the globe knew the firm (correspondence with P. Coelho da Rocha Reference Coelho da Rocha2014). Given Demarest's own view that his success depended on the assistance of Almeida and the many other Brazilians with whom he worked, such a gesture likely would have made him self‐conscious—despite how fitting the move really was.
The “Advogado Americano”: Carl Kincaid's Story
In terms of age, Carl Kincaid was senior to both Momsen and Demarest. Born in Texas, in 1883, Kincaid was the son of a well‐regarded lawyer, W. A. Kincaid (interview with G. M. Vianna, February 27, Reference Vianna2014). The senior Kincaid was a justice on the Supreme Court of the Philippines (a US protectorate at the time). Because of his father's status and professional success, Carl Kincaid was afforded the opportunity to spend much of his youth traveling both domestically and overseas. He met professionals from around the world, and given that several other members of his family were lawyers, by the time Kincaid graduated from Yale College in 1908, it was a foregone conclusion that he would go to law school and then seek to become a member of the bar (interview with C. Kincaid, Jr., March 13, Reference Kincaid2014).
Kincaid studied law at the University of Michigan, although a records check indicates that he did not graduate (correspondence with B. Garavaglia, June 19, Reference Garavaglia2014). (Note that at this time it was not always necessary to hold a law degree to be a member of a state bar or a working lawyer.) In the early 1910s, he appears to have traveled to Manila to clerk for his father (correspondence with C. Kincaid, Jr., March 13, Reference Kincaid2014). Kincaid then returned to Texas where he took a job working in‐house for the Standard Oil Company (interview with C. Kincaid, Jr., March 13, Reference Kincaid2014). In the 1920s, Standard Oil transferred Kincaid to Mexico and then shortly thereafter to Argentina (interview with C. Kincaid, Jr., March 13, Reference Kincaid2014). In 1929, Kincaid once again moved within the region—this time to Rio, a city that he would come to love and adopt as his home for the rest of his life.
Kincaid thrived on being an outsider who was in Brazil to learn, absorb, and live out his desire to be a global professional (interview with C. Kincaid, Jr., March 13, Reference Kincaid2014). Moreover, given the economic climate and impact of the crash of the markets in the United States, he had little incentive to return home (interview with G. M. Vianna, February 27, Reference Vianna2014). Kincaid managed himself very well; he spoke both Spanish and Portuguese (and often mixed the two in conversations, which is known in Brazil as Portuñol). He developed friendships and important connections, including with Momsen, and overall acclimatized himself to Brazilian life.
The relationship with Momsen was special. Even though Kincaid was nearly ten years older, Momsen served as a mentor for Kincaid in how the latter thought about the law, the internationalization of business, and the ways in which to succeed as an American legal practitioner in Brazil (interview with C. Kincaid, Jr., March 13, Reference Kincaid2014). Momsen's contacts and his entrepreneurialism were inspiring to Kincaid. The savviness with which Momsen so nimbly operated taught Kincaid important lessons. Indeed, Momsen helped connect Kincaid with different clients—both domestic and international—and Momsen served as a key link in a relationship that Kincaid began with Demarest (interview with C. Kincaid, Jr., March 13, Reference Kincaid2014).
In 1932, after being situated in Rio for nearly three years, Kincaid decided to begin his own law firm. Recall that Demarest was working as in‐house counsel for a Brazilian subsidiary of a US company, and during this time Demarest served as a source of business for Kincaid (interview with C. Kincaid, Jr., March 13, Reference Kincaid2014). But Kincaid knew that in order to penetrate the Brazilian market, it would not be enough to rely only on connections to Americans; there needed to be a strong nexus with local lawyers and local businesspeople. He thus asked two lawyers with whom he had very collegial relationships to become his law firm partners—Rodrigo Octavio Filho and João Pedro Gouvêa Vieira (Vianna Reference Vianna2012). Octavio Filho was a prominent lawyer, literary critic, and high‐ranking government official.Footnote 14 He had immense social capital and was known throughout the country as a powerful, eloquent statesman with a brilliant legal mind (Academia Brasileira de Letras 2014). In addition to his legal talent, Octavio Filho's use to the firm was through the connections he had, while the day‐to‐day operations would be handled by Kincaid and Gouvêa Vieira.
Gouvêa Vieira was an ideal partner for Kincaid—but also vice versa. At the time he joined the firm, Gouvêa Vieira was a young lawyer who was seeking to gain legal experience and thus was willing to do the (often tedious and laborious) administrative tasks necessary to help make this nascent firm competitive (Vianna Reference Vianna2012; interview with G. M. Vianna, February 27, Reference Vianna2014). In addition, it helped Kincaid that Gouvêa Vieira came from a wealthy family that had political and economic connections, including his personal relationship with President Getulio Vargas (Vieira Reference Vieira1989). This was also an opportunity of a lifetime for Gouvêa Vieira. He was able to have the prominent Octavio Filho serve as a mentor while also working with Kincaid, who he viewed as a global, entrepreneurial lawyer (Vianna Reference Vianna2012; interview with G. M. Vianna, February 27, Reference Vianna2014).
The formation of this firm also occurred during a time when Rio was undergoing a major shift in its economy—a point not lost on any of these three lawyers. Prior to the 1930s, Brazil's economy was primarily agricultural, with coffee serving as the major export (Skidmore Reference Skidmore1999; Baer Reference Baer2001; Ianni Reference Ianni2009). But as Kincaid, Octavio Filho, and Gouvêa Vieira were establishing their firm, the industrialization process was gaining speed within the country, particularly in Rio.
These changes were fortuitous for the Kincaid Law Office, which assumed the formal name of Escritórios de Advocacia de Kincaid. A few years after the firm opened, it hired Antônio de Pádua Martins Britto. Britto was from the state of Piauí, located in northeastern Brazil (interview with G. M. Vianna, February 27, Reference Vianna2014). He was considered to be a brilliant litigator and someone who had worked as a clerk in Rio de Janeiro's Civil Court, which was the key judicial venue for the country's most complicated litigation matters (Vianna Reference Vianna2012).
Because of his government service, Britto was well‐known by the bench, bar, and the city's powerful politicians and civil servants. His decision to join Kincaid was a major coup for the firm. At the same time, however, Britto recognized the financial benefits he would be receiving as well. Kincaid and his colleagues were earning a great deal of money and had developed a reputation as the leading law firm in the country for advising on matters relating to maritime and shipping law (Vianna Reference Vianna2012). Britto joining the firm as a partner was therefore seen as a win for both sides.
Soon Britto became the everyday manager of the firm. He did not know English, so Kincaid decided to divide up the labor between them. Kincaid—in the vein of Demarest—took on the role of rainmaker, bringing in foreign clients to the firm (Vianna and Vianna Cardoso Reference Vianna and Mendes Vianna Cardoso2012). Kincaid was charged with generating the major revenue for the firm, while Britto played an administrative and logistical role (Vianna and Vianna Cardoso Reference Vianna and Mendes Vianna Cardoso2012). For example, in the early 1940s, the Brazilian government passed significant legislation overhauling labor laws within the country (see Consolidação das Leis Trabalhistas 1943). The firm had clients who sought both to benefit from these laws and to defend themselves against lawsuits. Britto was in charge of hiring lawyers who would cater to these needs, and to that end he recruited Brazilians who could practice in the courts as everyday litigators (Vianna Reference Vianna2012).
One of the lawyers he hired was José Thomaz Nabuco. Nabuco was skilled in different areas of Brazilian law, including in intellectual property, but he was an important hire for the firm because he sought to further accelerate the internationalization of Kincaid's law office (interview with G. M. Vianna, February 27, Reference Vianna2014). (Nabuco would remain with the firm for nearly fifty years, and in fact after he passed, his grandson would provide the office with a portrait of Kincaid entitled “The Advogado Americano,” which remains hanging to this day [interview with G. M. Vianna, February 27, Reference Vianna2014.])Footnote 15 Two other key people who Britto hired in 1956 and 1960, respectively, were João Batista Louzada Câmara and Antônio Carlos Mendes Vianna. Both were highly respected lawyers and were inspired by Kincaid and Britto's vision of continuing to make the firm global while remaining committed to assisting domestic legal needs (Vianna Reference Vianna2012). Louzada Câmara and Mendes Vianna helped usher in a new cohort of lawyers who moved the firm beyond its staple areas of shipping, labor, and litigation. By 1960, the firm had lawyers within it who were working on a range of transnational, transactional deals.
Sadly, however, two years earlier, in 1958, Kincaid had died. Because of his love for Brazil and the fact that he identified himself as a Carioca (a native of Rio), he requested his family to bury him in the nearby city of Petropolis (interview with C. Kincaid, Jr., March 17, 2014). Yet his dream of seeing his firm continue as a global enterprise endured. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the firm prospered and expanded its client base. In 1987, Mendes Vianna's son, Godofredo, was hired, and then three years later his daughter, Camila, joined (Vianna and Vianna Cardoso Reference Vianna and Mendes Vianna Cardoso2012). Although these hires reflected the traditional patterns of Brazilian kinship employment and provided a sense of continuity to clients, the children had substantive global bona fides and an international vision for the firm, which they gained through their legal and educational experiences abroad.
The firm today, Kincaid Mendes Vianna, remains among the most reputable in the country and has four offices, forty‐five lawyers, and more than 400 staff (interview with G. M. Vianna, February 27, Reference Vianna2014). Godofredo and Camila serve as key leaders, and they attribute the firm's eighty‐year history and success, in large part, to the strength, character, and foresight of the people who were there at the beginning—especially Kincaid (Vianna and Vianna Cardoso Reference Vianna and Mendes Vianna Cardoso2012).
A Third Moment of Legal Elite Migration to Brazil: 1954 and on
Research exists highlighting how following World War II, the US government and US philanthropic organizations, such as the Ford Foundation, began to look for ways to assist and influence legal systems in different parts of the world (Krishnan Reference Krishnan2004, Reference Krishnan2012). Lawyers were key to these initiatives, but lawyers working for—or seeking to start their own—law firms also were attracted to international possibilities. Brazil was one such market of focus.
Paul Griffith Garland
One person who became a major global lawyer during this period in São Paulo was Paul Griffith Garland. Garland was born in 1930 and after receiving his bachelor's degree in Spanish from Yale, he enrolled at Harvard Law School in 1952. However, Garland broke with the norm of earning his law degree in three years. In 1954, following his second year of law school, Garland applied for a nonprofit fellowship, which he won (interview with P. G. Garland, March 17, Reference Garland2014). This funding allowed him to work in Brazil as a legal intern as well as to pursue academic studies within the country (interview with P. G. Garland, March 17, Reference Garland2014).
The place where Garland received his first foreign employment opportunity was at Demarest & Almeida. At the firm, he met and worked with both named partners and had distinct impressions of each. For Garland, Demarest was an “inspiration” (interview with P. G. Garland, March 17, Reference Garland2014), but he was also stereotypically American—someone who meant and did well but who did not fully assimilate into the country (by, e.g., not being able to speak Portuguese fluently) (interview with P. G. Garland, March 17, Reference Garland2014). Almeida, according to Garland, “was good in the traditional areas of Brasilian law and wise enough to bring in specialists, case by case on more modern matters, such as tax questions” (correspondence with P. G. Garland, April 17, Reference Garland2014).
Following his internship in 1955, Garland enrolled at the Facudade de Direito do Amazonas, where he studied law within a remote, completely Portuguese‐speaking environment (interview with P. G. Garland, March 17, Reference Garland2014). Upon completion of this abridged program, which had accepted his law school academic credits from Harvard, he received a degree and license to practice law in Brazil (interview with P. G. Garland, March 17, Reference Garland2014).
Garland subsequently returned to Harvard where he finished his law degree in 1957. Thereafter, he took a position with the prestigious New York law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell, where he was tasked to “work on all things Latin American” (interview with P. G. Garland, March 17, Reference Garland2014). In particular, he focused on securities and tax issues and assisted US clients who were seeking to make inroads into South America (interview with P. G. Garland, March 17, Reference Garland2014). In late 1958, Garland received a call from Russell Baker, a named partner of the Chicago‐based Baker & McKenzie (B & M), who was seeking to revamp his firm's Brazil practice (Bauman Reference Bauman1999, 181–83). Up until that time, B & M had a fraught relationship with a local Brazilian firm, and Baker consequently wanted to move forward on setting up his own office within the country (interview with P. G. Garland, March 17, Reference Garland2014). He thus approached Garland—whom he came to know through a mutual friend at Sullivan—to serve as B & M's head partner in a new São Paulo office (interview with P. G. Garland, March 17, Reference Garland2014).
Excited by this opportunity, Garland agreed to leave New York and move to Brazil in early 1959. Although he was only twenty‐nine years old, he was given free rein to build the firm in his own vision (interview with P. G. Garland, March 17, Reference Garland2014). Among one of his early moves was to hire a Brazilian lawyer, Carlos Emilio Stroeter, to be his partner. Stroeter had earned his LLM from Harvard Law School, but had returned to São Paulo when Garland recruited him. Furthermore, rather than referring to the office as Baker & McKenzie Brazil, Garland intentionally opted to have Stroeter's name featured with his own, branding the São Paulo office as Garland & Stroeter (Matsuura Reference Matsuura2009; interview with P. G. Garland, March 17, Reference Garland2014). Given his fluency in Portuguese and his education at a Brazilian university, along with the fact that he had passed the Brazilian bar exam and felt “100% Brazilian” (interview with P. G. Garland, March 17, Reference Garland2014), Garland believed that it made more sense to market B & M subtly—namely, through the highlighting of two locally licensed lawyers. (Garland noted that he kept the US B & M office regularly apprised of his activities in Brazil, and that this strategy he adopted would become one that B & M would replicate around the world.)
Over the course of the next ten years, Garland & Stroeter thrived. The firm grew from two partners to eighteen (interview with P. G. Garland, March 17, Reference Garland2014). It developed an international client base, serving the interests of corporations mainly from the United States, Brazil, and Canada, but also occasionally from Europe and other parts of Latin America. B & M had secured its desired foothold within a market that it valued, and individually Garland and Stroeter became wealthy men (interview with P. G. Garland, March 17, Reference Garland2014).
With the military takeover in 1964, the macropolitical situation changed. The military government was deemed by many to be an ally of the United States (Skidmore Reference Skidmore1999, 155–57), but there were elites within civil society—including powerful lawyers within the bar—who resented the US government's support of the regime (interview with P. G. Garland, March 17, Reference Garland2014; see also more generally Skidmore Reference Skidmore1999, 160–66; França Reference França2009; Ferreira Reference Ferreira2012). By the end of the 1960s, strife seeped into Garland & Stroeter as well, as conflict emerged among the Brazilian lawyers and the founding partner (interview with P. G. Garland, March 17, Reference Garland2014).
By 1972, Garland decided to leave his Brazilian firm and B & M entirely and return to the United States. B & M retained its presence in Brazil through Garland & Stroeter, although the latter would take on different names over the years, eventually becoming what it is today: Trench, Rossi & Watanabe (TRW).Footnote 16
Ulysses Grant Keener, Jr.
Around the same time that Garland first came to Brazil, another US lawyer also made his way into the country. In 1955, Ulysses Grant Keener, Jr. began working as an associate in Rio at the firm led by Carl Kincaid (Stayton Reference Stayton1955:225). Keener, however, was different than the other US attorneys who had come to Brazil up until that point because he was born in the country in 1926 while his parents were serving as missionaries (indeed, Portuguese was his first language). Eventually the family returned to the United States, where Keener received most of his education, including his law degree from the University of Oklahoma College of Law in 1951 (lawyers.com 2014). Following graduation, Keener practiced law in Houston, Texas—the state where Kincaid retained strong home ties. Through mutual networks, Keener learned that Kincaid was looking to expand his Rio office, and upon applying for a position he was hired by the Brazilian firm (interview with C. Kincaid, Jr., March 17, 2014).
Both Kincaid and Keener recognized that the latter was limited in terms of being allowed to practice domestic Brazilian law. However, Keener was not hired for that reason. Rather, Kincaid, who was in the later stages of his career, sought to mentor Keener and to train him to become a lawyer who could leverage his US ties and Portuguese language skills for the purposes of developing cross‐border business opportunities for the firm. Unfortunately, Kincaid died less than three years after Keener arrived and, shortly afterward, Keener decided to leave the Kincaid law firm.
Keener aspired to form his own enterprise. He thus joined with someone he had come to know, José Geraldo Garcia de Souza, in May 1959 to establish Garcia & Keener Advogados (Garcia & Keener Advogados Reference Garcia and Advogados2014). Garcia was a law graduate from the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, and he specialized in corporate law, maritime law, and labor law (Conjur 2004). Together, they both recruited a female lawyer to join them—a progressive move for the era—Lourdes Carvalho, who would be the firm's main tax lawyer (interview with L. Carvalho, February 27, Reference Carvalho2014). (Carvalho continues to work as a partner at the firm.) Keener's main duties for the firm were clear: to procure business clients from abroad who wanted to engage the Brazilian market (interview with L. Carvalho, February 27, Reference Carvalho2014). He was very successful in this role, courting companies like those owned by shipping magnate and billionaire Daniel K. Ludwig (interview with L. Carvalho, February 27, Reference Carvalho2014; also see Pinto Reference Pinto1986).
Over the course of the next three decades, Keener played a crucial role in growing the firm, in terms of profits, reputation, and size. Keener's adroit business skills, extensive connections in both Brazil and the United States, and eventual receipt of a Brazilian law license (Lawyers 2014) proved to be of great benefit for his Brazilian firm—and for his Houston‐based firm, Keener & Associates, which continued to operate and work closely with Garcia & Keener (interview with L. Carvalho, February 27, Reference Carvalho2014). Today, Garcia & Keener remains headquartered in Rio, but has expanded to São Paulo, Campinas, and Manaus, employing a total of thirty lawyers (Garcia & Keener Advogados Reference Garcia and Advogados2014).
Conclusion
The theoretical framework established at the beginning of this article argued that when they are willing to immerse themselves within a local environment and strategically partner with domestic stakeholders, foreign legal elites have the ability to transform a society's legal practice system and legal culture. In the Brazilian context, the evidence provided above supports this theory and highlights the influence US legal elites had on the Brazilian corporate law sector during the first half of the twentieth century. Indeed, this story complements important scholarship that has discussed the US influence on the Brazilian legal landscape, particularly after the 1960s (see, e.g., Dezalay and Garth Reference Dezalay and Garth2002, 11; 2010; Trubek Reference Trubek2011).
As the findings suggest, the likes of elites such as Momsen, Demarest, Kincaid, Garland, and Keener arrived in Brazil and helped transform the structure of law firms in ways that have continued to impact the practice of law to this day. Moreover, these lawyers came at a time when regulatory prohibitions on them were absent. Yet they were astute enough to immerse themselves within the culture, to partner with local lawyers, and to learn from their Brazilian colleagues on how to navigate the legal and business landscape. These American legal settlers brought a new type of knowledge to their new environment but were savvy enough to recognize that they needed the social connections, networks, and ties of their domestic counterparts in order to be successful. Together, these US and Brazilian elites operated as brokers on behalf of US businesses seeking to enter Brazil, as well as on behalf of local Brazilian clients—including those wishing to go abroad. They were, to be sure, “pioneers” (Dezalay and Garth Reference Dezalay and Garth2002, 49).
Ultimately, with the exception of Keener, who would continue to travel between the United States and Brazil through the 1980s and 1990s, the last of this elite US cohort circulated out by the early 1970s. A new wave came in, led by, among others, the US Agency for International Development and the Ford Foundation, which worked with a new set of on‐the‐ground elites from the Brazilian bar and state (see, e.g., Dezalay and Garth Reference Dezalay and Garth2002; Trubek Reference Trubek2011; Migalhas 2012; Análise Advocacia Reference Análise2013; interview with D. Trubek, March 25, Reference Trubek2014). But as the narrative here shows, the first group of US elites, who came starting in 1913, made a significant imprint on the Brazilian corporate bar and, in doing so, had a lasting legacy on a legal environment for generations to come.