Tamar Herzog's ambitious book squeezes more than two millennia of European legal history into 243 pages. This requires some hard choices. As she explains in her introduction, Herzog wanted to undertake a long-term analysis of European legal-historical development and distill its “most essential elements” rather than “supplying endless details,” thereby avoiding “provincial stereotypes and misconceptions” (3). Moreover, the book aims to elucidate how and by whom norms or institutions were formed and used in their various contexts (4–5). These goals can be lauded and endorsed wholeheartedly. Additionally, Herzog wished to emphasize that the common law and Continental legal traditions have more in common and have interacted more with each other than is usually supposed (5–6), an admirable intention in these Brexiting times.
The book is divided into six chronological parts: ancient, early medieval, later medieval, and early modern times are followed first by modernity (!) and then the nineteenth century. An epilogue adds the European Union to the development. For the benefit of those wanting more insights into the topic, there is a “Further Reading” section.
Herzog has successfully added a global twist to the prevailing master narrative of Western legal thought by examining the history of European law from an instrumental perspective. Writing for a United States academic audience, including students and professors in history and law, she has posed and answered the question: what relevance does European legal history have for the New World? She also asks, reflecting present-day political trends on both sides of the Atlantic, why does European legal history matter (and, in fact, does it)? Herzog, answering the latter question in the affirmative, posits: European law spread around the world because it “came to refashion itself both as the epitome of reason and as a system with…universal applicability” (2).
Not being a member of Herzog's self-proclaimed target audience, I may not be the right person to assess the extent to which her message regarding the relevance of European legal history resonates for United States readers. I hope it does, given the attractiveness of her approach. That said, Herzog's focus on a United States audience has led her to emphasize English, French, and Spanish developments at the expense of countries such as Italy and Germany. Similarly, because of their importance for the global dissemination of European law, the ius gentium, natural law, and the French Revolution receive more attention than in other European legal history textbooks. From my perspective, the author's focus on the global spread and appeal of European law is simultaneously the strength and weakness of this well-written and well-ordered book. Admittedly, this approach adds freshness and depth. Yet, out of a desire to avoid “provincial stereotypes” by adding the United States dimension, Herzog may actually perpetuate such provincialism by focusing solely on the regions that matter from that United States-oriented perspective.
For example, where in Herzog's story are Poland, Hungary, Bohemia, the Nordic countries, the Baltic region, the Balkans, Byzantium, or the regions under Ottoman rule? Altogether, these form approximately half of early modern Europe. Herzog apparently considers them irrelevant for the global spread of European law and “the most fundamental developments” (10), therefore meriting only passing mentions, if any (42–43, 65, 80, 182, 208, 232–33). To my ears, the argument sounds, albeit remotely, like omitting the legal cultures of Native Americans as “non-fundamental” in a nutshell of United States legal history.
Thus, both Herzog and the textbooks she criticizes end up marginalizing a lion's share of Europe as irrelevant for the master narrative(s) and reducing vast regions to insignificance. This Europe never matters in the canonized and oft-repeated histories of European law. Herzog could easily have included examples of these neglected regions; for example, with regard to the reception of the ius commune. Although Herzog's interpretation has many strengths, it may lead United States lawyers and legal historians to think that two millennia of multifaceted European legal history can be reduced only to the strands, admittedly important ones, followed in this book. Moreover, when analyzing the dissemination of European law to the Americas, Herzog could have used examples from New France or the Latin American Spanish and Portuguese colonies. Additionally, further discussion of the influence of colonial law in Africa or Asia, or alternatively, of the German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch in both Europe and Japan, would have enriched the global outlook. The book would still have been short, but less United States-centric.
Having said this, I stress that its very narrowness makes Herzog's interpretation so effective. The book delivers successfully almost everything it promises. Its readers will indeed get a relatively rigorous and easily digested overview of two millennia of law-changing mechanisms in selected parts of Europe.
