The Madisonian Constitution is a valuable addition to the growing body of literature that seeks to provide a holistic view of how constitutional meaning develops. “American constitutionalism,” the author argues, “is primarily about countervailing power and not about the legal limits enforced by courts” (2). In other words, a consensus on fundamental issues emerges only after extended public debate that is facilitated by separation of powers and other structural devices that create competing platforms for officials seeking to advance their legal vision; a process in which the Justices play a role but not the paramount role. This thesis is ably defended through an analysis of The Federalist Papers and a series of case studies focusing on Reconstruction, the Progressive Era, the New Deal, and the Reagan Revolution, which are each interesting in their own right. While this approach may not appeal to those who believe that there is one correct interpretive method, the author responds that “seeing the Constitution in a more political light should not denigrate it or reduce constitutionalism to politics in a crass sense. Rather, recognizing that contests over constitutional meaning are, at root, about deep political choices should restore to politics—in all of its complexity and tension—the dignity it deserves” (169).

Given that this is the work of a political scientist, it is somewhat surprising that political parties do not receive more attention. There is a powerful irony here—Madison was initially opposed to the institutions that are essential to making the system he described in Federalist 10 and 51 work. Indeed, recent scholarship by Rick Pildes and Daryl Levinson points out that separation of powers between the president and Congress cannot be relied upon to limit federal power when the same party controls both branches. Moreover, Madison did not anticipate (or at least say much) about judicial review, thus it hard to say that he saw the Court as a significant player in the deliberative process. Accordingly, The Madisonian Constitution gives too much credit to Madison and not enough to figures such as Martin Van Buren, who offered a deeply theorized account of why parties are a necessary feature of constitutional government.

To the extent that there is a flaw in the book, it is in the author's failure to grapple with the fact that judicial supremacy continues to be the dominant view. If constitutional meaning really is the product of political competition mediated by structure, then why do so many people accept the Court's self-serving statements to the contrary? The author does take a stab at this problem in his conclusion by discussing Brown and pointing out (as Michael Klarman has at length) that the desegregation cases did not become settled law for many years until other institutions evaluated those decisions. Nevertheless, that is not how most law students or citizens understand Brown. This gap between practice and theory is perhaps the leading conundrum in constitutional law today.

In the end, we need a framework that reaches beyond The Madisonian Constitution to incorporate subsequent institutional developments. By pointing out that many of our modern assumptions about higher law rest on a shaky foundation, this book makes a useful contribution to that effort.