In this book, Basar Bașsal analyzes the securitization of the FARC and the Colombian government during their six-decade-old conflict; that is, how they constructed each other as existential threats that required extreme responses. Baysal advances a “dual securitization framework,” which extends the focus of securitization theories about the state by analyzing the securitization by a nonstate actor, a communist- inspired guerrilla group. Baysal has two goals. The first is to expand securitization and international political sociology and insecuritization theories by considering the Global South and non-Western democracies that have not been central in securitization analyses. Second, Baysal aims to advance a theory that conceptualizes securitization as a process, considers both state and nonstate actors, theorizes types of security professionals, and includes the actors that are harmed (insecuritized) by the securitization process.
In chapters 2 and 3, Baysal provides a review of critical security studies and securitization theories that can be useful for students and for those looking for an insightful introduction to this literature. In chapter 2, he explains how securitization theory emerged in response to traditional security analyses rooted in realism, which define security from a military, state-centered perspective. Critical security studies contest such a definition by arguing that security goes beyond military issues and is not simply a material reality. The securitization theory initially advanced by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap De Wilde (Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 1998), argues instead that security is constructed through the speech acts of elites.
In chapter 3, Baysal explains securitization theory and the responses to it from the international political sociology and insecuritization approach. Baysal persuasively criticizes each approach but also highlights its contribution to understanding securitization. The securitization approach’s focus on elite speech acts highlights the importance of top-level politicians and bureaucrats in framing security threats.
However, it deemphasizes the material dimensions of security, makes securitization a one-time event rather than a process, and focuses excessively on the state. The international political sociology and insecuritization approach considers the context of securitization and its harmful consequences for other actors, and views securitization as a process constructed through the practices of security professionals. The limitation, Baysal argues, is that this bottom-up approach ultimately ignores the role of elite discourses in determining extreme threats. Baysal’s theory aims to integrate and advance the two approaches.
In chapter 4, Baysal discusses one of the book’s central contributions: including the level of democracy and state capacity as contextual factors to analyze securitization. Baysal emphasizes that in developing countries and democracies, the securitization process ought to be different from that in developed democracies. Showing deep awareness of debates about the definition and nature of democracy, Baysal argues that in hybrid democracies and in weak states, securitization will be easier, owing to the difficulties the state faces in controlling territory. Likewise, given the lack of democratic avenues for opposition, a countersecuritization process by nonstate actors would prevail over democratic opposition to securitization. But this claim lacks theoretical and empirical nuance. Hybrid democracies indeed limit participation, yet this does not imply that participation is impossible or absent because, as Baysal recognizes, there are many forms of hybrid democracy, and opposition may be easier in some cases than in others.
Additionally, and perhaps inadvertently, Baysal ends up reifying a Westernized perspective that oversimplifies the behavior of citizens in the Global South, while arguing that “in hybrid democracies where liberal norms like tolerance, respect for differences, and peaceful coexistence are not existent in the society, strategic level security professionals can easily find support to securitize internal issues from a certain group in the society” (61, emphasis mine).
This is connected to the empirical limitation: defining democracy in Colombia as hybrid is correct, but it ignores the transformations that democratic institutions have undergone over time. Baysal acknowledges these transformations but ends up brushing off differences across periods and providing simplistic interpretations of events like the 1991 Constitution. It is sadly true that democracy in Colombia remains limited, but as many scholars acknowledge, there is also a complex process in which institutional reforms, such as the popular election of local authorities, expand participation but end up interacting with the conflict and armed actors in complicated ways.
Empirically, Baysal is also incorrect in declaring that democratic opposition has been minor in Colombia. Undoubtedly, democratic opposition has been silenced, repressed, or eliminated. But this does not mean it has been marginal. As many recent analyses have documented, local communities have long resisted both the FARC and the state, and although they pay a very high price, they are not marginal. There is enormous variation over time and across the territory.
Chapter 5 delineates the dual security theory, which argues that to understand the securitization process, it is important to consider not only the “primary” securitization by the state but also the democratic opposition and, crucially, the countersecuritization by nonstate actors. The theory also considers three levels of security professionals (strategic, tactical, and operational) and three phases of the securitization process: definition, construction, and insecuritization-in-action.
This is a comprehensive framework that builds on a solid understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of current approaches. Analyzing the securitization by nonstate actors, specially in internal civil wars, and considering top-down discourses and bottom-up security practices in tandem are important contributions of Baysal’s analysis. But by including multiple elements in the framework, he missed the opportunity to provide a deeper analysis of each element. For example, one question that is not clearly answered is whether Baysal expects the securitization process to be similar for both state and nonstate actors. The analysis seems to suggest that these two are seen as similar processes with different protagonists, but one can think of ways that governments and nonstate actors like guerrillas respond to different constraints, which, in turn, may lead to different ways of securitizing an issue.
Another limitation is the idea of phases. The author recognizes that phases are not necessarily sequential, yet referring to phases in tandem with analyzing three moments of the Colombian conflict gives the idea of sequentialism. While it makes sense to think about definition and construction as sequential moments, it is clear that insecuritization-in-action is not a phase but a dimension of securitization that is present throughout.
Chapters 6, 7, and 8 provide the empirical analysis. Chapter 6 gives a useful overview of the Colombian conflict. Chapter 7 analyzes the securitization process at the beginning of the conflict (late 1960s); the construction phase, during the time of Álvaro Uribe’s presidency (2002–10); and the insecuritization-in-action for the conflict as a whole, summarizing statistics provided by the Colombian Historic Truth Commission on the death toll and armed actions committed by both state and FARC. Baysal makes an important contribution by showing how securitization theories could be applied to understand the Colombian conflict from a different perspective. Unfortunately, however, the empirical analysis is limited. Baysal recognizes this limitation, acknowledging the difficulty of conducting fieldwork. But it is important to note that there is significant research on the Colombian conflict based on original fieldwork, and the limitation in this book derives more from Baysal’s logistical restrictions.
Baysal presents a useful analysis of speeches and documents of the FARC and the government (especially during the Uribe years), providing a glimpse of the speech acts of strategic-level actors. Yet there is no analysis of other security professionals. The author also analyzes the beginning of the conflict and the Uribe years as part of the same securitization process, but I believe that a more productive securitization analysis would compare the process across different stages of the conflict to understand, for example, when and how governments and FARC leadership agreed to start peace negotiations (even if those negotiations failed).
The last chapter advances in this direction when describing the factors that facilitated the last government—FARC negotiation that culminated with the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement in 2016. Despite problems with its implementation, this agreement officially ended one of the longest-lasting conflicts in the world. As Baysal recognizes, he does not analyze the desecuritization process, but the book would have made a stronger contribution by applying his framework to analyze the speech, practices, and changes in audience that made the peace process possible.
Securitization and Desecuritization of FARC in Colombia will not provide novel empirical insights for those familiar with the Colombian conflict, but it presents an interesting and solid overview of that conflict and of securitization theories. Applying securitization theories to the Colombian conflict provides a novel lens to understand it, and Basar Bașsal has certainly taken a significant step in this direction. But a full realization of this analysis requires more empirical work and a nuanced approach to the stages and realities of the conflict.
