The title of this collection of papers is rather enticing as it promises to deal with two important concepts whose mutual relation is far from straightforward. In medieval European thinking dominated by theology, logical argumentation was used to strengthen religious belief, particularly in the existence of God which culminated in the formulation of the disputed ontological proof. Modern time promotes free inquiry and values logic as an indispensable tool of reasoning which allows man to reach valid conclusions verifiable by experience and therefore amounting to proofs. Before verification, newly arrived at conclusions are provisionally held as theories. As to belief, it can be defined as a firmly held opinion or conviction or as acceptance that something exists or is true without verification by experience or undisputable proof. Such beliefs may even contradict principles of logic as is illustrated by contradictory truth claims of different religious orthodoxies which are nevertheless firmly believed in by their respective followers. Curiously enough, this holds true even for some scientists if they assert (as do, for example, biological materialists) the nonexistence of something for whose existence there is no laboratory proof available, such as survival of physical death, or a transcendental dimension of reality inaccessible to sensory perception. In other words, neither its existence nor its nonexistence can be proved. Assertions of this type amount to quasi-religious beliefs for which Richard Dawkins is a case in point. His stance would be more properly referred to by the term ‘philosophical belief’ coined by Karl Jaspers. The criterion for evaluating conflicting philosophical beliefs when discussing them could then be the degree of logical probability of each one of them.
This collection of academic research papers, finalised in 2008, was the result of a seminar held under the auspices of Warsaw University (in 2006 - or in 2007?) I in which the editor teaches Sanskrit and lectures on Indian philosophy and religions. Most papers, grouped in thematic sections, are highly specialised, except the first one, in the section ‘Myth, Belief and Appeal to Rationality’, by Johannes Bronkhorst (University of Lausanne) titled ‘What Did Indian Philosophers Believe?’ It notes that on a higher level, myths are not believed in, not even Christians take the myth of creation in six days literally and the same goes for Indian creation myths. In some cultures myths represent a kind of ‘sacred history’. They are not questioned or expressly thought about. Affirmation of their being ‘true’ (in a literal sense) is sometimes the result of persistent questioning by anthropologists. Some myths may even be artefacts of inquiry rather than pre-existing creeds. In India there seems to exist a variety of attitudes, but none is too hardened. In philosophical systems literalism is replaced by interpretation with a tendency to ‘inclusivism’, expecially in Advaita Vedānta, whereby other doctrines are viewed as stages of and therefore subordinate to one's own system's absolute truth. Logic does not seem to play a great part in it, but the concept of ‘philosophical belief’ is, I think, applicable here.
In the next paper Claus Oetke (University of Stockholm) resolves, in ‘Pramāṇa, Logic and Belief’ the relation between knowledge and belief by pointing out that knowledge entails belief but not vice versa. Raghunath Ghosh (University of North Bengal) asks: ‘Can there be Unbiased Epistemology in Indian Philosophy?’ His answer in ‘no’, because it is vitiated through metaphysical or ontological presuppositions. The paper of Peter Flügel (University of London) concerns ‘Power and Insight in Jain Discourse’ and it is an extensive treatise (over 100 pages) whose starting point is the Jain acceptance and utilisation of common Indian material and its adaptation for Jain belief system.
The section ‘God vis-à-vis Proof and Belief’ starts with the paper by Carmen Dragonetti and Fernando Tola (both of University of Lima), ‘The Distinction in intellectu / in re in the Ontological Proof and in Bhartṛhari’. It points out the coincidence between the method of rejection by some philosophers of Saint Anselm's ontological proof and Bhartṛhari's principle of Indian thought represented by the distinction between what can be regarded, on the one hand, as existing in reality, and, on the other, as existing only in the mind. John Vattanky (Gnandeepa-Vidyapeeth, Pune) deals with ‘Theism: The Culmination of Nyāya Logic’. It seems that the Nāya proof of God's existence resembles the ‘watchmaker’ analogy. The editor's paper, ‘What Exists for the Vaiśeṣika?’ presents Vaiśeṣika ‘knowability thesis’ in the equation: ‘existentiality = nameability = cognisability’. What can be named is known and it therefore exists. Applied to God, the acceptance of his existence is based on the Vaiśeṣika theistic belief, not on rational, philosophical enquiry.
The following three sections have two papers each. In the section, ‘Logic and Belief in Sāṅkhya and Yoga’, the paper by Shujun Motegi (Shinshu University, Nagano), ‘Early Concepts of Logic in Sāṅkhya’, deals with types of inference which Sāṅkhya used to prove the existence of prakṛti. (The author translates it as ‘primordial matter’ which is misleading; ‘nature’, explained as ‘the primeval dynamic force’ would be more accurate.) The paper by Philipp Maas (University of Vienna), ‘Valid Knowledge and Belief in Classical Sāṅkhya-Yoga’, shows that Patañjali used pramāṇa theories in order to create acceptance for the soteriological efficiency of Sāṅkhya-Yoga. The two papers of the section ‘Language, Grammar and Belief’, by Ashok Aklujkar (University of British Columbia), ‘Grammarians’ Leaving Logic at the Door’, and by Hideyo Ogawa (Hiroshima University), ‘Bhartṛhari on Unnameable things’ have self-explanatory titles. The section ‘Logic and Belief in Interpretation and Translation’ has a piece by Diwakar Acharya (Kyoto University) on ‘Major Points of Vācaspati's Disagreement with Maṇḍana’ dealing among other topics with possible levels of Brahman realisation. Then follows a valuable annotated translation and commentary styled ‘From the Tattva-cintā-maṇi by Gaṅgeśa: The Kevala-vyatireki-prakaraṇam’ on negative-only inference by Stephen Phillips (University of Texas at Austin).
The richest section is on ‘Logic, Reality and Belief in Buddhist Tradition’. There is room mostly just for the titles of these important and interesting papers. Horst Lasic (University of Vienna): ‘A Hot Dispute About Lukewarm Air: Dignāga on Āpta-vāda’; Dan Arnold (University of Chicago): ‘On (Non-semantically) Remembering Conventions: Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara on Saṅketa-kāla’; Vincent Eltschinger (Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna): ‘Studies in Dharmakīrti's Religious Philosophy: The Cintā-mayī Prajñā’; Klaus-Dieter Mathes (University of Hamburg): ‘The ‘Principle of True Nature’ (dharmatā-yukti) as a Justification for Positive Descriptions of Reality in Mahāyāna Buddhism’; Hiroshi Nemoto (Hiroshima University): ‘Tsongkhapa on the Three Times: New Light on the Buddhist Theory of Time’. This paper rightly starts with the statement that time is not a substance existing apart from entities, but finishes with the Tsongkhapa's peculiar view of past, present and future. The last paper in this section is by Kaoru Onishi (Kansai University, Osaka), ‘The Bodhi-caryāvatāra and Its Monastic Aspects: On the Problem of Representation’. It tries to correct some Western misconceptions of Śāntideva's masterpiece. The collection closes with one paper in the section ‘Belief, Hope and Gambling’ by Irma Piovano (CESMEO, Torino) entitled ‘Sociological and Juridical Aspects of Dice-Play in Ancient India’, a serious essay about a fortuitous addiction.
Every paper has, besides references in footnotes, an extensive bibliography and there is also a good general index. However, by far the best tool for using the book is the included CD with the searchable PDF file of the updated text of the whole book. It makes it into an excellent source for pursuing any theme covered by or touched upon in the book across its whole range. If this feature were adopted for all important research works in book form (which is just a pious wish), it would make the work of a researcher pursuing an individual topic across the board infinitely easier.
