1. The participle haṇt- and the relative yōi həṇtī ‘(those) who are’

Johanna Narten (Reference Narten1982, pp. 80–97) has extensively examined the participle and the formulaic relative yōi həṇtī ‘(those) who are’ (in Y 44.16, 45.6 and 51.10). Her view is unequivocal: “dient der Relativsatz. . . für den ein Bezugswort im Text fehlt, in der Bedeutung ‘(diejenigen,) die sind (existieren, leben)’ in den Gathas aber zweifellos zur Bezeichnung lebender Menschen” (p. 87). The gen. pl. form of the participle (as a partitive-genitive determining a superlative ‘als Steigerung’ in Y 29.3, 35.3 and 44.10) does not refer to gods either (p. 88): “bezeichnet hātąm an den beiden Gathastellen keine göttlichen Wesenheiten, wie sie durch den Satz yōi åŋharəcā həṇticā charakterisiert warden”. Narten translates Y 44.16b’ θβā pōi s ṇghā yōi həṇtī “um durch deine Verkündigung (diejenigen,) die sind, zu schützen” with the relative clause as an accusative complement of the infinitive ‘to protect’; and Y 45.6b’ y hudå yōi həṇtī “der wohlwirkend ist (= Ahura Mazdā) (für diejenigen), die sind” with the relative understood as subordinated to an elliptical dative pronoun. The relative phrase refers to human beings that are the object of divine care. In the same vein, the relative in 51.10 refers to human beings: tā duždå yōi həṇtī “. . . (und) dadurch übelwirkend ist (für diejenigen), die sind” (p. 87). Thus in her view both the participle and the relative phrase refer to human beings.

Jean Kellens (Reference Kellens1989, p. 50) argues on the other hand that the participle is a generic term that designates divine beings, i.e., the immortals, and the relative yōi həṇtī is ‘un raccourci de *yōi åŋharəcā həṇticā buuaiṇticā’ (p. 61): those “who have been, are and will be” (cf. Kellens Reference Kellens and Skjærvø2000, pp. 109–111). Such beings must be divine. In this perspective Kellens reads the relative in Y 44.16 and 45.6 as a partitive-genitive complement, respectively, of vərəθr m.jā and y hudå, an exact functional equivalent of hātąm “parmi les Existants” (p. 54). As for the adjective haiθiia-, “il faut admettre que, dans certaines de ses attestations vieil-avestiques, sinon dans toutes, il ne signifie pas ‘vrai’ ou ‘vérité’, mais est resté le dérivé tout à fait primaire de haṇt-, donc ‘qui se rapporte aux haṇt (= aux dieux)’ ou, en prenant quleque hauteur, ‘sacré’. C'est incontestablement le cas lorsqu'il qualifie iiaoθana-, lequel, il faut bien le reconnaître, s'accommode mal de ‘vrai’ ou d'une de ses projections arbitraries, comme ‘sincère’ ou ‘juste’. L'exemple le plus explicite est fourni par le Y 30.5 yaēcā xšnaošən ahurəm haiθiiāiš iiaoθanāiš fraorə mazdąm ‘et ceux qui satisfont Ahura Mazdā avec empressement par les actes qu'ils adressent aux haṇt (= par les actes du culte)’” (p. 58).

It appears that the disagreement is for the most part due to different interpretations of the syntax of the passages. Both readings are indeed justifiable as far as the syntax is concerned. As for haiθiia-, Kellens refers to Y 30.5 as an ‘incontestable’ evidence for his understanding of the adjective as sacred or cultic. Beyond the problem of the ambiguity of the function of the relative, there are two assumptions that underlie the terms in which the matter has been handled by the two scholars and their disagreement. These assumptions in my mind remain unexamined: 1) the formulaic relative yōi həṇtī and the participle haṇt- must have the same reference; and in the case of Kellens, 2) the derived adjective haiθiia- must semantically match the participle. As far as the latter issue is concerned, one must note that even if it turns out that the participle designates divine beings, still it does not follow that the adjective too must pertain to things cultic. The cognate Vedic adjective satyá- ‘true, real’ certainly does not only mean divine (cf. EWA 690 ‘wahr, wahrhaft, wirklich’); neither does Old Persian hašiya- ‘real, true’. The use of the participle to refer to the gods – even if, as I said, it turns out to be the case – could have been a development that postdates the formation of the adjective, while the latter continued its etymological career. Judging from relevant comparative evidence just mentioned, this is certainly a plausible scenario. As for the first assumption, the partitive-genitive function of the formulaic relative, even if it should refer to divinities, it does not mean that hātąm must likewise designate divine beings, because seemingly it performs an ‘equivalent function’.Footnote ²

The relative phrase does seem to refer in the Gāthās to immortal beings, in view, firstly, of the formulaic nature of the relative clause. Kellens maintains that it is an abbreviation of “those who have been, are and will be”, which obviously refers to immortal beings. Whether this particular syntactic usage, e.g., lack of antecedent, signifies the formulaic end point of a poetic development is hard to determine, since the number of attestations is too small (three in all) to make a sound judgment. Nonetheless, if one accepts the view that our relative phrase is an abbreviation of something like *yōi åŋharəcā həṇticā buuaiṇticā one must acknowledge that it does refer to divine beings. We can imagine Y 51.22 yōi åŋharəcā həṇticā “who have been and are” used without correlative pronoun. The absence of antecedent is significant because it seems to occur in the Gāthās only under particular conditions, which may point to the formulaic nature of the relative.Footnote ³ But if so, the relative phrase owes its semantics not to the sense of the verb as such but to its own poetic lineage. (The Old Persian phrase from Darius’ inscription at Bīstūn (DB IV 61) utā aniyāha bagāha tyaiy haⁿtiy “and other gods who are” may not be relevant if the relative here should be understood merely as a concessive expression of the existence of gods other than A^huramazdā: “and other gods who (might) exist”.) There is also a contextual argument for understanding the formulaic relative as referring to divinities. In Y 44.16bb’ k vərəθr m.jā θβā pōi s ṇghā yōi həṇtī, the complement of the infinitive ‘to protect’, judging from the context Y 44.15-19, is in all probability the implied ‘me’ and not the relative phrase (subordinated to an elliptical antecedent) in an accusative role. In the extended passage the poet commends himself (e.g., 44.15 pōi ma ) in different manners and respects to the care of the divinity. If so, the only role available for the relative would be that of genitival determination of vərəθr m.jā ‘smasher of obstacle’: “who (is) the smasher of obstacles among gods for protecting me in accordance with your declaration?” This is the only occurrence of the relative phrase where the context may shed some light on the semantics of the expression.

The case is different for hātąm ‘among or of beings’. In its two Gāthic occurrences it functions as the partitive-genitive complement of a superlative: Y 29.3 hātąm. . . aojištō ‘the strongest of beings’ and Y 44.10 hātąm vahištā ‘the best of beings’. Three out of five occurrences in the Yasna Haptaŋhāiti have the same form: Y 41.2, 3, 4 hātąm hudāstəmā ‘the most beneficent of beings’. This is the usage that Narten has called ‘Steigerung’, meaning that it enhances the stature of the superlative. There are two further attestations in the Yasna Haptaŋhāiti in which, however, the term may have a different function. In Y 35.3 hātąm has, as apposite to ‘actions’, a partitive-genitive function in Narten's translation, like its usage with the superlative just listed: yā hātąm iiaoθananąm vahištā iiā ‘welche von (allen) Werken, die es gibt, die besten sein dürften’.Footnote ⁴ Not so according to Kellens’ and Pirart's translation: ‘les meilleurs des actes (rituels) adressés aux Existants’. hātąm is a genitive dependent on ‘the best of ritual gestures’. But interpreting the subjective genitive hātąm iiaoθananąm as ‘addressed to the gods’ is somewhat ad hoc, not otherwise attested for a genitivally determined iiaoθana-. More importantly, it seems to me that their translation is based on a questionable analysis of the syntax of Y 35.3 ta a varəmaidī ahuramazdā a ā srīrā hiia ī mainimadicā vaocōimācā varəzimācā yā hātąm iiaoθananąm vahištā iiā ubōibiiā ahubiiā, which they translate: “Nous choisissons ceci avec la belle Harmonie, ô Maître Mazdā: penser, dire et accomplir, pour les deux existences, les meilleurs des actes (rituels) adressés aux Existants”. However, hātąm iiaoθananąm does not belong to the relative (yā . . . vahištā iiā ubōibiiā ahubiiā but qualifies the acc. pl. neuter pronoun ī ‘these’, the envisaged object of thinking, speaking and doing, all in the optative. This requires that the verb of the relative also be in the optative (in a modal form, in any caseFootnote ⁵ ), hence iiā ‘may be’. The modal character of this latter is lost in Kellens’ and Pirart's text. In other words, hātąm does indeed have, here too, a partitive genitive function apposite to iiaoθananąm, probably with an enhancive nuance: hātąm iiaoθananąm ‘of (all) actions there are’. Thus the phrase can be translated: “O Ahuramazdā, for the sake of beautiful a a, we indeed commit ourselves to this: that we think, speak and perform (only) those of (all) actions there are which would be best for both existences”.Footnote ⁶ So here we can fairly confidently say that the participle does not refer to divine beings; nor indeed does it refer to any kind of being.

The last occurrence of hātąm to be examined is Y 35.8 a ahiiā āa sairī a ahiiā vərəz nē kahmāicī hātąm jījišąm vahištąm ādā ubōibiiā ahubiiā, which Kellens (Reference Kellens1994, p. 110) translates as: “Dans l'union avec a a, dans le clan d’a a, à quiconque je dis que l'effort pour gagner la faveur des (dieux)-qui-sent est très bon pour les deux états”. The feminine word jījišā- is derived from the desiderative present of √jī ‘win, conquer’. Narten (Reference Narten1982, p. 89) maintains that it is a verbal noun (‘Verbalabstraktum’) whose literal meaning is something like “des Wunsch, etwas zu gewinnen, Wunsch nach Gewinn”. Kellens and Pirart (Reference Kellens and Pirart1991, p. 134) understand it as “effort pour se concilier la faveur de”, thus as having a verbal force. The desiderative verb itself is used in Y 39.1 yōi nå jījišəṇtī “(the domestic animals) that wish to win our favour” (literally: wish to win us), governing the accusative ‘us’. Therefore, if the noun has a verbal force, one would expect the word it governs to be in the accusative and not in the genitive.Footnote ⁷ But if hātąm cannot be related to jījišąm, where does it fit? Narten (Reference Narten1982, p. 89) makes it the genitive complement of kahmāicī ‘to whoever’ either in a ‘nominalizing’ role (‘als Substantivierung’), “einem jeden der Seienden (= der Menschen)”, or in an enhancive role (‘als Steigerung’) as in its usage with the superlative, “welchem auch immer von (allen), die es gibt, jedem, den es gibt”. In either case, the phrase refers to human beings. Hintze (Reference Hintze2007, p. 91) translates the sentence: “I now tell every (human) being that in union with Truth, (and) in the community of Truth the desire to gain (one's living) is best for both existences”. According to her, it has the following sense: “each person. . . should pursue their breadwinning ‘in union with truth’ and ‘in community with truth’. In this way people will do what is best ‘for both existences’, i.e., their physical and spiritual life” (p. 94). So, in effect, the two locatives condition jījišā- “the desire for gain” in her text, whereas in Kellens’ they refer to a “metaphorical clan”, with a more or less descriptive value.Footnote ⁸ In any event, the meaning of jījišā- “desire to gain the favour of” or “desire to gain one's living” remains somewhat obscure. As far as our problem goes, however, we may conclude that the words hātąm jījišąm can hardly mean “the desire to gain the favour of anonymous gods”, for aside from the problem related to the government of the verbal base, the sense of the sentence in Kellens’ interpretation remains elusive.

According to Kellens, the significance of Y 35.8, the only one in the YH in the 1^st person singular, is to be sought in the context of a tactful management of the potential divine interlocutors in the ritual. “En même temps qu'une déclaration introductive sur l'acte rituel, ce passage [i.e., Y 35.4-8] constitue une précaution préliminaire par laquelle le chantre avertit les dieux que le sacrifice sera réservé à Ahura Mazdā, mais néanmoins très bon pour eux’ (1994, p. 113). “Sacrifice is reserved for Ahura Mazdā”, the anonymous gods are told in Y35.4-8, but they are also given to understand that the sacrifice addressed to the supreme god is “nonetheless very good for them”. Kellens’ supposition of the presence of ‘anonymous gods’ in the passage is based, however, not on textual evidence but on his conception that there cannot be any non-divine interlocutor in these liturgical compositions. Here he has to maintain this position in the face of the phrase “best for both existences”, occurring in Y 35.3 and 8, which can only have human beings as an interested party, and in the face of the “man or woman” directly addressed in Y 35.6. Kellens takes the interlocutors of 35.7 v “for you” as referring to anonymous gods, whom are told, according to him, that the sacrifice to Ahura Mazdā and the care of the cow are “very good” for them too. The reasonable position is to rely on the evidence of the discursive context and, in the present case, to see in “for you” human interlocutors unless we have sound proof to the contrary – and here we do not. Kellens’ comments on Y 35.8 (Reference Kellens1994, p. 113) are not helpful: “La phrase résume le commentaire théologique qui vient d’être fait sur l'acte rituel en présentant la cérémonie qui va suivre comme une tentative pour gagner la faveur des haṇt”. The sacrifice, exclusively dedicated to Mazdā and the entities, is ‘nonetheless’ meant to win the favour of the anonymous gods as well. We have then in Y 35.8 a disjointed situation where these gods are told about the ritual anxiety they create and are simultaneously reassured. What do we do, then, with the explicit intimation that the “effort to win the anonymous gods” is “best for both existences”? In what sense, in the light of Kellens’ construction, should we understand it? The idea of a ritual management of potential divine guests and intruders is spurious.Footnote ⁹

One possible way to understand Y 35.8 is to translate jījišā- as ‘endeavour’ and relate it to the two locatives via an implied ‘be’, as Humbach (Reference Humbach1991 I, p. 144) does. We would then have something like: “I declare to anyone of (all) those who exist that the endeavour (to be) in the company of a a (and) in the community of a a (is) the best for both states”. I am inclined to think that the two locative phrases do not mean the same thing. Repetition of this sort is unexpected in the compositions of oral traditions. Perhaps one should relate the ‘company of a a’ with the ‘mental’ (phase of) existence and the ‘community of a a’ with the ‘corporeal’ (phase of) existence. There may also be a better way to understand the string kahmāicī hātąm jījišąm vahištąm than the one suggested by Kellens. The later Avestan tradition understood the participle as the complement of kahmāicī , but it may well be the genitive complement of vahištąm in Narten's enhancive role (‘als Steigerung’). Thus we would have for Y 35.8: “I declare to whoever (there may be) that the endeavour (to be) in the company of a a (and) in the community of a a (is) the best of all there are (= of endeavours) for both existences”.

The gen. pl. participle hātąm seems to have only a rhetorical function (i.e., enhancive role) in all its occurrences in the Old Avestan texts, and does not refer to any particular kind of being, whether divine or human. The relative yōi həṇtī (without antecedent) probably refers to immortal beings rather than human beings. Narten's semantic argument for discounting the ‘specialised’ meaning of ‘divine beings’ is not cogent, since it does not take into account the apparently formulaic nature of the relative phrase. Besides, she does not think the phrase refers to beings in general but specifically to human beings.

2. The adjective haiθiia-

The significance of the adjective haiθiia- usually translated as ‘true’ is not easy to grasp. Bartholomae (AW 1760) gives the following meanings for both the Avestan word and its Old Persian counterpart hašiya-: “der Wirklichkeit entsprechend, wahr, echt, recht”. Almost all Avestan scholars translate it either as ‘real’ or ‘true’, depending on the context. The only exceptions, as far as I know, are Kellens and Pirart, who (Reference Kellens and Pirart1990, p. 325) translate it as “qui se rapporte aux haṇt, cultuel”. The adjective is derived from the present participle (haṇt-) of √ah ‘be’. I argued above that one should not automatically derive the meaning of haiθiia- from that of the participle haṇt-, even if we could show that this latter had a specific meaning, e.g., divine beings, which as we have seen does not seem to be correct. The adjective occurs only once in the YH, in 35.6 yaθā ā utā nā vā nāirī vā vaēdā haiθīm aθā ha vohū “Now, as a man or a woman knows haiθiia- (action?), so (he or she also knows its) being good”, or more liberally, “just as one knows what a haiθiia- action is, so does one also know that it is good”. Following Narten (1986, p. 39), Hintze (Reference Hintze2007, p. 82) substantivises both adjectives ‘true or real’ and ‘good’: “Just as now a man or a woman knows what is real, so (do they know) what is really good”. Humbach (Reference Humbach1991 I, p. 144) has the adjective haiθiia- modify an implied ‘formula’ and translate it as ‘true’. Kellens (Reference Kellens1994, p. 110) translates the phrase: “Ainsi qu'un homme ou une femme sait qu'un (acte-rituel) est dû-aux-(dieux-)haṇt, ainsi sait-il qu'un (acte-rituel) est bon”.Footnote ¹⁰ Translating the term as ‘true’ or ‘real’ does not make its significance clear. The question would then become what ‘real’ or ‘true’ means to the composers of the Gāthās or the YH. Generally speaking, we may be certain that these words had a different sense for the ancients than they do for us. Kellens’ attempt to give haiθiia- a more specific meaning seems to be in part based in the recognition that words such as ‘true’ or ‘real’ or ‘good’ are traps for the unwary interpreter. What does indeed the phrase, “just as one knows what is real, so one knows what is really good”, mean? The word haiθīm is either a substantivised adjective (‘what is real’, so Hintze) or qualifies a noun in ellipsis. The context speaks for the latter. Why ignore the evidence of the context that strongly suggests ‘action’ as the underlying noun? As for reading ‘action’ as the underlying noun, we have the ‘unit’Footnote ¹¹ Y 35.3-4 where the worshippers announce that they would undertake only the “actions that would be best for both existences” (35.3), emphatically recalled and placed in a new context in 35.4 ⁺ ad-āiš tāiš iiaoθanāiš yāiš vahištāiš ‘by (doing) these, (namely) these best actions’.Footnote ¹² In Y 35.7 the anaphoric ‘that’ (ta ) refers to a neuter noun (underlying vahištəm ‘the best’), which is the object of an accomplishment (vərəziiāmahī ‘we carry out’), i.e., it is understood as an activity. Thus there is strong contextual support for reading ‘action’ as the underlying noun of the adjective haiθiia- in Y 35.6. In the same vein, vohū must be an adjective qualifying a neuter noun. I am not certain what “the good” in the absolute sense or “what is really good” could mean in the passage, but it is not necessary to speculate about it. The whole context, as we have seen, is concerned with ‘actions’ that are ‘good’ or ‘best for both states’ (YH 35.3, 35.7, 35.8). It is thus reasonable to let the discursive context supply the underlying neuter noun, i.e., action. I have argued that yaθā. . . aθā. . . is a logical conjunction.Footnote ¹³ The knowledge that an action is ‘good’ is grounded in the knowledge that that action is haiθiia-. It seems to me that in view of Y 35.3 and 8, the neuter adjective vohū ‘good’ should be understood as “good action for both existences”. With this assumption, the substance of the phrase becomes: “as one knows an action to be haiθiia-, so one knows it is good for both existences”. In other words, the haiθiia- action is good for both existences.

The term occurs a number of times in the Gāthās, some of which may help us take our analysis further. In Y 31.6 we are told that the haiθiia- ‘formula’ (mąθra-) secures integrity (or health), a a and immortality (yim hauruuatātō a ahiiā amərətātascā). In Y 44.6b-d’ the adjective is used of a statement: yā frauuaxšiiā, yezī tā aθā haiθiiā / a əm iiaoθanāiš, dəbązaitī ārmaitiš / taibiiō xšaθrəm, vohū cinas manaŋhā “whether these (words) I am going to pronounce in this way (are) haiθiiā: Right-mindedness with her actions consolidates a a (and) through good thinking provides power for you”. We can gather from these passages that haiθiia- can apply to verbal expressions of a special kind, and that, in one case (Y 31.6), the expression seems to have an eschatological dimension. It is not clear though whether the eschatological valence belongs to it because of its being haiθiia- or being a mąθra; in the latter case, the adjective may be understood in the sense of ‘genuine’: one looks to the ‘true’ mąθra to sustain one's eschatological hope.Footnote ¹⁴

Aside from these two, there are nine attestations of the adjective in the Gāthās, one of which, Y 53.6, is in a stanza that is completely obscure.Footnote ¹⁵ The remaining eight may be divided into three groups. Three occurrences are in the concluding stanzas of three Gāthās (Y 34.15, 46.19, 50.11), in a stereotyped lexical and discursive environment, and, significantly, in two with a noun in ellipsis, or else with haiθiia- substantivised. The second group (Y 43.3, 51.13, 30.5) consists of stanzas that directly or indirectly relate the adjective to the phrase ‘straight paths’. The third group contains two passages that describe seemingly eschatological scenes: in one (Y 34.6) the adjective in the accusative is probably used adverbially, and in the other (Y 49.11) it is found in an imprecation. In the latter we find the souls (uruuąnō) of the partisans of druj (drəguuatō) confronting them with foul food (akāiš x^varəθāiš), who are envisaged to be “true guests in the house of druj” (drūjō dəmānē haiθiiā. . . astaiiō). I will come back to this in the end. The context of Y 34.6 haiθīm seems to be eschatological or ecstatic: yezī aθā stā haiθīm “since you (i.e., Mazdā, a a and vohu- manah-) are in truth such (i.e., as described in the previous stanza)”. The gods are ‘in truth’ powerful and protective.

The second group (Y 43.3, 30.5 and 51.13) sheds decisive light on the significance of haiθiia-.

The adjective haiθiia- (acc. pl. masc.) plainly qualifies the “straight paths of vitalization”, but used in its own verse line with the noun in ellipsis. There are two interesting questions one could ask about its usage in this passage. Firstly, one wonders whether the distraction of the adjective from the noun with which it belongs and its placement right after the ‘mind’ is significant. Does it, in other words, qualify the straight paths of salvation exclusively, as these bear on the ‘existence of the mind’? The differentiation between the corporeal state and the mental state is a fundamental conceptual distinction in Gāthic system of thought, and thus the choice of contiguous positions for the expressions may have some conceptual significance. This question of a possible elective affinity of haiθiia- with the ‘mental state’ is also at stake in the goal of the paths of vitalization that are haiθiia-: they lead to beings (stīš). This noun from √ah ‘be’ seems to mean ‘being’ in the concrete and not abstract sense in the passage – a development that is not unusual for verbal abstract nouns in -ti.Footnote ¹⁸ It is hard to know what or who these ‘beings’ are; Y 43.13 suggests that they may constitute an immortal realm: 43.13c-e’ arəθā vōiždiiāi, kāmahiiā t m mōi dātā / darəgahiiā yaoš, y m vå naēciš dārəšt itē / vairiiå stōiš, yā θβahmī xšaθrōi vācī “so that I can attain the objects of my desire, fulfil for me this (desire) for a lasting life, for which no one has daredFootnote ¹⁹ to approach you, (the desire) for the choice existence that is said (to be) in your realm”. The terms in which the ‘existence’ in question is described leave little doubt that it is the immortal life that is meant. It is not clear whether the existence imagined in this passage is that of a mental state in which the departed soul continues its existence or a ‘splendid’ earthly existence purged from death and other evils. In any event, from Y 43.3 we can conclude that haiθiia- is used of the paths that lead to immortal life.

This conclusion may be tested in 51.13.

Here, too, we find the adjective connected with the ‘straight (path)’Footnote ²⁰ , but it does not qualify it. One can perhaps speculate, on the basis of 53.2dd” dåŋhō ərəzūš paθō, yąm daēnąm ahurō, saošiiaṇtō dadā “the lord places the vision-soul of the vitalizer onto the straight paths of boon”, that in Y 51.13 the straight (path) refers to ‘boon’ rather than ‘vitalization’. Nonetheless the theme of vitalisation is present in Y 53.2 in the figure of the saošiiaṇt-. The supreme god makes the psychopompic ‘vision-soul’ (daēnā-) of the saošiiaṇt- the conduit of the ‘boon’. The figure places the ‘boon’ in an eschatological perspective.Footnote ²¹ In Y 51.13 we are told that the drəguuaṇt is blind to the haiθiia- action which constitutes (or places one on) the ‘straight path’ in an unmistakably eschatological context, where the drəguuaṇt’s soul is portrayed suffering in the afterlife as a result of his negligence in the earthly life. The failure must be understood against this background, i.e., it concerns the afterlife. The turn away from a a lies at the basis of the damnation of the drəguuaṇt’s soul in Y 51.13, and is associated with the ‘worst acts’ committed by the ‘drəguuaṇt intuition’ in Y 30.5:

Choosing a a involves undertaking haiθiia- actions. In Y 30.5 and 51.13, two kinds of action are set against one another: the action (the ‘worst’ kind, according to Y 30.5) that is part and parcel of the abandonment of the path of a a, on the one hand, and on the other, the ‘true action’ that constitutes the ‘straight path’ of ‘vitalisation’ or ‘boon’ (according to Y 51.13, and pleases Mazdā according to Y 30.5). The former prepares a horrid afterlife, the latter leads to a blissful one.Footnote ²²

The adjective haiθiia- significantly occurs in three Gāthā-concluding stanzas. In all these stanzas the adjective appears with fəraša- ‘splendid’ or ‘brilliant’ that seems to mark a particular existence or state. The syntax in all of them is somewhat ambiguous. Y 34.15cc’ is an independent statement with the verb (√dā) in the injunctive aorist, which presents the action from the outside, e.g., as a fact: xšmākā xšaθrā ahurā, fərašəm vasnā haiθii m då ahūm. Most scholars translate this verse as something like: O Lord, through your power (you) make real at will (or in accordance with our wish) an existence that is brilliant. So Insler (Reference Insler1975, p. 59) has: “By your rule, Lord, Thou shalt truly heal this world in accord with our wish”. He derives fəraša- from fra √ar: *frarta- and translates ‘healed’, and interprets haiθii m as an adverb.Footnote ²³ Lommel (Reference Lommel1971, p. 89) translates: “Durch eure Herrschaft mache, o Herr, nach (deinem) Willen das Dasein wirklich herrlich”, also reading haiθii m as an adverb. Humbach (Reference Humbach1991 I, p. 143) has: “Through Your power make real the existence (which is) brilliant in (my) imagination, O Ahura”. He (1991 II, p. 115) maintains that vasnā cannot mean ‘at will’, i.e., derived from √vas ‘wish’, since this would give *vašnā as in Old Persian vašnā ‘in accordance with one's wish’. The Gāthic term is identical in form to the Vedic vasná- ‘value, price’ (EWA II, 535), whose sense also seems to fit: ‘splendid or brilliant in value’.Footnote ²⁴ Kellens (Reference Kellens2013, p. 82) suggests to derive vasna- from √vah ‘illuminate’. The term would then mean something like ‘heavenly light’. One way to read the verbal phrase is ‘render haiθiia- an existence (that is) splendid’, where one would translate the adjective as ‘real’, so ‘realise an existence (that is) splendid’. In Y 30.9, however, we have the poet expressing his wish tōi vaēm iiāmā yōi īm fəraš m kərənaon ahūm “may we be those who will make this existence splendid”. It seems to me that the attraction of reading Y 34.15c’ haiθii m då as ‘make real’ or ‘realise’ is due to the preconception that one knows what ‘real’ means in the phrase, and that ‘making real an ideal existence’ is an understandable way of expressing an eschatological undertaking. But one may as well read the verbal phrase, ‘make existence haiθiia- (and) splendid in value (or with heavenly light)’, which would agree with Y 30.9. If this reading is right, the adjective characterises a certain kind of existence.Footnote ²⁵ We must keep in mind that the aorist stem of √dā with the supreme god as the subject seems to describe the latter's creative activity in the Gāthās.

In Y 46.19 haiθiia- refers to a noun in ellipsis which is the object of √varz ‘perform, accomplish’: y mōi a ā , haiθīm hacā varəšaitī / zaraθuštrāi, hiia vasnā fərašō.təməm / ahmāi mīždəm, hanəṇtē parāhūm ‘(for him) who will have accomplished for me, Zarathuštra, the haiθiia- (act) oriented to a a– for him who (thus) earns (it) the prize which is most splendid in value: a (desirable) existence beyond!’ The verb √varz does not mean ‘make’ but ‘perform, accomplish’ or ‘work (the land)’. So the verbal phrase haiθīm. . . varəšaitī. . . hiia . . . fərašō.təməm cannot mean ‘make real. . . what is most wonderful’. haiθīm must refer to an activity or a state.Footnote ²⁶ The prize of the ‘life beyond’ must mean a desirable afterlife, especially in view of the relative clause qualifying it.Footnote ²⁷ The relative hiia vasnā fərašō.təməm can hardly be the accusative complement of varəšaitī. Rather, it describes the envisaged prize. In Y 34.15 the supreme god is imagined to use his divine power to render existence haiθiia- and heavenly; here the one who carries out the ‘haiθiia- action’ (for Zarathuštra) is promised a ‘higher life’.Footnote ²⁸

Finally: Y 50.11c-d’ dātā aŋh uš, arəda vohū manaŋhā / haiθiiāuuarəštąm, hiia vasnā fərašō.təməm “the creator of existence will foster through good thinking the haiθiia-work (and thus) what is most splendid in value”. The manuscripts have either haiθiiāuuarəštąm or haiθiiā.uuarəštąm. Kellens and Pirart read ⁺ haiθiiā ⁺varəštąm, the former word as an elliptical adjective in the instrumental for ‘with a cultic gesture’ and the latter as the 3^rd sg. aor. imp. of √varz ‘accomplish’. They accordingly interpret arəda as an adverb, ‘remarquablement’. Their translation is: “Que l'instaurateur de l'existence (rituelle) accomplisse remarquablement (la formule) par la divine Pensée et par an (acte) cultuel qui est très plantureux. . .” They suggest that the noun in ellipsis is iiaoθana-, which for them means ‘ritual gesture’. We then have the pleonastic phrase ‘cultic ritual gesture’, characterised as the most splendid. Kellens’ and Pirart's objection, that arəda (√ard ‘promote, foster’, cf. Vedic ardh ‘promote, attain’Footnote ²⁹ ) cannot be a verb since a subjunctive is untypical in a principal clause, is not decisive on its own. The subjunctive aorist is used to envisage a future accomplishment, as it is in Y 46.19. The action in the aorist subjunctive is reduced to a fact and imagined as a future event. Thus it seems that the adjective haiθiia- qualifies a certain activity that plays a part in a context which may justifiably be described as eschatological in view of the parallel phrase “what is most splendid”.