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The worst of both worlds: Commercial rice production in West Indramayu, 1885–1935

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 September 2010

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Abstract

This paper deals with the consequences of the increasing commercialisation of the rice industry in west Indramayu from the mid-1880s to the late 1930s. Instead of prosperity as a result of growing rice for sale in a free market, local peasants found their survival being threatened by traders who had them bound to a vicious cycle of debts and who acquired much of the rice they produced. The rice growers in west Indramayu were impoverished far more than the peasants growing cash crops such as sugar elsewhere in Java.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The National University of Singapore 2010

The Dutch colonial economic policy, according to Clifford Geertz, resulted in Javanese peasants being forced to eke out a meagre living on miniscule plots of farm land while earning a small money income from growing export crops, which led to a stasis in economic development or ‘agricultural involution’, a process that allegedly began in the 1830s and reached its apogee in the 1920s.Footnote 1 The indigenous population never achieved prosperity let alone progress towards industrialisation, Geertz argues, but its subsistence needs were ensured by the colonial state, which was humane in its demands on the land and labour of Javanese peasants to produce agricultural crops for sale in the world market. James Scott refines Geertz's argument and says that, with the exception of the Dutch colonial state in Java, colonial rulers elsewhere in Southeast Asia did not ensure the subsistence needs of the indigenous population.Footnote 2

While many aspects of Geertz's neo-conventional involution paradigmFootnote 3 has come under severe criticism, its main thrust of the colonial state ensuring the subsistence of indigenous people has been overlooked, because both Geertz and his critics have been preoccupied with the ways in which production of agricultural crops for export on a large scale affected the Javanese peasants. The revisionists claim that the Javanese peasants who produced export crops on a large scale for the world market enjoyed a degree of prosperity and were economically and socially differentiated, instead of being reduced to an undifferentiated mass of agricultural population living on the brink of subsistence under colonial rule.Footnote 4 While it is indeed true that the tremendous expansion in the production of sugar, indigo and coffee after 1830 was arguably the deus ex machina, which produced both positive and negative effects in Javanese economic and social life, people who did not produce export crops were also affected by the commercialisation of economic life. They supplied agricultural crops and products of domestic industry for the local market, bought and sold a wide range of consumer goods and services, acquired consumer habits and use of money, just like their peers involved in growing export crops. There were, however, significant differences in the commercialisation of indigenous economic life across Java, which produced strikingly different modes of economic behaviour, defying any effort to coax them into a broad pattern of economic transformation.Footnote 5

This is particularly true for rice growers, who usually sold a portion of the rice crop in increasing amounts from the 1820s onwards. Rice produced on the northeast coast of Java from Cirebon to Surabaya was exported to other islands via the major markets of Makasar, Johor-Riau and Melaka in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.Footnote 6 This trade was interrupted, apparently due to a slump in rice production in Java, in the l790s, and following its slow recovery in the next decade, locally-produced rice in excess of consumption needs was sold in local markets across Java, where the demand for rice began to rise steadily with the rapid expansion in production of export crops after 1830.Footnote 7 While rice producers consumed most of rice produced locally, peasants in some parts of the island such as Cirebon, Semarang and Surabaya sold a portion of their rice crop on a regular basis to supply growing demand.

Were the effects of commercial rice production different from the effects of producing sugar, indigo, tobacco and rubber for the world market? What impact did the commercialisation of rice production have on the peasants who sold a large part of rice crop? Did they succumb to involution or achieve economic prosperity, as did the peasants in the Burma Delta in the second half of the nineteenth century?Footnote 8 Did they fare better in safeguarding their subsistence requirements than their peers involved in the production of agricultural crops for sale in the world market, if it was indeed true that the colonial state consistently pursued a policy of protecting Javanese peasants from the market economy and ensured their subsistence requirements?

Most peasants across Java sold a certain amount of rice in order to procure some cash money, apparently in increasing quantities, from the 1860s onwards mainly due to the rising demand for rice which rose as the number of non-agricultural workers increased. But the number of commercial rice producers, i.e. peasants who produced rice exclusively for local trade and export to Europe, was indeed small vis-à-vis the number of peasants who produced sugar, indigo, coffee and so on for the world market. The economic metamorphosis of commercial rice-growers in Java is rather difficult to discern, because the bulk of colonial reports on economic matters are focused on the production of export crops and its effects on peasants. While it is relatively easier to construct a broad narrative of the economic vicissitudes of indigenous people, let alone a colonial economy without indigenous people, from a vast amount of information enshrined in regular colonial reports,Footnote 9 it is rather difficult to elucidate the dynamics of indigenous economic life, because colonial officials probed into such matters under special circumstances such as scandals involving the production of export crops. People who were beyond the fringe of export agriculture appear in silhouette even in reports produced at the local level of colonial administration, which provide inadequate information to construct a clear narrative of the ways in which their economic life changed as a result of the increasing production of export crops. Furthermore, bewildering local variations on the theme of how the Javanese peasants adapted themselves to the sweeping changes makes it harder still to present a generalisation for Java as a whole. Occasionally, however, when a long series of documents focusing on a particular issue or theme encompassing a particular area is serendipitously preserved – and found after painstaking search through the thousands of metres of records – one has a rare opportunity to examine what colonial officials called the ‘domestic economy’ (huishouding) of the indigenous people.

Commercialisation of rice production seems to have transformed both land and labour into commodities, promoting consumerism and the use of money in daily economic activities, progressively weakening the subsistence ethos of the rural population. Whereas peasants growing export crops were able to retain their rice crop for consumption – income from leasing land and supply of labour to grow export crops was more than enough to pay the land rent on all arable land – peasants who grew rice for sale had to sell it to pay the land rent and to obtain money for their material needs, perhaps accelerating the process of commercialisation more than in areas where export crops were produced side by side with rice and secondary food crops. There was noticeably little diversification of economic activity in exclusively rice growing areas, where people could find enough to live on from selling rice, as the demand for rice in local markets across Java rose after 1850. Therefore it is not surprising to find a relatively larger proportion of peasants earning their means of livelihood from small plots of wet-rice land in a manner reminiscent of the Geertzian involution phenomenon. There was, however, little or no sign of ‘shared poverty’ arising from accommodating practically all the economically active population in agriculture, as argued by Geertz, although being relatively free in decision making does not seem to have provided peasants a better opportunity to achieve economic progress. The case of west Indramayu illustrates a pattern of change in indigenous economic life in areas where peasants produced rice for sale significantly different from the pattern of change in areas where peasants were involved in the production of crops such as sugar for export on a large scale since 1830. That paradigm of socio-economic changes has been widely assumed to encompass all Java, probably due to the paucity of information on socio-economic changes in areas where the production of agricultural crops for export was insignificant. But such a view is untenable in view of the vicissitudes in the economic life of people who produced rice, other crops and other consumable articles for sale in local markets in many parts of Java.

This paper explores the experience of a small community of commercial rice cultivators in west Indramayu, part of Cirebon Residency in west Java. It describes economic changes among peasants who grew rice for sale from the mid-1880s through to the 1930s, fortuitously recorded in great detail in the wake of several episodes of scarcity of food, prompting agrarian reforms to bolster the export rice industry under the aegis of the colonial state bent upon improving the well-being of indigenous people. The reforms failed miserably because the colonial state itself tried to exploit the rice producers as much as private rice traders, who managed to eliminate all competitors and bind peasants securely to them through a vicious cycle of debt, to the disadvantage of the peasants. The colonial state could not protect or help peasants exposed to the risk of subsistence crises as more and more rice came into the hands of traders and, worse still, this forced peasants to live at subsistence level as they were unable to derive the full benefit of producing rice for sale under more favourable terms enforced by a regime following a laissez-faire economic policy. The experience of rice growers in west Indramayu, and perhaps elsewhere in Java too, reveals limits to benevolence under colonial rule and a pattern of economic change for indigenous people far closer to the Geertzian notion of agricultural involution than anywhere else in Java, where people were engaged in the production of sugar alongside rice for sale in the world market.

Transition to commercial rice production

The area of west Indramayu consisted of two large private domains (particuliere landerijen), Indramayu and Kandanghaur, outside government control before 1911.Footnote 10 Located on the west bank of the River Cimanuk, the two private domains were under nominal control of the local government (residency) of Cirebon. The area was ideal for rice cultivation so it was not surprising that the landlords were disinclined to produce other crops, such as sugar for export, which would have required large amounts of capital, entrepreneurial skills and administrative forces. The landlords kept the local population confined to the cultivation of rice, exacted prime-quality rice for export to Europe and effectively closed off the area to traders from outside, who played an important role in the process of commercialisation of economic life elsewhere in Java. The primitive state of the roads made it easy for the landlords to keep people isolated from outside influence. The local peasants produced no more rice than necessary for their subsistence and to fulfil their obligations to the landlords, in striking contrast to the diversified economy elsewhere in Java in the middle decades of the nineteenth century.Footnote 11

West Indramayu was a sparsely populated area – only a small portion of its total area, especially in Kandanghaur, was under cultivation in the early 1880s, when nearly all households had access to wet-rice (sawah) land, and the majority of peasants held more than 0.7 hectare per person and many peasants held larger areas of wet-rice land. Many peasants claimed to have produced a rice crop sufficient to last from one harvest to another into the early 1870s, but had virtually no other means of income and were locked into a narrow subsistence economy seen nowhere else in Java around 1880. The narrow subsistence economy aggravated the economic hardship of peasants in Indramayu and Kandanghaur private domains, as in the case of the subsistence crisis of 1883–84, caused by a large amount of rice being extracted for export at times of falling rice production.Footnote 12 The landlords continued to monopolise the rice crop in excess of peasants' subsistence needs in lieu of land rent, which increasingly affected the food supply of peasant households as rice harvests became erratic in the 1890s.

The colonial government's conscience was disturbed as never before by the plight of people in the aftermath of the subsistence crisis of 1883–84. But it could do very little to help people, except persuade the landlords to let peasants sell some rice to traders from outside to earn a little cash money to survive in difficult times. This limited freedom to earn a money income, which brought local peasants into closer contact with the market for rice, and with consumerism, proved a mixed blessing. Peasants with larger holdings of land, enough labour to cultivate it and produce a large rice crop probably welcomed the opportunity. Most peasants, whose rice crop was small, readily sought credit from traders to overcome their current difficulties, forfeiting their rice crop in advance, which caused more hardship as rice production became increasingly erratic during the quarter century after the subsistence crisis of 1883–84. This state of affairs was at least partly responsible for the slow increase in population, which was just a little over 1 per cent a year, from 114,475 in 1885 to 149,202 in 1909, slower than the population growth in west Java as a whole during the same period.Footnote 13 It seems also that increasing difficulty in securing subsistence needs caused a fall in natural fertility, for the average family size declined from 4.6 persons in the mid-nineteenth century to 3.7 persons per household by 1905, and the proportion of children in the total population declined from 49 to 43 during the same period.Footnote 14

The area of sawah in west Indramayu rose in proportion to the population growth,Footnote 15 but the rice cultivation was plagued by crop failures due to the drought, flood and lack of irrigation facilities.Footnote 16 Rice production was erratic and falling in the 1880s, and the larger than usual rice crops in 1890 and 1893–95 were exceptions to the norm of low crops of about 39,000 tons of paddy for a decade after the subsistence crisis of 1883–84.Footnote 17 The erratic rice production was a worrying concern for people, because it was inadequate for family consumption after payment of the rising land rent, and did not allow them to extricate themselves from spiralling debts, a state of affairs confounded by the abuses that crept into assessment and collection of the land rent.Footnote 18 The only course of action peasants could follow was to borrow money, often on unfavourable terms, binding them to a vicious cycle of debt against the background of frequent crop failures.Footnote 19 Borrowing money and rice had become widespread after the subsistence crisis of 1883–84, for most peasants lost their cattle and finished all their food stocks during the crisis.Footnote 20 ‘The circumstances under which Kandanghaur domain is being managed causes the wellbeing of people to decline’, one official observed, ‘and people are prostrated under the burden of heavy taxation, compulsory public labour services and the ubiquitous system [of] money lending’.Footnote 21 The repayment of debt reduced the amount of rice at their disposal in the 1890s, when rice production was plagued by frequent crop failures. In Kandanghaur private domain, debt repayment required from between 248 to 620 tons of rice a year,Footnote 22 while peasants in Indramayu borrowed a great deal more – from f.80,000 to f.100,000 a year – and repaid their debts at the rate of 62 kilogram of prime-quality rice or 1.24 kilogramme of paddy for each f.5.00 borrowed.Footnote 23 Agricultural indebtedness increased with frequent crop failures, revealing the effects of commercialisation of rice production, which exposed peasants to the risk of subsistence crises in the early 1900s.

In early March 1903, C.J. Hoekendyk, a missionary, wrote about a scarcity of food in the Indramayu region, where the rice crop had failed for two consecutive years. Some 600 people walked daily to Indramayu town, hoping to find odd jobs to feed their families, and those who could not walk so far ate leaves and roots to appease their hunger. It was so hard to find food that one man forced his wife to become a prostitute in order to earn money to feed the family. Hoekendyk's mission post in Indramayu was a haven for the starving people, but his funds were inadequate to provide food for more than a few hundred people.Footnote 24

Rice production in Indramayu and Kandanghaur private domains halved between 1900 and 1902.Footnote 25 In 1900, peasant had at their disposal 26,253 ton of rice, enough for consumption after paying the land rent, which amounted to 5,295 tons of rice.Footnote 26 But the situation changed dramatically in the following two years. In 1902, people had 10,878 tons of rice at their disposal to last six months.Footnote 27 It would have been barely enough to feed the local population until the next harvest, which was expected to be equally bad. In 1903, one-quarter of the area of land planted under rice was expected to fail due to flood, drought and pest.Footnote 28 Therefore Hoekendyk's claims of a severe shortage of food in some parts of the Indramayu region had a ring of truth, but the local government was reluctant to admit it and made an unsuccessful effort to quash Hoekendyk's claims. The management of private domains was impervious to the difficulties of people trying to weather the shortage of food.Footnote 29 The landlords, allegedly suffering from diminished income, were forced to initiate relief work, usually building canals and roads, and provide the peasants with seed paddy in the next season.Footnote 30

The mission workers fed a lengthening queue of starving people, mostly old men, young women and children, who went away looking for work, or another shelter once rested and fed for a few days.Footnote 31 Hoekendyk's shelters for needy people were disagreeable to the administrators of private domains, who forced him to dismantle them by persuading people to leave in an attempt to refute the claims of a subsistence crisis.Footnote 32 The central government was reluctant to consider the situation serious enough to warrant any relief operation and shrugged off the vociferous claims of mission workers as a storm in a teacup, but not for long.Footnote 33

In mid-1903, W.H. Jacometti, a lawyer acting on behalf of some European and Chinese rice traders in the Indramayu region, complained about the interference of the local government in his clients' operations by prohibiting the sale of rice before peasants saved 2 ton of paddy per household in the village rice barns.Footnote 34 The fear of scarcity of food in the area was, according to Jacometti, exaggerated, and no different from the situation every year to require special measures. The local government disagreed with this view, for rice production in the entire Indramayu area was significantly lower than the normal level of production.Footnote 35 The local government also pointed out the insignificance of cultivation of secondary crops in this area, which Jacometti cited as evidence for sufficient food supply, and observed that a serious shortage of rice was the likely outcome of increased acquisition of rice by traders, regardless of the plight of people, so it was necessary to limit the amount of rice traders procured from peasants.

One might hesitate to trust the local government's solicitous efforts to bolster food supply in view of its reluctance to admit a scarcity of food in the area less than a year previously. The local government did not comment on its volte-face, but it might have underestimated the gravity of the situation and have been trying to make amends for its mistake by reacting quickly, as soon as it became evident that the crop failure was more widespread than initially assumed.Footnote 36 The cause of the scarcity of rice for consumption was, the local government appears to have assumed, the increased sale of rice by peasants in the private domains, oblivious to their precarious food supply at times of falling rice production. Colonial officials were blind to the increasingly commercialised character of indigenous economic life, which forced peasants to sell a larger portion of the rice harvest in order to earn money to meet their material needs in the early 1900s.

East Indramayu, or Indramayu Regency, had been a major rice producing area that boasted a coterie of Chinese rice traders and rice millers since the 1820s, and was a prime field of operation for rice traders.Footnote 37 Their operations enlarged considerably as the demand for prime-quality rice for export to Europe rose significantly after 1880,Footnote 38 in addition to the growing demand for rice in local markets in Java and in other Indonesian islands.Footnote 39 The Chinese traders, who roamed in rural areas and conducted commercial activities with indigenous people with little official interference, were indispensable in collecting rice from peasants.Footnote 40 The restrictions circumscribing the activities of Chinese traders had gradually fallen by the wayside as indigenous economic activities became commercialised.Footnote 41 Both European and Chinese rice traders in Indramayu town, who were keen to export the highly sought-after prime-quality rice from west Indramayu,Footnote 42 conducted a brisk business through Chinese intermediaries. They penetrated into the hitherto isolated areas of Indramayu and Kandanghaur private domains and drew the local peasants within the orbit of their commercial operations, once the landlords allowed them into the private domains after the subsistence crisis of 1883–84. While some traders such as Kwek Tjin Siang were leading members and even office holders of the Chinese community – he was the Lieutenant Captain of Chinese in Indramayu – most traders were small operators, such as Oey Tjin Kie, who travelled back and forth between the towns of Lelea and Indramayu, or Tan Mi Nio and Tjan Hie Nio, who lent peasants money and collected repayments in rice.Footnote 43 The local peasants probably did not need much encouragement to sell rice, for they were hard pressed to procure funds to produce rice as well as to survive in times of crop failures. Some peasants familiar with the rice trade in east Indramayu were probably aware of the potential income from selling rice to traders at market price.Footnote 44 The peasants apparently responded enthusiastically to the overtures of Chinese traders and sold whatever rice they could spare after payment of the land rent, sometimes without keeping enough rice to feed their families, knowing that they could procure easy credit from traders to buy rice for consumption.

The Chinese traders are invariably depicted in colonial reports as exploitative moneylenders whose hold on the Javanese peasantry was detrimental to its wellbeing. This stereotypical view conceals the fact that the Chinese traders cum moneylenders performed a rather useful service in rural credit at a time when the need for credit was great among the peasants – a need the local government of Cirebon emphasised in numerous reports in the early 1900s – and served as conveyers of agricultural products to local markets, no doubt with a keen eye to maximise their profits. In the early 1900s, ‘the influence of Chinese in economic affairs is not insignificant’, one perceptive local official wrote, ‘mainly due the custom of lending money on the crops, so it is not surprising that we find a large number of Chinese in remote rural areas’ of the Indramayu region.Footnote 45 The rising demand for rice apparently intensified the competition among traders, whose ability to control the supply of rice was dependent on access to the rice harvest in remote villages. The scale of rice traders' operations can be gauged from the fact that the rice stores in Indramayu town had 6,200 tons of rice ready for export after the rice harvest was gathered and, at the current prices, 30,000 ton of rice would have brought f.4,000,000 to the traders.Footnote 46 Therefore anything that interfered with the rice trade was unacceptable to traders playing for high stakes. It is difficult to say to what extent the scarcity of rice in the private domains during 1901–03 was due to selling rice, but it undoubtedly exacerbated the problems of food supply. The peasants were perhaps not ignorant of their plight in a case of scarcity of rice, but sold rice none the less in order to obtain money to meet their increasing material needs, and to overcome the perennial shortage of funds to open up new land for cultivation, to buy cattle, tools and seed paddy to continue rice production under the difficult circumstances of frequent crop failures.

Even a small peasant household, with a miniscule holding (0.2 hectare) of wet-rice land, in a fertile rice-growing area, sold a large portion of its rice crop, which yielded almost 80 per cent of its income, and bought its food and other domestic necessities, suggesting a significant degree of commercialisation of household economic activities.Footnote 47 The degree of commercialisation of domestic economic activities and consumerism proportionately increased with a family's larger holding of wet-rice land, its area of dry arable land and house-yard.Footnote 48 Indeed, use of money, consumerism and market economic forces had penetrated even into the remote parts of Java in the 1880s, a state of affairs further advanced in the following decades of rapid economic growth.Footnote 49 The degree of commercialisation of the economy in coastal areas such as Indramayu was conceivably far greater, given their proximity to markets and the opportunities they provided to people for buying and selling. Therefore it is not surprising that the peasants in Indramayu region as a whole were accustomed to produce rice for sale with borrowed money, sold rice in increasing quantities and bought cheaper varieties of rice for consumption.

In the early 1880s, only a small proportion of peasants in west Indramayu held plots of wet-rice lands below 0.7 hectare, which produced enough rice to feed a family of average size of 4.5 people; the rest of the peasants held plots of wet-rice land ranging from 0.7 hectare to 2.4 hectare per peasant.Footnote 50 This pattern of land holding was quite similar to that in east Indramayu in the early 1900s, when 44 per cent of all peasants in east Indramayu, just like their peers in west Indramayu, held under 0.7 hectare per peasant, while 17 per cent of households held 0.7 hectare per peasant and 38 per cent of households held farms ranging from 1.4 hectare to over 8 hectare per peasant.Footnote 51 In east Indramayu, all peasants were accustomed to sell rice in varying quantities, and peasants with larger holdings of arable land were regular commercial rice producers, who probably had funds and were less dependent on credit, while most peasants with smaller holdings of wet-rice land were dependent on credit to produce rice to a large extent. Marginal peasants would need funds to lease or rent land and to meet all the expenses and the cost of living, and even small peasants with holdings of 0.7 hectare needed funds to buy or hire cattle, seed and tools, in addition to cash money for their material needs. It is very likely that the latter segment of peasants was more vulnerable to the effects of crop failures and yet had no choice but to borrow money and sell rice to survive.Footnote 52 The situation in west Indramayu would not have been much different, either in terms of distribution of wet-rice land by size of holding or the way most peasants disposed of their rice crop in the early 1900s.

It was against this background of the growing rice trade in the Indramayu region that the local government imposed restrictions on the movement of rice traders beyond the perimeter of district towns, and the sale of rice before a certain amount of it was saved in village barns, a measure which raised the ire of rice traders, who realised this would mean a considerable loss of profit if they could not collect rice from peasants.Footnote 53 Traders also pointed out, quite correctly, that the restrictions on the rice trade would not only affect them but also the well-being of the local population. The local government of Cirebon relaxed restrictions on the rice trade in 1904, only to find a great scarcity of rice for consumption among people in the wake of another crop failure three years later.Footnote 54

The sale of rice was increasing apace, because apart from the Chinese traders the landlords had also been buying rice from peasants in addition to the rice supplied in lieu of the land rent, probably to eliminate rice traders who were increasingly active in west Indramayu. Peasants sold not only the prime-quality rice but inferior quality rice as well, to obtain money for their seemingly increasing material needs. The opening of private domains to rice traders brought about rapid changes in the consumer habits of the local population through circulation of money, encouraging peasants to sell rice and procure credit to meet their needs, which were exacerbated by periodic crop failures and falling rice production. The subsistence rice economy that sustained generations of people had been consequently eroded substantially by 1911, when the government repurchased Indramayu and Kandanghaur private domains, almost a century after they were sold out, and integrated them into east Indramayu, creating a very large area producing rice for sale.Footnote 55

Rapid commercialisation of rice industry

The repurchase of Indramayu and Kandanghaur private domains occurred under the aegis of a new turn in colonial policy aimed at improving the wellbeing of indigenous people.Footnote 56 They ought to remain peasants, the colonial state still insisted, but should be stronger economically to withstand the pressures of commercialisation. Continuous subdivision of smallholdings of wet-rice land and increasing agricultural indebtedness due to the commercialisation of economic life was considered to have adversely affected the Javanese peasants, encouraging rural protests.Footnote 57 Injecting large sums of funds to improve the irrigation facilities, and the rural credit services, and agrarian reforms to strengthen a class of enterprising and contented peasants were considered to be effective measures to prevent the growing agrarian radicalism.Footnote 58 The local government of Cirebon introduced a set of reforms with the blessings of the central government in Batavia, which was liberal with funds, to protect the lucrative rice industry in west Indramayu from ‘unscrupulous’ rice traders and to ensure the wellbeing of peasants. The government felt that a fair system of land rent together with an efficient credit service would encourage peasants to produce more rice and sell rice in excess of consumption needs to the government at reasonable prices.Footnote 59 The colonial officials were in fact proposing to create a government monopoly of the local rice industry, attesting to its development during the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

The government allocated f.200,000 to provide credit and stipulated that money borrowed should be repaid at interest of 20 per cent in prime-quality rice, valued at the rate of f.2.50 per pikul (62 kilogrammes) of paddy and f.5.00 per pikul of rice.Footnote 60

The rural credit scheme was popular with peasants, despite the high interest rate, and nearly 15,000 peasants borrowed f.103,703 during the first year of its operation.Footnote 61 Before long, however, it became evident that peasants were reluctant to sell rice to the government at what they considered to be low prices. They paid back their debts in low-quality paddy and sold the prime-quality paddy to traders for a higher price than that offered by the government. Traders were aggressive competitors who had a much wider network of agents to provide credit and collect rice compared with official agencies. The government offered low prices and regulated credit and collection of debts, which constrained peasants who needed easy access to credit, and disliked being paid less for rice when they could sell it at a higher price.Footnote 62

Traders appear to have redoubled their efforts to secure rice, for exporting rice to Europe was highly lucrative well until the outbreak of the First World War.Footnote 63 The demand for rice in local markets all over Java was also rising as a result of the increase in number of non-agricultural workers dependent on the market for rice, and the Indramayu region became a major centre of rice trade in Java during the inter-war years.Footnote 64 By 1919, 11 new rice mills had been established in the area, and some of them were located far away from the district towns in order to capture rice production in remote villages. The government could not compete with the rice traders, for it had insufficient resources to acquire paddy and to overcome the peasants' reluctance to sell their paddy at a low price. The government's plan to control the lucrative local rice industry consequently suffered a major setback when the rice mills operated by the government became a liability, because more and more peasants sold their paddy to traders.Footnote 65 Failure to secure enough paddy to process at the new big mill, built by the landlords at such expense and inherited by the government,Footnote 66 proved beyond doubt that the government's plans had no hope of success against peasants trying to raise their income from selling rice, with the help of astute traders determined to force the government out of competition. The new rice mill lent a great deal of money, but received less and less paddy to process,Footnote 67 and was sold within a year after it came into operation.Footnote 68 The old rice mill in Losarang continued to operate, perhaps because there was little competition for paddy in the area and the local peasants were content with supplying paddy to the government in return for credit.Footnote 69 The need for credit among local peasants was as great as ever so the government decided to maintain a credit service through the village rice barns, but to collect the debts in money instead of paddy so the peasants were free to dispose of their paddy or rice as they wished.Footnote 70 To the dismay of local officials, the prospects of running a rice industry under government control encountered a severe obstacle in the flourishing rice trade, now encompassing both east and west Indramayu, a place which soon became attractive to people from adjacent areas with little or no new arable land to earn their means of livelihood from growing rice for sale.

Improved roads and railway lines linking the western and southern parts of Kandanghaur with Indramayu, and both areas with the rest of the island, within a decade of west Indramayu coming under the direct government rule brought about a dramatic change in population growth and economic development.Footnote 71 West Indramayu came to boast a sizeable population, which rose from 79,224 in 1900 to 97,542 in 1920 and then to 172,862 in 1930, largely as a result of migration of people from the nearby over-populated areas into this new frontier of settlement.Footnote 72

It seems that a large number of people from east Indramayu, where the production of rice for sale had long been entrenched, where wet-rice land was at a premium and nearly all land suitable for wet-rice cultivation had already been cultivated, moved into west Indramayu. Many people eking out a meagre living from wage labour and petty trade in the nearby areas of central Java moved into west Indramayu in large numbers, established new settlements and brought under plough a large stretch of new land in the 1920s.Footnote 73 The area soon became thickly populated in comparison with the situation half a century earlier, although population density was nowhere as high as in some parts of Central Java in the 1920s.Footnote 74 The early migrants settled in Indramayu despite its relatively small area of arable land suitable for reclamation, but after 1920 more and more people appear to have moved into Kandanghaur. In the western part of Indramayu many new settlements came into existence, prompting the local government to build roads linking new villages with the central part of Indramayu that served as the hub of rice industry.

The area of wet-rice land in west Indramayu increased substantially from 46,090 hectares to 117,210 hectares, an increase of 5 per cent a year at a rate commensurate with the population growth between 1910 and 1930.Footnote 75 The expansion of area of land cultivated, however, did not necessarily bring economic prosperity to the inhabitants of west Indramayu. Slow progress in improving irrigation facilities, for instance, had disastrous consequences, as shown by a large-scale crop failure in 1916.Footnote 76 The irrigation facilities improved slowly in several phases in the 1920s, but much of the wet-rice land dependent on rainfall for irrigation was still subject to crop failure.

The wet season of 1920–21 was notoriously bad for the peasants in Cirebon Residency as a whole and for the inhabitants of Indramayu Regency in particular, where crop failure on a large scale brought great hardship to the local population.Footnote 77 The previous rice crop was affected by heavy rainfall in the east monsoon of 1920, causing the entire rice crop of 187,513 hectares of land to fail completely and another 21,420 hectares of land to fail partly. In the subsequent year, the rainfall was late to begin cultivation of rice and peasants consequently gathered a smaller rice crop. In the districts of Jatibarang and Indramayu alone, as much as 80 per cent of the rice crop was destroyed as a result of inadequate irrigation, which set in motion a series of events with far-reaching consequences for people now dependent on the sale of rice for their livelihood.Footnote 78

Falling rice production may not have had much impact on the rice trade, because traders always collected rice immediately after the harvest, when peasants were easily pursuaded to sell rice. It was only several months later, when a subsistence crisis loomed large, that people found themselves without adequate food supplies and no money to buy food.Footnote 79 They had sold 25,520 tons of rice, presumably for export, in addition to another 3,720 tons of rice that was sold locally. The amount of rice at the disposal of peasants was consequently small and they had insufficient means to buy rice, which had become expensive in the local markets. The situation fortunately was improved by the timely arrival of imported rice causing prices to fall slightly towards the end of 1920.Footnote 80 The government came to the rescue of people with a subsidy of f.2,000 per peasant to buy seed paddy and to cultivate some secondary food crops until the next rice harvest. This measure was supplemented by another f.70,000 made available to peasants to cultivate land the following year without difficulty.

Many peasants, nevertheless, encountered difficulties in feeding their families, procuring their material needs other than food and, perhaps more importantly, continuing rice production into early 1921.Footnote 81 They had lost access to credit because of their inability to repay debts to the rice traders, who were hard hit by falling rice exports due to the difficulties in shipping rice to Europe after 1914; and exports plummeted to a new low level as a result of falling rice production in rice exporting areas such as Indramayu. In 1921, the amount of rice exported from Java amounted to a mere 1,000 tons, a far cry from over 50,000 tons exported in 1910.Footnote 82

Falling rice exports clearly suggest a major crisis in Java's rice industry, which boded ill for the inhabitants of Indramayu region. The rice traders and peasants alike appear to have suffered heavy financial losses, to judge from the small amount of rice that found its way to the local market between 1915 and 1920.Footnote 83 Fortunately, the crisis was brief due to the timely relief measures undertaken by the government and the revival of the rice industry itself. The government tried with some success to raise rice production in Java, and it restricted rice imports and regulated the price of rice in local markets.Footnote 84 In the 1920s, rice production in west Indramayu was static, due largely to frequent crop failures and inadequate irrigation facilities,Footnote 85 but probably much of its rice production was exported, mainly to Europe, until the onset of the Great Depression in late 1928. The collapse of European markets for rice, and other commercial crops, made traders seek markets nearer home in Java and other Indonesian islands, which sustained the rice trade at a modest level for a decade from 1928 to 1939.Footnote 86

Rice production in the entire Indramayu region probably continued unabated in the 1930s, although production figures are not available for the entire decade. Rice production rose from 231,000 tons in 1936 to 282,000 tons in 1937, faster than that in west Java as a whole, but it declined a little to 270,000 tons in 1938.Footnote 87 In 1933, west Indramayu exported the largest amount of rice from Java, 5,768 tons of rice, to Batavia, the largest market in Java, in addition to another 678 tons of rice to other Indonesian islands.Footnote 88 The amount of rice exported from Indramayu harbour rose from 21,272 tons in 1936 to 49,616 tons to 1937, declining to 24,532 tons next year; no other area in West Java exported as much rice, and very few areas in all Java did so during this period.Footnote 89 Rice exports from Indramayu region as a whole most probably increased for the next few years, when local rice mills were busy milling rice in increasing quantities. Indeed, the amount of rice milled and exported by West Java, which produced the bulk of rice milled in Java, surged after 1930, from a little over 100,000 tons to nearly 400,000 tons in 1937.Footnote 90 There were 14 mills in west Indramayu by 1933, but only 10 of them were actually operating during the rest of the decade.Footnote 91 They appear to have increased their milling capacity, for the amount of rice processed by mills rose from 13 per cent to 26 per cent of all rice production in West Java between 1928 and 1938.Footnote 92

Most rice mills in west Indramayu were under the control of the Chinese, and only one mill, R. & C., belonged to a European company, which offered serious competition to the Chinese entrepreneurs.Footnote 93 The rice mills were located in places where several roads met and regular markets were held, so it is not surprising that centres of commercial activity developed around rice mills. Twenty Chinese wholesale merchants had established themselves in the district towns and dealt with local rice producers through petty traders, rice collectors and moneylenders, linking peasants and traders with the markets. They had a degree of influence on trade and commerce far beyond their numerical strengthFootnote 94 through supply of credit unfettered by legal restrictions that accompanied some other economic activities.Footnote 95 The success of the rice trade was dependent on acquisition of paddy in sufficient quantities at a low price, and the best means of gathering rice was by supplying credit to the peasants, who could not easily avail themselves of the services of official credit services. The amount of money Chinese rice traders made available to the local peasants was considerable, to judge from the fact that one Chinese rice mill alone provided no less than f.855,000 in six months. Most Chinese traders could supply the peasants with money in small amounts, for it was difficult for them to muster large amounts of credit without borrowing from European rice mills and local banks. The aforesaid R. & C. rice mill played a major role in lending money to the rice mills operated by the Chinese, who obtained more money on promissory notes or by mortgaging the valuables of their women folk.Footnote 96

The expansion of the rice milling industry in west Indramayu, and in Java as a whole, after 1930 was a matter of great concern for the officials who had been monitoring its consequences for the indigenous people. They acknowledged that the need to find local markets for rice in the wake of the depression led to a rapid expansion in rice milling. The danger was, however, that over supply of rice would cause a sudden drop in prices, creating a chain reaction that would bring about considerable economic difficulties for people.Footnote 97 Those gloomy predictions proved justified before long, not due to a glut of rice in the market but to the rice growers' dependency on selling rice, with the result that much of local rice production was not at the disposal of the peasants, who encountered yet again a severe shortage of food verging on famine in 1935.

The rice crop in the entire coastal belt from Kerrawang to Cileduk in east Cirebon was devastated by disease in 1934.Footnote 98 The food supply in the Indramayu region was critical in February 1935. There was no sign of hunger as yet and some people managed to eat just a small amount of rice earned from working for others while many people ate roots and leaves. The government supplied 600 tons of rice to feed people, whose plight worsened as little cash money was in circulation, and only those who had a regular income could afford to buy rice at the prevailing market prices.Footnote 99 The scarcity of rice was widespread in the Indramayu region and people ate rice only when they could obtain some rice from working for the peasants who had ample resources, sometimes after walking 15 kilometres or more.Footnote 100 The local government immediately began to gather more rice to alleviate the severe shortage of food and organised relief work to help people with food and cash money. These measures prevented the outbreak of a famine affecting 50,000 people in the area, whose plight could have been similar to that of their less fortunate peers in some parts of Indochina had the local government been less caring about people.Footnote 101

The local peasants no longer had enough rice to feed themselves until the next harvest, being hard pressed to hand over the bulk of the crop to rice traders immediately after the harvest. Peasants' cash income was depleted and their ability to secure credit diminished after the crop failures. The local shops conducted very little business, for only people with a regular income and ample money patronised shops, which is not surprising in view of the high price of rice consumed by people in the mid-1930s.Footnote 102

The crop failures reduced the amount of rice peasants could keep for their needs after meeting their obligations. They had been keeping less and less rice for consumption, being forced to give up more and more rice to repay debts. The peasants consumed a relatively small portion of the prime-quality rice they produced and ate cheap imported rice, bought with the money earned from selling their own produce or, more than likely, obtained from traders on credit. The peasants in Indramayu region had become firmly bound to the rice trade through credit, which had become a major operation with a great deal of money at stake for rice traders. They were less sympathetic towards peasants when the interests of the rice industry were in jeopardy. The subsistence crisis in 1935 was indeed a crisis caused by the sudden erosion in ‘exchange entitlements’ between peasants and the rice traders, who could not repay their debts so easily against the background of falling production and depressed economic conditions.

The ways in which peasants were integrated into the rice trade through credit probably deprived most small peasants of an adequate food supply and income to buy food in case of a crop failure. The peasants also are not likely to have received the maximum price for rice when they paid back their debts in paddy, because the traders took into account the delay in repayment of debts and adjusted the price accordingly. This explains why the inhabitants of west Indramayu experienced a low level of purchasing power, despite the rapid expansion of the rice trade. The majority of people could not buy rice at the prevailing high prices in the mid-1930s, and the local shop owners observed a considerable fall in income due to the scarcity of cash money among people.Footnote 103

Peasants who produced rice for sale are said to have suffered much less, for they at least had their food supply assured, compared with people who were involved in the production of commercial crops for the world market during the Great Depression.Footnote 104 The rice growers in west Indramayu nevertheless suffered a fall in money income just as much as their peers in rice growing areas elsewhere in Southeast Asia. The Dutch colonial officials provided some help to people in sugar producing areas in Java but left the rest of the indigenous population to their own devices to survive the effects of current economic hardship. The economic prospects of rice growers in Indramayu indeed looked better than the prospects of people involved in production of sugar elsewhere in Java hard hit by the depression. The food supply of rice growers was virtually guaranteed, colonial officials believed, and their ability to earn more money from selling rice was potentially greater than before, now that rice imports had been reduced with a view to stimulate the local rice industry.Footnote 105 The real situation was, however, radically different: the rice growers in west Indramayu experienced perhaps the worst ever scarcity of food to occur in the region and found their money income severely undermined during the depression years.

The level of salt consumption in Indramayu Regency was well below that in the adjacent Regencies of Cirebon and Majalengka, which enjoyed a greater degree of money income generated by the sugar industry. Its collapse reduced the money income of people in those areas, but the reduced money income did not seriously affect the consumption of essential food items such as salt. The inhabitants of Cirebon Regency consumed 2.37 kilogrammes of salt per person in 1933, which rose to 2.45 kilogrammes per person by 1938. In contrast, it declined from 0.66 kilogrammes to 0.51 kilogrammes per person in Indramayu Regency between 1933 and 1936 and rose only to 1.64 kilogrammes per person by 1938.Footnote 106 Indramayu Regency was the only area in West Java that registered such a low level of salt consumption, which is difficult to explain except in terms of low purchasing power of people. The amount of rent collected from markets (pasar), which declined from f.25, 901 in 1930 to f.17,007 in 1938 – only 66 per cent of the income in 1930, also implies a low level of money income among people.Footnote 107

The shortage of cash money was so acute in the entire Indramayu region that people were forced to mortgage their goods in order to obtain some money. The amount of money borrowed in Indramayu Regency rose from 85 cents per person to 119 cents per person between 1936 and 1938, just a little better in comparison with the situation in Cirebon Regency, where it rose from 105 cents per person to 159 cents per person during the same period.Footnote 108 This resulted in a higher level of indebtedness, including unpaid land rent, which amounted to 21 cents per person in Indramayu Regency by 1936, declining sharply to just 1 cent per person two years later. This suggests a dramatic turn around in the means to pay debts towards the end of the decade, the rice trade gathering momentum as it reoriented itself towards the domestic market in the Indonesian islands. The shortage of cash money among rice growing peasants in the entire Indramayu region was no less acute in comparison with peasants involved in commercial agriculture, and, worse still, the local population encountered severe difficulties in procuring their food, whereas people in areas where commercial agriculture even if their money income suffered considerably during the 1930s. The commercialisation of the rice industry in the entire Indramayu region apparently deprived local peasants of their subsistence as well as a degree of material wellbeing from the 1890s through to the 1930s.

Colonial officials saw the rapid growth of commercial rice production in west Indramayu as a highly undesirable development from the paternalistic point of view, which guided colonial policy in the early twentieth century. They argued that rice traders exercised a pernicious influence on peasants, enticed them with easy credit and obtained rice under terms disadvantageous to peasants, perpetuating a vicious cycle of debt and reducing peasants to poverty. If the colonial perspective is assumed to be correct, then, it is difficult not to conclude that, being exposed to the vagaries of market economic forces peasants pursued a strategy to ensure their survival by sharing land among more and more people, as the commercialisation of rice industry accelerated in the early twentieth century. Indeed, it can be argued that peasants with miniscule plots of wet-rice land produced just enough rice to live from selling rice and found themselves entrenched in a state of poverty and economic stasis that can be aptly described as ‘involution’, whereas elsewhere in Java peasants whose economic activities were diversified enjoyed a greater degree of economic prosperity, albeit without development, contrary to the Geertzian hypothesis. But such a view does not quite capture the real situation of commercial rice growers, because even miniscule plots of wet-rice land seem to have produced an income sufficient for people to live at a level above subsistence, except in times of hardship caused by crop failure, and a fairly large number of peasants with holdings of farm land above the average size seem to have enjoyed a considerable income by rural standards.

The experience of peasants in west Indramayu was not unique, for their peers in east Indramayu, which had been the centre of a flourishing rice trade since 1820s, were equally ‘involuted’ in the sense that the majority of the local population were found earning its means of livelihood from growing rice on miniscule plots of wet-rice land with diminishing returns in the early 1900s. There was little diversification of economic activity in east Indramayu unlike elsewhere in Cirebon Residency.Footnote 109 The economic difficulties of the local population mounted with steady population growth, forcing the government to introduce a set of reforms aimed at bolstering an economically viable peasantry by reducing fragmentation of arable land and redressing agricultural indebtedness in the early 1900s.Footnote 110 A similar situation is observed in yet another rice-growing area, Semarang Residency in Central Java, perhaps with a greater degree of agricultural indebtedness comparable with west Indramayu, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.Footnote 111

There are several features common to all three cases: commercial rice production, agricultural indebtedness, steady population increase vis-à-vis a static area of wet-rice land, fragmentation of wet-rice land among the majority of people and a small class of prosperous large landholders who controlled the rest of the peasantry in collision with rice traders. The standard of living of the rural population was also markedly lower than that of people in areas with a greater degree of diversification of economic activities. Perhaps west Indramayu represents the adverse consequences of commercialisation of rice production in stark fashion, because commercialisation of the rice economy in the area developed within a few decades, whereas in east Indramayu and Semarang people had found it easier to cope with adverse effects of commercialisation, which had begun in the 1820s.

Perhaps the conduct of commercial rice growers in west Indramayu, and elsewhere in Java too, can be explained in a positive manner if we discount the moral overtones in the discourse of colonial officials with a crusading mission to ‘liberate’ peasants from the clutches of ubiquitous Chinese rice traders cum money lenders. The notion of peasant victimisation pervasive in the literature ignores the vital fact that peasants are rational in conduct, do not always operate on the ‘safety (of subsistence) first’ principle and are not averse to profit making.Footnote 112 The cumulative impact of commercialisation of indigenous economic life characterised by increasing use of money and consumer habits of the rural population proves beyond any reasonable doubt that the Javanese peasants were not so concerned about subsistence, but enthusiastically availed themselves of the opportunity to earn a money income.Footnote 113 The peasants in west Sumatra were equally if not more adept at manipulating commercial agriculture to improve their standard of living in the early twentieth century.Footnote 114 The pace at which peasants in west Indramayu responded to the access to a market economy by increasing rice production with borrowed money to buy cattle, seed and tools as well as by selling rice at competitive prices, bears witness to rational conduct in decision making in economic life quite typical of people who had been accustomed to commerce for a very long time.Footnote 115

There is no denying the fact, however, that rapid commercialisation of the rice industry in west Indramayu from the mid-1880s onwards caused problems and hardship for peasants, often due to circumstances beyond their control, such as inclement weather and ensuing crop failures. Those problems were exacerbated by peasants' inability to withstand such difficulties and the pressure of market economic forces in the form of repayment of debts, more often than not in paddy, immediately after the rice harvest at the risk of scarcity of food before the next rice crop. This state of affairs affected different groups of peasants in different ways, relative to their circumstances, as shown by the experience of peasants in west Indramayu as commercialisation of the rice industry gathered pace in the early 1900s. The reason why the commercial rice industry caused so much hardship, verging on subsistence crises at times, and a relatively low standard of life, for commercial rice-growers vis-à-vis other peasants needs explaining. In most parts of Java, where peasants sold some rice on a regular basis, they rarely risked a scarcity of food even against falling rice production on account of crop failures, because they had the bulk of the rice crop at their disposal and were not forced to sell a greater proportion of it to meet their financial obligations, such as land rent. They had several other means of earning a money income such as growing sugar cane, tobacco, wage-labour and producing articles for domestic consumption. The commercial rice growers, in striking contrast, had no recourse to money income other than from the sale of rice and were entirely dependent on it to meet their obligations. Consequently, their subsistence was at risk once the greater part of the rice harvest was sold and the prospects of the next rice harvest was under some threat, jeopardising their purchasing power, or what Amartya Sen called the ‘exchange entitlements’.Footnote 116

The course of economic changes in commercial rice-producing areas in Java depicts a pattern quite different from that of people involved in the production of agricultural crops such as sugar for export. The latter is emphasised both in conventional and revised wisdom on Java's economic transformation, which ignore other patterns of economic changes in Java under colonial rule. The case of west Indramayu, eloquently documented, provides a close-up view of one segment of the complex view of Java's economic transformation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Conclusion

The peasants in west Indramayu unable to benefit from growing rice for the market may not appear to be unique among peasants in Java, let alone peasants elsewhere in Southeast Asia, under a colonial rule that was essentially concerned with economic exploitation of the land and labour of the indigenous population. What makes the case of west Indramayu striking, however, is that peasants involved in growing commercial crops for sale in many parts of Java apparently had much less difficulty in earning their livelihood, except at times of exceptionally volatile circumstances produced by the upheavals in the world market such as the Great Depression. Growing rice for sale was no different from growing other crops for sale, and indeed growing rice for the market should have been much less prone to all sorts of impediments in producing sugar cane and allowed a greater degree of control of their economic life to the peasants. How successfully indigenous peasants could have benefited from growing rice for the world market was exemplified by the rapid growth of the rice industry in lower Burma under colonial rule from the early 1850s through to the 1920s. Interestingly enough, a similar situation was found among peasants growing commercial crops in Java and the Philippines.Footnote 117

The famine in west Indramayu in 1883–84 revealed the precarious position of a local peasantry firmly entrenched in a rather narrow subsistence rice economy, a state of affairs that had disappeared from most parts of Java, but exploited by the landlords of private domains who were bent upon exporting prime quality rice in large quantities with the least trouble and expense. Consequently, a degree of freedom to earn some cash money was allowed to the peasants in the aftermath of the famine. They were allowed to sell some rice to earn money for their material needs, which belatedly and suddenly brought them into direct contact with the market economy leading to commercialisation of rice production in the following decades. A new era in the life of the inhabitants of west Indramayu began with the promise of economic prosperity after the two private domains were bought back by the government in 1911, but the promise sadly remained unfulfilled as a result of the colonial government's inability to control the direction of rapid economic change that engulfed people as the rice industry became increasingly commercialised.

The introduction of land rent on arable land to be paid in money, or its equivalent in rice, within the framework of a state-run commercial rice industry, set in motion a set of economic imperatives after west Indramayu came under the direct government rule in 1911. Indeed, some of those forces had begun to influence the local peasantry from the mid-1880s onwards, as rice traders slowly penetrated into the hitherto isolated parts of west Indramayu, introducing peasants to consumer habits and thereby binding them to borrow money to be repaid in rice.

Colonial economic policy in the Dutch East Indies was built on a tripartite principle, viz., the Europeans controlling the superstructure and the Chinese in effective control of the intermediary sector, where much of buying and selling with indigenous people occurred, while the indigenous people occupied the bottom layer. The intermediary sector of the economy was largely beyond the effective control of the government, which failed not only in its abortive efforts to regulate the economic activities involving Chinese and Javanese but also in implementing a mechanism to make sure that market economic forces were operating fairly for the benefit of all parties.

The rice industry in the entire Indramayu region gathered momentum after 1880, and the rice traders in Indramayu town began encroaching on a greater field of operation, slowly but surely drawing the inhabitants of Indramayu west within the orbit of rice trade centred in Indramayu town in the early 1900s. The peasants in west Indramayu, who were in desperate need of cash money, were happy to sell rice to traders in increasing quantities, but increased sale of rice exposed them to the nefarious practices of rice traders who secured rice supplies through credit, which was easily available in times of good rice crops but not in times of crop failures.

The colonial government made an abortive effort to curb the pervasive influence of rice traders by supplying the peasants with easy credit, but the scheme was doomed to fail from the beginning for several reasons. The government was unwilling to pay the peasants at the rate of market prices for rice supplied. It was less irksome for peasants to sell paddy to traders instead of pounding it for the government, which accepted only polished rice, especially in areas far away from the rice mills operating under government control. A great deal of local rice production gradually came into the hands of rice traders, who had consolidated their control over local rice producers by 1920.

The rice trade controlled by Chinese and European traders was not necessarily a source of evil repercussions for the local peasantry. But the government, which failed to introduce a mechanism to regulate economic transactions between peasants and traders, did not carefully monitor the rice traders' activities. This state of affairs minimised the beneficial effects of producing rice for sale and placed the peasants at the mercy of traders who were trying to maximise their profits. Consequently, the introduction of a free market economy failed to generate economic prosperity and wellbeing for the people of west Indramayu, who experienced a further deterioration in their economic prosperity as a result of their weakened exchange entitlements at times of hardship, which were never far away for the rice growers susceptible to periodic natural calamities. Rapidly increasing population and the diminishing frontier of arable land introduced yet another variable into a distorted economic system highly in favour of Chinese traders and their European partners in business, forcing peasants to share land in ever smaller plots in an effort to eke out a living no longer confined to producing food for consumption. The end result was a peasantry with miniscule holdings of wet-rice land at one end against a small class of big landholders at the other end, with the latter forging an alliance with rice traders to exploit the former caught up in a whirlpool of market economic forces beyond its understanding let alone control. The conventional paradigm of indigenous economic transformation in Java under colonial rule is best known for its assertion that colonial policy protected indigenous peasants from the pernicious effects of market economic forces. They nevertheless permeated indigenous economic life, increasingly drawing indigenous people into the orbit of the market for their material needs, a process which affected not only the patterns of consumption but also production in the long run and produced a distorted economic system incapable of improving the wellbeing of people, economic growth and development. It was a situation where people at the bottom level of the colonial economic edifice could achieve neither prosperity nor progress.

References

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3 The Geertzian paradigm refashioned the pre-war colonial explanatory paradigms of Java's economic transformation as formulated by Julius Herman Boeke in his concept of ‘dual economy’. Its main ideas are presented in Indonesian economics: The concept of dualism in theory and policy, ed. A. Van Marle (Hague: Van Hoeve, 1961). For a critical review of Boeke's conceptualisation of Indonesian economic development by one of his contemporaries, see Burger, Dionijs Huibert, ‘Boeke's dualisme’, Indonesie, 7 (1954): 177–98.Google Scholar Boeke's ideas became popular following the publication of his work in English under the title of Economics and economic policy of dual societies as exemplified by Indonesia (New York: Institute of pacific Relations, 1953). A noteworthy reappraisal of Boeke's ideas in the context of Indonesia's lack of economic growth and development in the 1960s was Higgins, B., ‘The “dualistic theory” of underdeveloped areas’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 4 (1956): 99115.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For a review of the critical literature on Geertz's agricultural involution hypothesis together with a sharp rebuttal of it, see White, Ben, ‘“Agricultural involution” and its critics: Twenty years after’, Bulletin of Concerned Scholars, 15, 2 (1983): 813.Google Scholar Geertz responded to his critics in ‘Culture and social change: The Indonesian case’, Man, 19, 4 (1984): 511–32. For a positive appraisal of Geertz's influence on Indonesian studies, see Elson, Robert E., ‘Clifford Geertz, 1926–2006: Meaning, method, and Indonesian economic history’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 43, 2 (2007): 251–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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5 In his pioneer study of the economic history of Java, D.H. Burger made some observations on the commercialisation process affecting all peasants in Java; De Ontsluiting van Java's Binnenland voor het Wereldverkeer (Wageningen: H. Veenman, 1939). A couple of small studies focusing on specific areas of Java by Burger reveal different patterns of economic behaviour; Vergelijking van de Economische Toestand der Districten Tajoe en Djokenan (Regentschap Pati, afdeeling Rembang) (Weltevreden: n.p., n.d.) and ‘De Desa Ngablak (Regentschap Pati) in 1869 en 1929’, Koloniale Studien, 17, 1 (1933), pp. 226–40. Likewise, D.C.L. Van Doorn gives a detailed account of economic changes in one small area of Java, which was not involved in commercial agriculture, in the light of information in colonial records and surveys conducted in the early 1920s; Schets van de economische ontwikkeling der afdeeling Poerworedjo (Weltevreden: Kolff, 1926).

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13 The statistics are from Regeringsalmanak, 1886, appendix GG, p. 236 and Regeringsalmanak, 1911, appendix MM, p. 662. The population of Cirebon Residency rose at the rate of 0.5 per annum, from 1,327,243 to 1,518,840 between 1885 and 1912; Boomgaard, Peter and Gooszen, A.J., Changing economy in Indonesia, vol. 11, Population trends 1795–1942 (Amsterdam: Royal Tropical Institute, 1991), pp. 116, 119.Google Scholar The local officials were reluctant to draw firm conclusions about the steady decline in population, because the figures were far from reliable. But they admitted depopulation occurring during the 1901–03 period; letter, Resident of Cirebon (Oudemans) to Governor-General, 11 Mar. 1910, no. 70, Mail Rapport (hereafter MR) 1910, no. 357, V 30 May 1910, no. 67, National Archives of the Netherlands (hereafter NAN). The crop failures in Kandanghaur are noted in Nederlandsch Handel Maatschappij, ‘Inspectie van het land Kandanghauer’, 20 Mar. 1910, enclosure, V 30 May 1910, no. 67. The health problems are discussed in Maatschappij tot Exploitatie van het Indramajoe-West, ‘Verslag over het boekjaar van 1 Juli 1909–30 Juni 1910’, pp. 8–9, enclosure, AMK V, 15 Aug. 1910, no. 10, NAN.

14 The average household size is calculated from the statistics of population count for 1905; KV 1907, appendix A, p. 25. In 1905, the total number of children was 66,449 while the total population of west Indramayu amounted to 154,065; Koloniaal Verslag (hereafter KV) 1907, appendix A, p. 25. For information on the average household size in the second half of the nineteenth century, see Fernando, ‘Famine in the land of plenty: Subsistence crisis in west Indramayu, 1883–84’, pp. 291–320.

15 The area of sawah under cultivation in Indramayu rose at the rate of 1% a year from 16,389 hectares to 21,048 hectares between 1883 and 1909; in Kandanghaur it rose at the rate of 2.2% a year from 15,322 hectares to 26,290 hectares during the same period; Heyting, ‘Rapport omtrent den toestand, vooral der particuliere landerijen Kandanghauer en Indramajoe West en in het algemeen, als omtrent de aldaar aanwezige voedingsmiddelen in het bijzonder’, AMK, V 7-3-1884-2; Maatschappij tot Exploitatie van het land ‘Indramajoe-West’, ‘Verslag over het boekjaar van 1 July 1909–30 Juni 1910’ and ‘Inspectie van het land Kandanghauer’.

16 In Indramayu, the area harvest under paddy was below 86% of the planted area and occasionally it declined to 82% between 1903 and 1909; in Kandanghaur it was much lower in the early 1900s – 76% in 1906 – and remained below 86% of the planted area in 1909. The figures are from ‘Gegevens nopens het in de residentie Cheribon, afdeeling Indramajoe, gelegen particulier land Indramajoe-West, ter beoordeeling van de koopwaarde en de rentegevenheid van dit landgoed by de terugbrenging daarvan tot het Staatsdomein’, enclosure, MR 1910, no. 928, V, 15 Aug. 1910, no. 10 and ‘Inspectie van het land Kandanghaur’.

17 The rice crop declined from 56,172 tons of paddy in 1890 to 38,595 tons of paddy in 1891; the situation improved a little the following year when the crop was estimated at 44,202 tons of paddy; KV 1892, p. 219, KV 1893, p. 228 and KV 1894, p. 222. The low rice production was commensurate with a fall in the area of land cultivated under rice from 33,360 hectares to 26,945 hectares between 1890 and 1893; KV 1892, p. 219 and KV 1894, p. 222. The effects of bad weather and inadequate irrigation facilities are noted in ‘Gegevens nopens het …Indramajoe West’; Maatschappij tot Exploitatie van het land ‘Indramjoe-West, ‘Verslag over het boekjaar van 1 July 1907–30 Juni 1908’ and ‘Verslag over het Boekjaar van 1 July 1909–30 Juni 1910’, enclosure, V 15 Aug. 1910, no. 10. The management of Indramayu domain often mentioned the lack of co-operation of the local government of Cirebon to improve irrigation as a reason for crop failures; Maatschappij tot Exploitatie van het land ‘Indramjoe-West, ‘Verslag over het boekjaar van 1 July 1907–30 Juni 1908’.

18 The peasants in Luwangmalang district once complained against their district head (demang) who added 100 kati (1 kati was equivalent to 0.62 kg) of rice more to the tax; letter, Resident of Cirebon (Oudemans) to Governor-General, 8 Jan. 1910, no. 6, MR 1909, no. 528, V 10 Mar. 1910, no. 2. The administrator of Kandanghaur, D. Buttingschap, apparently told the district head to add extra charges to the land rent and Buttingschap sacked the village heads who complained about the matter. The hardship suffered by the peasants in Kandanghaur domain was highlighted by E.W.E Dowes Dekker, editor of Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, in his novel Het Boek van Siman den Javaan (Amersfort, 1908).

19 ‘Inspectie van het Land Kandanghauer’.

20 In Kandanghaur, the landlord provided 1,240 tons of paddy or unhusked rice for consumption and another 310 tons of paddy for seed, in addition to f.120,000 in cash; letter, Director of Internal Administration to Governor-General, 25 June 1910, no. 1924, MR 1910, no. 1010, V 9 Aug. 1910, no. 51.

21 ‘Inspectie van het Land Kandanghauer’.

23 ‘Gegevens nopens het … Indramajoe-West Land’.

24 Hoekendyk's letter to S. Coolsma was published in Nieuw Rotterdamsch Courant, 20 May 1903. This and other newspaper articles mentioned below are enclosed in MR 1903, no. 575, AMK V 18 Aug. 1903, no. 17, NAN.

25 An inquiry into the subsistence crisis of 1903 was conducted by Lawick van Pabst, the Chief Inspector of Cultivations, and his report appeared in Javasche Courant, extra-bijvoegsel, 19/6 – 1903 no. 49, a copy of which is enclosed in V 18 Sept. 1903, no. 17. In 1900, rice production amounted to 29,016 tons of paddy in Indramayu and 28,520 tons of paddy in Kandanghaur. In 1901, Indramayu harvested 14,198 tons of paddy and Kandanghaur harvested 11,160 tons of paddy. In 1902, it was respectively 13,613 and 13,585 tons of paddy; report by Lawick van Pabst, Javasche Courant, extra-bijvoegsel, 19/6 – 1903 no. 49, AMK V 18 Mar. 1908, no. 17.

26 Javasche Courant, extra-bijvoegsel, 19/6 – 1903 no. 49. The figure for land rent is from AMK V 3 Mar. 1911, no. 21, NAN.

27 Javasche Courant, extra-bijvoegsel, 19/6 – 1903 no. 49.

28 K. Wijbrands, ‘“Schaarste” en Rapporten’, Het Nieuws van den Dag voor Nederlandsch-Indie, 31 May 1903, pp. 1–2.

29 Several writers took up the cudgel on behalf of the landlords of private domains. One writer claimed that the landlords had not derived any income from their domains in recent years and consequently had insufficient wherewithal to support the distressed people; Anonymous, ‘Nood in Indramajoe’, Algemeen Handelsblad, 20 Mar. 1903; Anonymous, ‘De nood in Indramajoe’, Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, 6 Apr. 1903, and Anonymous, ‘De nood in Indramajoe’, Het Volksdagblad, 14 May 1903, all enclosed in MR 1903, no. 575.

30 The amount of tax collected declined drastically from 5,239 tons of rice in 1900 to 2,068 tons of rice in 1901. Next year, it was slightly higher, 2,492 tons of rice; AMK V 15 Aug. 1910, no. 10. The position of landlords was stated in Anonymous, ‘Nood in Indramajoe’, Algemeen Handelsblad, 20 Mar. 1903. The administrators of private domains told the local officials that there was no need for the government to come to the aid of people in view of the relief measures adopted in consultation with the landlords; Javasche Courant, extra bijvoegsel, 19/6, 1903 no. 49. This statement was probably an effort to prevent any interference in the management of private domains. In 1901–02, the landlords set aside for this purpose f.12,236 for Indramayu and f.22,121 for Kandanghaur. During the same period, in Indramayu f.67,901 was allocated for seed paddy and loans while in Kandanghaur, f.27,066 was set aside for the purpose together with 1,304 tons of seed paddy. During 1902–03, f.60,000 and f.16,008 was set aside for lending respectively in Indramayu and Kandanghaur, while 1,483 tons of seed paddy was also supplied. Furthermore, 190 tons of rice for consumption was provided to the needy; Javasche Courant, extra bijvoegsel, 19/6, 1903, no. 49.

31 Hoekendyk reportedly supplied 4,091 meals between 27 January and 31 March 1903, possibly involving around 300 people; in his report, Van Pabst gives the number of meals and the number of people is surmised on the basis of information in the aforesaid newspaper articles and Hoekendyk's letter.

32 Coolsma, ‘De nood in Indramajoe’.

33 The Director of Internal Administration proposed to close the file on the affair after van Pabst submitted his report, which concluded that there was not enough evidence to suggest a widespread scarcity of food let alone a famine in the private domains; letter Director of Internal Administration (P.A. Arends) to G.G., 29 May 1903, no. 3410, MR 1903, no. 575, AMK V 18 Sept. 1903, no. 17.

34 Letter, Resident of Cirebon (J.W. Mesman) to G.G., 23 Sept. 1903, no. 146 geh., MR 1903, no. 927, AMK V 21 Jan. 1904, no. 10, NAN.

35 According to Mesman's information, the rice crop in all three districts of Indramayu Regency had declined considerably. In Kandanghaur private domain, the outlook of the crop was far from favourable and it was also likely to fall in Indramayu private domain. The decline in rice production in the last year led to the cancellation of land rent on 1,120 hectares of sawah in the government-controlled area; Letter, Resident of Cirebon (J.W. Mesman) to G.G., 23 Sept. 1903, no. 146 geh.

36 This paragraph is based on information from letter, Resident of Cirebon to Governor-General, 23 Sept. 1903, no. 146 geh.; letter, Resident of Cirebon to Governor-General, 9 Sept. 1903, no. 142 geh., and Letter F.H.J. Wessels to Governor-General, 17 July 1903, all enclosed in MR 1903, no. 927. The estimated rice production of Cirebon Residency (excluding the private domains) declined from 313,200 tons in 1902 to 288,100 in 1903, a fall of 8%, which implies a local problem confined to Indramayu Regency, where the rice cultivation is reported to have declined in 1903; figures are from Changing economy in Indonesia, vol. 10, Food crops and arable lands, Java 1815–1942, ed. Boomgaard and van Zanden, p. 119. In his report, van Pabst denied any scarcity of rice in Indramayu Regency; according to some newspapers, the local officials also denied any scarcity of rice in Indramayu Regency.

37 For a detailed account of the rice trade in Indramayu Regency in the mid-19th century, see Fernando, M.R, Famine in Cirebon Residency in Java, 1844–1850: A new perspective on the Cultivation System (Monash University: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies Working Papers no. 21, 1980).Google Scholar The role of Chinese traders in collecting rice in Indramayu Regency is reflected in the reports of the inquiries into the so-called ‘diminishing welfare’ of indigenous population in Java during 1903–05; Onderzoek naar de Mindere Welvaart der Inlandsche Bevolking op Java en Madoera (hereafter OMW), Overzicht van de Uitkomsten der Gewestelijke Onderzoekingen naar de Economie van de Desa in de Residentie Cheribon (Buitenzorg, 1907), pp. 19–20, 25 and 53, and OMW: Overzicht van de Uitkomsten der Gewestelijke Onderzoekingen naar de Handel en Nijverheid in de Residentie Cheribon (Buitenzorg, 1907), pp. 1, 5, 8, 10 and 11.

38 During the 1884–1913 period, Java and Madura exported 40,1000 tons of rice, a peak not repeated before or since except during 1939–40, and much of the rice exported came from west Indramayu; Changing economy in Indonesia, vol. 4, Rice prices, ed. Creutzberg (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1978), p. 17.

39 The amount of rice imported by Indonesia increased after 1880, attesting to the growing local demand for rice; ibid. pp. 67–70.

40 On Chinese economic activities, see Cator, W.J., The economic position of Chinese in the Netherlands Indies (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1936), pp. 6584;Google ScholarPurcell, V., The Chinese in Southeast Asia (London, Kuala Lumpur and Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 428–34.Google Scholar The best account of Chinese influence on the indigenous economy and society is Rush, J.R., Opium to Java (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990).Google Scholar

41 Furnivall, J.S., Netherlands India (Amsterdam: B.M. Israel BV, 1976), pp. 213–14.Google Scholar

42 In 1903, export quality rice from Indramayu was sold for f.13.52 per 100 kg while that from Kandanghaur was sold at f.14.09 per 100 kg. These prices were indeed high in comparison with f.4.03 per 100 kg of normal paddy from east Indramayu; Changing economy in Indonesia, vol. 4, Rice prices, p. 57.

43 Letter, Wessels to Governor-General, 17 July 1903.

44 Prime quality rice from Indramayu fetched f.19.49 per 100 kg and that from Kandanghaur f.19.89 per kg in 1883, the year of the famine. This was obviously a result of the scarcity of prime quality rice from the region. In the following decade, the price of rice from the private domains remained high; Changing economy in Indonesia, vol. 4, Rice prices, pp. 57–8.

45 ‘Memorie van Overgave’ of J.W. Mesman, V 9 Mar. 1909, no. 50, NAN.

46 Letter, Resident of Cirebon to Governor-General, 9 Sept. 1903, no. 142 geh., MR 1903, no. 927.

47 Boeke, J.H., ‘Inlandsche Budgetten’, Koloniale Studien, 10 (1926): 296300.Google Scholar

48 Ibid., pp. 239–45.

49 M.R. Fernando, ‘Dynamics of peasant economy in Java at local levels’, in Nineteenth and twentieth century Indonesia: Essays in honour of Professor J.D. Legge, ed. David P. Chandler and Merle C. Ricklefs (Clayton: Monash University, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1986), pp. 97–121.

50 Fernando, ‘Peasants and plantation economy’, p. 346.

51 OMW: Samentrekking van de Afdeelingsverslagen over de Uitkomsten der Onderzoekingen naar de Economie van de Desa in de Residentie Cheribon (Weltevreden, 1907), appendix 3.

52 The enquiries into the indigenous economy in the early 1900s yielded a good deal of information on peasants producing rice and other crops for sale in local markets and what colonial officials considered to be the entrepreneurial conduct of peasants in Indramayu Regency; ibid., pp. 12, 20–1, 47, 49–50 and 60–1.

53 Letter, Resident of Cirebon to Governor-General, 9 Sept. 1903, no. 142 geh., and letter, Assistant Resident of Indramayu (E.J.W. van Dyk) to Resident of Cirebon, 24 July 1903, no. 2605/20 geh., and letter, Assistant Resident of Indramayu to Resident of Cirebon, 24 July 1903, no. 2605/20 geh., MR 1903 no. 927.

54 Rice production in west Indramayu had recovered by 1904, when it was estimated at 55,751 tons of paddy, and an equally good crop of 55,305 tons of paddy was gathered in the following year; KV 1906, appendix QQ, and KV 1907, appendix TT. In late 1906, the prospects of a good crop loomed large because of the timely rainfall in Nov.–Dec., but heavy rainfall and floods in Jan. 1907 wrought great damage on the rice crop. Still, it did not cause great anxiety until March when the crop caught a disease that reduced the rice harvest of 1907, paving the way for a scarcity of rice the next year; Maatschappij tot Exploitatie van het ‘Indramajoe-West’, ‘Verslag aan de Algemeene Vergadering van Aandeelhouders, te Houden op Zaterdag 14 Dcember 1907’, V 15 Aug. 1910, no. 10. The administrator of Kandanghaur private domain imported 16 tons of rice from the adjacent Pamanukan private domain and set up relief work, which provided people with a daily wage from 0.30 to 0.35 cents, to alleviate the shortage of food supply; this account is based on information from letter, Resident of Cirebon (J. Oudemans) to Governor-General, 19 Mar. 1908, no. 2180; letter Resident of Cirebon to Governor-General, 12 Mar. 1908, no. 1943; letter, Assistant Resident of Indramayu (Kruseman) to Resident of Cirebon, 30 Mar. 1908, no. 906; letter, Resident of Cirebon to Director of Internal Administration, 14 Apr. 1908, no. 3005 and letter, Resident of Cirebon to Governor-General, 8 May 1908, no. 3551, all enclosed in MR 1908 no. 604, AMK V 20 Oct. 1908, no. 24, NAN.

55 The two private domains were initially integrated into the Indramayu Regency, but before long it was evident that the area was too big to be administered from one centre so the Regencies of Indramayu and Majalengka were reorganised as an independent residency in 1925. The administrative reforms in 1925 are dealt with in Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indie 1925 no. 404.

56 The new turn in colonial policy dubbed as Ethical Policy has been re-examined, just like many other aspects of colonial economic policy, in recent years; E.B. Locher-Scholten, Ethiek in Fragmenten: Vijf Studien over Koloniaal Denken en Doen van Nederlanders in de Indonesische Archipel (Utrecht: Hes, 1981). For a brief discussion on the economic implications of the Ethical Policy, see Howard Dick, Vincent J.H. Houben, J. Thomas Lindblad and Thee Kian Wie, The emergence of a national economy: An economic history of Indonesia, 1800–2000, pp. 146–8.

57 Increasing rural unrest in Java is discussed in Kartodirdjo, Sartono, Protest movements in rural Java: A study of agrarian unrest in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1973)Google Scholar, and Kartodirdjo, Sartono, ‘Agrarian radicalism in Java: Its setting and development’, in Culture and politics in Indonesia, ed. Holt, Claire (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), pp. 71125.Google Scholar For a new dimension of rural protests, see Fernando, M.R., ‘The trumpet shall sound for rich peasants: Kasan Mukmin's uprising in Gedangan, East Java, 1904’, JSEAS, 26, 2 (1995): 242–62Google Scholar and Fernando, M.R., ‘In the eyes of the beholder: Discourse of a peasant riot in Java’, JSEAS, 30, 2 (1999), pp. 263–85.Google Scholar

58 This view was expressed by some writers who dealt with agrarian problems in Java in the early 1900s; Lette, J.R., Proeve eener Vergelijkende Studie van het Grondbezit in Rusland, zooals dit zich heeft Ontwikkeld tot de Revolutie, en op Java (Leiden, 1928).Google Scholar

59 J. Oudemans, Resident of Cirebon, who introduced similar reforms elsewhere in the residency in the early 1900s, suggested this measure. Oudemans wasted no time in drawing the attention of his superiors to the need for rural credit facilities in the former private domains; letter, Resident of Cirebon (J. Oudemans) to Director of Internal Administration, 20 June 1910 no. 4907, AMK, MR 1910, no. 1010, V 9 Aug. 1910, no. 51, NAN. Following Oudeman's suggestion, Carpentier Alting, who was in charge of the rural credit service, compiled a detailed report entitled ‘Schema van Voorziening ter zake van het Credietwezen op het land Kandanghauer’, dated 22 June 1910; enclosure, MR 1910, no. 1010. His proposal was subjected to further discussions documented in numerous letters and reports enclosed in AMK, MR 1911, no. 1004, V 27-2-1912, no. 64. Carpentier Alting's proposal was approved by resolution of 10 Sept. 1910 no. 6; MR 1910, no. 1342, V 3 Mar. 1911, no. 21, NAN. Carpentier Alting's second report on the subject entitled ‘Schema voor de Credietverstrekking aan de Inlandsche bevolking op voormalige particuliere land Indramajoe-west’ (dated 15 Oct. 1910) is enclosed in MR 1911, no. 1004, V 27 Feb. 1912, no. 64. His proposals for supplying credit to people in Indramayu were approved by the resolution of 8 Feb. 1911 no. 45; MR 1911, no. 350, V 27 Feb. 1912, no. 64.

60 Resolution 13 July 1910, no. 1; MR 1910, no. 1080, V 27 Feb. 1912, no. 64; resolution 8 Feb. 1911, no. 45; ‘Schema voor de Credietverstrekking aan de Inlandsche bevolking op voormalige particuliere land Indramajoe-west’.

61 ‘Eerste Jaarverslag 1911. Commissie voor West-Indramajoe’, AMK, MR 1912, no. 2112, NAN.

62 The government's failure to secure rice supplies from peasants in return for credit was discussed at length by various officials concerned; AMK, MR 1917, no. 2242, NAN.

63 The amount of rice exported from Java to the Netherlands rose from 29,000 tons in 1898 to 44,000 tons in 1913; Changing economy in Indonesia, vol. 4, Rice prices, pp. 68–9.

64 Verslag van den Economischen Toestand der Inlandsche Bevolking 1924, vol. 1 ('s Gravenhage: M. Nijhoff, 1926), pp. 178 and 181.

65 This paragraph is, unless otherwise noted, based on information from ‘Nota in zake de voor-en nadeelen van het rijstbedrijf en het geldpadiebedrijf respectiewelijk op de voormalige particuliere landerijen Kandanghauer en Indramajoe-west’, 24 Aug. 1917, MR 1917, no. 2242.

66 In 1909, the landlords ordered from a company in Hamburg a modern rice mill capable of processing 4,000 pikul of paddy a day. The total cost including the mill building was estimated to range between f.118,000 to f.120,000. The mill began operation in 1910, but not in full capacity; Maatschappij to Exploitatie van het Indramajoe-West, ‘Verslag over het boekjaar van 1 Juli 1908–30 Juni 1909’. The failure of the new mill is discussed in letter, Director of Internal Administration to Governor-General, 13 Feb.1912, no. 734, AMK, MR 1912, no. 451, NAN.

67 By the resolution of 28 Feb. 1912, no.1, the government allocated f.240,000 to provide peasants with credit in return for repayment of debts in paddy; MR 1912, no. 451. The peasants were quick to obtain credit but slow to repay their debts in prime-quality paddy as insisted on by the government. In the case of Losarang mill, out of f.335,000 lent only f.285,000 had been repaid by the end of 1916. In the case of Princes Juliana mill in Indramayu, peasants still owed the government a sum of f.84,000; letter, Director of Internal Administration to Governor-General, 15 Oct. 1917 no. 10,536/B, MR 1917, no. 2242.

68 This matter was decided by resolution of 8 Mar. 1913, no. 6, MR 1913, no. 560 and resolution of 29 Apr. 1913, no. 40, MR 1913, no. 969.

69 Letter, Director of Internal Administration to Governor-General, 15 Oct. 1917, no. 10,536/B.

70 By resolution of 30 Oct. 1917, no. 4, it was decided to authorise the Resident of Cirebon to make the necessary arrangements; enclosure, MR 1917, no. 2242. The arrangements are elaborated in the letters of Resident of Cirebon to the Director of Internal Administration, 20 Sept. 1917, no. 8960/30 and 19 Sept. 1917, no. 8882/3G, MR 1917, no. 2242.

71 By 1930, railway and tramlines had all been completed and offered competition to other forms of transportation; ‘Memorie van Overgave’ of A.A. de Vloten, Resident of Indrmayu, 1931, Instituut voor Tropen Library, Amsterdam, manuscript no. Aae.3, p. 52.

72 The population figures are from KV 1902, appendix A; Uitkomsten der in de maand November 1920 gehouden Volkstelling (Batavia: Ruyrok, 1922) and Volkstelling 1930, vol. 1 (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1931). Migration of people as the main cause of population growth is mentioned in letter, Director of Public Works to Governor-General, 30 Sept. 1919, no. 19837/B, MR 1920, no. 732.

73 ‘Memorie van Overgave’ of Vloten, p. 19.

74 Indramayu's population density rose from 153 persons per square km in 1900 to 161 in 1920 and then to 335 in 1930, whereas that of Kandanghaur rose much more slowly given its larger area of land — from 59 in 1900 to 65 in 1920 and to 146 in 1930; KV 1902, appendix A; Uitkomsten der in de maand November 1920 gehouden Volkstelling (Batavia: Ruyrok, 1922) and Volkstelling 1930, vol. 1 (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1931).

75 The figures are from ‘Inspectie van het Kandanghaoer’; Maatschappij tot Exploitatie van het Land ‘Indramajoe-west’, ‘Verslag over het Boekjaar van 1 July 1909–31 Juni 1910’ and ‘Memorie van Overgave’ of Vloten, p. 34.

76 Details of this crop failure are not available. It was noted that a large area of land planted under rice was destroyed by flood in 1916; letter, Director of Public Works to Governor-General, 4 Feb.1923, no. 13,604/E, MR 1924 no. 339. The crop failure is also noted in ‘Memorie van Overgave’ of F.Ch.N. van der Moore, MR 1915 no. 816, V 1 July 1915, no. 80.

77 This account of the 1920–21 crisis in food supply is based on information from ‘Memorie van Overgave’ of van der Marel, J. in Memori Serah Jabatan 1921–1930 (Jawa Barat), ed. Kartodirdjo, Sartono (Jakarta: Arsip Nasional, 1976), pp. 192–5.Google Scholar

78 There are no figures for rice production in Indramayu Regency and hence the scale of the crop failure should be gauged from the figures for Cirebon Residency as a whole. This exercise is imprecise, because in addition to the area covered by the former private domains, some other parts of Indramayu Regency were also affected by the crop failure. The figures nevertheless give a fairly reliable impression of the magnitude of the crop failure. The rice production in the residency declined from 437,000 tons of (unhusked) rice in 1913 to 384,700 tons of rice in 1916 and continued to fall for the next two years. It reached the level of 354,000 tons in 1918 and, in the next year, rose to 402,000 tons, but declined sharply once again to 355,100 tons in 1920 and then to 265,800 tons in 1921; Changing economy in Indonesia, vol. 10, Food crops and arable lands, Java 1815–1942, pp. 119 and 121.

79 Letter, Resident of Cirebon (van der Marel) to Director of Agriculture, Industry and Trade, 16 May 1921, no. 4384/20, MR 1921, no. 1468.

80 The price of rice in Cirebon Residency was reportedly high at the beginning of 1920, f.20, f.18 and f.17.50 per pikul of respectively first, second and third grade rice. The price slowly declined in the course of 1920 and reached the level of f.18, f.16.50 and f.15 per pikul for three types of rice by the end of the year. The slight fall in the price of rice was ascribed to the import of Saigon rice; ‘Memorie van Overgave’ of J. van der Marel in Memori Serah Jabatan, ed. Sartono Kartodirdjo, p. 194.

81 Letter, Resident of Cirebon to Director of Agriculture, Industry and Trade, 16 May 1921, no. 4384/20.

82 Changing economy in Indonesia, vol. 4, Rice prices, pp. 69–70.

83 Indramayu appears to have exported no rice during the 1915–16 period or in 1919. It did export a little rice during the 1917–18 period, for which very low prices are recorded; Changing economy in Indonesia, vol. 1, Rice prices, p. 58.

84 The evolution of government rice policy is set forth in Het Ekonomisch Beleid in Nederlandsch-Indie, vol. 2, ed. P. Creutzberg (Groningen: H.D. Tjeenk Willink, 1974), pp. 171–547. There was a strong feeling that more could be done to increase rice production in Java by curbing the expansion of the sugar industry, which competed with the cultivation of food crops for access to wet-rice land, improving irrigation and credit facilities, in addition to making new technological developments available to the peasants. For a brief account of the problems affecting rice production in Java and the proposed measures to be taken to alleviate them, see P. van der Elst, ‘De crisis in de padicultuur op Java’, Koloniale Studien, 8, 2 (1924):106–7; Anonymous, , ‘Het rijsttekort in Nederlandsch-Indie’, Koloniale Studien, 8, 2 (1924): 184–7Google Scholar and Scheltma, A.M.P.A., ‘De voeding van de Inlandsche bevolking van Nederlandsch-Indie’, Koloniale Studien, 14, 2 (1930): 368–94.Google Scholar

85 The rice crop of 19,632 hectares of wet-rice land failed in 1928, but it was a modest crop failure in comparison with the subsequent crop failures, for the area of wet-rice that failed during the period of 1929–31 amounted to respectively 32,122, 31,696 and 48,145 hectares; ‘Memorie van Overgave’ of A. van Vlooten.

86 Changing economy in Indonesia, vol. 4, Rice prices, pp. 70–2. For details of rice imports, see ibid., pp. 65–72. The restrictions affecting rice imports in the wake of the depression are presented in Ekonomisch Beleid in Nederlandsch-Indie, vol. 2, ed. Creutzberg, pp. 398–420.

87 The increase in rice production in Indramayu Regency as an index (with the base 1926 = 100) amounted to 119,146 and 139 for the three years in question whereas West Java as a whole achieved 110,116 and 121 during the same period; Departement van Economische Zaken, Jaarcijfers met Toelichting Betreffende den Economischen Toestand der Inheemsche Bevolking op Java en Madoera over 1937 en 1938 (mimeograph) (Batavia, 1939), (hereafter Jaarcijfers), appendix 1.

88 Anonymous, ‘Rijstvervoer langs de Javakust en uitvoer naar de Buitengewesten’, Economisch Weekblad, 15 Dec. 1933, p. 987.

89 Jaarcijfers, appendix 6.

90 Anonymous, ‘Rijstpellerijen in Nederlandsch-Indie’, Economisch Weekblad, 13 Oct. 1933, p. 635; Anonymous, ‘Rijstpellerijen in Ned.-Indie in 1933’, Economisch Weekblad, 5 Oct. 1934, p. 1575; Anonymous, ‘Rijstpellerijen in Ned.-Indie in 1934’, Economisch Weekblad, 11 Oct. 1935, p. 1605; Anonymous, ‘Rijstpellerijen in Nederlandsch-Indie’, Economisch Weekblad, 30 Oct. 1936, p. 2069; Ibid., 17 Sept. 1937, p. 2005; Ibid., 16 Sept. 1938, p. 1782; and Ibid., 1939, p. 1865.

91 Anonymous, , ‘Rijstpellerijen in Ned.-Indie in 1933’, Economisch Weekblad, 3, 40 (1934), 1575;Google Scholar Anonymous, ‘Statistische gedeelte’ and ‘Rijstpellerijen in Ned.-Indie in 1934’, Economisch Weekblad, 11 Oct. 1935, pp 1604–06.

92 Total rice production in West Java for 1928 amounted to 1,224,499 tons and 886,794 tons in 1938. The amount of rice milled amounted to 163,294 tons and 227,349 tons respectively; ‘Rijstpellerijen in Nederlandsh-Indie’, Economisch weekblad, 13 Oct. 1933, p. 635 and ‘Rijstpellerijen in Nederlandsch-Indie’, Economisch Weekblad, 1939, p. 1865.

93 The following account is based on J.L. Vleming's work on Chinese economic activity in Java reproduced in Chinese economic activity in Netherlands India, ed. M.R. Fernando and D. Bulbeck (Singapore: ISEAS, 1992), pp. 180–1.

94 The Chinese population in west Indramayu declined from 5,480 to 5,286 between 1901 and 1920; the figures are from KV 1902, appendix A and Uitkomsten der in de maand November 1920 gehouden Volkstelling, p. 30.

95 For an account of Chinese money lending, see Cator, The economic position of the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies, pp. 79–84.

96 Chinese economic activity in Netherlands India, p. 181.

97 The economic and social consequences of the expansion of rice milling in the 1930s is discussed at length in letter, Director of Economic Affairs to Governor-General, 24 June 1939, in Het Economisch Beleid, vol. 2, ed. Creutzberg, pp. 473–85.

98 This account is based on two letters, Director of Economic Affairs (G.H.C. Hart) to Governor-General (de Jonge), 5 Mar. 1935 and 15 July 1935; Economisch Beleid in Nederlandsh-Indie, vol. 2, ed. Creutzberg, pp. 421–33.

99 The price of rice rose by 22% between May 1934 and May 1938, due to the shortage of rice in the local markets; Jaarcijfers, appendix 5. The rice imports into Indramayu region amounted to 1,587 tons and 5,141 tons between 1936 and 1938; letter, Director of Economic Affairs to Governor-General, 24 June 1939, in Het Economisch Beleid, vol. 2, pp. 473–85.

100 Letter, Director of Economic Affairs (G.H.C. Hart) to Governor-General (De Jonge), 5 Mar. 1935, in Economisch Beleid van Nederlandsch-Indie, vol. 2, p. 423.

101 Scott, James C., The moral economy of the peasant (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1976), pp. 114–56.Google Scholar

102 Letter, Director of Economic Affairs (G.H.C. Hart) to Governor-General (De Jonge), 5 Mar. 1935, in Economisch Beleid van Nederlandsch-Indie, vol. 2, p. 424. There are no figures for rice prices in Indramayu Regency during 1935–36. But between May and November 1934, the price reportedly rose by 125% and, between May and November 1937, by 154%, whereas in Cirebon Residency as a whole the price of rice rose by 75% and 132% respectively during the same periods; Jaarcijfers, appendix 5.

103 Letter, Director of Economic Affairs (H.C. Hart) to Governor-General (De Jonge), 5 Mar. 1935, Economisch Beleid in Nederlandsch-Indie, vol. 2, p. 424.

104 Brown, Ian, ‘Rural distress in Southeast Asia during the World Depression of the early 1930s: A preliminary re-examination’, Journal of Asian Studies, 45, 5 (1986): 9951025.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For a discussion of the impact of the Great Depression on people in a sugar cane growing area of Java, see Elson, R.E., Javanese peasants and the colonial sugar industry (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 239–47.Google Scholar A detailed discussion of the impact of the Great Depression in most parts of Southeast Asia is found in Weathering the storm: The economies of Southeast Asia in the 1930s Depression, ed. Peter Boomgaard and Ian Brown (Singapore: ISEAS, 2000); and Brown, Ian, A colonial economy in crisis: Burma's rice delta and the World Depression of the 1930s (Abindon: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

105 G.J. Schimmel, ‘De Rijstpolitiek in de Jaren 1933 tot 1937’, in Handelingen van de Twaalfde Dienstvergadering van Landbouw en Nijverheidconsultanten in Nederlandsch-Indie (Buitenzorg: Departement van Economische Zaken, n.d.), pp. 156–72; and E. de Vries, ‘Maatregelen op het Gebied van Voedingsgewassen en Voedseldistributie’, in ibid., pp. 173–201. For a general survey of the food supply issue, see Het Ekonomisch Beleid in Nederlandsch-Indie, vol. 2, appendix 1, pp. 751–84.

106 The statistics are from Jaarcijfers, appendix 8.

107 The statistics are from ibid., appendix 9.

108 The figures of debts are from ibid., appendix 12.

109 Fernando, ‘Peasants and plantation economy’, pp. 338–63.

110 Breman, Jan, Control of land and labour in colonial Java: A case study of agrarian crisis and reform in the region of Cirebon during the first decades of the 20th century (Dordrecht: Foris, 1983).Google Scholar

111 Djoko Surio, ‘Social and economic life in rural Semarang under colonial rule in the later 19th century' (Ph.D. diss., Monash University, 1982).

112 The notion of peasants as victims of exploitation of supra-village agencies is embedded in the popular formulations of economic transformation in colonial Southeast Asia advanced by Geertz, and Scott, Moral economy of peasants. For a critical review of Scott's views, see King, Victor, ‘Moral economy and peasant uprisings in Southeast Asia’, Cultures et Developpement, 10, 1 (1978): 123–49.Google Scholar The idea that peasants were rational decision makers with a keen awareness of making profits is strongly projected by Popkin, Samuel L., The rational peasant: The political economy of rural society in Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).Google Scholar A similar point is also made by Michael Adas with reference to the situation in lower Burma.

113 A great deal of information encompassing all parts of Java supporting this conclusion is presented in several studies cited such as Dick et al., Emergence of a national economy; Boomgaard, Children of the colonial states; Elson, Village Java under the cultivation system, 1830–1870; Fernando, ‘Growth of non-agricultural economic activities in Java’. Further evidence covering the last quarter of the 19th century is to be found, strangely enough, in the voluminous reports of the ‘diminishing welfare’ enquiry conducted in the early 1900s. For a convenient summary of its results, see Hasselman, C.J., Algemeen Overzicht van de Uitkomsten van het Welvaart-onderzoek, gehouden op Java en Madoera in 1904–1905 (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1919).Google Scholar A series of peasant budget studies conducted by J.H. Boeke between 1880 and 1930 mentioned earlier also provide evidence on the phenomenon.

114 Ken Young presents a fascinating case of peasants allocating household resources, particularly labour, to derive maximum benefit from both subsistence and commercial agriculture in West Sumatra under colonial rule; Islamic peasants and the state: The 1908 anti-tax rebellion in West Sumatra (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994). A similar view is advanced in Kahn, Joel S., Minangkabau Social Formation: Indonesian peasants and the world-economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).Google Scholar

115 It is noteworthy that Geertz found Javanese peasants enthusiastically embracing the opportunities to produce agricultural crops for sale and commerce, all linked with the sugar industry, in a corner of east Java between 1880 and 1930s; The social history of an Indonesian town (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1965). This important study has not received the scholarly attention it deserves. The fact that Javanese and Malay people were enthusiastic in commerce and profit-oriented economic activities has been elucidated in several recent studies dealing with the period from 1400 to the early 1800s. For a broad picture of this state of affairs, see Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, vol. 2 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993).

116 Sen, Amartya, Poverty and famines: An essay on entitlement and deprivation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 4551.Google Scholar

117 Larkin, John, The Pampangans: Colonial society in a Philippine province (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972);Google ScholarOwen, Norman G., Prosperity without progress: Manila hemp and material life in the colonial Philippines (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984);Google Scholar R.E. Elson, Javanese peasants and the colonial sugar industry: Impact and change in an East Java residency 1830–1940.