This book updates a two-part claim about the fall of Singapore to the Japanese imperial forces in the Second World War. First, that Britain almost certainly could not, once it had prioritised Africa and Russia for reinforcement of tanks and modern aircraft, have held Singapore and Malaya in 1941–42 (pp. 220–21). Second, however, that had civil authorities prepared better it could have been defended for longer. Lives could have been saved (for instance, through more air raid shelters) and the Japanese attack slowed (by early preparation of fixed defences in Johore and Singapore) (pp. 239–40). At best, it is sometimes suggested, the Japanese might not have taken Singapore, since they were running low of ammunition at the end. The latter is a tenuous claim (the South Seas were awash with Japanese ships carrying troops that would soon take the entire region), so the case that civil administration made things worse than they needed to be has always been the stronger one. Had people been warned more clearly and honestly (pp. 182–5), had they been enlisted more enthusiastically, defeat could, perhaps, have been seen as merely an interlude, rather than as a failure in competence and protection. As a symptom of the confidence-sapping effects of failures, McCrum highlights the first Japanese air raid on Singapore (pp. 135–7), at 4.30 am on 8 December. Despite some troops having been held at the ready for invasion since 6 December, the air raid warning system was unmanned, and Japanese pilots were greeted by a beautifully illuminated Singapore.
Such was the case made from Ian Morrison's Malayan postscript (London: Faber and Faber, 1942) onwards. It is parodied in J.G. Farrell's novel The Singapore grip (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1978), in which officials and rubber merchants are blinkered; military and civilians comically divided. Though Ivan Simson in his 1970 work, Singapore: Too little, too late, makes it clear that there was also military obstruction to his plans for more fixed defences, due to the emphasis on defending all of Malaya, and fears of undermining morale. Hence Brigadier Simson, Chief Engineer from four months before the Japanese attack, and later also Director-General of Civil Defence, Singapore, spreads blame more widely. A useful summary of these debates can be found in Louis Allen's 1977 book Singapore 1941–1942. Readers can also read Governor Sir Shenton Thomas’ defence online, at the Royal Commonwealth Society collection, Cambridge University Library. His paper, ‘Malaya's War Effort’, argues that skeleton civil defence units were established from 1939, eventually with over 4,300 air-raid wardens in Singapore (prewar population 730,000, wartime 1.4 million); and that it was agreed sinking slit trenches and deeper air-raid shelters was difficult due to water levels, rain and population density (pp. 109–10). Hence the emphasis on shield walls, sandbagging equipment, and large dispersal centres. From his perspective, running up food supplies for six months was impressive, and had the army pushed earlier for more works and been willing to pay realistic labour rates, they could have got more.
The contribution of this book to these arguments is threefold. First, it gives an updated summary. Second, it fleshes out the main civilian characters and issues, for instance, reminding us of how badly matched Thomas’ stolid, precise character was to the need, in 1940–42, to overrule bureaucratic niceties. Third, its value will be dictated by how far it adds nuance, and original points, to the pre-existing debates.
In terms of detail, McCrum notes that the Governor was in his 60s, and (pp. 58–9), and had recently been criticised for suppressing a damning report into the Malay States judiciary. Hence, ‘Thomas’ withholding information and dismissing bad news was a character defect …’ (p. 59), speaking to an inability to cut through Straits Settlements and Malay States complexities (pp. 62–3, 224–32). Without a change in tone from the top, bureaucratic fussiness could do real damage, as when a ship's captain ordered the disembarkation of departing wives who lacked the correct permits in February 1942 (p. 194). Likewise McCrum rehearses the actions of competing senior officers, the new commander-in-chief from October 1940, Robert Brooke-Popham, and civilians such as Secretary of Defence Charles Vlieland, and Alfred Duff Cooper. The latter cabinet minister was resident in Singapore from September 1941.
This account also gives an indication of how far personal tensions were founded on strategic dilemmas, in chapter 4, ‘The Ambiguous Strategy’. In 1940 Vlieland–Babington (the latter in charge of the RAF) versus Bond (for the army) arguments reflected the fact that strategy foregrounded RAF-led defence of all-Malaya and holding airfields in the peninsula's north. But the army knew there were not enough aircraft yet, and forward defence would overstretch its limited resources. Brooke-Popham's appointment as commander-in-chief (over the RAF and army) meant all-Malaya defence (as proposed back in 1937–39, after a study Arthur Percival had helped with) won. But sufficient aircraft never came, nor tanks. Key parties were locked, therefore, in acrimonious debates fuelled by the existence of a strategy for which the resources never arrived.
McCrum nevertheless argues that a more active governor might have done more, and could have sought a compromise over Colonial Office demands to prioritise dollar-earning rubber and tin exports. Though, again, one is tempted to ask, when, and to what end? His argument that more could have been done is well made (chapter 5, ‘Civil Defence Disarray’), as is the point that the Defence Committee was discordant and initially did not even take minutes. But his case is not helped by seeming to suggest civil defence should have been urgent from 1939 (when Japan's nearest bases were too far away to give air support, pp. 137–8, and pp. 103–5), lightly dismissing Thomas’ defence that by 1941 civil defence was well rooted.
In short, civil organisation could have done better, but things did get done: air-raid organisation, six months food stock laid in ahead of war, etc. Here disagreements (the civil side had to be told storing much of the rice in the north was not viable) are emphasised, but not results. So the key question still hangs in the air. Yes, there was discord and inadequate practice, but which deficiencies made a substantive difference, given the army itself was against early preparation of defences in the south? Elsewhere commanders such as those at Jitra had no desire to prioritise defensive works, when their orders were to head into Thailand at short notice for Operation Matador. Nor was the General Officer Commanding Malaya, Percival, keen on much effort going into defensive works (pp. 176, 235). Though in one area, lateness in recruiting Asian and especially Chinese volunteers (December 1941), McCrum is on solid ground (pp. 235–7). What has never been clear is if that lateness was more a reflection of failed imagination, or of inherent weaknesses in British colonialism in the area.
The conundrum of how civil failures textured military failure even if failure itself was unavoidable thus remains. This book is a valuable addition to that debate, especially read alongside the defences of Shenton Thomas and works about the bigger strategic picture. In summary, this is a balanced and useful updating of arguments that the civil side let themselves, Malayans, and the empire, down.
