Sino–Myanmar relations are very important, but there are few in-depth scholarly studies of this field from the perspective of either of the players. Chinese research has long been prejudiced by adhering to the intellectual framework and patterns of Pauk-Phaw (sibling) harmonious relations. Any book devoted to Sino–Myanmar relations still has to face pre-publication censorship in China. Conflicts between the two countries have often been filtered out in Chinese research in order to highlight their long-standing Pauk-Phaw status. Consequently, such ‘Chinese friendship’-oriented research has failed to provide a complete picture of Sino–Burmese relations since 1948.
Maung Aung Myoe's book offers a valuable interpretation of the Burmese version of Pauk-Phaw relations. The author uses hitherto inaccessible (Burmese) sources, particularly the archives of the Myanmar Defence Services Historical Museum and Research Institute (DSHMRI). These provide Myanmar's official perceptions and thinking about its relations with China, allowing for fresh insights.
The vicissitudes of Sino–Myanmar relations between 1948 and 2010 reveal the dual character of Myanmar's balanced diplomacy with China — flexiblity and prudence. On the one hand, Myanmar has always highlighted its own geopolitical significance to China (p. 185) and skilfully played the geostrategic card to serve and maximise its national interests. On the other hand, ‘Yangon has always tried to find alternatives to counter China's growing influence in the country’ when necessary. According to the author, this is not intended as a balance against China (p. 105). Myanmar, as the ‘younger sibling’, for all practical purposes and to its own advantage, constantly repositions its China policy to accommodate China's interest in the country and in the region (pp. 189–90). So Myanmar's China policy, as the author describes it, ‘has always been placed in somewhere between balancing and bandwagoning’, and this policy hallmark ‘is likely to remain unchanged’ (p. 190).
While the book's most important feature is its Burmese perspective and sources, herein too lie the book's chief weakness. The author points out in the Introduction that previous research has failed ‘to examine Myanmar's China policy in the wider context of her overall foreign policy’ (p. 8). In fact, this appears to be the case in this book as well. For example, analysing the reason for the shift in relations in 1954, Maung Aung Myoe claims that ‘Yangon had convinced the Chinese leadership that it had much to gain from improved relations with neutralist Myanmar’, which prompted Beijing to pursue a flexible policy toward Rangoon (p. 23). He exaggerates Burma's role in the bilateral relations shift in 1954 although he also attributes it to ‘a result of changing perceptions and political realities in China’ (pp. 26–7). The shift of China–Burma relations in 1954 was essentially because China changed its overall foreign policy, particularly the policy toward all neutral neighbours, not only Burma.
The author also argues that China was dissatisfied with Burma's failure to demonstrate ‘socialist solidarity’ (pp. 61, 181) in her international relations between 1963 and 1966. The argument is inauthentic because the CCP never believed that the ‘Burmese Way to Socialism’ was ‘true and scientific’ socialism, but rather bureaucratic capitalism and state capitalism with outward appearances of socialism, according to the declassified documents of China's Foreign Ministry.
The book also suffers from a fair number of incomplete or missing source citations.
To take but a few examples, the author cites many communiqués and official statements issued by both governments without full details (e.g. pp. 13, 30–31, 47, 57, 69, 83, 96, 107, 110, 112–13, 121). Several notes lack proper source details (chap. 2: nn 40, 50; chap. 3: nn 35, 36, 41; and chap. 4: nn 66, 107, 108). There are a few pinyin spelling mistakes (e.g. Cao Gangchuang, Fu Quangyou, Keng Sheng, Xiao Jingguang, Xinhwa, Shaanxi, Wantin, Wang Jiaxang, Lanchan) and traditional and simplified Chinese characters have been mixed and used inconsistently in the volume.
The author's arguments and conclusions sometimes fail in terms of persuasiveness and proof. For instance: the author argues that Premier Zhu Rongji's negative impression of Myanmar's leaders affected his government's policy toward the country (pp. 113–14); in China–Myanmar economic cooperation projects, China uses trickery (p. 164); and that since early 2008, Sino–Myanmar relations began to enter a difficult phase (p. 131), but by late 2008, both sides understood the rules of the game and the emerging framework of bilateral ties (p. 137). The author could provide sufficient facts and grounds to bolster and substantiate his statements; in chapter 4, the extensive quoting of both Chinese and Burmese leaders could be more analytical and less descriptive.
On the whole, though, this is a worthwhile study of China–Myanmar relations in spite of these weaknesses, and is a must for all those interested in an area in which little academic work has been done, particularly because Myanmar has unrolled a succession of great changes since 2011.
