1. INTRODUCTION
One of the greatest achievements of the last century was the way in which governments established preventative measures to improve and maintain working conditions in many fields (Reference 4). Nevertheless, these measures have made uneven progress across the various states and sectors. There are even marked differences among the member states of the European Union. Undoubtedly, the level of economic development in each member state is one of the factors conditioning how these social policies have been implemented. As new members are admitted into the European Union, Spain may be a point of reference for these more recent arrivals. Therefore, it is hoped that there are parallels between the results of this study and the conditions at sea that will later be established by the new members, some of whose merchant navies belong to a glorious seafaring tradition and have extensive merchant fleets.
However, the starting point here is to examine work-related accidents in the Spanish maritime transport sector in terms of rates, frequency, severity, types, trends and causes, among other points. These figures are compared with national averages and statistics from other sectors, to serve as reference points. First of all, a distinction must be made between the types of accidents that may occur at sea. On the one hand, studies refer to work-related accidents in general, at sea or berthed, and the relationship between workers and their jobs. This is one area covered in the text. On the other hand, there is what is specifically termed accidents at sea related to safety in navigation: mainly shipwrecks and collisions. It is possible to see how much each type comes into play.
About 30·4% of the fatalities were involved in accidents caused outside normal working circumstances: 8% of these en route and 22·4% due to maritime accidents. The remaining 69·6% of the deaths occurred while the seafarers were carrying out daily working tasks aboard. These figures do not take into account other factors which may have intervened beyond what is normally the case with workers using equipment for routine tasks. That figure, 69·6% of the fatalities, appears to express what the risk is for those doing their daily work aboard (Reference 3).
2. STATISTICAL DATA
2.1. Incidence Rate (Ii)
The number of accidents, during the working day, leading to lost work time related to the number of workers exposed. This rate reveals the dangerous nature of this sector. In 2004, the national average was Ii=6,136·4 accidents leading to lost work time for every 100,000 workers. For maritime transport, however, it was Ii=9,623·6 accidents for every 100,000 workers. In absolute values, if the previous figures for maritime transport did not seem noteworthy, one can now see that they are well above the national average. It is a useful exercise to follow their development.
In 1995, Directive 89/391/EEC was established. With this, measures would be applied to improve the health and safety of workers on the job. It is therefore the general legal framework through which the European Union's preventative measures operate. Between 1994 and 2004, the incidence rate followed these trends:
● National average: the incidence rate increased by an average of 12·65% with respect to the data from 1995. The maximum deviation was 24·73% in 2000.
● Maritime transport: The incidence rate went up by an average of 65·80% with respect to the 1995 figures. The maximum deviation was 114·41% in 2004.
Does this mean that the European maritime transport sector has become more dangerous? Even before scrutinising the data, it is possible to establish two hypotheses:
1. Improvements in information technology and the collection of accident-related data might make it seem as though there was an increase, when none existed.
2. The sector really has become more dangerous.
The reality may embrace both these hypotheses. Several ideas come to mind to support the idea of greater risk within the sector: the hiring of multicultural crews, with a different perception of risk; advances in technology not being accompanied by the necessary training; fewer crew members with a greater number of tasks assigned to them; fatigue due to the long working day; lack of training in prevention both on land and at sea; temporary contracts and workers being unable to become proficient at their jobs; and a lack of legislation or inadequate codes.
2.2. Index of severity (Ig)
The number of working days lost for accidents that occurred during the working day, for every thousand hours worked by the crew exposed to the risk. Neither this figure nor the frequency rate was available for maritime transport from the Spanish Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs. Nevertheless, to give an idea of what this rate might be, the authors calculated the percentage of serious accidents over the total of those that occurred. It can be shown that the numbers for maritime transport are double the national average and almost twice the figures for the construction sector. Even more striking is the percentage of fatal accidents in relation to the total of accidents leading to absence from work. The proportion of fatalities in maritime transport is nearly six times that of the national average and over five times that of construction.
Another indicator of severity would be the average time for accident-related absences. Across all the sectors in Spain, the highest figures belong to maritime transport. Only fishing comes close: both had an average period of lost work time due to accidents of 34 days from 1992 to 2002, compared with 23·6 for the national average: just under 50% more.
2.3. Types of accident
Examining the total for accidents leading to absence within maritime transport, one can see that three main categories stand out according to the averages for recent years.
● Falls on the same or from a different level account for more than a quarter (>25%, a stable trend),
● Overexertion constitute more than a quarter (>25%, an upward trend)
● Knocks against objects or equipment make up about 17% and this is a steady trend. A study about these shows that the majority involve cuts.
According to the averages over recent years, these are the main kinds of serious accidents:
● Falls, on the same or from a different level, make up just about a third (32·7%),
● Knocks against an object or piece of equipment stand at 19·7% and
● Non-traumatic pathologies (heart attacks or aneurisms) are at 12·5%. Curiously, overexertion hardly features here and this may be due to the initial medical prognosis.
As an interesting aside, a pilot study was done by one of the authors, Julio Louro, in the second half of 2002 while he was a consultant for a Spanish organisation related to risk prevention at work. The study dealt with accidents in the service sector (including maritime transport sector) and re-assessed initial medical prognoses related to overexertion, based on the length of time off work. As a result, this type of accident accounted for 22% of serious accidents (Reference 2).
In terms of fatal accidents, non-traumatic pathologies take up the first position, with the average for recent years at 44·1%. This figure clearly exceeds the national one of 28·4%. A reason for this is that maritime transport is not affected by another key factor in fatalities at work: traffic accidents. It is important to point out that the story behind non-traumatic pathologies among seafarers could differ from the one for their counterparts on land. Certain risk factors must be considered. Being separated from one's family and friends is stressful. Sleep patterns are affected by watches, particularly at night. These workers are usually subjected to a diet limited in fresh produce and rich in fats. The noise level aboard impedes a proper night's rest. Crew may even experience fear in given circumstances. All of these points may play a role in the non-traumatic pathologies suffered by seafarers.
It is striking that drowning, from falling overboard, was not considered as a kind of accident until 2003. Consequently it is difficult to know where it slots in. Possibly it belongs to non-traumatic pathologies. In the fishing sector, this kind of accident has a major incidence.
2.4. Body part injured
This is directly related to the kind of accident. Overexertion would be linked to the thorax, back – especially the lumbar, sides and abdomen (recent averages: 22·45%). Falls and knocks affect the hands (19·42%), legs (18·7%) and feet (14·6%).
An analysis of why incidents and accidents occur could inform the preventative and corrective measures taken to avoid their happening again. However, parallel measures of protection will help minimise the consequences of injuries. Safety footware, the right gloves and awareness about the procedures for working with heights should be the basis of a campaign related to individual protection equipment.
2.5. Gender
A cul-de-sac is reached with any analysis in this section because of insufficient data about women working in maritime transport. It is therefore impossible to make any comparisons with the male population. In any case, the population of working women is less exposed to industrial types of risks (being hit by something projected into the air, knocking against objects or equipment, overexerting oneself). Nowadays almost the only posts they hold aboard are Deck or Engineering Officer.
2.6. Type of work
Then there is the question of whether a victim was or was not carrying out a task that was routine and part of his normal work. What is striking is that, in 97·90% of cases, the former is the case. However, no official definitions of “routine work” exist; research aboard vessels indicates that this percentage does not coincide with reality. While crews shrink in size, each member has to do more tasks, meaning that their ability to do this “routine” work is called into doubt.
2.7. Type of contract
Another point that stands out is that temporary contracts do not figure so much as a relevant factor in the accident rate. This is in contrast with other sectors, where widespread use of short-term contracts means that the probability of accidents is three-fold. In maritime transport, they “only” double. One explanation could be the high turnover that has always been a normal trend in this sector. A crew member with a temporary contract is just as likely to be as well trained or experienced as someone with a permanent contract. Moreover, there is the specialised nature of the sector; staff must have a series of certificates and training courses under their belt before embarking. This stops unqualified workers from turning up, as they do, for example, in construction. Nevertheless, it is obvious that, in maritime transport, temporary contracts do influence the accident rate, mostly because crew members are unfamiliar with the vessel and the jobs themselves.
2.8. Causes
Official statistics offer more details about the causes of the injury than the cause of the accident. To find out why accidents happen, it is necessary to carry out research. Thus, it possible to establish causes so that corrective measures to avoid their being repeated. However, the lack of such research could explain why the same incidents occur again and again among workers in maritime transport.
Field work involving research into accidents at sea based on the Reason model point to the following causes: slightly more than half of the immediate causes can be attributed to unsafe practices by the worker. A little less than half correspond to unsafe conditions aboard. Among other factors, overconfidence, bad habits and rush jobs stand out. Failing to use individual protective gear makes the outcome worse. In the category of unsafe conditions are the poor construction of the vessel (stairways, accesses and floors), unstable equipment, a lack of order and cleanliness, and inadequate lighting.
As far as the severity of the consequences, unsafe practices are associated with more accidents, but of a less serious nature; unsafe conditions, with fewer accidents, but of a more serious nature.
One of the primary causes for cases involving the more seasoned workers is limited motivation. Newer staff suffer from gaps in knowledge, training and experience. Insufficient aptitude and fatigue also come into play. On the other hand, with unsafe working conditions, deficiencies in the more senior staff's training and attitudes are factors, as they are on land. These deficiencies lead to inadequate supervision, predictable risks and a lack of maintenance. There is also the mismatch between worker and task, and it goes without saying that fewer crew mean more varied work for all.
3. THE INADEQUACY OF LEGISLATION
One of the main basic causes detected in accidents within the maritime transport sector has to do with weaknesses in the legislation. This may be in the form of a legal vacuum where there is no code for a specific area due to obsolete legislation, plus difficulties in or a refusal to apply what does exist. These legal pitfalls affect areas as important as: the working day; noise levels in terms of work and the environment; vibrations; the way the vessel is built for work and accommodation; engines and other machinery or equipment; screen displays for data; the fact that this sector is not classified as a dangerous activity; and gaps in training and awareness in preventing accidents at all levels of command and among the other crew members aboard, as well as staff on land overseeing the vessel. As can be observed, these legal points enter in the area of health and safety at work, that is, within Spanish and European Union legislation. In contrast, navigation safety, covered by international standards, is much more developed and widespread in its implementation (Reference 6).
A final consideration is that there are also deficiencies in controlling how these work-related codes are being applied aboard the vessels. The authorities within Employment and Transport Ministries share the job of monitoring these within maritime transport, and there are frequent misunderstandings over who does what.
4. QUALITY OF THE STATISTICAL DATA
The data featured in this article are taken from the ones processed by the Subdirección General de Estadísticas Sociales y Laborales (General Office of Social and Labour Statistics) within the Spanish Employment and Social Affairs Ministry. They have come from accident and work-related illness reports. The quality of this statistical data about work-related accidents in the maritime transport sector is far from reflecting the reality. Factors which prevent a good level of quality from being obtained include:
● The way accident reports, in use since 2003, were developed had more to do with dealing with workers' compensation claims than with informing preventative measures.
● Statistics for maritime transport do not include data that, at one time, the Spanish had promised to collect (ratification of 30 November 1971, of agreement number 134 of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), Accident Prevention (seafarers), from 1970).
● The Frequency Rate and Index of Severity, as well as the tables derived from this data, are not available for maritime transport. Both rates have a common denominator: the number of hours worked. In accordance with ILO agreement 180, every vessel must be able to inform authorities of the number of hours worked by its crew (a figure which in turn is not exploited by officials).
● Not every accident is included, especially in terms of those occurring aboard a vessel in navigation. A study, consistent in its analysis of the logbooks listing the pharmaceuticals administered aboard (Directive 92/29/EEC), confirms that nearly all the accidents leading to either no lost work time or a short absence go unregistered in the official statistics.
● Doctors handle these cases differently. Both outside statistics and studies by one of the authors show how medical staff are reticent in authorising lost work time for embarked crew. Whereas time off would be given to workers on land in certain situations, that is often not the case among seafarers. This might explain, in part, why the sector has the highest average for time off work: short-term sick leave hardly exists.
● Accidents cannot be reclassified. Doing so would bring with it a sharp increase in their severity. Those who are killed in the act feature as grave accidents in the statistics. Cases of overexertion, the main type of accident leading to time off, would then play a much more important role among serious accidents.
● As for work-related illnesses, the obsolete regulations still in force and the lack of medical research mean that it is hard to form an impression about what is really happening in the sector. For example, loss of hearing is only diagnosed for workers in the engine rooms.
5. THE REAL ACCIDENT RATE IN THE SECTOR
Field studies based on the factors that prevent researchers from obtaining high quality data, for the reasons above, indicate that the real situation may mean:
● A higher accident rate in the sector.
● A higher incidence rate.
● A higher frequency rate.
● A lower severity index, which, in turn, would increase if accidents were reclassified.
● Lower average duration for accident-related absences.
These studies about the real accident rates aboard vessels show that the exact figures may be four or five times greater than the official ones, especially with accidents that involve no or limited lost work time.
6. PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVEMENT – STATISTICS
6.1. Data collection
Unify efforts to collect data about work-related accidents at sea. It is desirable to have an accident report specific to the shipping-fishing sector (based on C-134 ILO). There should be greater uniformity with basic concepts, such as establishing the grades of severity for injuries and reclassifying accidents.
6.2. Research
Carry out research, on a national level, on work-related accidents at sea in terms of causality. The entire body of results should be analysed and published (Reference 5).
6.3. Action Plan
Propose an action plan for the sector and follow up on its implementation.
6.4. Efficiency
Monitor the efficiency of measures.
7. PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVEMENT – MEDICAL RESEARCH
As workers, seafarers form a minority sector within Europe. However, when considered as a whole, they justify the efforts made by medical researchers to improve their health conditions.
7.1. Noise levels
According to recommendations from the ILO (Agreements 148 and 141) and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO, Res. A. 468) a maximum continuous noise level should be established equivalent to 24 hours in relation to the working campaign time specified by the companies (doses). This limit must be informed by the results of medical research concerning the special conditions to which a seafarer's ear is exposed. Their periods of rest are so irregular that, each day, they have no time to recuperate normal hearing. The point of reference of 11 laid down by Directive 2003/10/EC must be reconsidered because these values contradict the guidelines in the European Union's Green Book, Brussels, 1996.
7.2. Vibrations
Following the recommendations of the ILO (Agreement 155) and 8 from Directive 2002/44/EC, an effort should be made by medical and technical teams to become familiar with and try to alleviate the effects of vibrations on seafarers. 24 out of 24 hours means that the conditions of their exposure are special. A new type of exposure should be added: trepidation, involving feet and legs.
7.3. Non-traumatic pathologies
With non-traumatic pathologies, a study should be made of the unique relationship between these pathologies and seafarers, involving stress, shift and night work, diet, a lack of exercise and problems that are psycho-social in origin.
7.4. Preventative medicine
Improve preventative medicine. Advantage should be taken of the information contained in the logbook for administering pharmaceuticals aboard, especially when it comes to common illnesses. A specialist medical protocol should be established. There should be studies about seafarers' state of health when they are close to retirement.
7.5. Systemic protocol
There should be a systemised protocol on how medical professionals treat seafarers and record books for work-related illnesses should be more uniform.
8. PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVEMENT – LEGISLATION
8.1. Noise
The current regulation from Directive 2003/10/EC, offers little for the maritime transport sector. Its reference point is the Noise Level Code aboard vessels, Resolution A. 468 (12) of the IMO and the guidance it provides on reducing noise at the source on ships (Whereas clause, point 11). Some advances have been made, although perhaps not enough, with respect to the earlier regulation, Directive 86/188/EEC. In its application, this regulation simply did not cover seafarers (Art. 1.2).
Some countries, like Spain, have subsumed Point 11 of Directive 2003/10/EC into national regulations. Thus, they have postponed implementing the values for exposure limits LEX,8h=87 dB (A) and Lpeak=140 dB (C), until 15 February 2011. No reference is made to the recommendations in Res. A. 468 (12) for reducing noise at the source.
In turn, Resolution A. 468 (12), from 19 November 1981, has its merits. It suggests methods for lessening exposure to noise and outlines programmes for protecting seafarers' hearing. Another relatively positive point is the limits it sets for noise in the workplace (adapting the value limits for exposure to Directive 2003/10/EC). However, the noise levels it proposes are disappointing: LEX,8h=80 dB (A) over 24 hours. In non-working periods, it is 60 dB (A) for sleeping cabins, day cabins and hospital, and 65 dB (A) for mess rooms, recreation rooms, etc. It must be remembered that the European Union's Environmental Policy, formulated in the Green Book, states that, during the day, a person begins to experience serious discomfort at around 55–65 dB (A). In environmental terms, it is considered unacceptable to exceed 65 dB (A) The levels suggested by the World Health Organisation (WHO) are somewhere in between: during the day, from 55 dB (A), so that normal activity is not interrupted.
With reference to nighttimes, the European Union's Green Book, in accordance with the WHO, claims that “sleep begins to be disturbed with levels of 30 dB (A) of continuous noise close to one's ears. In special situations, even lower levels might disturb sleep”. A series of studies lead to the overall conclusion that, to guarantee sleep, the maximum levels of acoustic pressure must not exceed 45 dB (A). Research shows that going over the recommended levels produces irritability or symptoms like tiredness, headaches and stomach problems.
Spain has a commitment to the ILO, particularly to Agreement 148 and the recommendations of Resolution A. 468 (12), as well as to the criteria set out in the European Union's Green Book and by the WHO. For this reason, there is a clear necessity to legislate in more concrete terms about noise levels aboard vessels, an issue related to both the environment and working conditions. The objective would be to protect the auditory capacity of seafarers. On a national and European level, other measures could be taken alongside these to safeguard workers' health, including programmes to protect the hearing of seafarers, noise maps for vessels and further training and awareness campaigns for crews.
There are many arguments in favour of reaching an agreement between Member States so that advances can be made in medical research about the maximum doses (daily, during the embarkation and annually) recommended to preserve the hearing of workers at sea. At the same time, greater efforts should be made in the field of technology to tackle noise aboard at its source. This means more than just covering the basic needs and rights of maritime transport workers defined in Res. A. 468 (12), for vessels over 1,600 tonnes of gross tonnage. Other seafarers must be taken into account: mainly, those in vessels under 1,600 tonnes and those involved in fishing.
8.2. Vibrations
Current European regulations on work-induced vibrations are found in Directive 2002/44/EC. Point 8 says that, given that technological advances have not reached all areas of sea and air transport, it is impossible to respect on a universal scale the value limits for exposure in the shipping industry.
Parallels exist with the issues around noise. A lack of medical research means that the effects of vibrations on seafarers are unknown. Consequently, legislators cannot set the maximum allowable doses. On the other hand, the directive itself recognises that the progress made in technology hampers efforts to reduce vibrations aboard to the maximum values permitted in other sectors: an exception is made. Nevertheless, rather than a justification, these seem to be arguments in favour of combining the forces of medical and engineering specialists to try to reduce vibrations aboard and their harmful effects on crew. Just as the directives on noise and vibration set out, different authorities should reach an agreement about such exceptions. They should include conditions that guarantee that the risks caused by them are reduced to a minimum. This should be done on the condition that those workers affected receive greater medical supervision. Moreover, these exceptions should be revised every four years and revoked when the circumstances justifying their existence have changed.
8.3. Construction and importation of vessels
Directive 89/654/EEC outlines the current European regulations on the minimum requirements for health and safety in the workplace, but does not cover jobs done within a means of transport (Art. 1.2.a). That is, vessels – among other vehicles – are excluded. Fishing boats are also excluded by name (Art. 1.2.d). The later Directive 93/103/EC fills the vacuum in terms of fishing vessels. However, it is for ships already built exceeding 18 metres in length between perpendiculars and new ones over 15 metres long. A huge fleet falls outside these limits.
In countries like Spain, the exception defined in the 1989 law has yet to be addressed. Therefore, the General Ordinance on Safety and Hygiene at Work of 1971 has remained in effect. It has already been seen how unsafe conditions aboard directly cause accidents in a high percentage of cases. Basically, while there are no directives on the safety conditions that vessels must comply with, builders and ship owners may be swayed by economic interests in terms of design.
When ships are brought in from a third country, they should also be obliged to meet these minimum health and safety requirements aboard. For this reason it is necessary to have regulations about the way they are built as a workplace and, it must be remembered, a living area as well. The United Nations (UN) Convention, Law of the Sea, comes to mind: Part VII “High seas”, Section 1: “General Regulations”, article 94, “Duties of the Flag Ship”, paragraph 3: “Every State will take measures for ships flying its flag as are necessary to ensure safety at sea with regard, inter alia, to a…‥b) (…) labour conditions.”
In Point 7-a, of article 4 from 31/1995, Law for the Prevention of Risks at Work (subsumed into Spanish Law along with Directive 89/391/EEC), these “labour conditions” are defined, “the general characteristics of the location, installations, equipment, products and other useful items found in the workplace”. Here the location in question is a vessel.
8.4. The workday
Current European codes on the workday aboard vessels are contained in Directive 1999/63/EC. This agreement is related to the agreement on regulating the working hours of seafarers followed by the European Community Shipowners' Association (ECSA) and the European Transport Workers' Federation (ETF). Legal Reason 4 of this directive refers to the ILO convention, specifically 1996 Convention, number 180, on working hours aboard and vessel crews. It was ratified by many, but not all, countries within the European Union.
The directive is meant to be a faithful reflection of Convention 180. In an effort to reduce fatigue and define minimum numbers for crews, the situation is monitored. However, it is revealed that, in day to day practice, article 5 has greater precedence than article 4. That is, the limits defined by the latter article are not considered: “this should be based on an 8-hour workday, with one day's rest each week, and with the days of rest corresponding to official holidays”. Instead, article 5 is followed, with inspections to ensure that no more than 14 hours are worked each day and no more than 72 each week.
Moreover, the directive breaks away from the convention's preventative ethos in point 6 of clause 5, which establishes exceptions to the 14 daily and 72 weekly limits. Nevertheless, these exceptions “must always respect the general principles related to protecting the workers' health and safety”. The duration for these permitted lapses vary, and do not seem to take into account that fatigue, harmful physically and psychologically, is accumulative in its effect. Thus, the possibility of allowing for longer periods of exemption should be rejected, while shorter, more frequent ones should be accepted with reservations.
Attention should be given to how other Member States have subsumed this directive. Some states like Spain have attached amendments that weaken it: art. 15.2, art. 16, art. 17.2.a, art. 17.5, art. 18, art. 18 ibid. 2, the fifth additional disposition and so on of Royal Decree 285/2002, with which Directive 1999/63/EC was to be incorporated into Spanish Law. The possible consequences of this misinformed interpretation of ILO Convention 180 are:
● It may lead to fatigue among crewmembers, one of the main factors in accident risk at sea.
● This ineffective regulation also allows for a reduction in crew numbers, leading to another risk factor: the fact that fewer workers carry out a greater range of tasks.
9. CONCLUSIONS
A common assumption is that major catastrophes at sea have posed serious risks to ecosystems, seriously harmed the environment and, at times, resulted in human loss. With the help of the United Nations as well as human and technological resources, countries have joined together in an attempt at countering these catastrophes and improving navigation safety. Conventions like SOLAS, MARPOL and the STCW, among others, have set limits on the “adventure at sea” that navigation entails.
The results have been obvious. Catastrophes like the Titanic are unthinkable nowadays. There has been continuous progress in reducing intentional and accidental outfall. The Human Factor, as a key or secondary cause of disasters at sea, is or will soon be taken into account within every IMO plan of action. Nevertheless, each day, there is the endless flow of small, daily catastrophes. Many seafarers each year give up their lives while carrying out their working routines. What is more, it is calculated that, for every 100 fatalities occurring at sea, 70% of these involve the worker doing his own job. Disasters at sea only account for about 22% of these deaths (Reference 3). However, the country under whose flag the vessel is registered is legally responsible for the safety of seafarers on the job. It is here that the European Union should extend this realm of jurisprudence. They have already done so, but they should go a little farther in terms of the IMO and implementing the International Safety Management (ISM) Code and the Erika packages.
Just as was stated in the proposals for improvement, with specialised and systematised accident reports for European seafarers, better quality statistical data would be produced. They would also facilitate joint research by member states. Furthermore, if they were considered a unified body of workers, European seafarers would become a cohort of workers sizeable enough to justify initiatives in medical research and concrete improvements in regulations. Finally, greater monitoring of the way directives are subsumed into national law and updating the list of job-related illnesses would help establish a common framework for health and safety conditions at work within the European Union.