Religious diversity must be seen as an aspect of the phenomenon of “moral pluralism” with which contemporary democracies have to come to terms. . . . Although the history of the West serves to explain the fixation on religion . . . the state of contemporary societies requires that we move beyond that fixation and consider how to manage fairly the moral diversity that now characterizes them. The field of application for secular governance has broadened to include all moral, spiritual, and religious options.
—Jocelyn Maclure and Charles TaylorFootnote 2In the period since the end of the Second World War, there has emerged what never before existed: a truly global morality. That morality—which I call “the morality of human rights”—consists not only of various rights recognized by the great majority of the countries of the world as human rights, but also of a fundamental imperative that directs “all human beings” to “act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”Footnote 3 The imperative—articulated in the very first article of the foundational human rights document of our time, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—is fundamental in the sense that it serves, in the morality of human rights, as the normative ground of human rights: As the concept “human right” is understood both in the Universal Declaration and in all the international human rights treaties that have followed in the Universal Declaration's wake, a right is a human right if the rationale for establishing and protecting the right is, in part, that conduct that violates the right violates the imperative to “act towards all human beings in a spirit of brotherhood.”Footnote 4 Each of the human rights articulated in the Universal Declaration and/or in one or more international human rights treaties—for example, the right, articulated in Article 5 of the Universal Declaration and elsewhere, not to be subjected to “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”Footnote 5—is a specification of what, in conjunction with other considerations, the imperative—the normative ground of human rights—is thought to forbid or to require.
A particular specification is controversial if and to the extent the supporting claim—a claim to the effect that the “act towards all human beings in a spirit of brotherhood” imperative forbids (or requires) X—is controversial. My aim in this essay is to elaborate and defend a particular specification: the right, internationally recognized as a human right, to freedom of conscience—to freedom, that is, to live one's life in accord with the deliverances of one's conscience.Footnote 6
A more focused name for the right—and the name that I will use in the remainder of this essay—is the right to religious and moral freedom. Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor begin their book Secularism and Freedom of Conscience by stating that “[o]ne of the most important challenges facing contemporary societies is how to manage moral and religious diversity.”Footnote 7 In the passage of their book that serves as the epigraph for this essay, Maclure and Taylor speak both of “religious diversity” and of “moral diversity.” One indispensable strategy for managing religious and moral diversity is, as I am about to explain, the right to religious and moral freedom—to freedom to live one's life in accord with one's religious and/or moral convictions and commitments.
The articulation of the right to religious and moral freedom that we find in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is canonical in this sense: The great majority of the countries of the world—about 87 percent—are parties to the ICCPR, including, as of 1992, the United States.Footnote 8 Article 18 of the ICCPR states:Footnote 9
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.Footnote 10
The United Nations Human Rights Committee—the body that monitors compliance with the ICCPR and, under the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, adjudicates cases brought by individuals alleging that a state party is in violation of the ICCPR—has stated that “[t]he right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion . . . in article 18.1 is far-reaching and profound . . .”Footnote 11 How “far-reaching and profound”? Note the breadth of the right that according to Article 18 “[e]veryone shall have”: the right to freedom not just of “religion” but also of “conscience.” The “right shall include freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching” (emphasis added). Article 18 explicitly indicates that the right concerns moral as well as religious freedom—Article 18 explicitly identifies the “belief” that is protected as moral belief—when it states that “[t]he States Parties to the [ICCPR] undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to assure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions” (emphasis added).Footnote 12 So, the right we are considering in this essay protects not only freedom to practice one's religion, including, of course, one's religiously based morality; it also protects freedom to practice one's morality—freedom to “to manifest his . . . belief in . . . practice”—even if one's morality is not embedded in a religious tradition, even if, that is, one's morality is embedded not in a transcendent worldview but in a worldview that is not transcendent. (By a “transcendent” worldview, I mean a worldview that affirms, rather than denies or is agnostic about, the existence of a “transcendent” reality, as distinct from the reality that is or could be the object of natural-scientific inquiry.Footnote 13) As the Human Rights Committee has put the point:
The Committee draws the attention of States parties to the fact that the freedom of thought and the freedom of conscience are protected equally with the freedom of religion and belief. . . . Article 18 protects theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not to profess any religion or belief. The terms “belief” and “religion” are to be broadly construed. Article 18 is not limited in its application to traditional religions or to religions and beliefs with institutional characteristics or practices analogous to those of traditional religions.Footnote 14
In deriving a right to conscientious objection from Article 18, the Human Rights Committee explained that “the [legal] obligation to use lethal force may seriously conflict with the freedom of conscience and the right to manifest one's religion or belief” and emphasized that “there shall be no differentiation among conscientious objectors on the basis of the nature of their particular beliefs . . .”Footnote 15
It is misleading, though common, to describe the human right we are considering in this essay as the right to religious freedom.Footnote 16 Given the breadth of the right—the “far-reaching and profound” right of which the ICCPR's Article 18 is the canonical articulation—the right is accurately described as the right to religious and moral freedom or, as many call it, the right to freedom of conscience, in the sense of freedom to live one's life in accord with the deliverances of one's conscience. Whether one calls it the right to freedom of conscience or the right to religious and moral freedom, it is the right to live one's life in accord with one's religious and/or moral convictions and commitments.
The Supreme Court of Canada has emphasized that the right we are considering here is a broad right that protects freedom to practice one's morality without regard to whether one's morality is religiously based. Referring to Section 2(a) of Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which states that “[e]veryone has . . . freedom of conscience and religion,” the Court has explained: “The purpose of s. 2(a) is to ensure that society does not interfere with profoundly personal beliefs that govern one's perception of oneself, humankind, nature, and, in some cases, a higher or different order of being. These beliefs, in turn, govern one's conduct and practices.”Footnote 17 Section 2(a) “means that, subject to [certain limitations], no one is to be forced to act in a way contrary to his beliefs or his conscience.”Footnote 18
Again, religious and moral freedom—as both the UN Human Rights Committee and the Canadian Supreme Court have emphasized—is the freedom to live one's life in accord with one's religious and/or moral convictions and commitments—at least some of which are, for many, the yield of one's grappling with what are sometimes called “ultimate” questions, such as: Who are we? Where did we come from—what is our origin, our beginning? Where are we going—what is our destiny, our end?Footnote 19 What is the meaning of suffering? Of evil? Of death? And there is the cardinal such question, which comprises many of the others: Is human life ultimately meaningful or, instead, ultimately bereft of meaning—meaningless, absurd?Footnote 20 If any questions are fundamental, these questions—what Catholic theologian David Tracy has memorably called “religious or limit questions”Footnote 21—are fundamental. Such questions—“naïve” questions, “questions with no answers,” “barriers that cannot be breached”Footnote 22—are “the most serious and difficult . . . that any human being or society must face . . .”Footnote 23 Historically extended communities—“traditions”—are principal matrices of answers to all such “religious or limit questions.”Footnote 24
Of course, not all who address such questions end up giving answers that constitute a transcendent worldview. To the contrary, many end up giving answers that constitute a thoroughgoing rejection of any transcendent worldview.Footnote 25 Nonetheless, John Paul II was surely right in his encyclical Fides et Ratio that such questions “have their common source in the quest for meaning which has always compelled the human heart” and that “the answer given to these questions decides the direction which people seek to give to their lives.”Footnote 26
Two clarifications are in order. First, that one's choice about what to do or to refrain from doing is protected by the right to religious and moral freedom, if one's choice is animated by what Maclure and Taylor call a person's “core or meaning-giving beliefs and commitments” as distinct from “the legitimate but less fundamental ‘preferences’ we display as individuals.”Footnote 27
[T]he beliefs that engage my conscience and the values with which I most identify, and those that allow me to find my way in a plural moral space, must be distinguished from my desires, tastes, and other personal preferences, that is, from all things liable to contribute to my well-being but which I could forgo without feeling as if I were betraying myself or straying from the path I have chosen. The nonfulfillment of a desire may upset me, but it generally does not impinge on the bedrock values and beliefs that define me in the most fundamental way; it does not inflict “moral harm.”Footnote 28
Second, that one is not—and understands that one is not—religiously and/or morally obligated to make a particular choice about what to do or to refrain from doing does not entail that the choice is not protected under the right to religious and moral freedom. As the Canadian Supreme Court explained, in a case involving a religious practice:
[T]o frame the right either in terms of objective religious “obligation” or even as the sincere subjective belief that an obligation exists and that the practice is required . . . would disregard the value of non-obligatory religious experiences by excluding those experiences from protection. Jewish women, for example, strictly speaking, do not have a biblically mandated “obligation” to dwell in a succah during the Succot holiday. If a woman, however, nonetheless sincerely believes that sitting and eating in a succah brings her closer to her Maker, is that somehow less deserving of recognition simply because she has no strict “obligation” to do so? Is the Jewish yarmulke or Sikh turban worthy of less recognition simply because it may be borne out of religious custom, not obligation? Should an individual Jew, who may personally deny the modern relevance of literal biblical “obligation” or “commandment,” be precluded from making a freedom of religion argument despite the fact that for some reason he or she sincerely derives a closeness to his or her God by sitting in a succah? Surely not.Footnote 29
Some ICCPR rights—such as the Article 7 right not to “be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”—are unconditional (absolute): they forbid (or require) government to do something, period.Footnote 30 Some other ICCPR rights, by contrast, are conditional: they forbid (or require) government to do something unless certain conditions are satisfied. As Article 18 makes clear, the right to religious and moral freedom is—as a practical matter, it must be—conditional;Footnote 31 under the right, government may not ban or otherwise impede conduct protected by the right, thereby interfering with one's freedom to live one's life in accord with one's religious and/or moral convictions and commitments, unless each of three conditions is satisfied:
• The legitimacy condition: The government action at issue (law, policy, etc.) must serve a legitimate government objective.Footnote 32 The specific government action at issue might be not the law or policy itself but that the law does not exempt the protected conduct.
• The least burdensome alternative condition: The government action—which, again, might be that the law does not exempt—must be necessary to serve the legitimate objective, in the sense that the action serves the objective significantly better than would any less burdensome government action.Footnote 33
• The proportionality condition: The legitimate objective served by the government action must be sufficiently weighty to warrant the burden imposed by the government action.Footnote 34
The relationship between the normative ground of human rights—the fundamental imperative, articulated in Article 1 of the Universal Declaration, to “act towards all human beings in a spirit of brotherhood”—and, for example, the right of every human being not to be subjected to “cruel, inhuman or degrading” punishment is clear: To subject any human being to such punishment is obviously not to “act towards [him or her] in a spirit of brotherhood.” What is the relationship between the normative ground of human rights and the right we are considering in this essay? Why should we think that denying religious or moral freedom to any human being is not to “act towards [him or her] in a spirit of brotherhood”?
To prevent one from living one's life in accord with one's religious and/or moral convictions and commitments, or to make it significantly more difficult for one to do so, is hurtful, sometimes greatly hurtful. As philosopher Mark Wicclair puts the point in his important book, Conscientious Objection in Health Care: An Ethical Analysis: “[Even] one instance of acting against one's conscience—an act of self-betrayal—can be devastating and unbearable.”Footnote 35 Wicclair elaborates:
[A] loss of moral integrity can be devastating. It can result in strong feelings of guilt, remorse, and shame as well as loss of self-respect. Moral integrity can be of central importance to people whose core beliefs are secular as well as those whose core beliefs are religious. [Martha] Nussbaum cites a powerful image that Roger Williams used to defend liberty of conscience: “To impose an orthodoxy upon the conscience is nothing less than what Williams, in a memorable and oft-repeated image, called ‘Soule rape’.” The reference to rape of the soul suggests that this statement was meant primarily as a defense of religious tolerance. Nevertheless, when a failure to accommodate secular core beliefs results in a loss of moral integrity, it can be experienced as an assault on one's self or identity.Footnote 36
The countries of the world—the great majority of them—agree that for a government to cause anyone such hurt is for the government to fail to “act towards [him or her] in a spirit of brotherhood” . . . unless the law or other policy that is the source of the hurt satisfies each of the three conditions: legitimacy, least burdensome alternative, and proportionality. Again, the right to religious and moral freedom is not—as a practical matter it cannot be—unconditional.
Article 18 sensibly and explicitly allows government to act for the purpose of protecting “public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.” Given, however, that the right we are considering in this essay—the right of which Article 18 is the canonical articulation—is the right to religious and moral freedom—the following question is especially important: What morals count as public morals under the right to religious and moral freedom?
The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political RightsFootnote 37 state:
2. The scope of a limitation referred to in the Covenant shall not be interpreted so as to jeopardize the essence of the right concerned.
3. All limitation clauses shall be interpreted strictly and in favor of the rights at issue.
4. All limitations shall be interpreted in the light and context of the particular right concerned.
Therefore, with respect to “public morals,” the Human Rights Committee has emphasized:
[T]he concept of morals derives from many social, philosophical and religious traditions; consequently, limitations on the freedom to manifest a religion or belief for the purpose of protecting morals must be based on principles not deriving exclusively from a single tradition . . . If a set of beliefs is treated as official ideology in constitutions, statutes, proclamations of ruling parties, etc., or in actual practice, this shall not result in any impairment of the freedoms under article 18 or any other rights recognized under the Covenant nor in any discrimination against persons who do not accept the official ideology or who oppose it.Footnote 38
As the editors of a casebook on the ICCPR have put the point, in summarizing several statements by the Human Rights Committee concerning protection of “public morals” under the right to religious and moral freedom: “‘[P]ublic morals’ measures should reflect a pluralistic view of society, rather than a single religious culture.”Footnote 39
“Protecting public morals” is undeniably a legitimate government objective under the right to religious and moral freedom: The canonical articulation of the right—Article 18 of the ICCPR—explicitly says so. However, if in banning or otherwise regulating (impeding) conduct purportedly in pursuit of that objective, government is acting based on—“based on” in the sense that government would not be regulating the conduct “but for”—either a religious belief that the conduct is immoral or a sectarian nonreligious belief that the conduct is immoral, government is not truly acting to protect public morals. It is, instead, acting to protect sectarian morals, and protecting sectarian morals is not a legitimate government objective under the right to religious and moral freedom.
Again, establishing and protecting the right to religious and moral freedom is a principal response to what Maclure and Taylor have identified as “[o]ne of the most important challenges facing contemporary societies,” namely, “how to manage moral and religious diversity.”Footnote 40 Crediting the protection of sectarian morals as a legitimate government objective, under the right to religious and moral freedom, would be patently contrary to the effort “to manage moral and religious diversity.” We can anticipate an argument to the effect that managing moral and religious diversity is only one objective, that nurturing social unity is another, and that from time to time the latter objective may require a society, through its government, to protect one or another aspect of sectarian morality.Footnote 41 However, such an argument is belied by the historical experience of the world's liberal democracies, which amply confirms not only that, as Maclure and Taylor put it, a society's “unity does not lie in unanimity about the meaning and goals of existence but also that any efforts in the direction of such a uniformization would have devastating consequences for social peace.”Footnote 42 The political powers that be do not need, and under the right to religious and moral freedom they do not have, discretion to ban or otherwise regulate conduct based on sectarian belief that the conduct is immoral.Footnote 43
When is a belief, including a nonreligious belief, that X (a type of conduct) is immoral a sectarian belief? Consider what the celebrated American Jesuit John Courtney Murray wrote, in the mid-1960s, in his “Memo to [Boston's] Cardinal Cushing on Contraception Legislation”:
[T]he practice [of contraception], undertaken in the interests of “responsible parenthood,” has received official sanction by many religious groups within the community. It is difficult to see how the state can forbid, as contrary to public morality, a practice that numerous religious leaders approve as morally right. The stand taken by these religious groups may be lamentable from the Catholic moral point of view. But it is decisive from the point of view of law and jurisprudence . . .Footnote 44
We may generalize Murray's insight: A belief, including a nonreligious belief, that X is immoral is sectarian if the claim that X is immoral is one that is widely contested—and in that sense sectarian—among the citizens of a religiously and morally pluralistic democracy.
Of course, it will not always be obvious which side of the line a particular moral belief falls on—sectarian or nonsectarian—but often it will be obvious. As Murray understood and emphasized to Cardinal Cushing, the belief that contraception is immoral had clearly become sectarian. By contrast, certain moral beliefs—certain moral norms—are now clearly ecumenical, rather than sectarian, in religiously and morally pluralistic democracies. Consider, in that regard, what Maclure and Taylor say about “popular sovereignty” and “basic human rights”:
[They] are the constitutive values of liberal and democratic political systems; they provide these systems with their foundation and aims. Although these values are not neutral, they are legitimate, because it is they that allow citizens espousing very different conceptions of the good to live together in peace. They allow individuals to be sovereign in their choices of conscience and to define their own life plan while respecting others’ right to do the same. That is why people with very diverse religious, metaphysical, and secular convictions can share and affirm these constitutive values. They often arrive at them by very different paths, but they come together to defend them.Footnote 45
Again, to prevent one from living one's life in accord with one's religious and/or moral convictions and commitments, or to make it significantly more difficult for one to do so, is hurtful, sometimes very hurtful. It is fitting, then, that the great majority of the countries of the world recognize the right to religious and moral freedom as a human right. It is fitting, that is, that the countries of the world—the great majority of them—agree that for a government to prevent one from living one's life in accord with one's religious and/or moral convictions and commitments, or to make it significantly more difficult for one to do so, is for the government to fail to act consistently with the normative ground of human rights—with the “act towards all human beings in a spirit of brotherhood” imperative—unless the contested government action (law, policy, etc.) satisfies each of the three conditions: legitimacy, least burdensome alternative, and proportionality. And, as I have explained, under the first of the three conditions—the legitimacy condition—government may not regulate conduct on the basis of sectarian moral belief.Footnote 46
Is the internationally recognized human right to freedom of conscience—to religious and moral freedom—part of, entrenched in, the constitutional law of the United States?
It is a bedrock feature of the constitutional law of the United States that neither the federal government nor state government may, in the words of the First Amendment, “prohibit [ ] the free exercise [of religion].” As interpreted by a majority of the justices now sitting on the Supreme Court of the United States, the right to the free exercise of religion is not the same as—it is not congruent with—the internationally recognized human right to religious and moral freedom. There is no need to do here what has been done well and often elsewhere: explicate the free exercise right as interpreted by a majority of the sitting justices.Footnote 47 For present purposes, it suffices to say that, in my judgment, those religious liberty scholars are persuasive who contend—as do the distinguished religious liberty scholars Douglas Laycock and Michael McConnellFootnote 48—that the present Court's interpretation of the free exercise right is too narrow, and that a better interpretation of the right is one according to which the right protects (conditionally, not unconditionally) this comprehensive, twofold religious freedom: freedom to practice and otherwise live one's life in accord with one's own religion, and freedom from laws (and other public policies) that coerce one to practice or otherwise live one's life in accord with—or that discriminate against one on the ground that one does not practice or otherwise live one's life in accord with—a religion not one's own, a religion one rejects.
I noted earlier in this essay that those who struggle with “religious or limit questions,” such as the question “Does God exist?,” do not invariably end up giving answers that constitute a theistic or otherwise transcendent worldview. As I said, many end up giving answers that constitute a thoroughgoing rejection of any transcendent worldview. Nonetheless, wrote John Paul II in his encyclical Fides et Ratio, such questions “have their common source in the quest for meaning which has always compelled the human heart,” and “the answer given to these questions decides the direction which people seek to give to their lives.”Footnote 49 What sense does it make, then, to understand “religion” in the free exercise right so narrowly that the provision protects only conduct animated by a theistic worldview? Is Buddhism, which in the main is nontheistic, to be excluded from coverage under the free exercise right? And if it is not—if Buddhism is to be included—why are other nontheistic worldviews not included, too?Footnote 50 Douglas Laycock, speaking of the free exercise right, is surely correct to insist that “we have to understand religion broadly, so that nonbelievers are protected when they do things that are analogous to the exercise of religion. . . . Nonbelievers have consciences, and occasionally, their deeply held conscientious beliefs conflict with government regulation.”Footnote 51
The appeal of a broad understanding of “religion”—the appeal of a generous rather than miserly understanding—is reflected in the breadth of Article 18 of the ICCPR, which, again, as the Human Rights Committee has emphasized, protects
the freedom of thought and the freedom of conscience . . . equally with the freedom of religion and belief. . . . Article 18 protects theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not to profess any religion or belief. The terms “belief” and “religion” are to be broadly construed. Article 18 is not limited in its application to traditional religions or to religions and beliefs with institutional characteristics or practices analogous to those of traditional religions.Footnote 52
The appeal of a broad understanding of “religion” is also reflected in what the Canadian Supreme Court has said about section 2(a) of Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms: that it “ensure[s] that society does not interfere with profoundly personal beliefs that govern one's perception of oneself, humankind, nature, and, in some cases, a higher or different order of being. These beliefs, in turn, govern one's conduct and practices.”Footnote 53 According to the Canadian Supreme Court, section 2(a) “means that, subject to [certain limitations], no one is to be forced to act in a way contrary to his beliefs or his conscience.”Footnote 54
This, then, is why we are warranted in saying that the internationally recognized human right to religious and moral freedom is part of the constitutional law of the United States: The right to the free exercise of religion is entrenched in the constitutional law of the United States, and that right is congruent with the right to religious and moral freedom, if “religion” is understood broadly, as it should be understood. That is, the free exercise right, appropriately—that is, broadly—construed, protects (conditionally, not unconditionally) freedom to live one's life in accord with one's own moral worldview, whether theistic or nontheistic; freedom from laws (and other public policies) that coerce one to live one's life in accord with—or that discriminate against one on the ground that one does not live one's life in accord with—a moral worldview not one's own, a worldview one rejects, whether theistic or nontheistic.Footnote 55
Even though, as interpreted by a majority of the sitting justices of the Supreme Court, the free exercise right is not congruent with the right to religious and moral freedom, a version of the right to religious and moral freedom—a version that the Supreme Court has sometimes called “the right of privacy”—has been protected by the Court as a constitutional right for almost fifty years. Consider the following rulings by the Supreme Court in the period since the mid-1960s:
• A 1965 ruling and a 1972 ruling, read in conjunction with one another, establish that government may ban neither the use nor the distribution of contraceptive devices or drugs.Footnote 56 In the 1972 ruling, the Supreme Court declared: “If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”Footnote 57
• In 1973, the Supreme Court ruled that restrictive abortion legislation implicated, and that some such legislation violated, “the right of privacy.”Footnote 58 In 1992, in reaffirming the 1973 ruling, the Court explained:
Men and women of good conscience can disagree, and we suppose some always shall disagree, about the profound moral and spiritual implications of terminating a pregnancy, even in its earliest stage. Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic principles of morality, but that cannot control our decision. Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code. The underlying constitutional issue is whether the State can resolve these philosophic questions in such a definitive way that a woman lacks all choice in the matter, except perhaps [where] the pregnancy is itself a danger to her own life or health, or is the result of rape or incest. . . .
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education. . . . These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.Footnote 59
• In 1978, in ruling that “the decision to marry [is] among the personal decisions protected by the right of privacy,” the Supreme Court stated:
It is not surprising that the decision to marry has been placed on the same level of importance as decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and family relationships. . . . [I]t would make little sense to recognize a right of privacy with respect to other matters of family life and not with respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of the family in our society. . . .
By reaffirming the fundamental character of the right to marry, we do not mean to suggest that every state regulation which relates in any way to the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny. To the contrary, reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship may legitimately be imposed. . . . [However, w]hen a statutory classification significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.Footnote 60
• In 2003, the Supreme Court ruled that government may not criminalize adult, consensual sexual intimacy and that therefore a criminal ban on same-sex sexual intimacy was unconstitutional:
Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of . . . certain intimate conduct. . . . [Government should be wary about attempting] to define the meaning of [an adult, consensual] relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects. . . . [A]dults may choose to enter upon this relationship . . . and still retain their dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons to make this choice. . . .
[F]or centuries, there have been powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as immoral. [This does not] answer the question before us, however. The issue is whether the majority may use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole society through operation of the criminal law. “Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.” . . . “[T]hat the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice . . . [I]ndividual decisions by married persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship, even when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, this protection extends to intimate choices by unmarried as well as married persons.”Footnote 61
The Supreme Court sought to justify its rulings in the foregoing cases on the basis of “the right to privacy” and/or the right not to have the government “deprive” one of “liberty . . . without due process of law.”Footnote 62 As a matter of defensible constitutional interpretation, however, the Court would have been on much less controversial ground had it sought to justify its rulings on the basis of the right—the right appropriately construed—not to have government “prohibit” one from engaging in “the free exercise of religion.”Footnote 63 Whether one or more of the Court's rulings in the foregoing and related cases are justifiable on that basis, however, is a separate question.Footnote 64
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
For written comments and/or helpful discussion as I was thinking about the issues that engage me in this essay, I want to thank—in addition to those I have already thanked, in the introduction to my book—Nathan Chapman, Rafael Domingo, and Chris Eberle.