Lisa Hilbink's book presents us with a puzzle. The 1973 coup that placed General Pinochet in power left the judiciary intact: the executive was usurped, Congress was suspended; but the judges, appointed by prior democratic presidents of left, right and centre persuasions, remained in place. And yet, Lisa Hilbink writes, ‘Chile's judges cooperated fully with the authoritarian regime’ (p. 5). They colluded more fully than their counterparts in neighbouring dictatorships, and they did so in face of a mounting international movement to end the Pinochet regime's human rights violations. What's more, this illiberal judicial performance outlasted the military regime. Even after the 1990 transition to a multi-party democracy – and even as the Hungarian and South African courts forged strong constitutional cultures in the wake of authoritarianism – the Chilean judiciary remained quietly conservative, loath to defend rights and to challenge the executive.

Hilbink's thoughtful, engaging study aims to uncover the roots of this illiberal tendency. After an introduction and framing chapter, each subsequent chapter explores a historical stage of the Chilean judiciary, from its colonial founding through to 2000, with greater attention given to the more recent years. Supported by interviews and archival work, Hilbink carefully constructs the theory that the Chilean judiciary's weak defence of constitutional rights – in dictatorship as in democracy – is best explained by institutional factors. The judiciary was designed in the nineteenth century to embody the ideal of a complete separation of law and politics, or ‘judicial apoliticism’. The product, however, is a hierarchical structure and culture that systematically suppress expression of liberal qualities of mind in its judges, while classifying conservative values as apolitical. Their reproduction is ensured by a hierarchy that polices and penalises lower judges who fail to toe the Supreme Court line. In the end, attempts to seclude the judiciary from the political realm yielded an institution so insular that it failed to support liberal democratic politics.

Latin American courts have taken on a more public role in recent decades, and a cadre of new scholars has begun to explore when, why and how law comes to influence politics in the region. Judges beyond Politics is an important contribution to this emerging sub-field of Latin American politics. By focusing on a counter-example in which the court seemingly stays on the sidelines, Hilbink's research convincingly shows that an important factor shaping judicial behaviour can be institutional culture, and, specifically, judicial role conceptions. Thus, we must add to the study of judicial preferences an examination of how those preferences come to be shaped by the particularities of the institutions the judges inhabit. This carefully drawn historical-institutionalist argument is particularly compelling as it declares in a field often dominated by rationalist models that ideas matter, as do informal norms.

The implication of her findings, Hilbink writes, is that a democratic judiciary should not aspire to apoliticism. Rather, we must openly and actively foster liberal democratic values in our judges, and encourage them to refer to their political compass. This is not to say that law does not matter, but that, insofar as constitutional law is concerned with restraining the political branches and defending rights, it has an important political dimension: ‘the political nature of the judicial role must be acknowledged and institutionally cultivated’ (p. 244). The closing chapter points to several examples of judiciaries that share an ideology of apoliticism, and a weak record on constitutional rights. Hilbink ends with an eloquent ‘defense of political courts’, and a recipe for creating democracy-enhancing judiciaries with a properly liberal democratic ideology. One of the virtues of this book is the grace with which it moves between political science scholarship and constitutional theory.

One might wonder, however, at Hilbink's optimism about the role of judiciaries in supporting democracy and the rule of law. In the first place, it would appear that courts have always and everywhere succumbed to repressive dictatorial and totalitarian regimes. Judges can do but little to uphold the rule of law during a time of exception (where exception is understood as the suspension of said rule). Even if Chile's judges were particularly quick to collude, it seems likely that resistance would have led only to a purge. Indeed, a stout defence of rights in face of authoritarianism would have posed a greater anomaly than capitulation.

Secondly, Chile today is a liberal-democratic success story despite its illiberal judges. In the 18 years since transition, democracy has flourished. Political party competition is strong. Laws are respected. Corruption is low.Footnote ¹ Vestiges of authoritarian power have slowly but steadily been cast out. Indeed, Chile is one of the highest performers in comparative studies of democracies beyond the North-West quadrant.Footnote ² Stepping back, one might take the lesson here to be that liberal and strong judiciaries are not necessary to successful democratic transitions. Or, going further, perhaps judiciaries may contribute to the emergence of a liberal democratic order by taking on a non-confrontational role during transition – particularly a pacted transition. This is not to deny that Chile's democracy today would be enhanced by a judiciary that takes seriously, for example, the rights of Mapuche activists to be tried under regular criminal law rather than anti-terrorist legislation from a bygone era. It is only to point out that the Chilean transition has established a flourishing liberal democracy under the watch of what Hilbink characterises as a deficient and illiberal judiciary, and it would have been interesting to hear her discuss this.

Judges beyond Politics provides an important contribution to the theoretical literature on comparative courts and politics. Further, Hilbink has provided a first-rate history of Chilean politics, seen through a legal lens. Chilean scholars have long viewed the judiciary's institutional culture as an impediment to its more liberal performance. None, however, has corroborated their conclusions with so thorough a historical account based on original research. This is the first study to systematically articulate a precise thesis of how to characterise this internal culture, and to trace how it hindered the protection of liberal democracy before, during and after the Pinochet regime. Judges beyond Politics is a beautifully written, succinct and engaging book that should be read by those interested in Chilean political history as well as students of law and politics, comparative politics, and human rights.