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Governance and Territorial Development in Ecuador: The Plan Nacional del Buen Vivir in Zaruma, Piñas and Portovelo

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 August 2016

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Abstract

This article analyses the impact at a local level of the changes that have been introduced within the framework of the Plan Nacional del Buen Vivir (National Plan for Good Living, PNBV) in Ecuador since 2007. It assesses the extent to which there has been real change in local administration and governance and, if so, the impact in areas such as economic development, innovation and quality of life. Fieldwork was carried out across three towns and cantons – Zaruma, Piñas and Portovelo – in the province of El Oro. Historically, these have been characterised by their dependence on the primary export model that the government of Rafael Correa has sought to move beyond. The progress and limitations of this process are assessed within the context of the National Plan for Good Living.

Spanish abstract

Este artículo analiza el impacto a nivel local de los cambios que se han introducidos dentro del marco del Plan Nacional del Buen Vivir (PNBV) en Ecuador desde 2007. Se evalúa si efectivamente ha habido un cambio real en la administración local y en la gobernabilidad y, de ser así, cual ha sido el impacto en áreas como el desarrollo económico, la innovación y la calidad de vida. Para lo anterior se llevó a cabo trabajo de campo en tres pueblos y cantones – Zaruma, Piñas y Portovelo – en la provincia de El Oro. Históricamente, estas localidades se han caracterizado por su dependencia en el modelo de exportación primaria que el gobierno de Rafael Correa ha buscado superar. Los progresos y limitaciones de este proceso son analizados en el contexto del Plan Nacional del Buen Vivir.

Portuguese abstract

Este artigo analisa o impacto em nível local das mudanças introduzidas desde 2007 pelo Plan Nacional del Bien Vivir (PBBV) no Equador. Avalia-se até que ponto ocorreram modificações reais na administração local e na governança e, caso tenham ocorrido, o impacto em aspectos como desenvolvimento econômico, inovação e qualidade de vida. Pesquisas de campo foram conduzidas em três cidades e distritos – Zaruma, Piñas e Portovelo – na província de El Oro. Historicamente, estes locais caracterizavam-se pela dependência do modelo de exportação de itens primários que o governo de Rafael Correa buscou superar. Os avanços e limitações deste processo são avaliadas dentro do contexto do Plan Nacional del Bien Vivir.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

Introduction

The twenty-first century has seen significant change in Latin America. The arrival in several countries of ‘new left’ governments and an international context marked by a highly favourable increase in the price of raw materials led to an ‘outward’ and an ‘inward’ reconfiguration throughout the region. Regarding the former, supranational agreements such as Mercosur, Alianza del Pacífico (Pacific Alliance) and Comunidad Andina (Andean Community), have been set up on a sound footing after decades of bickering. As to the latter, changes have taken place in political and territorial management. On the one hand, the new governments have started to take measures to mitigate the effects of three decades of neoliberal adjustments by increasing the role of the state – in contrast to the approach adopted in other regions, including Europe. On the other, following the trend of recent decades, there has been a gradual process of decentralisation, giving local and regional authorities greater autonomy and responsibility.

The improvements across the board in territorial management and cooperation have been significant. Thus, today there is a more dynamic relationship between Latin American countries while local actors have started to play a more proactive role in terms of development, although this remains far from the levels of participation that exist elsewhere. In this respect, the principal arena for the redefinition of social policies in Latin America is the city, with municipal governments as the driving force.Footnote 1

The aim of this article is to analyse changes in territorial management at the local level by drawing on three case studies. The choice of Ecuador is due to the profound transformations the country has experienced in recent years, with socio-territorial effects such as increased decentralisation of the state bureaucracy alongside the inclusion of other goals such as improvements in the quality of life. These processes tie in with other issues, such as changing the country's productive matrix or improving urban planning and the environment. These areas have been addressed by the central government with the drawing up of the Plan Nacional del Buen Vivir, which aims to implement these along with other issues related to education, health, quality of life and citizens' participation. However, as will be seen below, although the results of this plan are visible nationwide, there remain serious shortcomings in terms of its impact at local level.

A theoretical framework was established for the analysis of the three case studies from the perspective of the relationship between governance and integrated territorial development. This framework highlights the emergence of new political models, noted in the gradual arrival to power of new parties, which looked to move away from the long-standing fractures. It also underlines the growing prominence of the models of integral development included in the PNBV. The plan addresses these aspects of territorial development, although the path followed by the cases under study seems to have constrained to a certain extent the development options of these cantons, marked as they are by a strong mining identity. After placing these cantons within the context of the principal measures taken by the government of Ecuador, their importance as examples that reflect this government's interest in starting the transition from a raw materials export model to one based on diversification and added value is clear. However, in the analysis of these case studies, problems are revealed that are mostly due to the difficult transition from theory to reality and from national to local planning.

This study is grounded in field work and qualitative research using in-depth interviews, statistical information and qualitative data. The result is a diagnosis of the principal achievements and limitations of the methods of local and supralocal cooperation, and of the relationship of these with other questions relating to integrated territorial development and the day-to-day reality of these places: economic diversification, environmental issues, urban chaos, workforce training, and so on. This study therefore illustrates the burden imposed by these inherited structures on local landscapes which, even when modified by structural changes, evolve slowly. In addition, it highlights the difficulty of implementing national guidelines (PNBV and the change of productive matrix) in local settings, characterised as they are by low levels of social participation, a limited range of alternatives and the absence of indicators that allow for the monitoring of this process.

Governance and Territorial Development in Latin America

The 1970s in Latin America were marked by the shift away from state intervention policies and the adoption of the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’. As a consequence of the overwhelming debt incurred by the countries of the region and of external pressures, a new orthodoxy established itself. This involved less economic intervention on the part of the state, financial liberalisation, privatisation and the closure of state-owned companies, together with fiscal and labour market reform, in pursuit of macroeconomic stability, inflation control and long-term economic growth.Footnote 2

The reform of the state underpinning this approach entailed reduced public sector involvement and paved the way for the incorporation of other actors from the private sector. Thus, the new strategies for economic growth relied to a greater extent than previously on engagement at the local level and the capacity of cities to mobilise their human and economic capital. The towns and areas that flourished would be those able to generate, and to attract, investment and to implement development projects which inevitably favour some areas over others.

It is against this backdrop that contemporary governance in Latin America has gradually emerged and taken shape. It has involved a two-way process between social or community participation (via NGOs, associations, etc.) and political participation (by means of elections and referendums, internal party elections, demonstrations, etc.) which came to establish the regional idea of what governance entailed.Footnote 3 Social participation, however, has traditionally been low in Latin America, resulting in the limited development of social organisations, characterised in turn by a lack of institutionalisation.Footnote 4 This gave rise to a situation in which the state played a central role, with lower levels of political participation obtaining than in other parts of the world.Footnote 5 ,Footnote 6 Moreover, the experience of Latin America, marked by high rates of social inequality, insecurity, violence and poverty, led some actors to associate governance with the democratic functioning of the state itself, and hence to seek to apply top-down policies to meet these challenges effectively.Footnote 7 For those who held this view, a high-quality democracy, together with the promotion of economic development, safety improvement and the addressing of social issues, implied the implementation of democratic and effective governance. Thus, governance in the region could be understood as the recovery of public space to reduce long-established shortcomings. As Boisier points out, the process of political decentralisation in Latin America requires the parallel existence of a strong state capable of imposing homogeneous territorial directives and collaborating with local institutions.Footnote 8 As will be seen below, this seems to be the path followed by Rafael Correa's government in Ecuador.

In the case of Ecuador, the issue of civil society consolidation was both marginal and late to arrive, even in the Latin American context. This was partly due to the scant participation of civil society in the restoration of democracy, which made it less of a feature within the Ecuadorean socio-political spectrum.Footnote 9 Therefore it would not be until the latter half of the 1980s, as the neoliberal state was establishing itself, that civil society came out of the shadows, in the context of demands for a public policy that looked beyond the market and upheld citizens' rights, at a time when the state had lost a substantial part of its regulatory and redistributive capacity.Footnote 10 Although peasant and workers' movements appeared in the 1970s, emigration to the city and the force-feeding of the neoliberal menu undermined them.Footnote 11 Similarly, the student movement emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, but its leaders became entrenched and proved incapable of adapting their demands to the new environment, and as a consequence the movement became significantly weaker.Footnote 12 This also occurred with the indigenous peoples' movement, which sprang up in the 1990s alongside a series of regional movements as an alternative to traditional political parties,Footnote 13 and sought to reconstruct a collective indigenous identity through political participation.Footnote 14 In spite of its initial success, this movement was soon questioned for backing the government of General Lucio Gutiérrez.Footnote 15 Its late emergence, its timid development, its uneven territorial influence (very weak in the case studies presented in this article) and its internal problems, saw it further diminished once Rafael Correa's Revolución Ciudadana had incorporated some of their demands into the new government's political agenda. Moreover, its limited capacity to organise itself as a political force, along with the new government moving to occupy its weakened political space, undermined civil society participation in politics at the grass-roots level.Footnote 16 ,Footnote 17 Added to this is Correa's image as a very people-oriented president, with a predisposition to plebiscites, as someone who looks to the people and public opinion, bypassing institutions and social organisations, facing problems shoulder to shoulder with the community.Footnote 18 The result has been, as shown by the case studies, both structural weaknesses and a lack of engagement on the part of civil society in collective associations and politics as a whole.

Beyond Ecuador's specific idiosyncrasies, today the gradual inclusion of governance in the political and social agenda is a key element in urban development processes, but has to go hand in hand with other issues jointly aimed at integrated territorial development.Footnote 19 ,Footnote 20 The goals of this integrated development, in terms of the strategies adopted by key local players might include: (i) economic development and employment growth, linked to such issues as the promotion of new sectors and the creation of economic clusters or the restructuring of traditional sectors to favour economic competition and job creation; (ii) the improvement of governance and the collective management of the city, by developing a culture of cooperation and governance mechanisms involving consultation bodies or citizen participation incentives; (iii) social and economic innovation, linked to the strengthening of the territorial innovation structure, by encouraging technology centres, spaces for entrepreneurs and business centres; (iv) the improvement of quality of life and the environment, with measures aimed at improving urban infrastructure and living conditions, and the renewal of housing stock. These strategies are all interconnected (Figure 1), and as such they are the keystones of coherent territorial management. As will be analysed below, these four dimensions are essential to Ecuador's PNBV and represent the benchmark for the interpretation of the achievements and shortcomings revealed in the case studies.

Source: Author's elaboration based on Méndez, 2010.Footnote 21

Figure 1. Strategies of Urban Revitalisation for Integrated Development

This layout is useful in terms of showing the unequal evolution of towns and cities and their capacity to generate new dynamics of development or governance in a novel socio-political setting, such as that which has existed in Ecuador since 2007. Piñas, Portovelo and Zauma are good examples of how these ideas work in practice and show the need for in-depth reflection when it comes to drawing up local development strategies, and the limitations of these when they depend on broader supralocal guidelines implemented with little or no consensus. The article continues with an analysis of the changes that have taken place in the country since 2007, followed by their interpretation through the prism of the case studies.

Territorial Context

Rafael Correa became president of Ecuador in 2007, after several decades of weak governments that proved incapable of putting an end to a series of political phases characterised by ungovernability and entrenched problems involving the voting system, accountability and power relationships.Footnote 22 After seven presidents followed in quick succession between 1997 and 2007, Ecuador entered a more stable period and the role of the state changed, moving from a laissez-faire approach to a more active role in all spheres of society, marking a major shift away from the distinctly neoliberal policies of the preceding decades.

Some of the salient features of the political changes that took place in Ecuador from 2007 are:

  1. (i) The adoption of a new Constitution in 2008, following a constitutional referendum, incorporating extensive rights for workers, the poor, the disabled, indigenous peoples, women, homosexuals and ethnic minorities, with broader control mechanisms and democratic participation.

  2. (ii) The creation of new ministries and administrative structures to implement those rights: the Ministries of Social Inclusion, Planning, Production, Employment and Competitiveness, among others.

  3. (iii) The strengthening of different companies in strategic sectors. It was deemed that the state should have control of communications, energy resources and strategic sectors, and there was a move away from the privatisation trend that had existed before 2007.

  4. (iv) SENPLADES, the Secretaría Nacional de Planeamiento y Desarrollo (National Secretariat for Planning and Development) was created. The function of this body was to lay down the broad guidelines for economic, urban and transport development with the aim of achieving the goals of economic development and territorial cohesion.

  5. (v) This was accompanied by the largest investment in infrastructure in the history of the country. New airports were built, the road network was improved and the principal ports were expanded with the aim of integrating the country and improving the productivity of Ecuadorean companies.

  6. (vi) There was ‘top-down’ decentralisation with the creation of municipal and provincial Gobiernos Autónomos Descentralizados (GAD) and local branches of ministries and institutions. In this regard, the drawing up of the Plan Nacional de Descentralización for 2012–15 is significant. The purpose of the plan was, first, to guarantee social, territorial and fiscal equity throughout the country; second, to foster public sector management excellence and, finally, to ensure that the decentralisation process was transparent and inclusive. Even though the plan had follow-up and controlling mechanisms, the role of the public was limited to the possibility of presenting complaints in the case of irregularities, which certainly raises questions as to the extent to which real governance at local level was implemented. However, we should not jump to the opposite conclusion, namely that Rafael Correa's government has overseen a recentralisation process, since despite any shortcomings, the transfer of responsibilities and the decentralisation of ministerial offices, previously concentrated in Quito, confirms the new relationship between central and local administration.Footnote 23

These actions have an economic raison d’être: to modify the country's role in the world economy and change its productive matrix.Footnote 24 To this end, four fundamental strategies were proposed: (i) A shift from a raw resource-based extractive model to one that added value to its products. The intention was to stop exporting raw materials (especially oil) and importing finished goods with a view to transforming products domestically and then export them as manufactured goods with added value. This policy sought to boost an industrial sector which employed 10.3 per cent of the active population in 2001 and 9.7 per cent in 2010, in spite of increasing from 472,805 to 592,096 workers over the period.Footnote 25 (ii) At the same time, the aim was to encourage new, technologically more advanced and environmentally more sustainable sectors, such as renewable energy, pharmaceuticals, petrochemicals and tourism, among others, with a view to diversifying revenue streams. (iii) A third aim was the reduction of imports of goods and services in favour of domestic production. (iv) Finally, new export markets were to be sought, focusing on Latin America and emerging markets such as China, and reducing dependence on the US market, which accounted for 44 per cent of exports in 2011.Footnote 26

As regards mining, which is crucial in the cases under study, Rafael Correa's coming to power resulted in greater state control of mining concessions and a return to extractivism as a means for the country's socio-economic development, after some months of tension between advocates of this course and others who favoured a shift towards a post-extractivist society.Footnote 27 In this regard, it is worth differentiating between a positive government attitude towards large and medium-sized companies, especially foreign ones, encouraged to invest in the country, and bring in their technology, with a more belligerent attitude towards small-scale, illegal mining, which was increasingly curbed and constrained by the state. This attitude to mining brought Correa's government into conflict with several ecological and indigenous movements that had previously given him their support and helped win him elections.Footnote 28

The PNBV is a landmark among the social policies introduced by Correa's government. It is a four-year plan aimed at improving the population's living conditions by meeting needs that go beyond economic growth: decent jobs, energy sovereignty, equality, social cohesion, grass-roots involvement, general safety. It brought together 12 goals geared to the political, economic and social transformation of the country, to be achieved through measurable policies and objectives by 2017.Footnote 29 To this end, funds have been allocated for improvements in public education and the creation of a public health network at all levels. In the political sphere, the implementation of mechanisms to encourage citizen participation and the process of political decentralisation were envisaged although, as the case studies show, these have yet to take root and flourish.

There have also been programmes to secure a minimum livelihood to the poorest families and to integrate disabled people. These include the Bono de Desarrollo Humano (Human Development Bonus), a conditional cash transfer implemented in September 1998 and claimed by 1.9 million people throughout the country; and the Misión Manuela Espejo (Manuela Espejo Mission), a programme for disabled people that provides assistance and integration services and which has received international recognition for its achievements in reducing inequality.

After seven years of implementation, the data do show some tangible outcomes in relation to the reduction of poverty and inequality. For example, Ecuador is the Latin American country that has seen the Gini Index fall furthest in recent years (Figure 2). Also notable is the reduction in poverty levels (which fell by 14 per cent between 2007 and 2015, according to figures from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censo) or the year-on-year GDP performance, which was higher than the regional average nearly every year (Table 1).

Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censo, www.ecuadorencifras.gob.ec.

Figure 2. Evolution of Poverty % and Gini Index in Ecuador (2007–15)

Table 1. Evolution of GDP Growth rate in Latin American Countries (2007–13)

Source: World Bank, Statistics, http://data.worldbank.org.

Another of the most visible aspects of the programmes carried out by the government had to do with improved public investment in social services. For example, investment in education and health has grown rapidly, improving the figures for the mortality rate for under-fives, as well as the number of physicians per 10,000 inhabitants and the percentage of poor people entering the middle and higher levels of the education system, one of the keys to reducing social inequality (Table 2).

Table 2. Comparison of Public Investment, 2006 and 2010

Source: Ministerio de Salud Pública and S. Mejía.Footnote 30 ,Footnote 31

Even though the social, economic and political advances made under the new government are visible, there is less clear evidence that these changes have been transferred to the local sphere or that the PNBV programmes and the change of productive matrix have been successful. One of the problems of these programmes is that they are nationwide and extend to 2017, meaning that data on their outcome are not as yet available, and where these do exist they are probably subsumed into the overall figures for Ecuador. Consequently, it seems appropriate to get some of the picture through case studies and research methods which combine statistics and qualitative techniques in order to assess the administrative capacity of local governments and the level of dynamic interaction with other key players. To this effect, the cantons of Zaruma, Portovelo and Piñas, with their three eponymous small towns in the south of Ecuador, have been chosen as case studies. All three, as will be seen below, are characterised by having their own distinctive history against a shared economic backdrop of dependence on mining, which has forged their identity and has left its mark on the population throughout their history. They have also been chosen because mining and the extraction of natural resources have become a crucial development factor for Ecuador in its strategy to improve the socio-economic conditions of its population. In addition, they have played – and are still playing – an important role as service providers (in education, health, administration, the law, etc.) in their surrounding areas, although some more specialised functions, linked to public administration and higher education, have been gradually lost.

Today both non-local and, to a great degree, local decision-makers are responsible for the policies adopted and the direction taken by these areas. For example, in the case of Ecuador, citizen participation in local planning has been strongly promoted as a response to the loss of trust in the national political parties: joint assemblies formulate provincial and municipal plans.Footnote 32 At the local level, however, the associative movement is low. Participatory structures are fragile and the capacity to get involved in politics is limited. This renders analysis complicated, and in consequence this study adopts an analytic and interpretative approach that combines qualitative and quantitative methods. To begin with, a wide range of sources was used (such as existing research, planning documentation, the local and regional press) together with economic, demographic and social statistics, in order to put Zaruma, Piñas and Portovelo in context. However, the principal source of information used as reference to interpret governance and its effect on other regeneration strategies are the 26 interviews conducted with local and supralocal decision-makers from different backgrounds and institutions. Their contribution has been extremely valuable in carrying out this research, as they compensate for the absence of statistics that show how the PNBV has performed. Drawing on field work and the interviews, the issues are developed and interpreted with the aid of statistical sources to provide an insight into the successes and failures of PNBV policies locally, in spite of the data limitations.

The Importance of the Mining Industry in Zaruma, Portovelo and Piñas

The three case studies are small towns (with populations of between 13,800 and 25,000) situated in the province of El Oro, in the south of the Republic of Ecuador (Figure 3). These towns have in common a history of gold mining, which today remains one of the principal sources of employment in all three cantons. Although the political presence of the national ruling party (Alianza País) is not strong in El Oro, during 2009–14 it won five of the 14 mayoral elections (Piñas and Zaruma among them), swept along on the rising tide of Rafael Correa's initial popularity and the subsequent alliance with the regional Movimiento Autónomo Regional, led by the provincial prefect, who had ruled the roost since 1996, with the party holding four other municipalities in El Oro in 2009. However, the 2014 elections were much less successful for Alianza País, unable to prise the principal political stronghold (Machala, the provincial capital) from the Social Christian mayor. Alianza País lost the Prefectura (Provincial Government) and saw its holding reduced to three municipalities (winning Portovelo and losing Piñas and Zaruma). However, four other municipalities in El Oro (Zaruma among them) returned mayors from parties close to the central government, mitigating the defeat and to an extent maintaining the relationship between the canton and central government.

Source: Author's elaboration.

Figure 3. Geographical Location of Case Studies

The first case study is Zaruma, a city of 24,907 inhabitants in 2010, in the south-west of the province at 1,200 metres above sea level, on the western slope of the Andes. Its history goes back to 1549, when the Spanish first settled in the area. Zaruma was important due to its gold deposits and in 1593 it was granted the title of town. It soon saw the arrival of civil servants, clergymen and mining administrators; the mines employed an indigenous workforce that toiled under extremely harsh conditions. Zaruma is interesting as a case study because of its history. Mining began in 1560, in what are now the cantons of Zaruma and Portovelo, and the town became a major colonial mining centre. The population grew or fell according to the fortunes of the mines, as booms and busts alternated.

Following independence from Spain, Ecuador's rulers were keen to reap the benefits of Zaruma's gold mining, so in 1862 taxes were levied on the gold extracted. In 1876 foreign geologists were hired and in 1888 the first concession was granted to a foreign company, the British-owned Great Zaruma Gold Mining Company. Although the British were the first to arrive, it was a US-owned company, the South American Development Company (SADCO), that introduced and operated large-scale gold mining in Zaruma and Portovelo from 1896 to 1950. This period saw Zaruma become the leading mining area in the country. SADCO established the Campamento Minero de Portovelo, a ground-breaking architectural and industrial complex in Ecuadorean and Latin American terms, with facilities including schools and hospitals.

The Ecuadorean government's aim of exercising control over gold mining, along with the gradual decline of the canton's output, led to a compensation agreement with the company in 1951, and SADCO withdrew from Ecuador. Subsequently, the Compañía Industrial Minera Asociada (CIMA), a company created by former SADCO workers (who owned 49 per cent of the shares) and the Zaruma municipality (51 per cent of the shares) oversaw mining operations. However, it was badly run, and concentrated on squeezing the remaining value from SADCO's existing machinery, methods and ore deposits rather than prospecting for new deposits or investment. CIMA filed for bankruptcy in 1979.Footnote 33

The company has been under state control since then, and a new situation emerged: an invasion of wildcat miners, who prospered under lax state control. In 1981, after several political and administrative initiatives, Portovelo was split off from Zaruma, becoming a canton in its own right. Today, both places have some large and medium mining companies and cooperatives that work under state concessions, but there are still thousands of wildcat miners who pay little heed to the environment or the orderly exploitation of deposits. Lastly, long-term government indifference has led to the progressive dismantling, destruction and sale as scrap metal of the buildings and mining heritage of these cantons. At present, gold mining in Ecuador is struggling to be competitive due to the fact that the currency is the US dollar, which places it at a disadvantage with regard to other regional producers such as Peru.

Piñas was founded at the beginning of the nineteenth century, when a Spanish engineer who had been sent by the Crown to carry out a study of the mines in Zaruma decided to settle there with his family. It became an independent canton in 1941. Its location and agricultural tradition have made it less dependent on mining than Zaruma and Portovelo. However, the Piñas economy is highly dependent on the mining income of the other two cities. It has been valuable as a place for property investment from assets derived from mining and a high percentage of its inhabitants work in the mining industry.

As can be seen in Table 3, the economy of Zaruma, Portovelo and Piñas is highly dependent on agriculture and mining, which in 2010 employed half of the active population of the first two cities and more than 30 per cent of that of Piñas, constituting clear examples of the primary export model that the government wishes to leave behind. Meanwhile, industry and services are little developed, although trade, public administration and education are important, especially in Piñas. Nevertheless, the fact that industry employs less than 5 per cent of the population in Portovelo and Zaruma (and 8 per cent in Piñas) or that a significant proportion of services involve little added value (such as trade) or are dependent on the public sector implies a major weakness for the economy of the three cities. Finally, it is striking that 5 to 7 per cent of the population figure as unregistered workers, which might indicate that they are engaged in illegal mining. This, however, does not necessarily mean that these are extremely rural places in Ecuadorean terms. It is worth recalling that in Ecuador 21 per cent of the population works in agriculture and that cantons that are capitals of provinces like Guaranda (51 per cent) and Morona (31 per cent) have employment rates in the primary sector that are even higher than those of the case studies. Zaruma and Piñas have traditionally been trading and service centres for the surrounding areas. In the past Zaruma was the focal point for most of these services, but the current government has given Piñas more bureaucratic agencies (establishing the offices of the Agencia Nacional de Tráfico, Centro de Salud, Centro de Emprendimiento there) to reflect its regional importance. It is worth noting, in terms of the significance of the case studies, that prior to 1950 Zaruma was the most populated canton in the province, with a higher population than the capital, Machala, and that until 2009 Piñas was one of the centres of the Universidad Técnica de Machala.

Table 3. Average Employment by Sector in Piñas, Portovelo and Zaruma (2001–10)

Source: INEC, Censo Nacional 2010.

Mining is not only the principal source of direct and indirect employment in these cities, but it has also posed three challenges: first, soil and river contamination due to inadequate extraction techniques; second, the existence of widespread illegal mining, which is accompanied by land grabs, illegal jobs and poor waste management; and finally, mining activity seems to be the cause of ground movements that extend as far as the urban areas. This situation, which has historically occurred in Zaruma and Portovelo, could be a real threat to the area and is a remnant of the past which undermines the quality of life in these areas.

The demographic impact of mining is also significant. Available data shows that the population grew during periods of steady mining activity (between 1950 and 1972, the population in Zaruma increased by 30.3 per cent and more than 100 per cent in Piñas), with a decline of 39 per cent in Zaruma between 1972 and 2001 after the closure of CIMA (Piñas and Portovelo also showed relatively low rates) and a slight increase in 2010 (Table 4). Regarding social and environmental issues, mining has also affected workers' health (cases have been recorded of pneumoconiosis and bronchitis and other ailments derived from the high levels of mercury, lead and cyanide that is found in the rivers and soil). In addition, the ground is sinking; this has affected some public buildings in Zaruma, such as the municipal sports centre and the swimming pool.Footnote 34

Table 4. Population Evolution and Year-on-Year Comparison (%) of Case Studies (1950–2010)

Source: INEC. Sistema Integrado de Consultas, REDATAM.

Governance and Development Strategies in Zaruma, Portovelo and Piñas

For decades, the three cities have followed paths closely linked to mining, as the principal direct source of employment (Zaruma and Portovelo), and as an incentive for growth in the tertiary sector (Piñas). Moreover, in all three cases it has led to a larger built environment, has affected demographic growth and has seen the emergence of environmental problems. Mining has had a significant bearing on politics, with a convergence of vested political and economic interests which lie behind some of the environmental or urban problems.Footnote 35 Although the strategies implemented at local level are influenced by multiple factors, this study highlights the role and strategies of the local protagonists, based on the blueprint developed in the theoretical framework (Figure 1), but stressing in particular the issue of governance and its influence on the other territorial strategies. One of the characteristics the three case studies share is an increase in the number of decision-makers and their engagement in the development strategies and a greater capacity for action as a result of the administrative decentralisation process set in motion in Ecuador in 2007. External actors, such as public employees working in the decentralised ministries and provincial government or foreign investors, play their part, but it is above all local actors who have an important role in both determining the policies adopted for Portovelo, Piñas and Zaruma and explaining them. The field work and the interviews explore these issues.

First, the strategies related to governance and citizens and interinstitutional participation in the three cantons have been short-lived. Thus, with the possible exception of Zaruma, which appears to have a tradition of citizen engagement (in fields such as tourism) of sorts, none of the cantons seems to be strong in this regard. These circumstances, which hold true for the country as a whole, could be attributed to the lack of a critical mass of people interested in urban planning, the environment and heritage, together with the limited extent of local associative activity and also the lack of local roots of many people who come to these cantons attracted by the mining activity.Footnote 36 As three political actors, one from Zaruma, another from Piñas and the last from Portovelo point out:

[In Zaruma] all the works to be carried out are socialised by the inhabitants […] all those affected are invited to the town hall, where they are informed about the project and they make suggestions […] citizens participate.Footnote 37

[In Piñas] there is no mechanism for citizen participation. That weakness exists […] There is no coordination at all with other municipal administrations; work is carried out in isolation. The climate of collaboration is poor.Footnote 38

[In Portovelo] in the rural area there is always coordination with the rural parishes and here with the municipality […] there isn't much coordination with the citizens […] here the climate of collaboration is poor. There has been no citizen participation in the Plan de Ordenación Territorial as there should be because the consultant […] didn't comply with the terms […] citizens have not been involved in the participation processes.Footnote 39

Therefore, even if things are somewhat different in Zaruma, the degree of participation is weak in the three cantons. As such, promoting citizen participation and empowerment is necessary. In contrast, interinstitutional relationships do seem to be working more fully in concert: the provincial government has taken on areas such as public works (roads and the construction of a community tailings dam), training and skills development, while the national government has adopted a broader remit, related to tourism and its related infrastructure. Although both have come in for criticism, in general they have been assessed positively. There are, however, observers who see a fundamental problem in these collaborative undertakings, namely a lack of continuity. All too frequently, the effort and capital expense of setting up initiatives is followed by disappointment when these are abandoned; a situation that leads to demotivation among the network of participants. This could already be seen at the national level in 2006 as evidence of a lack of trust in the political powers that be.Footnote 40 This problem has been found in all three case studies, with most of the interviewees identifying lack of interest or continuous changes in the make-up of the teams as the principal causes. Here, the issue is illustrated by the words of political actors in Zaruma and Portovelo and an economic voice from Piñas:

[In Zaruma] in Agua y Gobernanza projects the population participates […] by means of training, delivering information and methodology on how to make more efficient use of water, meeting with the presidents of the parish councils […] but the project was over and it remained like that. The problem is lack of continuity […] people who started to act should receive backing.Footnote 41

[In Piñas] we were made an offer […] the government sent trainers […] to start business sessions for export […] but the project was shelved and we don't know when it will be taken up again […] in some aspects […] expectations are sometimes high but given the circumstances […] projects collapse.Footnote 42

[In Portovelo] some time back we worked with the provincial government […] to accommodate tourists in the haciendas […] it worked for some time […] but it was over because we were never summoned […] it never went beyond paperwork, projects […] it didn't move forward.Footnote 43

Interviewees also subtly suggested that frequently the possibility of attracting investment or an improvement in services or infrastructure would be linked to the mayor's ideology and to how in tune he or she was with the central or provincial government. Thus, the arrival of funds to Zaruma to restore its historic buildings or the setting up of a local office of the Agencia Nacional de Tránsito in Piñas would be related to this situation. On the other hand, the poor communication between the urban parish and the rural parishes of Portovelo was attributed to the bad relations that exist between the mayor and the provincial prefect. Therefore, the inclusion of a strong personal element in political relations can be seen as a major constraint and a difference between the case studies.

As illustrated in Figure 1, all the strategies are interconnected; consequently governance culture developed in the case studies influenced other territorial strategies. Following on from this, there are the measures relating to economic development and job creation, such as the promotion of new sectors and the formation of economic clusters or the restructuring of traditional sectors to foster economic competitiveness and job creation. It is significant that in all three cases, in spite of the existence of measures to encourage employment, only a handful have been aimed at diversifying the local economy, still highly dependent on agriculture and mining. Most of the strategies have focused on regularising mining activity and improving agricultural yields. On occasion, the latter have experienced difficulties as a consequence of workers' lack of collaboration, as in the case of the Piñas livestock association, which had the intention of transforming raw material into processed dairy and meat products, but failed due to problems with the workers:

The stockbreeders had formed an association but it didn't work […] the infrastructure was established but now it's at a standstill […] it worked for about 3–6 months […] now it's only producing water […] it was a cooperative fund. The livestock association […] organised themselves to set up a pasteurisation plant […] the plant isn't producing milk because there are problems between the partners.Footnote 44

This situation, mentioned by some of the interviewees, illustrates two of the canton's weaknesses: the shortage of entrepreneurs and the lack of a cooperative culture. In fact, several interviewees highlighted how few initiatives had been undertaken and the preference for working ‘for oneself’ rather than starting a joint business, in which no one could be sure of the other partners’ commitment. This resistance towards cooperatives is confirmed in the National Economic Census, which in 2010 registered one cooperative in Piñas, one in Portovelo and three in Zaruma out of total of 1,861 companies in the three cantons.Footnote 45

Zaruma's cultural heritage (it is a World Heritage City candidate) has led to an increase in tourism and related businesses, such as hotels and restaurants (from 95 jobs in 2001 to 172 in 2010), but this is very different from the situation in the other two cities.Footnote 46 This makes it difficult to get to grips with changing the productive matrix, as set out in the PNBV, as the collaboration between actors is so limited and the initiatives of the municipal governments are scarce. A greater culture of cooperation is needed, along with some of the issues already mentioned, such as focusing on project continuity, and other incentives linked to better training and a greater continuity in terms of the specialists sent from the different ministries (agriculture, industry, SENPLADES) to work in the territory, so that these measures have a bearing on the towns' economic development.

Furthermore, initiatives relating to economic and social innovation are closely linked to the above, since these aim to improve company competitiveness and create the necessary conditions for the emergence of entrepreneurs, through projects developed by business centres and business nurseries to generate technology centres, spaces for entrepreneurs, links between research and economic sectors or urban enhancement.Footnote 47 The main measures adopted in the cases under study have to do with, on the one hand, further training in local people's own fields of activity or lessons on work safety or the environment, and on the other with the construction of a training centre for miners in the Portovelo canton, driven by the national government. In all of them, the creation of networks of collaboration among the actors has been important, as other entities (provincial, ministerial, etc.) are used to carry out the training courses. Also important is the reliance on central government for the building of the training centre and providing instructors for the training courses. It can therefore be seen that, although decentralisation is under way in theory, dependence on the central government in practice is high, and its strong influence on local life is very much present.

[In Piñas] work has been carried out with other institutions under training agreements […] bakery, pottery […] learning during the courses can lead to the setting up of micro businesses […] some micro businesses have been set up.Footnote 48

[In Portovelo] supporting the mining activity would be the best solution […] training miners and trying to improve the environment […] a training centre for artisanal mining will be built to professionalise the activity […] funded by the national government.Footnote 49

This trend reflects to a certain extent the importance that the different ministries have given in recent years to certificates and the ‘professionalisation’ of jobs, which until then had been carried out with barely any control. In the case of Portovelo, the intention is also to improve the control of the effects of mining on the environment. These initiatives, however, have been scarce in a setting in which research is not very important; these places do not seem to have opted for innovation in the past and there is a lack of adaptability to an economic context entailing substantial change.

We next come to strategies aimed at improving quality of life, urbanism and the environment. The importance of these in the case studies should be stated from the outset. The existence of extremely precarious conditions regarding facilities and services in these cities (exacerbated by the fact that they are located on slopes and suffer landslides in the rainy season) together with environmental damage caused by mining makes things difficult from the start. Among the principal measures are the improvement of urban facilities, the renewal of housing stock, environmental initiatives and the recovery of historical heritage.Footnote 50 In Zaruma, specifically, there is also the challenge of preserving buildings in the historic centre, many in a state of deterioration due to their owners' lack of funds. Although some renovation plans in Zaruma are being implemented, promoted by the central government jointly with the municipality – as is happening in other heritage cities in Ecuador – there is still the problem of a shortage of specialist heritage workers in the municipality. Thus they depend to a great extent on the political will of the authorities, the budget and the emphasis given to heritage units in the municipal administration and the instruments of local planning. There are also problems in the governance sphere, when coordinating actions and making decisions about heritage. These highlight the fact that there is little community participation in decision-making related to heritage.Footnote 51 This was also observed in the case of the Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial de Portovelo (Land Use Management Plan of Portovelo). Once again, this showed a limited participative tradition in public affairs. In connection with heritage conservation, a political actor from Zaruma stated:

There is collaboration with the provincial prefect regarding works […] with Fundación Tecnalia from Spain too […] in a project to improve safety and living conditions of people in the historic centre […] it has been socialised […] work was carried out on a municipal building […] a heritage building has been adapted […] to house the heritage office.Footnote 52

Another issue relating to the improvement of quality of life, linked to governance and highly important when considering territorial development strategies, involves the measures taken to raise the environmental quality of the three cantons. All three face serious environmental problems concerning river pollution, mining activity and deforestation. Even though the reasons and seriousness of these are different in each canton, the problems are widespread and the actions taken have yet to produce results. To begin with, water contamination particularly affects Zaruma and Portovelo. These cities share a tailings dam area whose waste discharges have affected the Amarillo River, an affluent of the Puyango River, which flows into Peru and has forced that country to undertake legal proceedings against Ecuador for water contamination. Hence there is a project already under way for a community tailings dam, with a 20-year lifespan, to collect and treat waste generated by mining in the surrounding area. The Portovelo municipal government, the provincial government and the central government are working jointly on this project, which once again shows the strength of interinstitutional relations. As a political actor from Zaruma points out:

There are many beneficiation plants between Zaruma and Portovelo […] since 2008 there has been a state-run project to build a community tailings dam to treat minerals and relocate the plants to a new industrial estate […] but it hasn't been finished yet […] during the night people pour waste into the river […] Peru is pursuing a lawsuit for contamination.Footnote 53

Second, the three municipalities face, as a consequence of mining and cattle activity, severe deforestation, which has weakened the soil and increased the risk of environmental catastrophes in heavy rainfall. Accordingly, in Piñas and Zaruma some interesting projects have emerged entailing the buying of land around the water courses (this will also diminish the pouring of waste into them) to reforest them, to be financed by a new tax tax collected with the water bill. This was one of the most important examples encountered during field work with the local and supralocal actors, with no counterpart in Portovelo, however. As an activist from Piñas states:

Reforestation is important […] the municipality acquired some land to reforest with indigenous species […] we have 50 ha and 35 ha have already been reforested […] a programme was set up in 2006 and it is still being implemented […] work was carried out with the municipalities of [the province of] Loja […] agreements are signed stating that no one is allowed within 40 metres around the water networks in order to preserve the quality of the water […] the landowners are paid not to use that land […] through the water bills.Footnote 54

Finally, in Zaruma and Portovelo a series of regulations have been introduced to control mining activity and prevent it affecting the urban areas of both cantons, where buildings have shaken on their foundations and there are problems of instability. However, the results have been disappointing, mostly because of the lack of coordination in the prevention, control and penalising of the relevant activity. In a context in which mining is not only the principal source of employment but also has a group of workers with quite a lot of political influence and weight when electing political representatives, it is difficult to impose excessively strict controls, as there is the risk of creating social problems. As a political activist in Zaruma stated:

More work with the Provincial Council should be carried out […] with the Ministerio de Medioambiente (Environment Ministry) […] reporting complaints should be less cumbersome. I see the mining activity as a little conflictive […] most of the companies are moving towards the city with their mining activity, there are many mines where work has been stopped [because entry is prohibited] but they go on working […] there should be greater control. There are mines under the city centre, there is a mining exclusion zone but it's not respected […] work in the municipality should be more coordinated.Footnote 55

In brief, in spite of some progress on all fronts to move the three cities towards an integrated territorial development, the weak association culture and the short life of many of the participatory initiatives with local and supralocal actors often appear to undermine measures regarding employment, innovation and quality of life.

Although problems (in terms of time, as the PNBV is to run until 2017, but also in terms of scale because they are planned for the whole of Ecuador) have been highlighted in the assessment of outcomes in the context of the case studies, it is possible to adapt some of the information to show achievements and shortcomings as experienced in these case studies. The data, gathered from different sources, reflect the difficulty of finding continuous series and do not provide a complete account of the strategies analysed, but even so, they seem to show that some progress has been made. In this light, a set of indicators regarding governance appears to reveal something of a paradox: while international studies tend to show Ecuador as a country with a low level of citizenship participation, Table 5 shows that, in most cases, the cantons under study present higher levels than the provincial average.Footnote 56 ,Footnote 57 Although unfortunately it was not possible to compare those indicators directly with the average for Ecuador, the figures indicate that Zaruma has average and low (in ‘strength’ and ‘consultation mechanism’) components; Piñas has average and low (in ‘strength’) components and Portovelo has average values for all components. Therefore, despite not being able to compare this information with other existing data, the three cantons are shown to be in an intermediate situation within the national context and a slightly positive one within the provincial context.Footnote 58

Table 5. Governance Indicators for Case Studies

Source: Author's elaboration from Banco del Estado (2010).

The quality of life (Table 6) indicators provided by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censo are superior both in number and in terms of the possibility of establishing diachronic analyses.Footnote 59 From this perspective all the cantons studied improved their indicators between 2001 and 2010. Several (percentage of population with cane or wood walls, connected to the public water network, telephone and electricity services, houses with toilet facilities, and literacy rates) showed much better outcomes than the provincial average. Therefore, in spite of the unsolved environmental problems (mining, river contamination, etc.), living conditions seem to have improved noticeably, at least regarding health and housing.

Table 6. Quality of Life Indicators Corresponding to the Case Studies

Source: Author's elaboration from Censo Nacional de Vivienda (2001 and 2010).

With reference to indicators related to employment, which come from the same source, Table 3 shows a significant drop in agriculture, a considerable increase in mining, stagnation in industry, a remarkable increase in construction and an uneven increase in the service sectors between 2001 and 2010. These figures suggest that the attempts to change the productive matrix are not proving entirely successful in these traditional mining cities. Industrial stagnation, low growth in the service sector (in both private and public sectors) and the continued strong influence of mining show the need to put more forceful measures in place.

A final group of indicators that has no counterpart in previous data is related to innovation. Table 7 shows how this component, in spite of the modest results, has similar or even better outcomes than the provincial average across all indicators except investment in skills development. This is evidence of the efforts – admittedly weak as yet – made by the companies of the region, reflecting the moderate policies (both in terms of initiatives and results) implemented to foster innovation in the cantons and confirmed in this study.

Table 7. Innovation Indicators Corresponding to the Case Studies

Source: Author's elaboration from Censo Nacional Económico (2010).

Conclusions

Today towns and cities play an important role within the territorial development strategies that drive political, economic and social change in Latin America. This statement is clearly true for big cities, which have developed successful management models overcoming scenarios of demographic growth without a parallel increase in their economy or political muscle. However, it requires further refinement when it comes to small and medium-sized cities. In these, the weight of a local history marked by the scant influence of civil society, and aggravated by their smaller population, which hampered the development of the ‘critical mass’ needed to significantly influence local politics, often represented important obstacles. This can be seen in the case studies of Zaruma, Piñas and Portovelo, which show some progress, but also certain shortcomings which seem to persist despite the political changes which have taken place in the country.

Governance has been a fundamental factor enabling territorial development strategies to evolve and function adequately. Accordingly, interinstitutional relations seem to work in the three case studies, with positive implications in the building of infrastructures and facilities or in workforce training. However, at the same time limited citizen engagement has been observed, either because there is no participatory culture or because the intended participatory mechanisms have not always been followed.

This has translated into problems with other components of the integrated territorial development initiative, related for example to limited project continuity, which in turn has important consequences for other elements affected negatively by the lack of engagement and continuity (for example, problems establishing solid line paths or the little influence of innovation policies). This issue, which also seems to have been identified in mining towns in other countries, is a significant problem for these places, since the shortcomings in areas such as facilities, workforce skills and pollution require policies to be continuous over time.Footnote 60 Problems have also been found when it comes to carrying out the measures put forward by the national government, because officials in charge of implementing them are often not trained adequately or have limited knowledge of the territory. Job and staff rotation is often high. Local politicians show little interest and local society is extremely disjointed, with no associations to serve as a link between the local and supralocal administration. Moreover, the decentralisation process and the transfer of competences are taking too long. As a consequence, direct investment from the central government is still needed, due to the financial constraints on the local governments, a fact closely associated with the absence of an adequate tax collection system.

Regarding the PNBV, this research has shown that its design as a national policy that lays down guidelines which are to be put into practice regionally through definite measures has not been as positive as was hoped. The absence of indicators at local level to quantify the extent to which the process is advancing, the lack of coordination with those responsible for implementing measures and the absence of clear-cut local initiatives have rendered the process disjointed and limited at local level. This is confirmed by the research.

In sum, the social, political and economic processes that Ecuador is experiencing have achieved evident ‘macro’ results in areas such as public investment, decreasing poverty or the improvement of health and education. However, the transfer of these components to places marked by a local history dependent on a primary export model, and where social participation is still low, presents challenges which can only be overcome gradually. One of the principal challenges is the encouragement of the proactive participation of citizens and their engagement in development strategies, so that they cease to be passive recipients and start to monitor them in order to achieve greater effectiveness and continuity.

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Figure 0

Figure 1. Strategies of Urban Revitalisation for Integrated Development

Source: Author's elaboration based on Méndez, 2010.21
Figure 1

Figure 2. Evolution of Poverty % and Gini Index in Ecuador (2007–15)

Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censo, www.ecuadorencifras.gob.ec.
Figure 2

Table 1. Evolution of GDP Growth rate in Latin American Countries (2007–13)

Figure 3

Table 2. Comparison of Public Investment, 2006 and 2010

Figure 4

Figure 3. Geographical Location of Case Studies

Source: Author's elaboration.
Figure 5

Table 3. Average Employment by Sector in Piñas, Portovelo and Zaruma (2001–10)

Figure 6

Table 4. Population Evolution and Year-on-Year Comparison (%) of Case Studies (1950–2010)

Figure 7

Table 5. Governance Indicators for Case Studies

Figure 8

Table 6. Quality of Life Indicators Corresponding to the Case Studies

Figure 9

Table 7. Innovation Indicators Corresponding to the Case Studies