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Banks and Entrepreneurs in Porfirian Mexico: Inside Exploitation or Sound Business Strategy?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 May 1999

NOEL MAURER
Affiliation:
Departamento Académico de Economía, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México
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Abstract

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Banks in Porfirian Mexico widely engaged in the practice of making long-term loans to their own directors, a practice known as ‘auto-prestamo’. This was neither pernicious nor fraudulent. Rather, Porfirian banks behaved as the financial arms of extended kinship and personal business groups. These groups used banks to raise impersonal capital for their diversified enterprises and give their partnerships a more permanent institutional base. Investors in these banks knew full well that they were investing in the businesses of a particular group and developed sophisticated techniques to monitor bank directors. However, because entry into banking was severely restricted under Porfirian law, the system concentrated economic power in a few hands and contributed to Mexico's oligopolistic industrial structure.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

Footnotes

I would like to thank Stephen Haber, Gavin Wright, Avner Greif, Ted Beatty, Joachim Voth, and the anonymous referees of the Journal of Latin American Studies for their comments on earlier versions of this paper. Any and all errors are, of course, entirely my own.