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Spinoza & Dutch Cartesianism. Philosophy and theology. By Alexander X. Douglas . Pp. vii + 184. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. £30. 978 0 19 873250 1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 September 2016

Victor Nuovo*
Affiliation:
Middlebury College/Harris Manchester College, Oxford
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Abstract

Type
Reviews
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

In this short book Alexander Douglas argues in favour of interpreting Spinoza's philosophy in the light of the ongoing conflict between Dutch Cartesians and Protestant Scholastics, the latter rooted in Calvinism and Neo-Aristotelianism. At issue was the viability of natural theology with or without the support of biblical revelation. Protestant theologians charged the Cartesians with impiety, because they separated natural philosophy from theology, explaining natural events by purely natural or mechanical causes, making no mention of divine creation and providence, and hence giving God no glory. The Cartesians defended this practice by appealing to the integrity of natural philosophy in its separateness, a principle of separation that has its roots in Bacon, although this is not acknowledged by Douglas. Spinoza responded by reconnecting theology and natural philosophy, and by providing a historical critical interpretation of the Bible that limits biblical revelation to its particular political theological context, and by replacing biblical authority with the political principle of the liberty of philosophising. Douglas's thesis concerning Spinoza's context is eminently plausible, and it fits the radical and subversive intent of Spinoza's philosophical programme and its comprehensive scope. However, he fails to make the case. Whilst his exposition of the Cartesian and Protestant background is on the whole adequate and useful, his interpretation of Spinoza is not. His exposition of Spinoza, especially of his metaphysics, is brief and inadequate, and most likely will only confuse novices and perplex more experienced scholars. He fails to explain how Spinoza recast the Cartesian notion of substance and made it the central idea of an a priori naturalistic monism. Indeed, he seems to have no clue to the essential character of Spinoza's metaphysical system. He also seems not to comprehend certain logical concepts on which his exposition depends: viz. the distinction between valid and sound argument, and the nature of circularity.