In Failed Democratization in Prewar Japan, Harukata Takenaka has two major goals: to better understand semi-democratic regimes and to explain why Japan descended from semi-democracy to military authoritarianism in the early 1930s. Takenaka spends the first portion of the book laying out his conception of a hybrid semi-democratic regime. He suggests that semi-democratic regimes have three major characteristics. First, while elections are held regularly and for important posts, they are not completely free or fair because of restrictions on freedom of expression and association. Second, not all major political offices are held accountable to the voters: there are important posts that are not subject to elections. Third, only a small portion of the population has the right to vote. Takenaka argues that Japan's political regime from 1918 to 1932 met all three characteristics, and can therefore be considered a semi-democratic regime.
Takenaka argues that semi-democratic regimes are understudied in the literature. He suggests that too much scholarly work on regimes and transitions focuses on the shift from authoritarianism to democracy. Takenaka argues that transitions in other directions, such as Japan's experience of going from semi-democracy to military authoritarianism, should receive scholarly attention as well. In addition, Takenaka submits that too many academics seem to believe that a transition from semi-democracy to democracy is swift and inevitable, but Japan's experience demonstrates that transitions toward democracy are far from preordained.
Semi-democratic regimes, according to Takenaka, tend to break down when the balance of power between democratic and nondemocratic forces within the regime begins to change. When the balance of power shifts too far in the nondemocratic direction, the regime is likely to fail. The relationship between democratic and nondemocratic forces within semi-democratic regimes is governed by three major factors: political institutions, legitimacy, and semi-loyalty. Political institutions are important because they determine the legal basis of the regime and help govern the actions that internal forces, democratic and nondemocratic, are likely to take. The regime's legitimacy is also crucial because it impacts the level of power democratic forces can project against their challengers. Finally, semi-loyalty is important: when democratic actors become only partially loyal to the regime, they empower nondemocratic forces while diminishing the power of their democratic allies.
The author's measurement of legitimacy is problematic: Takenaka gauges the regime's legitimacy based on newspaper columns, opinions of intellectuals, turnout rates, labor strikes, and conflicts between peasants and their landlords. Most of these elements of legitimacy are extremely hard to measure, and Takenaka could have benefited from taking a more direct approach to measuring legitimacy. His introduction of the concept of semi-loyalty, however, is an interesting innovation.
In the second portion of his book, Takenaka turns to exploring three periods of Japan's history: the competitive oligarchical era from 1889 to 1918, the semi-democratic era from 1918 to 1932, and the military authoritarian era from 1936 to 1945. The competitive oligarchical era began with the adoption of the Meiji Constitution in 1889. Takenaka argues that the oligarchical period in Japan's history paved the way for the emergence of a semi-democratic regime in 1918. It did so by expanding suffrage, encouraging some political competition, and giving the electorate control over some political offices. In addition, during this period the elected Lower House had some moral suasion over the actions of the nondemocratic government.
As Japan shifted into its semi-democratic era, political competition intensified. Both major parties had nationwide organizations and formal policy prescriptions. In addition, parliamentary government was effectively established, as the President of the largest party in the Diet was appointed Prime Minister. However, Takenaka argues that this period cannot be considered fully democratic for three reasons. First, the government intervened in the electoral process and excluded certain groups from participation altogether. Second, the franchise was limited to 20 percent of the population. Third, four of Japan's major political institutions, including the military, were still not under popular control. Party government during this period was also burdened by a lack of cohesiveness, fragmented political power, and the relative autonomy of the military.
Takenaka suggests that, despite its precarious position, party government was fairly successful in constraining the military's influence between 1918 and 1926, mostly because of its high level of legitimacy. Nonetheless, party government failed to capitalize on that legitimacy to bring more offices under the electorate's control. After eight years of relative inaction, the semi-democratic regime began to break down. According to Takenaka, between 1926 and 1932 party government's legitimacy was eroded by scandals, a rise in semi-loyalty, economic crises, and unpopular secret deals between political parties. As a result, the balance of power between party government and the military began to shift in the military's direction. As party government's credibility diminished, its ability to restrain the military also declined. After several political crises, in 1932 the military stepped in to help remove the semi-democratic regime.
As Japan transitioned from semi-democracy to military authoritarianism, a new ruling class emerged, composed of members of the army, navy, bureaucracy, some politicians, and a handful of aristocrats. Free speech in the Diet was severely limited and its power was curtailed. Moreover, the new regime that emerged in the 1930s, under pressure from the military, began to intervene in elections for the Diet. The military became extremely influential, with sway over the composition of the Cabinet and government policies.
Takenaka concludes that the most important factor in encouraging the failure of Japan's semi-democratic regime was its inability to bring all of the nation's important political offices, including the military, under the electorate's control. Overall, Takenaka does a good job in contrasting the political realities of the three periods of Japanese history explored in the book, although he spends surprisingly little time looking at the role of the Emperor. Takenaka also offers a thorough overview of his conception of semi-democratic regimes and the problems that can cause their downfall. Some cursory understanding of modern Japanese political history would be desirable before reading Takenaka's work, as at times his historical descriptions can be overly detailed and technical. However, Takenaka does make several adept comparisons with other semi-democratic regimes to make the book more accessible.
