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A demographic factor as a determinant of migration: what is the effect of sibship size on migration decisions?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 November 2019

Jianmei Zhao*
Affiliation:
China Academy of Public Finance and Public Policy, Central University of Finance and Economics, 39 South College Road, Beijing 100081, China
Hai Zhong
Affiliation:
China Academy of Public Finance and Public Policy, Central University of Finance and Economics, 39 South College Road, Beijing 100081, China
*
*Corresponding author. E-mail: jianmei@cufe.edu.cn

Abstract

Developing countries often lack an adequate social security system, and elderly parents rely heavily on their children for support. Aging populations and low-fertility rates are an emerging trend in developing countries. In this paper, we examine the effects of sibship size on individuals' internal migration decisions in China. We find that the number of siblings has a positive effect on individual migration decisions, but this effect is non-linear and marginally increasing. Second, we find that having brothers has a more significant effect on migration decisions than having sisters. Finally, although of different magnitudes, the effects are persistent across genders, Hukou status, and education levels.

Type
Research Papers
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain 2019 

1. Introduction

Life expectancy has risen in many developing countries over the past several decades. In 1975, the majority of the world's population aged over 60 resided in developed countries. However, a United Nations report shows that in developing countries, the population over 60 increased to 554 million in 2013 and is growing at the fastest pace ever: 3.7% per year from 2010 to 2015 and projected to grow by 2.9% annually before 2050 [United Nations (2015)]. It is common for developing countries to lack adequate social security systems and institutionalized care, causing elderly parents to rely heavily on their children for support.

In addition, low fertility is quickly becoming the norm in many developing countries. In 2010, 70 countries were categorized as having low-fertility rates (2.0 or fewer children per woman), according to the United Nations' World Fertility Report 2013. Many developing countries in Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean are experiencing fertility levels that are below the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman [United Nations (2013)].

At the same time, labor migration (either internal or international) is a popular and efficient way for adult children in developing countries to improve their well-being. Given the need for children to provide support for their elderly parents, it is interesting to examine whether the trend of low fertility imposes a constraint on migration. In this paper, we empirically examine the effects of sibling numbers on individuals' internal migration decisions in China.

Our study is related to two strands of literature. The first concerns the determinants of migration. There are many factors that may affect an individual's migration decision. For example, lager wage differentials, better education and labor skills, existing social ties in the migration destination, lower language and culture barrier could increase the probability of migrating out; on the other hand, need of care provision to parents may negatively affect an individual's migration decision. However, when formal care markets exist, there could be a substitution effect between earning making remittances and care provision to the parents. There is a large literature on those determinants of migration [detailed reviews are available in Greenwood (Reference Greenwood1975); Borjas (Reference Borjas, Ashenfelter and Card1999, Reference Borjas2014); Molho (Reference Molho2013)]. In the past, existing studies mainly focused on socioeconomic determinants of migration, which include wage differentials, labor skills, employment opportunities, attitudes toward risk, information availability, social ties, and language or cultural barriers.

In recent years, there is a small but growing literature on demographic factors as determinants of migration. Connelly and Maurer-Fazio (Reference Connelly and Maurer-fazio2016) considered effects of number of children on living arrangements of elderly parents; however, their focus is not the effects on individuals' migration decisions. Antman (Reference Antman2012) considers the intrafamily allocation of elderly care among siblings in the context of migration. Stohr (Reference Stohr2015) theoretically and empirically explores two effects of siblings' interaction on migration decisions; a chain migration effect that can increase the probability of migrating out, and a specialization effect that increases individuals' incentives to remain at home and provide care for their parents when their siblings migrate. Empirical estimates from Moldova indicate that second effect dominates the first one.

Comparing with our study, the main focuses of both Antman (Reference Antman2012) and Stohr (Reference Stohr2015) are the interactions among siblings rather than the effect of sibling numbers on migration decisions. Furthermore, those effects might be different across different social and economic contexts. For example, Bratti et al. (Reference Bratti, Fiore and Mendola2017) found no empirical support for the hypothesis that high fertility drives migration. Our empirical estimates for China regarding internal migration decisions provide contrary results. Moreover, our empirical specifications allow us to explore threshold effects of sibling numbers, i.e., having one sibling is different from having two or more siblings.

We also consider the literature on the social effects of sibship size. Numerous studies have examined the effects of sibling numbers on children's human capital accumulation, i.e., the quantity–quality trade-off theory. Studies have been conducted in the context of developed countries [e.g., Becker (Reference Becker1960); Becker and Lewis (Reference Becker and Lewis1973); Becker and Tomes (Reference Becker and Tomes1976); Rosenzweig and Wolpin (Reference Rosenzweig and Wolpin1980); Hanushek (Reference Hanushek1992); Black et al. (Reference Black, Devereux and Salvanes2005); Caceres-Delpiano (Reference Caceres-Delpiano2006); Lee (Reference Lee2008); Angrist et al. (Reference Angrist, Lavy and Schlosser2010)] and developing countries such as China [e.g., Li et al. (Reference Li, Zhang and Zhu2008); Rosenzweig and Zhang (Reference Rosenzweig and Zhang2009); Millimet and Wang (Reference Millimet and Wang2011); Liu (Reference Liu2014); Zhong (Reference Zhong2014)]. The results are mixed for both developed and developing countries. Some studies found a negative relationship between sibship size and children's education or health, concluding that there is a quantity–quality trade-off as suggested by theoretical models. Some found that measures of children's education or health are not affected or are only marginally affected by the number of siblings, and hence concluded that there is little or no support for the quantity–quality trade-off. However, few studies have examined the influence of sibling numbers on other aspects of life.

Our analysis is conducted in the context of China, the largest developing country. In China, the role of children in providing elder care is rooted in the Confucian norm of filial piety. For thousands of years, having children (especially sons) ensured medical care, social security, and long-term care for most elderly Chinese, and this intergenerational care is a crucial part of Chinese family values [Ikels (Reference Ikels, Maddox and Lawton1993); Jiang (Reference Jiang1995); Zhang (Reference Zhang2007)]. In addition to this social norm, the role of family support of elderly parents was codified into law in China. The Marriage Laws of 1950 and 2001 emphasized that children have a responsibility to support their elderly parents. Many studies have documented the existence of regular financial transfers, in-kind transfers, or labor input from children to their elderly parents in China, both in rural and urban areas [e.g., Zimmer and Kwong (Reference Zimmer and Kwong2003); Cai et al. (Reference Cai, Giles and Meng2006); Giles and Mu (Reference Giles and Mu2007)]. Until very recently, institutional elder care in China was rare and mainly provided to people without children or close relatives. In response to the rapid aging of the population and decline in the availability of family caregivers, the number of elder-care homes has increased in the past several years. However, the supply of elder care is far less than needed [Feng et al. (Reference Feng, Liu, Guan and Mor2012); Zhu (Reference Zhu2015); Liang and Marier (Reference Liang and Marier2017)]. On the other hand, many Chinese are reluctant to send their elderly parents to elder care homes, as this is still considered a stigma in Chinese culture [Shang (Reference Shang2001)].

Along with economic reforms, China's non-agricultural labor market has experienced dramatic growth that has caused a large volume of migration. Estimates using the 1% sample from the 1990, 2000, and 2010 rounds of the Population Census show that the inter-county migrant population grew from just over 20 million in 1990 to 79 million in 2000 and 120 million in 2010, which represents roughly 3%, 10%, and 16% of the working-age population in the respective years [Giles and Mu (Reference Giles and Mu2007); National Statistics Bureau of China (2010)]. Types of migration include short-distance within-region migration and long-distance inter-provincial migration. The lack of adequately paying jobs in rural areas is the main reason why farmers have moved to cities. Disparities in wages between the more developed coastal provinces (such as Beijing, Guangdong, and Shanghai) and the mainly agricultural inland provinces (such as Anhui, Hunan, and Sichuan) lead to large volumes of inter-provincial migration. Calculations in Chan (Reference Chan, Ness and Bellwood2017) show that in 2005, about 65% of migration occurred within provinces; the remaining 35% was inter-provincial.

Migrant workers have made significant contributions to China's economic growth. One report indicated that at the beginning of 2010, migrant workers made up half of China's urban work force and accounted for half of the country's gross domestic product (GDP).Footnote 1 Foreign trade is an important driving force of the Chinese economy and has consistently accounted for more than 40% of annual GDP in the past decade [National Statistics Bureau of China (2016)]. The millions of migrant workers are the foundation of the success of the “Made in China” phenomenon. In export centers in the Zhujiang Delta area, rural migrant labor accounts for 70%–80% of the labor force [Chan (Reference Chan, Ness and Bellwood2017)]. On the other hand, high-skill jobs in China are more concentrated in large cities. Increasing numbers of Chinese youth have received higher education in the past two decades, and they tend to purse their goals and aspirations in large cities.

China is among the few developing countries that is transforming into an aging society, and it may experience the most dramatic population aging process in human history. As a result of socioeconomic development and the one-child policy implemented in the 1980s, the fertility rate in China dropped from 6.0 in 1957 to 1.28 in 2010 [Cai and Wang (Reference Cai and Wang2006); National Statistics Bureau of China (2010)]. At the same time, life expectancy at birth has risen continuously, from 35 in 1949 to 75.4 in 2015 [Bergaglio (Reference Bergaglio2008); CIA (2015)]. Therefore, the effects of sibship size on migration decisions in China deserve careful study.

This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the data and variables used in the analysis. Section 3 presents the empirical results. In the estimation, one concern might be the potential endogeneity issue of sibship size. For example, some parental characteristics could be correlated with both fertility decisions and children's migration decisions. This may cause an omitted variable bias. To formally address this concern, we first employ a propensity score matching method with tests of hidden bias. Matching could remove significant differences in the covariates between the two categories of children. However, if there are unobserved variables that simultaneously affect assignment into treatment and the outcome variable, a hidden bias might arise. We use a Rosenbaum Hidden Bias test to identify whether our estimations suffer from this problem. As a further check on the issue of hidden bias, we then conduct an instrumental variable (IV) estimation in which variability in the strictness of the one-child policy across locations and over time is used to construct IV. The last section provides discussion and conclusions.

2. Data and variables

Our data come from two sources. One is from the 2013 cycle of the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS). The CHARLS is a nationally representative sample of Chinese people aged 45 and older, collected using a multi-stage, stratified, clustered sampling method. The 2013 CHARLS includes data for 18,605 individuals in 150 counties and districts within 28 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions in mainland China, and covers 450 communities/villages. The populations in Hainan, Ningxia, and Tibet are too small for sampling, and the data from these provinces were not included.

The CHARLS is a comprehensive survey that covers many aspects of health, earnings, and other socioeconomic factors of surveyed individuals and their family members that are divided into 13 modules. We obtain children's information from the family module, related information about their parents is taken from the demographic, income, heath care and insurance, and work retirement and pension modules. The targeted population in this study is the adult children of elderly adults. To study the effects of sibship size on individuals' internal migration decisions, we restrict our sample to parents who did not move out of the county where their children were born to avoid co-migration of parents and their children. As a result, 8.83% parents are excluded. Excluding samples with their necessary variables being missed, our final estimation sample includes 14,048 adult children.

The other data source is from Ebenstein (Reference Ebenstein2010) who constructed yearly provincial “Fine” data for above quota birth from 1979 to 2000. The One-Child policy was initiated in 1979 in china. Each couple had to pay a monetary fine for unauthorized births to obtain the registration of children's Hukou, which directly determines the accessibility of education and welfare programs provided by the government. The magnitude of fines varies across provinces and over time. We calculated the “Fine” for the children in CHARLS by matching their birth province and birth year according to Ebenstein's fine data. For the children born before 1979 or children with authorized birth, the “Fine” equals zero, otherwise the “Fine” rate for each child is dependent on his/her birth province and birth year in the Ebenstein data.

The definitions and summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis are presented in Table 1.Footnote 2 Based on children's locations of birth and current residence, we generate two dichotomous dependent variables that measure migration decisions in relation to distance from the original family. The variable “Mig-city” takes a value of 1 if the child works and lives in a city different from the parents' permanent address. “Mig-city” measures within-province migration. The variable “Mig-province” measures inter-provincial migration, which takes a value of 1 if the child works and lives in a province different from the parents' permanent address. To have a better understanding, we present a map of China and rate of out-migration by province in Figure 1. A table summarizing the data is provided in the Appendix (Table A1). Independent variables related to children include the number of siblings, further examined as numbers of sisters and brothers; the demographic characteristics of children include age, gender, education level, and marital status. Independent variables related to parents include average age, education level, marital status, health status, and aggregate income. Table 1 shows that the mean age of adult children in this study is 35, and 80% are married at the time of the survey. About half of children have an education level of middle school or senior high school, and 14% hold a college degree or above. About 5.7% of the children are the only child in the family.Footnote 3 The remaining children have an average of 2–3 siblings. The average age of parents is 62, and almost all married parents live with their spouse. The education levels of fathers are higher than those of mothers.

Note: We did not color the provinces of 46 (Hainan), 54 (Tibet), and 64 (Ningxia) as they are not covered in the CHARLS. The provinces highlighted with darker colors correspond to higher percentage of out-province migration.

Figure 1. The percentage of out-province migration.

Table 1. Summary statistics

Note: Data are from 2013 CHARLS.

3. Empirical analysis

To estimate the effects of sibship size on individual migration decisions, we estimate a model as follows:

(1)$$Mig_i = \alpha + \beta \,siblingsize_i + {X}^{\prime}_i\gamma _1 + {Z}^{\prime}_i\gamma _2 + \varepsilon _i$$

where Mig i is a measure of the migration decision of individual i, α is a constant, and siblingsize is a measure of the number of siblings. X i is a set of control variables of individual i, including age, gender, level of education, and marital status. Z i is a set of control variables of parents, including age, health status, level of education, marital status, and average income.

We first estimate the model with the ordinary least square (OLS) method in section 3.1. Since endogeneity is a potential concern of our policy variable sibship size, we will discuss and formally address this issue in sections 3.2 and 3.3. Specifically, we first employ a propensity score matching method with tests of hidden bias, and then use an IV approach as a robustness check. Further robustness checks are reported in section 3.4.

3.1 OLS results

Some observations consist of siblings from the same household; therefore, we correct the standard errors with the assumption that observations are clustered at the household level in all the estimations below. The effects of sibling number on individual migration decisions are reported in Table 2. Columns 1 and 2 present the effects of being the only child (singleton) on migration decisions; singletons are significantly less willing to migrate out of their city and province. In columns 3 and 4, we report the effects of number of siblings on migration decisions. For individuals with one or more sibling, the probability of migrating out of the home city and province increases by about 2%, relative to those without siblings. In a traditional East Asian society with a strong son-preference, the effects of having sisters could differ from those of having brothers. Therefore, we estimate the effects of number of brothers and number of sisters separately. The results in columns 5 and 6 suggest that the number of brothers has a stronger effect on migration decisions than the number of sisters. Coefficients of the control variables in Table 2 show that migration decisions are more strongly correlated with individual characteristics than those of parents. In general, well-educated children with greater earning potential are more likely to migrate out of their homes. Female children have greater likelihood to migrate than their male counterpart, this perhaps because that, in Chinese culture, boys are more responsible for supporting their parents, whereas girls normally leave their parents' family and join their husbands' one after the marriage.

Table 2. The effects of singleton, number of siblings, number of sisters, and number of brothers on migration decisions

Note: The reported standard errors are clustered at the household level, we also cluster standard errors at the community level, and the significance of variables remain. ***, **, *: Statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

In the above analysis, we assume a linear relationship between sibling number and migration decision and estimate the average effects. To allow maximum flexibility in this relationship, we transform the variables related to sibship size into a set of dummy variables and re-estimate equation (1). From Table 3, we observe a trend of increasing marginal effects of sibship size on migration. For example (see column 1), compared with singletons, the probability of an individual with one sibling migrating out of his/her city increases by about 15%; the probability increases by 3.6% to 18.6% when an individual has two siblings, but marginal effects are negligible after two siblings. A similar pattern is observed if we separate sibship size into number of sisters and number of brothers.

Table 3. The effects of number of siblings, number of sisters and number of brothers on children's migration decisions

Note: The reported standard errors are clustered at the household level, we also cluster standard errors at the community level, and the significance of variables remain. ***, **, *: Statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Other control variables include: Age, Age2, gender, children's education levels, children's birth Hukou status. The parent's information includes their age, marriage status, income, and education levels. Children's birth provinces are also controlled.

To see whether there are heterogeneous effects of sibship size on migration decisions, we conduct subgroup analyses and report the results in Table 4. First, we make between-gender comparisons of the effects of sibship size on migration decisions. Columns 1 and 2 show that for singletons, being female has a much stronger negative impact on migration than being male. Nonetheless, having siblings could significantly stimulate female's probability of inter-city and inter-provincial migration, particular for female who have brothers. We also conduct the analyses by children's birth Hukou status and their education level. Columns 3–6 show that the effects of sibling number on migration decisions are slightly stronger for children birth with an urban Hukou and high-education levels. Over all, we observe a positive effect of sibling number on migration.

Table 4. Effects of singleton, number of siblings, number of sisters, and number of brothers on migration decisions, by subgroup

Note: The reported standard errors are clustered at the household level, we also cluster standard errors at the community level, and the significance of variables remain. ***, **, *: Statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Other control variables include: Age, Age2, gender, children's education levels, children's birth Hukou status. The parent's information includes their age, marriage status, income, and education levels. Children's birth provinces are also controlled.

3.2 Endogeneity of sibship size, and a propensity score matching method with tests of hidden bias

In the literature on effects of sibship size on children's accumulation of human capital, a foremost concern is the potential endogeneity issue of sibling number. Both quantity and quality of children could be chosen by parents. If this is true, an observed quantity–quality trade-off could be spurious due to unobserved household characteristics and parental preferences. Whether an explanatory variable suffers from endogeneity is crucially related to the nature of the dependent variable. The two most important causes of endogeneity are reverse causality and omitted variables. The dependent variable in our analysis is individual migration decision, which occurs many years later than parental decisions about fertility. While there is a potential effect of sibling number on migration decisions, there might not be an effect from the other direction. Regarding the omitted variable issue, one concern is that that some parental characteristics could be correlated with both fertility decisions and children's migration decisions. To formally address this concern, we first employ a propensity score matching method with tests of hidden bias and then use an IV approach as a robustness check.

We follow Rosenbaum and Rubin (Reference Rosenbaum and Rubin1985) to perform a matching approach to evaluate the causal effects of sibling number on children's migration decisions. In practical terms, estimating the effects of sibling number (with singletons as the reference group) is equivalent to measuring the effects of singletons (with children with siblings as the reference group). Since about 5.7% of children in our sample are singletons, and matching a small sample from a large population facilitates a better matching balance, we consider singletons as the treatment group whereas children with siblings are in the control group. The identified average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) implies how less likely a singleton tends to migrate compared with a child with siblings?

Children are distinguished by whether they are the only child (P = 1/0), where 1 indicates that the child is a singleton and 0 indicates the child with siblings; Y 1 denotes the migration outcome conditional on a singleton (P = 1), and Y 0 denotes the migration outcome conditional on a child with siblings (P = 0). The ATT is defined as:

(2)$${\rm ATT} = E\lsqb {Y^1{\rm \vert} P = 1} \rsqb - E\lsqb {Y^0{\rm \vert} P = 1} \rsqb $$

Empirical data for E[Y 1|P = 1] are available for singletons, but the migration outcomes of their counterfactual state (if they have siblings), E[Y 0|P = 1], are unavailable. We assume that given a set of observable covariates of children (X) and their parents (Z), potential outcomes are independent of whether the child is a singleton, and the mean of potential migration outcomes is the same for singletons and children with siblings after adjustments for observable differences [Lechner (Reference Lechner2002); Imbens (Reference Imbens2004)]. Thus, we use matched children with siblings to measure how the singletons would have made migration decisions had they had siblings. Conditional on the matching estimators of observable covariates from both children (X) and their parents (Z) in equation (1), the ATT is calculated by comparing the mean probability of migration between treated singletons and controlled children with siblings:

(3)$${\rm ATT} = \displaystyle{1 \over N}\mathop \sum \limits_i \left[ {\lsqb {Y_i^1 {\rm \vert} P = 1,X} \rsqb - \mathop \sum \limits_j \omega \lpar {i,j} \rpar \; \lsqb {Y_j^0 {\rm \vert} P = 0,X} \rsqb } \right]$$

where N is the number of matches; $Y_i^1$ and $Y_j^0$ are outcome variables measuring the migration outcomes of singletons and children with siblings, respectively; and ω(i, j) is the weight of a child with siblings (j) matched to a singleton child (i). Matching covariates are control variables of both children (X) and their parents (Z) in our linear probability model. We separately match singletons with children with a given number of siblings to reflect the relative effects of different sibling numbers. Mating variables are control variables from both children (X) and their parents (Z) in our linear probability model. The ATT outcome variables are presented in Table 5.Footnote 4

Table 5. ATT of outcome variables and sensitivity analysis

Note: ***, **, *: Statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

The matching approach is based on the assumption of conditional independence or unconfoundedness. Nonetheless, if there are unobserved variables that simultaneously affect assignment into treatment and the outcome variable, a hidden bias might arise to which matching estimators are not robust. Following Rosenbaum (Reference Rosenbaum2002), we apply a bounding approach to determine how strongly an unmeasured variable may influence the selection process. Sensitivity analysis of hidden bias is also presented in Table 5. For example, when the critical value of hidden bias (Γ) equals 1.75–1.80, if children with the same covariates differ in their odds of being a singleton vs. a non-singleton by a factor of 75%–80%, the significance of singleton effects on outcome variables may be questionable.

The ATT estimates from each matching group in Table 5 uniformly indicate that singletons are less likely to migrate out of the city or province compared with their counterfactual state (having siblings), reflecting the positive effects of sibship size on migration decisions. In addition, as sibling number increases, the magnitude of the estimated ATT increases. These results are consistent with the linear probability model (section 3.1) that having more siblings increases the probability of migration.

3.3 IV approach as a robustness check

The results in Table 5 indicate that omitted variables do not pose a serious threat to our analysis. As a further check on the assumption of unconfoundedness, we use variability in the strictness of the one-child policy across locations and over time to construct an IV and re-estimate the main equations. This is a commonly used approach in recent literature [e.g., Ebenstein (Reference Ebenstein2010); Li and Wu (Reference Li and Wu2017); Wei et al. (Reference Wei, Zhang and Liu2017); Zhong (Reference Zhong2017)]. China's one-child policy was implemented from 1979 until 2015. This policy significantly reduced the average number of children per family. As a result, the fertility rate dropped from about six in the 1960s to less than two in the 1990s. Meanwhile, the strictness with which the one-child policy was implemented varied across provinces and over time and had a significant influence on individual fertility decisions. Penalties for above-quota births usually included a large fine, denial of household registration, and demotion or dismissal from work for parents employed in the state sector. Fines were heavy and varied dramatically across provinces and over time. For example, for an above-quota birth, Liaoning province fined parents 10% of their income for 14 years, while Guangxi province collected a one-time penalty equivalent to about 5 years of household annual income [Li and Wu (Reference Li and Wu2017)].

Using data from Ebenstein (Reference Ebenstein2010), we construct an IV “Fine,” which equals the ratio of the fine to family annual income for above-quota births from 1979 to 2000.Footnote 5 This variable varies over time and across provinces. For people born before 1979, the variable equals zero. We then match this variable with the CHARLS data according to birth year and province of each child. On the one hand, “Fine” is considered as the financial cost of a child imposed by the government; the demand for children should decrease as the fine increases. On the other hand, “Fine” reflects the rigidity of each province in implementing the one-child policy, which largely depended on incentives of government officials in charge of the local Population and Family Planning Commission in the 1980s and 1990s and is not directly correlated with an individual's current migration decision.

The results of the IV estimation are reported in Table 6. In the first column, the coefficient of “Fine” in the first-stage regression is statistically significant and shows a negative impact on sibling number. The first stage F-statistic is 174.52, which is above the conventional criteria of 10, indicating that “Fine” is a strong instrument for number of siblings. The Anderson–Rubin weak identification test is equal to 4.19, with a p-value of 0.04, suggesting that the endogenous regressor is not under-identified and the instrument variable is valid.

Table 6. Two-stage least squares IV estimation

Note: “Fine” is used as the instrument for the number of siblings. The Anderson–Rubin weak identification test is equal to 4.19, with a p-value of 0.04, suggesting that the endogenous regressor is not under-identified and the instrument variable is valid. The reported standard errors are clustered at the household level, we also cluster standard errors at the community level, and the significance of variables remain. ***, **, *: Statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

Since we have only one IV, we only estimate the effects of sibling number on migration decisions. Columns 2–3 show qualitatively similar conclusions that having more siblings significantly increases an individual's probability of migration.

3.4 Additional robustness checks

As shown in the top panel of Table 7, introduction of the one-child policy at the end of the 1970s produced a radical change in family structure in China. One concern is that the effect of being a singleton differs for cohorts before and after introduction of the one-child policy. Therefore, we estimate equation (1) separately for individuals born before and after 1978. Results in the bottom panel of Table 7 support our conclusion, i.e., being a singleton affects migration decisions of both the younger and older generations. However, the negative effects of being a singleton on migration are stronger for those born before 1978, possibly because parents are older and more likely to need family support.

Table 7. Sub-sample analysis, born before and after 1978

Note: The reported standard errors are clustered at the household level, we also cluster standard errors at the community level, and the significance of variables remain. ***, **, *: Statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. In view of space, results for the other control variables are not reported.

Another concern might be an omitted variable bias caused by the omission of birth order. This is, if parents have some preference for children based on their birth parity, the effect of sibship size may mask this preference (due to the co-movement of birth order and sibship size). In other words, if for some reasons Chinese parents prefer to have their first child close to them, and dispatch higher parity children as migrants instead, a spurious positive correlation may emerge between sibship size and emigration, since higher parities are only found in larger families. As a sensitivity test, in our regression we add a dummy variable that equals to one if the observation is the first child in his or her family, and report the results in Table 8. Although the magnitude of the coefficients of our variables of interest are smaller, we still could reach similar conclusions.

Table 8. When birth order is introduced for children with siblings

Note: The reported standard errors are clustered at the household level, we also cluster standard errors at the community level, and the significance of variables remain. ***, **, *: Statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. In view of space, results for the other control variables are not reported.

Furthermore, the effects of sibship size on migration decisions might be different across age groups. Children may migrate out more easily when their parents are relatively young, and have to stay home to provide support to their parents when they get older. To test this hypothesis, we run the regressions separately for the following four age groups: between 20 and 25, between 25 and 30, between 30 and 35, between 35 and 40. Results in Table 9 provide supporting evidence for this hypothesis.

Table 9. The effects of singleton and number of siblings on migration decisions among different age groups

Note: The reported standard errors are clustered at the household level, we also cluster standard errors at the community level, and the significance of variables remain. ***, **, *: Statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. In view of space, results for the other control variables are not reported.

Finally, the estimated effects might be different between rural and urban areas. Therefore, we conduct sub-group analysis according to parents' Hukou status. In China, people with rural Hukou normally live in rural areas and participate in certain agricultural related work. Regression results in Table 10 show that for those children who have at least one parent with rural Hukou, and those whose parents both have urban Hukou, the estimated effects do not have systematic difference.

Table 10. The effects of sibship size on migration decisions among when group children by their parents' Hukou status

Note: The reported standard errors are clustered at the household level. ***, **, *: Statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. In view of space, results for the other control variables are not reported.

4. Discussion and conclusions

In this paper, we examine the effects of sibship size on individuals' decisions about migration within China. We find that number of siblings has a positive effect on migration decision, but this effect is non-linear and marginally increasing. Compared with singletons, individuals with one sibling have a significantly greater probability of migrating; the presence of additional siblings has a positive effect on migration decisions. Second, we find that having brothers has a more significant effect on migration decisions than does having sisters. This is consistent with the son-preference tradition in East Asian society. Finally, although differing in magnitude, the effects are persistent exist across genders, urban and rural Hukou status, and education levels.

After controlling the potential endogeneity of sibship size, the estimated effects are generally larger than those obtained from OLS estimations. One possible explanation is that some unobservable parental characteristics are positively correlated with sibship size and negatively correlated with children's migration decisions. For example, parents who feel unsecure about their old age may raise more children and exert negative influences on children's migration decisions latterly. The one-child policy caused a sharp decline in fertility. While the one-child generation has gradually become the majority of participants in the labor market, our results suggest that a lack of siblings may have a negative impact on internal migration in China. This is in line with migration trends over the past decade. Our estimations indicate that the annual rate of increase in internal migration in China is 8.5% from 2005 to 2010; however, this number falls to 2.2% between 2010 and 2015 [National Statistics Bureau of China (2012); National Health and Family Planning Commission (2016)]. The one-child policy was relaxed after 2016, and a second birth is now officially allowed; our findings suggest that this may have positive effects on internal migration in China in the future. Although developing countries have different social norms regarding elder care, the trend of increasing life expectancy and low birth rates suggests that our findings may be useful to policy makers in other developing countries where children play an important role in elder care.

Acknowledgement

We thank the editor, Professor David de la Croix, and three anonymous referees for comments that substantially improved the paper. We also gratefully acknowledge financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China (project number: 71673314).

Conflict of interest

The authors certify that they have no affiliations with or involvement in any organization or entity with any financial interest or non-financial interest in the subject matter or materials discussed in this manuscript.

Appendix

Table A1. The percentage of out-migration for each province

Table A2. Matching balance for singletons and children with one sibling

Table A3. Correlations between covariates in the regression

Footnotes

1 Source: Andrew Jacobs, New York Times, August 29, 2011.

2 A table with the correlation between the variables is provided in the appendix.

3 The total fertility rate in China was 2.90 in 1979 and 1.87 in 1990 (National Statistics Bureau of China, 2010). This explains why only 5% of observations in our sample are the only child in the family. Before the end of the 1970s, very few Chinese families had just one child. The one-child policy was implemented in 1979. In principle, no family can have a second birth. In practice, because of difficulty in implementation and the potential for social unrest, the policy was relaxed in many areas to allow some families to have a second child under certain circumstances. For example, if the first child is a girl, or both parents are an only child, the couple may be allowed to have a second child.

4 The matching balance results would be provided upon request.

5 In the calculation, fines were discounted to present values. Refer to the very detailed explanation of the calculation of fines in the appendix of Ebenstein (Reference Ebenstein2010).

Notes: We use GenMatch to match singletons with children who have siblings. The standardized mean difference approach (Rosenbaum and Rubin, Reference Rosenbaum and Rubin1985) and empirical quantile–quantile (QQ) plot approach are used to check the matching balance of continuous variables suggested by Sekhon (Reference Sekhon2011). For continuous variables, the standardized mean difference is calculated as $B = 100\lpar {{\bar x}_{\rm T} - {\bar x}_{\rm C}} \rpar /\sqrt {\lpar {s_{\rm T}^2 + s_{\rm C}^2} \rpar /2}$, where $\bar x_{\rm T}$ and $\bar x_{\rm C}$ denote the sample mean of covariates in treated and control groups, and $s_{\rm T}^2$ and $s_{\rm C}^2$ denote the sample variance of covariates in treated and control subjects. For dichotomous variables, the standardized difference is calculated as $B = 100\lpar {{\hat p}_{\rm T} - {\hat p}_{\rm C}} \rpar /\sqrt {\lpar {{\hat p}_{\rm T}\lpar {1 - {\hat p}_{\rm T}} \rpar + {\hat p}_{\rm C}\lpar {1 - {\hat p}_{\rm C}} \rpar } \rpar /2}$ where $\hat p_{\rm T}$ and $\hat p_{\rm C}$ denote the mean of dichotomous variables in treated and control subjects, respectively. p-values from the bootstrapped K–S test are presented in the table to statistically assess the distribution difference of covariates. We perform each match between singletons with children who have 1 sibling and 2, 3, 4 or more siblings, separately. Here we report the first matching balance; other matching balances are available upon request.

Note: ***, **, *: Statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Child education takes values of 1, 2, and 3, larger value represents the higher level of education. Father's education and mother's education are measured in the same way.

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Figure 0

Figure 1. The percentage of out-province migration.

Note: We did not color the provinces of 46 (Hainan), 54 (Tibet), and 64 (Ningxia) as they are not covered in the CHARLS. The provinces highlighted with darker colors correspond to higher percentage of out-province migration.
Figure 1

Table 1. Summary statistics

Figure 2

Table 2. The effects of singleton, number of siblings, number of sisters, and number of brothers on migration decisions

Figure 3

Table 3. The effects of number of siblings, number of sisters and number of brothers on children's migration decisions

Figure 4

Table 4. Effects of singleton, number of siblings, number of sisters, and number of brothers on migration decisions, by subgroup

Figure 5

Table 5. ATT of outcome variables and sensitivity analysis

Figure 6

Table 6. Two-stage least squares IV estimation

Figure 7

Table 7. Sub-sample analysis, born before and after 1978

Figure 8

Table 8. When birth order is introduced for children with siblings

Figure 9

Table 9. The effects of singleton and number of siblings on migration decisions among different age groups

Figure 10

Table 10. The effects of sibship size on migration decisions among when group children by their parents' Hukou status

Figure 11

Table A1. The percentage of out-migration for each province

Figure 12

Table A2. Matching balance for singletons and children with one sibling

Figure 13

Table A3. Correlations between covariates in the regression