Introduction
Decades after the rise of modern IslamistFootnote 1 movements, the factors behind their peacefulFootnote 2 or violentFootnote 3 behavior still remain mysterious. In recent years, while many moderate Islamist groups seeking formal recognition have remained quiet under state repression,Footnote 4 pervasive violence broke out in some Muslim countries.Footnote 5 The prevailing studies on the Islamist violence particularly stress the role of state behavior toward these movements. States – particularly if nondemocratic – are routinely assumed as capable of exclusively affecting the formation of such movements as well as their mode of behavior. The omnipotence of state actions is specifically attributed to their capability for single-handedly orchestrating the rules in those countries where authoritarian regimes are in charge.Footnote 6 Thus, they are able to ‘shape’ the behavior of the Islamist groups by cornering and eventually diminishing their room for maneuver.Footnote 7 Therefore, while state repression is associated with violent Islamist behavior, various forms of co-optation or recognition are seen as keys to affirming Islamist moderation.
While convincing, these explanations attribute little or no dynamic agency to the Islamist groups, which constitutes the starting point of this study. More specifically, it explores the role of organizational differences among moderate Islamist groups on the breakout of violence or its absence following their repression. It argues that ideological and practical concerns of the Islamist groups can affect their initial perception of available opportunities and limitations, including any existing regime constraints, and lead them to adopt an organizational style – here simply divided into ‘party’ vs. ‘front’ format. Later, however, the centralized or decentralized organization styles of Islamist groups can constrain or expand their long-term strategy choices in unpredicted ways. Whereas establishing a political party can initially restrict the choices and actions otherwise available to a moderate Islamist movement, the loose framework of a political front reduces the organizational costs and lends remarkable flexibility to attract a wider range of followers. Later, however, these conditions are reversed. The boundaries of political parties enable limited access of an Islamist group into the political system otherwise completely inaccessible, and can enhance its power. Likewise, the protean characteristics of political fronts can become a liability in raising the suspicions of the incumbent regimes about having ties with radical Islamist factions. Worse, the radicals can also perceive them as rivals, and take advantage of their repression to start launching violent attacks to replace them.
For the reasons explained below, four countries are selected to discuss these points. In Turkey and Indonesia, the Islamist groups demonstrate the short-term downside effects of assuming the party format, which also helps to explain their long-term political success and peaceful mien. In both cases, the party framework has restricted the spectrum of non-violent options otherwise hypothetically available to moderate Islamist movements by reinforcing the exclusive use of political methods. Later, unlike their counterparts organized as political fronts, the better delineated boundaries of these movements have helped them to gain credibility as purely political – i.e., non-violent – organizations. Thus, they have been able to avoid any serious allegations about having organic ties with militant extremists. The same characteristics have also helped these movements to gain partial yet constant access to the existing political system. Promoting their ideological views alongside their non-Islamist counterparts and building their own patronage ties, in turn, have gradually enabled them to widen the existing crack further to their advantage.Footnote 8
The set of ideological and organizational advantages and drawbacks for establishing political parties are reversed for the Islamist groups organized as political fronts. As the examples of the FIS in Algeria and the MB in Egypt suggest, the decentralized structure of the political front format enabled these Islamist groups to retain a spectrum of the non-violent means at their disposal, of which politics is only one. The reduced costs of maintenance due to the loose-knit ties have been another incentive for them to maintain their decentralized form of existence. Ultimately, however, the political front framework has helped these groups to keep both their boundaries and their objectives fluid and responsive. The ambiguities on what they include and represent or not, in return, significantly helped the moderate political Islamist movements in Algeria and Egypt to attract a diverse range of followers, sometimes including the radicals.
The same cases furthermore indicate that the advantages of maintaining a loose-knit organization can backfire for those Islamist groups that adopt them in the long run, and become a leading cause of Islamist violence. In Algeria, the protean characteristics that initially provided the FIS its remarkable flexibility have also played a significant role in the loss of control over its followers later. Amorphous boundaries have cost both the FIS and the MB their images as peaceful movements, and further raised the suspicions of the political regimes facing them. They have also invoked the wrath of the non-incorporated radical Islamist groups, which considered them competitors. Ultimately, both groups have lost their credibility in the eyes of their supporters and opponents alike. Worst, however, is the unexpected entry of the radical Islamist groups on to the scene to rival the leadership of the Islamist political fronts as the leaders of the Islamist movement in both countries. The ire of the governments that has led to the repression of both groups also proved auspicious for their radical rivals to start or escalate their violent attacks to attract attention, and, preferably, followers.
Finally, on a broader scale, this study argues that organizational factors matter, as they enable the otherwise individual actors to socialize and undertake common goals.Footnote 9 Organizational decisions also help in understanding the consequences of the steps that such movements take in response to the political environment surrounding them. On a different level, studying the organizational factors offers an alternative to the essentialist portrayals of Islamists as wild-eyed reactionary religious fanatics, and depicts them as political actors capable of rational and strategic reasoning according to the existing ‘structures of opportunity’.Footnote 10 While incapable of explaining all actions of the Islamist groups in politics, studying the Islamist strategies and their consequences – both expected and unforeseen – can provide a more balanced view of the state–Islamist relations.
Case selection
There are 41 Muslim countries in the world. In 22 of them, Islamist groups have sought formal recognition as political parties or groups since 1980s. At least 12 out of these 22 countries are known to harbor radical as well as moderate Islamist groups.Footnote 11 Among them, following state repression, widespread violence gradually erupted in Algeria, Egypt, and Tajikistan. Here, two peaceful and two violent cases out of this subset of countries are taken for further discussion.Footnote 12 Whereas Islamist movements organized as political parties have peacefully existed in Indonesia and Turkey, widespread violence broke out following the repression of the leading moderate Islamist groups in Algeria and Egypt. Nahdlatul Ulama (NU, ‘the awakening of Islamic scholars’) in Indonesia and Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party – WP) and its descendents in Turkey represent the moderate Islamist movements organized as ‘political parties’, i.e. with a centralized structure. Similarly, the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) in Algeria and al Ikhwan al Muslimun (the Muslim Brotherhood – MB) in Egypt constitute examples of moderate Islamist movements organized as ‘protean political movements’ or ‘political fronts’. Taken altogether, these four countries offer a view of the peaceful or violent evolution of political Islamist movements in terms of the advantages and disadvantages that both organizational frameworks offer to these groups initially and later.
Algeria represents the most tragic example of violent state–Islamist interactions. Founded in 1982, the leading Islamist organization in the country, the FIS (Front Islamique du Salut, Al Jabha al-Islamiyya li-Inqadh, or the Islamic Salvation Front) sought official recognition as a political party in1989, following the announcement of the authoritarian political regime led by President Chadli Benjedid to open up the system. The first one of its kind in Algerian history, the first half of the general elections ended with the victory of the FIS. By the end of these first pluralist elections ever held in Algeria in 1990, the FIS had already affirmed its position as a formidable political force: it received 55% of the votes in comparison to the incumbent party's 31%, and won 853 of the 1,539 municipalities.Footnote 13 The rapid political rise of the FIS went further after its victory during the first round of the general elections held in December 1991, where it took 47.2% of the votes.Footnote 14 The second round of elections, though, were never held: alarmed by the election results, the military intervened at the beginning of 1992. The elections were halted, the FIS was banned, and many of its supporters and leaders were arrested. The already increasing violent demonstrations and unrest by the Islamists following the interruption of the elections dramatically accelerated following the ban on FIS. Over 100,000 lives were lost in the years that followed.
The Egyptian experience, while much less bloody, has also been eventful. Throughout the 1980s, the Egyptian state extended some rights to moderate political Islamists that enhanced the MB's position as the leading political opposition.Footnote 15 By forming a coalition with non-religious parties, the MB even managed to enter parliament in 1987. During the early 1990s, however, the Egyptian state changed its approach and started what it later also conceded as a ‘heavy-handed’ campaign against the MBFootnote 16 In the cities, certain neighborhoods such as Imbaba or some regions in the south where radical Islamist groups had gained a free hand in local affairs, or even claimed to form ‘a state within a state’ were hardest hit.Footnote 17 The Brethren also received their share of repression. Right before the 1995 elections, over 1,000 members and supporters were arrested, and only one managed to get elected out of the existing 180.Footnote 18 Although nowhere near the massive carnage in Algeria, the violence that followed the repression of MB between the state forces and radical Islamist groups later was labeled as a ‘civil war’ by the government officials in 1993.Footnote 19 The Islamist violence during these years differs in its focus and intensity from its predecessors. Unlike in former years, the Islamists have primarily ‘targeted the state and its institutions’, and their frequency increased several-fold.Footnote 20 In retrospect, the arrest of the MB members during these years are ironic: ‘[a]lthough the Brotherhood had helped the government turn jailed Islamist militants toward nonviolence, in the months leading up to the 1995 elections the NDP imprisoned the most popular Brotherhood candidates and engineered their convictions in military court’.Footnote 21
Although the MB is currently represented in the Egyptian parliament through its independently elected members, its confrontation with the state is not over. In 2005, hundreds of people were arrested by the police for getting involved in illegal street activities posed against the regime. The arrests evoked the fury of the Brethren, which responded by threatening the regime with ‘civil disobedience if that was the only way to achieve freedom and justice for the Egyptian people’.Footnote 22 Daily harassments on various levels continue to date.
Contrary to Algeria and Egypt, the story of political Islam in Turkey has mostly been peaceful. The rise of the Islamist movement in modern Turkey dates back to 1970s. The first of its kind in Turkey, the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi) was established in 1972 and became the third largest party in 1973. The NSP played an active role in Turkish politics until the military coup in 1980, when it was closed down for covertly seeking to demolish the existing political system to establish a sharia-based regime. Instead of going underground, however, its members established the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) immediately after the civilian regime was restored in 1983. Successful both at the municipal and general elections, the WP finally came into power by forming a coalition government with a center right party in 1996. In 1997, however, based on the charges of violating the principles of secularism defined in the constitution, the WP was brought to court again. Under intense pressure from the military, the non-religious media, and the opposition parties in parliament, it finally had to step down from government, and was closed down in 1998. Another successor, the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi) was already established in 1997 and entered parliament as the third largest party following the general elections in 1999. Yet, a combination of political scandals and other events brought the premature end to the VP in 2001, which was closed down by the Constitutional Court on charges that it was a direct descendent of the WP. A split within the Islamist movement followed, and two new parties emerged. The first one, the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi), was founded on the axis of the NOP-NSP-WP-VP. It has followed the political course laid down by its predecessors for decades. Its competitor Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) was established in 2001 by the ‘new generation’ Islamists – most of them former members of the VP. Managing to marginalize the FP and taking the lead within the Islamist movement, the JDP performed unexpectedly well during the general elections in 2002, and came into power on its own, and was further bolstered by the 2007 general elections, in which it took nearly half of all votes.
Similar to Egypt, Islamist movements in Indonesia precede its independence in 1945. Unlike the latter, however, moderate Islamist activism in Indonesia has remained multivocal almost since the earliest years of its existence.Footnote 23 Among the Islamist activist organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama (the Awakening of the Islamic scholars) is possibly the most remarkable. Established in 1926, the organization is estimated to have around 30 million followers, and thus the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia. Following the Second World War, the NU became a political party, and garnered nearly 40% of all votes with another Islamist party, Masyumi.Footnote 24 Although the united Masyumi and NU could have easily swayed the political course of the newly independent Indonesia single-handedly, their split due to internal rivalries ultimately helped President Sukarno, the founder and leader of the new Indonesian state, to take advantage of the following deadlock to lay the foundations of his authoritarian ‘Guided Democracy’ years.Footnote 25 With the arrival of General Suharto into power in 1966 and the New Order period under its leadership further consolidated the authoritarian features of the political regime. While the New Order administration rewarded the NU's loyalty to the state during the internal civilian conflicts that shook Indonesia during mid-1960s, it also left little leg room for any Islamist ambitions to maneouver.Footnote 26 In 1973, the Indonesian political system experienced a major reshuffle that significantly diminished the political leverage of the Islamist groups vis-à-vis the existing political system. All existing political parties were shut down, except for three that were formally allowed to exist to cover all major tendencies of the Indonesian political spectrum. The new political arrangement practically introduced a barely concealed single-party rule, and severely curtailed the actions of political Islamists, now united under the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan), including the NU.Footnote 27 This arrangement held until 1998, when Suharto finally stepped down under increasing pressure, and democratization of Indonesian politics began in earnest. Earlier, in 1985, however, the NU had already decided to withdraw from active politics, and become a political pressure group, which has persisted to date.
Finally, a word on the choice of time frame is in order. Islamist movements in some cases, such as Egypt and Indonesia, have a long history. Spanning their entire evolution is beyond the means of this study, which, instead, focuses on roughly the years between 1980s and 2000.Footnote 28 While deciding on a time period is never fully objective, there are convincing reasons to focus on this particular one. It was during this period that political Islamist movements gained velocity in many parts of the world. In many Arab countries, some form of multiparty elections on various levels was conducted, and institutional reforms of varying degrees were introduced.Footnote 29 The sample countries have also experienced important changes. In Algeria, the 1999 presidential elections and their aftermath have played a significant role in the normalization process which has positively affected the overall level of violence there. In Indonesia, the New Order regime led by Suharto came to an end in 1998 when he stepped down, followed by democratic parliamentary elections in 1999; the first of their kind since 1955. The newly elected president, Abdurrahman Wahid, was also the NU leader. The turn of the century also brought changes to the Islamist movement in Turkey, which came to a crossroads with the internal split in the movement spearheaded by the Welfare Party and its clones that culminated with the establishment of the Justice and Development Party in 2001. Even in Egypt, where the ending year seems most arbitrary due to the lack of a similar landmark event regarding the evolution of the Islamist movement there, moving it a couple of years forward does not seem to alter the conclusions reached.
State behavior as independent variable – can it explain it all?
States are often quoted as the main factor affecting the organizational framework and mode of behavior of the Islamist groups. Authoritarian state policies in particular are held responsible both for the rising popularity of the MB, the most prominent moderate Islamist movement in Egypt established in 1928, and the Islamist violence that followed its repression since 1990s.Footnote 30 The New Order administration under Suharto from late 1960s to late 1990s is depicted as the shrewd secular architect of the peaceful brand of Islamism in Indonesia.Footnote 31 In Turkey, state policies are assumed to be responsible for the increasing electoral success of the Islamist movement.Footnote 32 Finally, the roots of the Islamist violence in Algeria throughout 1990s are often traced to the state elites,Footnote 33 who formally approved the FIS as a political party in 1989.Footnote 34
These arguments converge in their assumption that the mode of Islamist behavior in a Muslim country – including its capability to form any kind of political organization – exclusively depends on state actions. Varying degrees of state repression or accommodation are thus used to explain the level of formal organization and mode of behavior of the moderate Islamist groups in different settings. The idea is, given a chance, all moderate Islamist groups would organize themselves into political parties. That they do not do so is not by choice, it is because they cannot. Consider the FIS in Algeria. Although established in 1982, it only sought to gain political party status in 1989, after the announcement of the authoritarian regime in power to open up the system.
State actions are important, since they can ‘delimit movement viability and the menu of tactics, actions, and choices’ of their Islamist opponents.Footnote 35 However, they are unable to capture all the nuances essential to understanding different outcomes in similar conditions on their own. Establishing Islamist parties, for instance, does not always depend on state regulations. Sometimes they are established despite explicit state prohibition. Consider Turkey. Although four parties founded by the Islamist movement have been closed down since 1970s, it has operated as a political party to pursue its goals, and has even managed to come into power more than once. It is significant, considering the fact that the Turkish constitution explicitly bans the formation of parties on religious grounds.
Sometimes, there are no explicit state rules, but de facto constraints against establishing an independent Islamist party. They, too, have limited constraining effects. Consider the evolution of the NU.Footnote 36 When the authoritarian New Order regime practically truncated the Indonesian political system into single-party rule in 1973, it targeted all opposition groups, yet it particularly hit the Islamists. The newly established umbrella party, the UDP, was ‘perceived as a wholly unsatisfactory vehicle for Islamic interests. It was designed to be just that.’Footnote 37 Finding itself caught between working with its former rivals and increasingly stifling state restrictions, the NU nevertheless did not relinquish its political party status until 1985.
As these examples suggest, similar state attitudes toward a certain condition do not always produce similar Islamist responses. In fact, as Bellin argues, ‘there is no simple correlation between a state's coercive capacity and will and its demobilization of society . . . Consequently, popular mobilization must be measured on its own, independent of assessment of the state's coercive capacity and will’.Footnote 38 This is because ‘while misery is ubiquitous, mobilization is not . . . grievances are not irrelevant, but there is a missing intermediary set of variables that is necessary to translate grievances into actualized mobilization’.Footnote 39 To understand the state–Islamist interactions better, some of the possible choices and consequences they face therefore require further reflection.
Choices and consequences
Once faced with an Islamist movement demanding political recognition, a state can always actively respond by either recognizing such requests or repressing them.Footnote 40 If the state decides to recognize the movement, it has the further option of doing so formally and within a democratic framework, or granting some of the requests, but withholding formal recognition, or ‘accommodate’. ‘Accommodation’ can involve any form of incorporation, including offering resources or patronage, short of political recognition in a democratic framework to appease and/or stem the demands of Islamist groups. It contrasts with the absolute and complete repression of such demands. States are also capable of repressing such movements after a period of full recognition or accommodation. Such a decision can be independent or dependent on the Islamist actions following their initial recognition.
Islamist movements, in response, can react by accepting the available terms and remain peaceful or reject them and turn violent. Numerous factors can influence their decision, including:
the degree of political system receptivity to challenger groups, the prevalence of allies and opponents, the stability of the ruling elite coalition, the nature of state repression, and state institutional capacity . . . While these dimensions may impact social movements by either opening or closing possibilities for activism, movement responses are contingent upon recognition and interpretation of opportunities and threats.Footnote 41
The perception and response of the Islamist movements can be affected by their ideological outlook.Footnote 42 The immediate benefits and drawbacks of each organizational style also influence their final decision. Once adopted, the organizational aspect becomes particularly interesting as it can influence the behavior of these groups in unexpected or unpredicted ways in the long run.
Mode of organization: party vs. front
Once accommodated, and opting to remain peaceful, an Islamist movement needs to decide on its mode of organization. ‘[S]ocial movements’, Clive Thomas points out, ‘display a wide range of diversity depending on their degree of organizational and strategic cohesiveness and the extent of their antiestablishment status.’Footnote 43 Only two forms are considered here: political parties and political fronts.Footnote 44 Both terms require further definition.Footnote 45 A political party is simply a centralized form of organization. The term ‘centralized’ denotes both structural cohesion between members, and the existence of a readily identifiable set of goals that involve advancing a political program through more or less set procedures. Regardless of the compatibility of these programs with the existing regime policies, the followers of a political party are expected – or agree – to follow them.Footnote 46
All political parties require ‘ideal and material purposes or objectives’.Footnote 47 Yet, parties do not always follow the goals they initially promote to attract followers.Footnote 48 Nor do their set procedures reflect a rigid adherence to orderliness.Footnote 49 Nevertheless, organization is a key factor to distinguish a party from a faction.Footnote 50 A functioning, orderly structure helps to ‘strengthen the organization’.Footnote 51 Typical party organization, while containing layers, is not hierarchical.Footnote 52 Some sort of ranking exists, but it is not rigid. Nevertheless, ‘each level of organization, to accomplish its ends, must obtain the collaboration of the lower layer or layers of organization’.Footnote 53
If political parties are neither rigid, nor in many cases institutionalized organizations, what holds them together? The classic response is, ‘[t]he ties of party loyalty, the obligations of individual to individual, the leverage of patronage, and the harnessed ambitions of men may create a compact and manageable group of party workers’.Footnote 54 For Islamist groups, organizing as a political party can bring self-reinforcing utilitarian and ideological returns. The level of access to patronage, in particular, can define the utilitarian returns. Patronage matters, as it ‘enables the organization leadership to weld together a cohesive group of workers animated by an appreciation of past favors and even more, by an expectation of future rewards’.Footnote 55
In Turkey and Indonesia, even limited access to patronage sources has helped the Islamist parties to increase their power in the existing system. It has also given them an incentive to remain peaceful under state repression. In Turkey, during 1970s, ‘coalitions gave the NSP legitimacy, a foot inside the state, and patronage with which to support and cultivate their clients, the religious orders and their off-shoots’.Footnote 56 During the WP-led government in 1990s, Islamists effectively established patronage ties by undertaking ‘wholesale changes of personnel in the bureaucracy, particularly attracting attention through its attempt to change senior legal figures – judges and prosecutors’.Footnote 57 The impact of the electoral – political – concerns over the behavior of the Islamist movement in Turkey is also visible through the internal split that heralded the end of the WP's successor, the VP and later, the rise of the JDP into its leadership. The relatively poor performance of the VP during the 1999 elections significantly contributed to the following unrest and criticisms that broke out among its ranks preceding the breakup.Footnote 58 The use of patronage ties to affirm and further party loyalty has also continued during the JDP period.
Likewise, in Indonesia, the strengthening role of patronage ties over the political identity of the NU peaked between 1953 and 1971, during which its members constantly participated in governments as Ministers of Religious Affairs. Van Bruinessen refers to the ministry as an ‘NU fortress’ during those years, ‘giving the party much patronage to dispense in the form of employment and other facilities’.Footnote 59 Later, the split of the NU from the PPP in 1980s can be traced to the intra-group political conflicts within the latter and the rapidly diminishing patronage resources after 1973.Footnote 60 Similar observations also exist for the MENA region.Footnote 61
The ability of parties to both express and combine political interests distinguishes them from other group formations, such as interest groups. This impact is traditionally explained with detailed party programs for governing, on which they base their actions.Footnote 62 Political parties can increase solidarity and affect their supporters' behavior particularly in those political settings where ‘[b]allots and bullets are both available, though asymmetrically distributed’.Footnote 63 This effect is dependent on the ability of political parties to portray themselves as magnets of nonviolent, orderly political action to their followers. Here, ‘partisan identities . . . serve as an organizing device for the voters’ political evaluations and judgments'.Footnote 64 More specifically,
[j]ust like sports loyalties, attachment to a emerging political party draws an individual into the political process to support his or her side . . . Partisans are more easily mobilized by political parties to turn out at the polls, and feel a stronger sense of personal motivation to support their preferred parties and candidates. Finally, partisanship encompasses a variety of normative attitudes regarding the role that political parties should play in the democratic system.Footnote 65
Meanwhile, protean political movements – or fronts – are often decentralized.Footnote 66 As a form of social movement, they can include ‘a defined leadership, a loose organizational structure, and a mixed record of coordinated strategy’.Footnote 67 Political fronts aim to:
construct frames that diagnose a condition as a problem in need of redress . . . Second . . . offer solutions to the problem, including specific tactics and strategies intended to serve as remedies to ameliorate justice. And third . . . provide a rationale to motivate support and collective action.Footnote 68
Following the description of Tarrow, they also tend to:
lack conventional organization and resources, but by making highly visible dramatic, and extreme claims on elites or authorities, organizers not only attract and influence new supporters, but reinforce the solidarity of old ones and gain the attention of both enemies and allies.Footnote 69
These descriptions do not perfectly fit the existing cases. The superior organizational capabilities of certain Islamist organizations like the MB, for instance, are well known.Footnote 70 Similarly, in newly established party systems, political parties can resemble fronts.Footnote 71 Nevertheless, Islamist groups themselves often distinguish between these two forms by calling themselves a political party or a movement. Ideological differences can play a role in their distinction.
Islamist groups and organization: ideological concerns
Islamist groups share a common interest in Islamizing the society they live in. Their methods of pursuing this, however, widely vary. Despite the tendency of the opponent regimes to clump them together, radical and moderate Islamists often do not see eye to eye.Footnote 72 When an Islamist terrorist attack occurs, moderate groups hastily deny any responsibilities for it. Meanwhile, the radicals snub the conciliatory efforts of the moderates to gain formal entry into politics.Footnote 73 Studies on political Islam, therefore, routinely divide such groups into moderates and radicals to track these variations concerning their existence, absence, and co-existence (or co-absence). This delineation, however, is not always helpful in understanding the differences between moderate movements. For instance, Islamist groups are simply called ‘moderate’ if they do not explicitly advocate violence for their purposes. Yet, advocating peaceful methods does not mean there is universal agreement on a specific purpose.
Take politics. While all moderate Islamist groups can be counted as ‘political’ depending on their goal, their proposed path of reaching them does not always involve using politics. Although all Islamist groups with an interest in politics can be counted as ‘political’, its organizational expression varies. Among moderate political Islamist groups, only some have identified themselves as a distinctly political organization, or a political party.
Nahdlatul Ulama in Indonesia and the former Welfare Party and its descendants in Turkey are such examples. Established in 1926, NU became a political party following the independence of Indonesia and remained as one until mid-1980s, after which it became a political pressure group. Political organizations with significant electoral success and distinguishable Islamist rhetoric in Turkey date back to the early 1970s. Although several Islamist parties were formed, elected, and have entered the Turkish parliament to date, they have also been closed down with alarming frequency in recent years. Yet, none of these political restrictions – including the bans on some of the most prominent Islamist leaders – has led their followers to seek violent vengeance as the FIS followers in Algeria did. Instead, they have ‘played by the rules as much as any other political party in Turkey’.Footnote 74
While not rejecting political methods, some moderate Islamist groups do not feel bound by their restrictions. Assuming the choices of moderate Islamist groups on using political methods as dichotomous, the second approach views politics as a tool among many other non-violent tools, including economic, educational, and social, to reach their goal; i.e. establishing an Islamic state. The first kind, however, treats it as its primary tool to achieve the same goals. Another difference rises from choosing centralized vs. decentralized forms of organization. Other conditions being equal, moderate Islamist groups that prefer political methods are more likely to organize themselves into ‘political parties’ than those that view politics as one of the many available options and organize as ‘political fronts’.Footnote 75
In Egypt, the MB works for an Islamic state, but its goals are not limited to the political realm. In fact, the Brethren have traditionally promoted themselves as a supra-political movement, both comprising and transcending politics. To its followers, the MB represents a variety of things, including:
(1) a da'wa from the Quran and the sunna (tradition and example) of the Prophet Muhammad;
(2) a method that adheres to the sunna;
(3) a reality whose core is the purity of the soul;
(4) a political association;
(5) an athletic association;
(6) an educational and cultural organization;
(7) an economic enterprise; and
(8) a social concept.Footnote 76
The FIS in Algeria constitutes a similar example. Underneath its distinctly Islamic tone, it appealed to all segments of the Algerian society as their mouthpiece against the single-party, authoritarian political system: ‘a melting-pot for very diverse factions which have little more in common than Islam and the desire to put an end to a political situation in Algeria based on arbitrariness and economic inequality’.Footnote 77 Thus, ‘the FIS has manifested itself in various guises – as a Leninist-type vanguard, a Western-style political party and a militant religious organization attempting to lead a revolution – each with its own methods and aims’.Footnote 78 Various statements of its members further indicated that it was not willing or ready to embrace politics as its sole method of gaining power.Footnote 79 In fact, prior to the 1991 elections – the first democratic one ever held in Algerian history – some of the militant Islamist groups were apparently already in contact with the FIS.Footnote 80
Adopting the party format can offer significant ideological advantages to an Islamist group in the long run. Thus even partial diffusion into the existing political system remains highly desirable for many Islamist groups.Footnote 81 It is assumed that after securing a foothold in the system, ideological infiltration into highly prized fields, such as education, becomes only a matter of time. While not entirely a result of strategic planning on their part, the success of Islamist groups in Indonesia and Turkey exemplify this point well. First, though limited, having access into the system has enabled them to widen their ideological influence. The decades-long control by the NU of the Ministry of Religion constitutes a good example to this condition. In Turkey, the resistance of the Islamist movement to the closure of the secondary schools giving religious education during the WP-led government and the consequent state crisis that led to its closure is also significant.Footnote 82 Islamist politicians readily acknowledge the potential of these schools as a rich source for expanding their network.Footnote 83 Meanwhile, party organization has encouraged the Islamists in Turkey to frame their ideological convictions into peaceful political goals, even under duress.Footnote 84 Among other things, it can be considered as the acculturational impact of the party framework. As explained next, unlike the MB in Egypt, it has also enabled them to eschew the ideological dilemma of weighing the dangers (faithwise) vs. advantages of becoming a political party.
Yet ideological convictions of Islamist movements can also prevent them from forming political parties. Some of the Brethren in Egypt, for instance, attribute their protean political framework to state restrictions.Footnote 85 Yet, another factor can be the aversion of some of its leaders to the compromising nature of politics, epitomized in the modern Western concept of political parties. A common reality of the political life in modern democracies is that:
The parties' electoral needs also encourage them to bring together a wide variety of interest groups and forge a common programme that these interests can support. Similarly, in governing, the political parties must reconcile the diverging interests that they represent . . . into a governing programme. Political parties are one of the few political organizations that must combine interest articulation with interest aggregation, thereby distinguishing them from individual politicians, interest groups, and other political actors.Footnote 86
Therefore, in real life, ‘[a]s parties need support, they “bend” their principles, they “bend” even more their policies and postpone their goals. Popular support is seen as indispensable and the first priority; policies based on principle recede into the background.’Footnote 87 Although the MB aims to establish an Islamic state, building a political party to reach that goal is regarded by such members as a violation of its claim to ideological purity; an overall unpalatable idea.Footnote 88
The history of the MB indeed contains two controversial ideological streaks concerning the group's identity and stance toward violence. Despite its prominent position in Egyptian politics, the MB was not initially founded as, or has aspired to be, a predominantly political movement.Footnote 89 Later, it was influenced by a radical discourse that advocated using ‘action’ not ‘words’, and portrayed violence as permissible to get their message across. Consequently, between 1940s and 1960s, the group was involved in many terrorist attacks ranging from judges and prime ministers to police chiefs and even Gamal Abdel Nasser, the president of Egypt at the time.Footnote 90 It was consequently outlawed in 1954. These conflicting tendencies also elicited internal division. Finally, during mid-1970s, the MB began to actively promote its political roots through non-violent methods and ‘the institutionalization of Islamic activism’.Footnote 91 Its leaders have renounced violence as a legitimate tool ever since.Footnote 92 Ironically, by abandoning the use of violence and seeking to promote itself as having ‘the most “reformist”, the least “revolutionary”, tendency’ of the Islamist movement in Egypt, the MB ‘also ensured that Islamicist groups seeking active intervention in fields that [they] dared not even discuss would arise outside it, and to a large extent against it’ later.Footnote 93 Ideological schism over becoming a political party remains, however, which can explain the reluctance of the MB to transform itself into a political party during 1980s, a period of relatively relaxed state approach toward the movement. The Brethren may not feel ready yet to leave their current multi-faceted identity to embrace a primarily political one.Footnote 94 As an MB leader succinctly stated, for the foreseeable future the group will remain ‘a social movement for change and not a political party seeking to seize power, and that is it. We are fulfilling an important role in creating profound changes in the intellectual and social structure of society. This is what is important to us at present.’Footnote 95
Similarly, when the idea of registering the FIS as a political party came up in 1989, many of its followers flatly refused it.Footnote 96 They were overruled by the FIS leaders, however, who had decided that to advertise the movement as a political party was a step towards pursuing ‘a more popular and political direction’.Footnote 97 Despite their decision to become a player in the pluralist political structure, however, the leaders did not later reaffirm their commitment to tolerate the same structure once in power.Footnote 98
Mode of organization – expected and unexpected payoffs
Along with ideological concerns, the perceived advantages or shortcomings of each organizational style can also affect their adoption by the Islamist groups. After all, ‘[t]o form a new party, or to join an existing one, is a calculated organizational gamble by party elites’.Footnote 99 Some of the potential matters of concern include the maintenance costs of keeping the organization centralized, preferably in cohesion and a more-or-less consistent political profile along established lines to compete with their non-Islamist counterparts. In contrast to other political groups, for instance, political parties also have to announce an explicit set of goals – e.g. a party program – even though they may intend to ignore them after coming into power. Meanwhile, establishing a political front involves concurrence on a loosely defined, yet common purpose, but not on the methods to carry it out. Its flexible framework attracts those Islamist groups that view politics as one of the many available tools to achieve their goals. Non-official methods of organization and the use of social networks are particularly attractive in those polities where state repression is not only possible, but probable. In such cases, informal methods of activism are preferred to avoid state intervention.Footnote 100 Though informal, tight-knit connections between members in such groups ‘nurture collective identities and solidarity, provide informal organization and contacts, and supply information otherwise unavailable to individuals’.Footnote 101
Along with their expected payoffs, however, selecting one organizational style over another can also bring unexpected consequences for all interacting players later. Once an Islamist group adopts an organization style, it has to signal its willingness to commit itself to remain peaceful and operate within the constraints of the existing political system. However, under similar settings, political fronts may find it more difficult to show their commitment to the existing regime than the political parties, and can be perceived as a rival to their radical counterparts.
Consider what happened in Algeria. In retrospect, the advantages of acting as a political front while maintaining political party status for the FIS are clear. For its leaders, the FIS was ‘not a party in the classical sense (but) . . . a Front which groups together several tendencies’.Footnote 102 It attempted ‘to fuse two important constituencies with different aims, whose common bond is their opposition to the government’.Footnote 103 Its decentralized structure and bifurcated leadership increased its appeal and won the support of diverse – even controversial – segments of the Algerian society, including the radically inclined.Footnote 104 The Janus-faced political approach and the amorphous organization of the FIS enabled it to ‘speak . . . in many ideological voices and, until its banning, could act as a revolutionary front organization, a religious movement or a Western-style political party as mood and circumstances dictated’.Footnote 105
Meanwhile, the general stance of the FIS on violence remained conspicuously ambiguous.Footnote 106 This ambiguity was acceptable to its leaders, though, since ‘[t]he FIS's priority was to mobilize popular support, and it was prepared to risk some of its middle-class support to the more moderate Islamist parties . . . rather than tone down the radical rhetoric on which its popular appeal depended’.Footnote 107 Thus, moderate Islamist factions that inclined toward building and maintaining a party-type organization that advocated a non-confrontational stance toward the existing political system were turned aside.Footnote 108
Later, however, the loosely knit, decentralized organizational framework that initially contributed to the rapid expansion and popularity of the FIS generated internal disorder and weakened its control over its followers.Footnote 109 Following its ban, the group increasingly lost its initiative power.Footnote 110 The calls of the FIS leaders to its followers to protest the cancellation of the first democratic elections ever held in Algeria soon deteriorated into chaotic street violence, and seriously diminished their credibility as a peaceful group.Footnote 111 Ultimately, the FIS ‘failed to signal credibly that it would not subvert the institutions once it won, thus opening the path for a military coup’.Footnote 112
After the outbreak of violence, scores of radical Islamist groups appeared in Algeria.Footnote 113 Most of them were established before the repression of the FIS in 1992, including the largest and most radical of all – the GIA. The GIA has been the most persistent radical Islamist group to maintain a separate – and rival – political profile to the FIS.Footnote 114 Despite its military extensions, the overall inability of the FIS to direct and control the flow of the Islamist violence, as the largest Islamist organization, ended its leadership within the Algerian Islamist movement. The GIA, consequently, became its most lethal political competitor, followed by other, smaller militant groups.Footnote 115 Ironically, none of the players had calculated or anticipated any of these results earlier.Footnote 116
Egypt also supports the hypothesis that when the boundaries between non-violent and violent political groups remain opaque, an external conditional change over one of them – e.g. state repression – can influence the behavior of the other one. Political restrictions on the MB have led ‘many of those seeking to effect policy and personnel changes . . . to extralegal means’.Footnote 117 It involved predominating associations and other social organizations, such as ‘[t]he organization and its supporters run schools, hospitals, day care programs, job training centers, tutoring programs, Quranic instruction programs, after-school programs, and numerous other development and social programs’.Footnote 118
The results are dramatic, since ‘[t]he absence of competitive party politics in parliament has accentuated the importance of professional syndicates’.Footnote 119 In an environment where political Islam is allowed to exist, but not legitimately, i.e. politically responsible for its actions, these organizations gradually became the foremost platforms of political expression.Footnote 120 They have also enabled the MB to ‘advocate positions they know to be untenable’.Footnote 121 Ultimately, like the FIS, the blurry line between the political and non-political activities undertaken by the MB, its supporters, or sympathizers initially helped it to rapidly expand its base of followers. Since many of these social activities intersect with the public services offered by the state, the MB has become a serious competitor to it.Footnote 122
Paradoxically, the inability or reluctance of the MB to transform itself into an exclusively political organization proved ominous for itself later. Competing against the existing regime without facing any significant political risks can help to explain the toughening state approach toward it the 1990s, and its eventual repression. The MB's identity as a movement with strong political tendencies but not an exclusive political organization particularly hurt it after the outbreak of Islamist terrorism during 1990s. Its amorphous boundaries made it difficult for its followers to firmly announce where the movement ended and the rest of the Islamist spectrum began. The Brethren have also admitted their inability to control their ‘overly enthusiastic’ followers.Footnote 123 The fact that some of the social groups they originally established or led became recruitment points for radical groups in earlier years has turned against them, too.Footnote 124 Despite the group's insistent speeches that condemn violence, the MB thus became increasingly vulnerable to the attacks of the Mubarak regime, which has accused it of having organic ties with radical groups. For the Egyptian state, the repression of the MB meant eliminating its main opponent. The subsequent attacks of radicals have also played into the hands of the authoritarian regime, ready to put all Islamist groups into the same basket to reduce their appeal to the masses, and to justify the harsh measures taken to deflect Islamist violence. While doing so, however, they have overlooked its unpredicted effects over the radical Islamist groups.
Since radical Islamist movements are secretive by default, it is difficult to assess their direct role in the political developments preceding their terror campaign. However, their previous relations with the MB and the comments of their leaders later suggest that the radicals have not collaborated with the MB to undertake their terrorist attacks following the latter's repression. The roots of their violence following the MB's repression during 1990s can be traced to the widening rift between them. The political effects of the intellectual split between the contemporary MB and radical Islamist groups did not surface until 1980s.Footnote 125 Until then, ‘[i]t was difficult to distinguish members of the Gama'a from those of the Brotherhood’.Footnote 126 The rivalry intensified during late 1970s due to follower recruitment.Footnote 127 It resulted from the rising power of the Muslim Brotherhood, which increased the number of its followers at the expense of other, increasingly radical groups.Footnote 128 In some cases, the split was far from amicable, and, ‘[i]n some universities in Upper Egypt, violent struggles broke out between students in the Brotherhood and those who split and joined more radical organizations’.Footnote 129 Although the state has inflicted heavy damages on both radical groups and the MB alike, the rift has persisted to date. Since radicals have also tried to enter the political scene peacefully in recent years, it is unlikely due to ideological differences.Footnote 130 The behavior of these groups, formerly known as radicals, is further interesting in that they constituted the heart of the most active militant groups during the 1990s.Footnote 131 Their change of behavior, without altering their position on the MB, reinforces the assumption that the relationship between both sides has been more competitive than co-operative. The statements of various radical Islamist leaders further support the idea that the radicals have acted violently following the repression of the MB to recruit followers, mostly at its expanse.Footnote 132 This is a pattern observed among other non-Islamist terrorist groups in the world as well.Footnote 133
To summarize, the eruption of Islamist violence in Egypt is not a deliberate outcome of carefully calculated long-term strategies of the involved parties. In retrospect, it ironically seems more like the vector sum of the diversely directed rational state policies, the moderate Islamist wing led by the MB, and the radical Islamist groups desire to prevail. Specifically, state policy to contain and stem the political power of the MB, by denying it a legitimate party status, and its ideological stance toward politics as a vocation have reinforced its already existing inclination to form a protean organization. Despite its considerable – and on the part of the Egyptian state, unexpected – advantages to the MB at first, it has also eventually led to its perception as a rival by the radical Islamists. Contrary to the explanations that implicitly assume the violent activities of the militant Islamists following the repression of the MB to be a sign of their support of that group, they could be attempts to take over the leadership of the Islamist movement from the moderates in Egypt. It is possible that the government has used the multifaceted identity of the MB – which it promoted earlier – as a means to circumscribe it. It has cost it the prolonged warfare with the Islamist militants, however. A more convincing ex post facto explanation is the contribution – albeit unintentionally – of both the MB and the Mubarak regime to the erupting violence in Egypt. Even though both sides have acted to maximize their interests, the side-effects of their actions proved detrimental to their own interests in the long run. None of the players ‘won’. The breakout of Islamist violence in Egypt thus exemplifies how rational and-well planned strategies can lead to unwanted outcomes, and how organization of political groups matter.
Conclusion
While studying politics of religion, Anthony Gill suggests ‘taking institutional and interest-based factors more seriously’.Footnote 134 Arguments that take state actions at face value to explain the peaceful or violent forms of Islamist behavior or its organizational form risk oversimplifying the question and reduce their explanatory power. Without undermining the impact of state policies, this study therefore highlighted some of the possible reasons and effects of organizational variation among moderate Islamist groups on state–Islamist relations, particularly following state repression. The short-term advantages each organizational style offers can influence its adoption by an Islamist group. The unexpected, paradoxical effects of such advantages also help to explain the contrasting outcomes following the rise of political Islam under similar conditions. The moderate Islamist groups in Turkey and Indonesia demonstrate the short-term downside effects of assuming the party format, which also helps to explain their long-term political success and peaceful mien. In both cases, the party framework has restricted the spectrum of non-violent options otherwise hypothetically available to moderate Islamist groups by reinforcing the exclusive use of political methods. Later, unlike their counterparts organized as political fronts, the better delineated boundaries of these groups have helped them to gain credibility as purely political – i.e. non-violent – organizations. Thus, they have been able to avoid any serious allegations about having organic ties with militant extremists. The same characteristics have, therefore, helped these groups to gain partial yet constant access to the existing political system. Promoting their ideological views alongside their non-Islamist counterparts and building their own patronage ties, in turn, have gradually enabled them to widen the existing crack further to their advantage.
The set of advantages and drawbacks hitherto discussed for establishing political parties are reversed for the Islamist groups organized as political fronts. As the FIS in Algeria and the MB in Egypt suggest, the decentralized structure of the political front format enabled these Islamist groups to retain a spectrum of non-violent means at their disposal, of which politics is only one. The reduced costs of maintenance due to the loose-knit ties have been another incentive for them to maintain their decentralized form of existence. Ultimately, however, the political front framework has helped these groups to keep both their boundaries and their objectives fluid and responsive. The ambiguities on what they include and represent or not, in return, significantly helped the moderate political Islamist movements in Algeria and Egypt to attract a diverse range of followers, sometimes including the radicals.
The same cases furthermore indicate that the advantages of maintaining a loose-knit organization can backfire for those Islamist groups that adopt them in the long run, and become a leading cause of Islamist violence. In Algeria, the protean characteristics that initially provided the FIS its remarkable flexibility have also played a significant role in the loss of control over its followers later. Amorphous boundaries have cost both the FIS and the MB their images as peaceful movements, and further raised the suspicions of the political regimes facing them. They have also invoked the wrath of the non-incorporated radical Islamist groups, which considered them as competitors. Ultimately, both groups have lost their credibility in the eyes of their supporters and opponents alike. Worst, however, is the unexpected entry of the radical Islamist groups on to the scene to rival the leadership of the Islamist political fronts as the leaders of the Islamist movement in both countries. The ire of the governments that has led to the repression of both groups also proved auspicious for their radical rivals to start their violent attacks to attract attention, and, preferably, followers.
While deserving careful observation and analysis, organizational forms that Islamist groups assume cannot determine the outcome of state–Islamist relations on their own. Further research is needed before expanding these observations to the rest of the Muslim world. For the time being, however, the evolution of political Islam in Algeria, Egypt, Indonesia, and Turkey suggest that while democratization remains a desirable goal per se, letting moderate Islamist groups establish political parties does not guarantee peaceful state–Islamist relations. Nevertheless, forming political parties matters, as it can indicate the value that an Islamist group attributes to peaceful methods to pursue their agenda.
Note from author
Gül M. Kurtoğlu-Eskişar is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at Dokuz Eylul University, Izmir, Turkey. An earlier version of this work was presented as “Political Islam and Violence: A New Interpretation” at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, Sep 03, 2004. The authors thanks David D. Laitin and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. All shortcomings remain author's.
