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Jeffrey L. Richey, Confucius in East Asia: Confucianism's History in China, Korea, Japan, and Vietnam, Association of Asian Studies, 2013, xvii + 99 pp.

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Jeffrey L. Richey, Confucius in East Asia: Confucianism's History in China, Korea, Japan, and Vietnam, Association of Asian Studies, 2013, xvii + 99 pp.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 January 2016

Peitao Jia*
Affiliation:
Tsinghua University
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

In this introductory volume on Confucianism in East Asia, Jeffrey L. Richey draws on both original Confucian classics and the latest relevant research and offers a well-structured presentation of Confucian traditions and their dominant influence on the moral, social, and political life in China, Korea, Japan, and Vietnam.

The whole volume is both balanced and engaging partly because it tends to present issues and problems in an ingenious way, without proposing solutions. That is why it is beneficial for both outsiders and alleged insiders of Confucian traditions, for both beginners and experienced researchers: other than acquiring more historical and theoretical perspectives and developing some insight that is more comprehensive and more comparative, readers can also learn about methodology as well as research issues such as the Neo-Confucianism Movement and its influences, different relationships between Confucian individuals and the ruling groups with or without Confucianism as a state-sponsored ideology, and combinations of and conflicts between Confucianism and modern political ideologies (e.g., nationalism, imperialism, and even communism) in the context of modernization and political legitimacy.

This volume is well structured, not just due to its uniform chapter‒section division but also because of the selection and arrangement of the content. Except for the first chapter on China, each one commences with circumstances or events at present, which highlights the contemporary relevance. Richey also helpfully highlights key words for each chapter. The key words for the Korea chapter are paradox or ambivalence, since this chapter focuses on the ethical debates over constitutive foundations of human nature, on the paradox between theoretical moral egalitarianism and the real-world social order based on unequal hereditary classes, and on the official ambivalence about Confucianism (pp. 30–1, 32–5, 39). The key words for the Japan chapter are blending, interweaving, or merging. This chapter emphasizes Japanese culture and its tendency to blend conflicting Confucian doctrinal principles (e.g., moral philosophy of Zhu Xi and that of Wang Yangming, no matter which is the ‘orthodox’ (正統) and which is a ‘heterodox’ (歧出) strainFootnote 1) as well as different religious traditions into one moral teaching, to interweave a ‘tapestry’ of Confucianism and Buddhism and even Shinto in order to accomplish the nationwide ‘Confucian socialization’, and to merge Confucianism with or into nationalism and even imperialism in the nation-building course of Japan (pp. 49, 53, 55–6). By contrast, the key word for the Vietnam chapter is tension, as according to the fourth chapter, the Vietnamese culture has been living with the effects of this tension rather than trying to relieve it through some ambivalent attitudes or blending solutions. This tension has been remaining both between Chinese and Vietnamese moral and social values and between Vietnamese Confucianism and other religious or political ideologies (pp. 61–2, 65–6, 69, 71–5). However, this tension within Vietnamese Confucianism seems to be inevitable, taking into account Vietnam's historic close linkage with China's culture and politics and its intense eagerness to be free from them, as well as its tendency to regard Confucianism as a ‘native expression of Vietnamese values’ (p. 60).

Considering all the moral, social, and political dimensions, the Korea chapter might be the best part of the book since it specifies exactly what the Neo-Confucianism Movement is about and how it influences and even dominates cultural trends in East Asia. In contrast, the theme of the China chapter is not well developed. Richey tends to limit the content of the first chapter in order (perhaps) to make room for the following arguments and discussions. As a result, readers might have to comprehend the development process of China's Confucianism per se by lateral comparisons and with references to all the other three chapters. And the China chapter itself has more the appearance of stereotypes reinforced. This, therefore, makes this chapter appear to be just a prelude, rather than a well-structured foundation for the investigations that follow, although Richey himself advises us to read chapter 1 before exploring the rest (p. 3).

Richey focuses on both the philosophical and the religious aspects of Confucianism when he regards Confucius as an historical and spiritual combination of Socrates and Jesus (p. 2); however, he appears to refer to Confucianism as a religion when he parallels it throughout all chapters with other religious traditions such as Daoism,Footnote 2 Buddhism, and Christianity. This viewpoint permeates every single understanding of Confucian doctrines and dimensions of East Asian cultures, and causes this volume to regard Confucianism mainly as a cultural phenomenon and not to involve systematic arguments in moral and political philosophy.

One associated problem is that Richey has not taken Legalism – Confucianism's true rival in political philosophy – seriously, although he does mention once the names of two pre-Qin legalists Li Si (李斯) and Han Fei (韓非) (p. 12) when writing about Xunzi (‘Master Xun’, 荀子). This makes him ignore an important interpretation of the Chinese imperial system: Confucian in appearance but Legalist in substance (‘陽儒陰法’ or ‘儒表法裡’), a comment attributed to a Confucian scholar from the Han dynasty named Jia Yi (賈誼). Without discussion of Legalism, Richey tends to ascribe too many political aspects and issues to Confucianism or even to leave nothing non-Confucianized.

Back to Confucianism itself, one key problem here lies in the gap between Confucius and Confucianism. What is labeled as Confucianism is not only or even mainly the teachings and the doctrine of Confucius; rather, for example, the doctrines of Mencius and Mencian hermeneutics occupy a prominent position. Moreover, the original Chinese words for Confucianism never literally meant ‘Confucianism’ (Kong Xue, 孔學); it means isms of Confucians (Ru Xue, 儒學) instead. Furthermore, the Chinese concept of Neo-Confucianism is no longer a Ru Xue, but the doctrine of the (cosmic) Law or the (heavenly) Principle (Li Xue, 理學). Given the context above as well as the demands of localizing Confucianism (considering the rejection to the ‘Chineseness’ of Confucianism in Vietnam, for example (pp. 60–1)), the term ‘Confucius’ in the titles of the introduction, the conclusion, and the volume itself apparently misses the real point.

There are still some relatively minor problems. For example, in the section on Chinese Confucian self-cultivation, it should have been mentioned that Mencius and Xunzi discussed two different types or dimensions of human nature (something like what was discussed in the Neo-Confucian ‘principle‒vital energy’ debate and the ‘Four‒Seven’ debate (p. 31)) rather than different moral judgments on the same human nature. As a result, the alleged ‘moral self-transformation’ is not (so) necessary for Mencius (as it is for Xunzi). In Mencius’ moral philosophy, the process of acquiring and exercising virtues resembles an Aristotelian development from the potential to the actual. Moreover, this volume contains no quotes from, or comments about, that well-known paragraph in The Great Learning. The book focuses specifically on ‘moral and social programs’ Footnote 3 and it articulates the Confucian process of self-perfection from individual moral cultivation towards the individual‒state relationship and further to the individual‒world relationship more systematically than any of the other Chinese classics. Without references to it, this volume seems to be flawed, or at the best incomplete. Additionally, in the section on the Chinese Confucian individual-state relationship, the quoted poem by Bai Juyi (白居易) was actually composed when he was 28 years old; and, yes, he passed the ‘imperial civil service examination’ at the age of 28, rather than as young as 18.

Nevertheless, among the increasingly numerous books and articles on Confucianism and/or East Asia, this introductory volume is one of the few that are beneficial even for those who are familiar with ancient Chinese classics. Nowadays, with the current enthusiasm for reflection on political models refueled by the latest work of Francis Fukuyama and by academic interests in authoritarian pragmatism after the death of Lee Kuan Yew, this volume both functions as a guide for beginners with the extensive range of research issues involved and sets an excellent model for fellow scholars with its erudite discussion – especially the outstanding arguments and analyses in the concluding chapter.

References

1 For an intensive discussion and discrimination between the two, see Tsung-san, Mou, Onto-cosmological State of the Original Heart/Mind and that of Human Nature (《心體與性體》) and On the Entire and Perfect Good (《圓善論》), Vols. 5-7 and Vol. 22 of The Complete Works of Mou Tsung-san (《牟宗三先生全集》), Taipei: Linking Publishing Co., 2003Google Scholar.

2 Although the English word Daoism or Taoism can be referred to as both a philosophical school (道家) originated with Laozi and a religious tradition (道教), in this book the author tends to regard it as no more than a certain religion; see the entries ‘Daoism’ and ‘Laozi’ in the glossary, pp. 89 and 90.

3 See Wing-Tsit, Chan (trans. and com.), A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963, pp. 8494Google Scholar.