Introduction
Electoral engineering, defined as manufacturing political outcomes via specific regulations (usually, though not always, electoral rules), is increasingly touted by political scientists as a legitimate device to augment representation. While some electoral systems and rules have been purposefully and adroitly installed by ruling parties to perpetuate their dominance, not all forms of innovations can be considered counter-productive to democracy. This paper serves to evaluate the efficacy of a particular form of electoral innovation unique to the island-state of Singapore: the nominated member of parliament (NMP) scheme. The research question that will be investigated is thus: Can the NMP scheme promote democratic governance? It will be contended that the scheme can in fact provide a boost to democratic representation for the electorate in Singapore in light of the changing electoral landscape. This is for two main reasons. Firstly, NMPs could be better placed to discuss issues that political parties shun as they scramble for votes in an increasingly competitive electoral arena, and therefore the presence of NMPs could widen the democratic space. It must be noted that the two most dominant parties in Singapore are ideologically similar, and hence there is ‘space’ on the ideological spectrum that cannot be filled by these parties. Secondly, NMPs are less likely to be alleged of ‘politicizing’ issues; in a state where democratic political culture has not been entrenched, it is commonplace for the incumbent to accuse opposition legislators of politicking whenever the latter raises important subjects that are deemed ‘sensitive’. NMPs have no such worries, and hence could raise issues that otherwise would not be discussed in parliament. Evidence will be provided to show how Singapore's hegemonic party-system is undergoing major changes that could constitute a transformation to a ‘competitive authoritarian’ system (Levitsky and Way, Reference Levitsky and Way2002), under which one major opposition party poses a direct challenge to the government.
While this paper is Singapore-centric, its theoretical and empirical findings will be of relevance to electoral engineering/systems studies, especially in new democracies or countries undergoing a democratic transition. Specific electoral engineering measures may be needed, in accordance to differing contexts, to enhance democratic processes.
Electoral engineering, democratic representation, and NMPs
A significant amount of literature has been devoted towards electoral engineering. Much of this deals with electoral engineering in multi-ethnic or divided societies (Reilly, Reference Reilly2001), and/or place electoral innovations within the context of options for newly democratizing or third-wave democracies (Sartori, Reference Sartori1994), and even established democracies (Norris, Reference Norris2004). Rodan (Reference Rodan2009) argues that schemes such as the NMP scheme could serve as a form of political co-option, as incumbents skillfully conjure up creative expedients to entrench their dominance, while scholars such as Hellmann believe it can be used to rid democracies of negative practices such as money politics (Hellmann, 2014).
This paper is situated within this literature and debate. The effectiveness of a particular form of electoral engineering, the NMP scheme, is assessed. While I do not deny that the NMP scheme was initially intended to be a tool to perpetuate the dominance of the hegemonic party in Singapore, I argue that over time the scheme has produced the unintended consequence of widening the democratic space in the city-state. This is in spite of the problems associated with the scheme, which will be discussed later. The lesson that can be learnt from the Singapore case is that in certain circumstances, unique electoral institutions could be developed to enhance democratic procedures and culture.
To comprehend my argument, it is first necessary to understand democratic governance. Two objectives of democracy, as espoused by Reynolds et al. (Reference Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis2008) while describing the criteria for designing electoral systems, are representation and accountability. Representation refers to the articulation of interests and voices that constitute the broad spectrum of society, while accountability of the government refers to the process of questioning and scrutinizing government policies in the legislature. Accountability can only be enhanced via a thorough process of deliberation: policies must be properly debated and all angles to an issue fully considered before decisions are made, and even after they are made, they need to be constantly reevaluated. Here, the concept deliberative democracy becomes instructive: it has been argued that ‘individuals participating in democratic processes are amenable to changing their minds and preferences as a result of the reflection induced by deliberation’ (Dryzek, Reference Dryzek2000: 32). Even if politicians’ minds are already made, irrespective of the amount of debate generated by their colleagues and opponents, discussions about a matter can influence members of the ‘audience’, or the electorate (Elster, Reference Elster and Elster1998). At the minimum, it will thrust the issue into the public arena, and in the consciousness of at least some members of the electorate. The louder these voices become, the more difficult it would be for policymakers to ignore the matter completely. Even if in competitive authoritarian regimes the voices of those outside the government do not matter as much as the key elites, they still do matter to some extent, as there is room for contestations and negotiations, unlike in more rigid authoritarian systems. Deliberation is most needed for contentious issues, where there are valid reasons for adopting different perspectives (Manin et al., Reference Manin, Stein and Mansbridge1987). The concept of deliberative democracy requires that political elites justify their actions with sound argumentation, while citizens can respond to that reasoning with ideas of their own (Gutmann and Thompson, Reference Gutmann and Thompson2004). Again, while this concept is not entirely present in competitive authoritarian regimes, it is not completely absent either. Citizens have some room to air their views, and politicians do still have to account for their actions to some degree. I argue that the NMPs can increase the deliberation process – and have done so in the past – and, hence, the levels of accountability. The very act of thrusting certain issues into the public arena via raising them in Parliament ensures that the government has to react with its own public stances on the said matters, and therefore has had to be more accountable for its policies. Previously it could remain silent or ignore these issues once they have been brought into the public domain; that option is no longer feasible. This is most evident in the homosexuality debate, which will be discussed in detail later.
A democracy must also be able to represent all segments of the populace, or, at the very least, a variety of voices must be given space to be heard, even if those views are not considered mainstream. The NMP scheme can bolster the voices of the under-represented segments of society This is against the backdrop of an increasingly competitive electoral arena where two parties, the incumbent People's Action Party (PAP) and the Workers’ Party (WP), are disproportionately stronger than others. The two parties also do not differ significantly in their core ideologies, or in Sartori's language, the ideological distance between them is relatively small. While this will help prevent the polarizing of politics that Sartori speaks of (Sartori, Reference Sartori1976: 150–65), and hence contribute to stability of the political system, some segments of society will not be adequately represented, as the voices of those ‘at the margins’ will not be heard via parliamentary representation.
Electoral competition might also induce parties to take a safe and moderate approach. As competing parties try to appeal to the median voter or adopt ideologies and policies that will garner the maximal votes (Holcombe, Reference Holcombe1989: 115), invariably there will be exclusion of the interests of citizens which are unconventional. While such a problem might be mitigated in a multi-party system, a two-party system will make this effect more pronounced. Downs argues in his seminal work that two parties, in a FPTP system, will mimic each other in policies, and their stances on issues will be extremely similar, at least in substance if not in rhetoric (Downs, Reference Downs1957). Parties are more likely to converge on most matters, differing not on the fundamentals but only on the details of issues, in their bids to maximize votes. As a result, disenchanted minorities might not be able to get themselves heard, as the FPTP system ensures that big parties can afford to ignore the aspirations of fringe groups. This poses problems for representation, since as Pitkin argues, a person is represented when he feels represented (Pitkin, Reference Pitkin1967), and as long as the desires of certain groups are not propagated in parliament, they would not feel as though they are represented. This is problematic as representation is undeniably one of the most crucial aspects of democratic governance (Urbinati and Warren, Reference Urbinati and Warren2008). The matter is compounded in Singapore as the WP might not be willing to champion causes that it believes in, due to the fear that the PAP might accuse it of ‘playing politics’ and attempting to disrupt the nation's stability. In a country where a democratic culture is not entrenched and where the ruling party is essentially the state, the opposition parties have to delicately balance between contesting the ruling party and yet, at the same time, not appear unpatriotic. The process towards gaining more electoral votes and seats could render the WP more conservative than it should be as an opposition party, as it attempts to avoid unfair PAP charges. This is perhaps less of a concern in established democracies, such as the US and India, where opposition parties are expected to challenge the ruling party on all fronts, but in ‘illiberal democracies’ (Mutalib, Reference Mutalib2000), such as Singapore, it is difficult for the opposition to be uninhibitedly liberal in its critiques of the government. These fears are not unfounded, as will be shown later. NMPs may also display greater willingness to put forth issues that are purposefully ignored or downplayed by political parties vying for votes. Examples of such positive contributions from NMPs will be produced later.
This work builds on Rodan's influential piece on the NMPs. He states, after a comprehensive analysis of the role of NMPs, which included interviews with many of them, that while the PAP undeniably intended to use the scheme as a form of political co-optation, the NMPs enhanced their representation by pursuing ‘socially progressive’ issues such as feminism, environmentalism, and homosexual rights, as the PAP and opposition parties were unwilling to do so because they did not want to risk ‘alienating’ the social conservatives (Rodan, Reference Rodan2009: 459–60). I argue that the NMPs are given more space to maneuver in these arenas because of the emerging political arena: the two parties that are most dominant are the PAP and the WP, whose core ideologies are essentially the same. They are both parties, whose concerns are more electoral than ideological, which is why these ‘progressive’ issues are avoided in Parliament. If it was the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP), an avowedly more liberal party, instead that was in parliament as the main opposition party, for example, we would probably witness elected parliamentarians discussing these issues more. Furthermore, it is not just about championing for gay rights; even the opposition towards homosexual rights – which many Singaporeans evidently do support – came in the strongest terms from an NMP. Neither PAP nor WP MPs rejected gay rights in vociferous terms – being parties that attempt to maximize votes and not propagate specific ideological agendas, they do not want to alienate the liberal factions in society.
Singapore's political scene: PAP dominance and the NMP scheme
Uninterrupted rule since independence
For the longest time, the preponderance of the PAP has intrigued political scientists. Through a deft array of strategies, including co-opting dissenting forces, employing draconian measures against political opponents (Gomez, Reference Gomez2006), creating an un-level electoral playing field (N. Tan, Reference Tan2013), controlling para-political institutions, and successfully delivering material prosperity to the Singaporean population (Wong and Huang, Reference Wong and Huang2010), the PAP has managed to secure more than a two-thirds majority in every single general election (GE) since the city-state's independence. It must be noted that elections, though unfair, have never been fraudulent.
Of the 87 parliamentary seats up for grabs in GE 2011, 12 were single member districts/constituencies (SMCs) that used FPTP while the remaining were shared among 15 group representation constituencies (GRCs). The GRC is a form of the party block vote (PBV) system where parties compete as teams in multi-member districts and at least one of the candidates must be from an ethnic minority (Malay or Indian). GRCs severely increase the barriers to entry for opposition parties as more candidates and higher electoral deposits are needed, and opposition parties have traditionally been unable to attract credible ethnic minority candidates (N. Tan Reference Tan2013). This form of electoral engineering has served the incumbent well: the collective effect of the FPTP and PBV systems has ensured the PAP a disproportionate control of Parliament. Before 2011, every single GRC had been won by the PAP.
Nominated member of parliament
This specific form of electoral innovation is this essay's focus. Introduced in 1990, this scheme was purportedly intended to encourage a multiplicity of views in legislature. From the outset, the government mentioned that the purpose of introducing the NMP scheme was to offer ‘Singaporeans more opportunities for political participation and to evolve a more consensual style of government where alternative views are heard and constructive dissent accommodated’.Footnote 1 The constitution allows up to nine NMPs to be selected (initially it was six, though only two were selected at the first time of asking). These people must be non-partisan and can be nominated by any Singaporean. The Parliamentary Select Committee, chaired by the Speaker of Parliament, evaluates the entire nominations list and will then recommend those whom it deems fit for the position, to the President, who will then give his approval. The Constitution of Singapore states:
The persons to be nominated shall be persons who have rendered distinguished public service, or who have brought honour to the Republic, or who have distinguished themselves in the field of arts and letters, culture, the sciences, business, industry, the professions, social or community service or the labour movement; and in making any nomination, the Special Select Committee shall have regard to the need for nominated Members to reflect as wide a range of independent and non-partisan views as possible.Footnote 2
Mutalib states that the scheme was introduced at a time when Singaporeans were clamoring for greater participation in socio-political affairs (Mutalib, Reference Mutalib2002: 663). The proposed scheme was met with much disdain from the opposition, who said the scheme was undemocratic and yet another way to strengthen PAP dominance. By discouraging Singaporeans from voting for the opposition, there will be guaranteed non-PAP presence in the legislature, and this hurts the credibility of the opposition (Chua, Reference Chua1995). Rodan describes the NMP scheme as a form of ‘strategic inclusion’ and co-optation that is used by the PAP to quell dissent (Rodan, Reference Rodan2009: 442). The scheme has been described as an extension of the elites’ deep-seated beliefs in governance that they know best what is good for the country, and the ‘Western’ style of criticizing leaders via elected opposition is not compatible with the values of the Singapore society. The NMPs, who are seen as non-partisan alternative voices, and not opposition voices, are more likely to criticize the PAP in a more ‘reasonable’ manner than opposition MPs (E. K. B. Tan, Reference Tan2013).
Undoubtedly, the scheme was originally intended to delegitimize the opposition, as the government said that NMPs were needed because opposition MPs could not sufficiently represent the general population (Thio, Reference Thio, Thio and Kevin2009). Some scholars argue that creation of the NMP scheme is a strategy by the PAP to ensure greater parliamentary diversity without sharing real power (K. Y. L. Tan, Reference Tan, Thio and Kevin2009: 75). Yet, some see value in the scheme, saying that ‘some check is better than no check’ on the PAP (Woon, Reference Woon and Da Cunha1994). It has also been argued that NMPs are in a position to articulate non-partisan critiques of government policies (Thio, Reference Thio, Thio and Kevin2009). Early on, a couple of NMPs made substantive contributions in parliament. Walter Woon moved a bill that eventually successfully culminated in the Maintenance of Parents Bill in 1994, which gave abandoned parents an avenue to claim upkeep from their children.Footnote 3 Dr Kanwaljit Soin was a well-known feminist who raised many women's issues in parliament, and (unsuccessfully) pushed for the Family Violence Bill in parliament.Footnote 4
No work to date, however, has evaluated this scheme in light of the changing political landscape in Singapore, especially post-2011, and this is what this paper purports to do. A competitive political scene was wholly absent during the early years of the implementation of the NMP scheme.
Emerging competitive political arena
The GE held in 2011 was dubbed as the beginning of the ‘new normal’ (K. P. Tan, Reference Tan2012). The PAP had its worse electoral performance since independence, securing only 60% of the popular vote. However, due to the FPTP and PBV system Singapore employs, the PAP managed to win 81 of the 87 parliamentary seats. Despite its parliamentary dominance, GE 2011 sent an unmistakable signal: the party is no longer as formidable as before. Not only did it receive its lowest share of votes, for the first time ever the opposition managed to wrest a GRC, unseating two ministers. Therefore, while the PAP is still dominant, its hegemony is no longer unchallenged, and signs point towards a more democratic scene. Crucially though, only one opposition party (the WP) made electoral gains at the expense of the PAP.
The PAP's failure to address ‘bread-and butter issues’, such as housing, transportation, and immigration, together with its newfound unwillingness to sue and bankrupt political opponents (which was a common strategy in the past)', and the emergence of social media as an alternative source of information to the state-controlled mass media, prepared a fertile ground for the opposition. The ‘climate of fear’ was no longer pervasive and the electorate was empowered (K. P. Tan, Reference Tan2012). With the empowerment of the masses, and with rising discontentment, a more competitive political arena ensued.
Equal to the task, the opposition parties managed to attract high-caliber candidates, who were almost ‘PAP-esque’. The WP, the best-performing opposition party, fielded candidates such as Chen Show Mao, a well-regarded international lawyer with impressive degrees from Ivy League universities. Candidates from other parties did capture the imaginations of the Singaporean voters but it was the WP that made substantive gains, winning one SMC and one GRC, gaining six seats. None of the other parties won any.
Several reasons could explain the variation in performance of the opposition parties. Firstly, the WP was led by an extremely shrewd politician in Low Thia Khiang, who has been described as Singapore's premier electoral strategist.Footnote 5 Secondly, it was evident that the WP's ‘politics of moderation’ appealed to Singaporeans. Unlike the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP), which has a history of being confrontational, the WP projected itself as a responsible party that is not out to topple the PAP, but rather to serve as a check and balance. The WP was keen to repeat that it was not ready to form the government. The PAP was doing well overall and the WP is just there to be a ‘co-driver’.Footnote 6 The WP appealed to the Singaporean psyche by employing this politics of moderation, as opposed to ‘politics of confrontation’. Its two-decade hold of Hougang SMC also ensured that it had the necessary town management and grassroots expertise needed to win elections and effectively govern wards. The fact that the WP, the party most ideologically similar to the PAP, made electoral gains instead of the other parties is testament not only to the WP's own aforementioned strengths, but perhaps also to the ideological preferences of the majority of the electorate.
Three subsequent smaller, but no less significant elections proved that the 2011 GE was not a flash in the pan. The Presidential Election in 2011 provided another rude shock to the PAP as the candidate that it openly endorsed, who was also a former party stalwart and Deputy Prime Minister (DPM), Tony Tan, won but without a clear majority, and only by a razor-thin margin (he garnered 35.2% of the valid votes, as compared to his nearest challenger, Tan Cheng Bock, who attained 34.85%).Footnote 7 For a former DPM whose credentials were well-known, this was a huge setback. It most certainly reflected the change in the political scene.
In 2012, a by-election was held for Hougang SMC, which was a WP stronghold, after the incumbent WP MP was sacked by the party due to a sex scandal. The WP retained the seat comfortably, sweeping aside the PAP candidate. A year later, another MP found himself in trouble due to sexual indiscretions; Michael Palmer, then Speaker of Parliament and the PAP MP for Punggol East SMC, resigned from his seat after details of an affair emerged. This time, however, the PAP's replacement for Palmer lost the by-election to a WP candidate, Lee Li Lian. This was quite an extraordinary development, as Punggol East was considered a ‘safe’ ward for the PAP. Evidently, the political scene in Singapore has evolved from a hegemonic party system, to a competitive authoritarian regime, where the PAP is still undeniably dominant, but another party, the WP, is challenging that dominance and is a becoming a serious threat (Ortmann, Reference Ortmann2011). At present, the signs point towards a snuffing out of the other opposition parties, leaving the WP as the only credible threat to PAP dominance.
This has huge implications. The fact that the WP, the party most similar in ideological terms to the PAP, is the only significant challenger to the PAP, means that NMPs can play a greater role in the political system: firstly, unlike the WP elected MPs, NMPs can freely challenge the status quo and pursue issues that the MPs could not; secondly, although they are ideologically similar, there are spaces on the ideological spectrum that are left unattended which the NMPs could fill, and they have done so on some occasions. This will be elaborated on later.
NMPs in the Singapore context: contributions to democratic governance
The PAP and the WP are virtually indistinguishable in their core ideologies: the latter scarcely differs from the former in its philosophical underpinnings of governance, unlike the SDP which puts forth an ideological challenge via its liberal-leaning postures on issues. The two parties’ disagreements are usually in the economic arena, where, for instance, the WP supports the minimum wage in some areas (though not all professions), while the PAP is so far against the idea. In non-economic realms however, the two parties more or less converge. For example, the WP does not offer any alternative to this highly racialized version of multi-racialism – the Chinese–Malay–Indian–Others (CMIO) model – which the PAP jealously swears by and is unwilling to compromise on. The WP does not advocate for a removal of ethnic classifications from Singaporeans’ identity cards or an end to racial categorizations, which has been a hallmark of the PAP's governance (Chua, Reference Chua2003). The SDPFootnote 8 and the Reform Party (RP) have called for a removal of these ‘archaic’ notions of race,Footnote 9 while the WP is more willing to embrace the PAP's version of multi-racialism. Similarly, while the SDP and the RP are vocal in articulating the rights of lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transsexuals (LGBT), the WP has taken a conservative stance similar to the PAP, and does not openly champion LGBT issues. However, like the PAP, the WP does not openly condemn homosexuality or homosexual activities. Clearly, via this equivocal stance, both parties try to appeal to the traditional segment of Singapore society that is uncomfortable with LGBTs, with the intention of not alienating the more liberal factions of the electorate. This is unlike the SDP and the RP, which have chosen to take a clear ideological position on the matter.
Even in the economic domain, where the WP seems to propose differing policies, it is very measured in its approach. Though the WP argues for the implementation of the minimum wage, a proposal that the PAP has always viewed with much disdain, it does not advocate for a blanket introduction of the minimum wage in all professions or areas, and even in this limited domain, it has only recently suggested such.Footnote 10 Again, this is in contrast to the SDP, which has always taken a stance in favor of the minimum wage. It is clear that there is not a great ideological distance between the PAP and the WP.
The combination of the WP's conservative ideology and electoral imperatives, coupled with the realities of the FPTP/PBV electoral system and the PAP's long-standing strategy of discrediting opposition challenges to its core ideologies as being anti-Singapore, necessitates that a non-partisan entity, which does not have to worry about getting reelected, can be in a position to articulate Singaporeans concerns, where elected representatives cannot, or do not want to.
Here I shall mention a few instances where NMPs, and not elected legislators, have been better placed to pursue certain issues.
Section 377A debate
In 2007, the NMP Siew Kum Hong proposed that Section 377A of the Penal Code, which criminalizes sexual activities between consenting male adults, be repealed. This was a momentous move in conservative Singapore, despite it not posing a direct challenge to the PAP's core ideologies. Siew argued passionately and vociferously, claiming the unconstitutionality of the law. The law was not amended, after PAP MPs weighed in on the debate. Generally, the common rhetoric given by the PAP MPs, which include Zaqy Mohamad, Indranee Rajah, and Christopher De Souza, was that Singapore is a largely conservative society that is not ready for homosexuality to be openly accepted. In doing so, they were careful not to pass their own judgments on homosexuality, and proclaimed that homosexuality is an individual choice that should be kept private. MP Zaqy stated:
In my view, the Government's status quo stand on homosexual activities under section 377A is for the benefit of society as a whole. The fact is, even though our country is open and receptive to changes and diversity, our society's majority view is still conservative in many aspects of life. But I concede that current points of view, especially amongst youths, are changing to a more progressive one. Homosexual activities, although undoubtedly exist, are still considered a lifestyle outside the mainstream society. From a secular point of view, it is something personal and I feel that it is good to leave it as such.Footnote 11
Zaqy's statement encapsulates the PAP's stance on homosexuality: the party is careful not to alienate voters of different orientations, and hence goes for the middle ground. This is in contrast to the response by another NMP, Thio Li-Ann, who provided the strongest and sternest rebuttal to Siew. Thio argued against homosexuality itself, asserting that it is immoral to be a homosexual. She said that homosexuality is a ‘gender identity disorder’, ‘anal-penetrative sex is inherently damaging to the body and a misuse to the organs,’ and likened male homosexual activities to ‘shoving a straw up your nose to drink’.Footnote 12 She questioned the government's rationale for rejecting Siew's proposal, stating that the PAP MPs were mistaken in using the time dimension as a reason for disagreeing with Siew. The question, she said, was not ‘if’ homosexuality should be allowed based on society's readiness, but ‘should’ it ever be allowed. Her rejection was based on ‘moral’ grounds, irrespective of societal acceptance.
What can be observed here is that both the strongest endorsement and condemnation of homosexual activities came from NMPs, while elected legislators were cautious in approaching the matter. Opposition MPs, including Low, did not even join the debate. It is evident that there is a segment of Singaporeans that enthusiastically support the repeal of section 377A, and at the same time there exist Singaporeans who consider homosexuality as immoral (Lee, Reference Lee2008). These polarizing opinions were not, and I argue could not have been, expressed by MPs who had the median voter in their minds, but the NMPs had no such inhibitions and could articulate views that were shared by sections of Singaporeans, however ‘politically incorrect’ those views were. Both the ‘pro’ and ‘anti’ homosexual camps had their voices heard in Parliament, and this could only lead to greater deliberation, enhancing the democratic process. As stated by Siew himself, the process actually put the pro-repeal stance into the limelight, and gave an opportunity for a proportion of the electorate, who were still undecided on the matter, to deliberate on it and to put more thought into their decision-making.Footnote 13 Likewise, the opposition put forth by Thio, based on ideological concerns that were shared by many conservative Singaporeans, was also given ‘air time’, By Siew's own admission, hearing both sides of the story can only lead to a more informed deliberation process.
National library saga
Related to this issue is the National Library Saga in 2014. Following complaints by members of the public, the National Library Board (NLB) made a decision to remove three books from the children's section that were said to be promoting homosexual values and were considered inappropriate to be placed in public libraries. This came on the back of a period when some Muslim and Christian groups were campaigning against the ‘Pink Dot’ event, an annual gathering that expressed support for LGBTs and called for the repeal of section 377A. The NLB announced that it would ‘pulp’ the books, leading to massive uproar from the more liberal-inclined factions of Singapore society. Despite many protests against the NLB, the board stood by its decision. Subsequently, the Minister for Communication and Information, Dr Yaacob Ibrahim, intervened and ordered two of the books (the third had already been disposed of) to be placed in the adults’ section, instead of being pulped. Yaacob stood by the NLB's decision to remove the books from the children's section, as the NLB and government had to consider ‘community norms’ when making decisions.Footnote 14 The subsequent intervention by Yaacob was clearly meant to placate the liberals, while not alienating the more conservative elements of the society.
In the July sitting of Parliament, eight questions were posed to Yaacob: one each by a PAP MP and a WP MP, while the remaining six were put forth by NMPs. Apart from the obvious quantitative difference, the nature of the questions were instructive too. Both the PAP and the WP asked Yaacob on NLB's procedures of acquisition and removal of books, while the NMPs’ questions were more pointed and indicative of the questioner's normative stances. For example, Faizah Jamal asked the minister to give an ‘assurance that the NLB will remain secular in all its procurement of library materials and in its policies and decisions’, and further asked if the decision to remove the books from the children's section would, ‘as a society of diverse races, views and ages, marginalize a group of people that may not necessarily fit into the model of the traditional family of father, mother and children, especially since things are changing organically’. Janice Koh, an NMP who had openly supported the Pink Dot campaign, challenged the Minister on the definition of community norms and who it was that got to define those norms, and proposed that the NLB should be a custodian of learning and not public morality. The NMP Eugene Tan was even more forthright; he proclaimed that: ‘It is important in any society to have such safe spaces in which contesting ideas can find a platform to engage. So, I am concerned that in this particular episode, the NLB was sucked into a contest of values.’Footnote 15 Such an unequivocal position on the issue was lacking from the elected MPs who mostly did not get involved in the exchange, and, even for the two who did, they questioned the minister on procedural rather than moral grounds. The minister, representing the government, did not take a firm stance either in favor of public institutions acting as vanguards of public morality or against it, unlike the NMPs who made their predispositions certain. In this case, those that spoke agreed unanimously that the NLB's actions were inappropriate and public institutions should not be involved with issues of morality, and had to remain ‘secular’. Neither the PAP nor the WP MPs made such clear stances; the constraints placed by electoral concerns clearly obstructed them from freely taking unambiguous standpoints. In this instance, more than just generating discussions, the NMPs were the ones who held the NLB and the government accountable for their actions, asking the Minister to plainly state the government's stance on fundamental issues such as the nature of Singapore's secularism.
Ethnicity in local politics
Much more contentious is ethnicity or race in Singapore society. The PAP has consciously sought to ‘manage’ race and racial relations (Ooi, Reference Ooi2005), and its version of multi-racialism is considered to be one of the building blocks of Singapore society. It has been absolutely intolerant of criticisms by opposition parties towards its ethnic policies. Two incidents, amongst many, highlight this. Both involve the issue of inequality in the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). Malays have long encountered discrimination in the SAF, and have expressed their discontentment on numerous occasions. The PAP leaders have admitted Malays are excluded from sensitive positions, despite the state's meritocratic proclamations (Peled, Reference Peled1998, 93–125). Lee Kuan Yew rationalizes this policy by declaring that to have Malays in charge of key installations in the SAF would be risky, as Singapore is surrounded by Malay countries.Footnote 16
The first incident was a parliamentary exchange between Chiam See Tong, veteran former opposition MP, and then Defence Minister Lee Hsien Loong, in 1987. Chiam questioned Lee on the unfair treatment Malays received, proclaiming that the government trusts foreigners more than its Malay citizens. Lee challenged Chiam to unequivocally state that if the latter was the PM, he would abandon the policy immediately. Chiam answered yes, and urged the PAP Malay MPs to speak without fear. Subsequently, the Minister of Muslim Affairs, Dr Ahmad Mattar, attacked Chiam and said that he was ‘politicking’.Footnote 17 Chiam was accused of undermining Singapore's interests by the PAP. The second incident was a more recent occurrence: in 2013, the WP MP, Faisal Manap, raised a similar concern. Faisal mentioned that Singaporean Malays were still questioning the SAF policy. This was met with a swift response by the PAP Malay MP, Zainudin Nordin, who alleged that the former was giving a ‘wrong impression’ of the actual situation, and questioned Faisal's intentions for raising the matter.Footnote 18
While the issue of equality and discrimination is still a concern for the Malays and Muslims, as evinced by the report in 2013 by the committee commissioned by the government, Suara Musyawarah (Conversations with the Community),Footnote 19 each time the issue is raised by an opposition MP, it would be dismissed as ‘politicking’. Hardly ever are there genuine responses and engagement on the issue of ethnicity or race. These incidences, one of which was post ‘new-normal’, reflect the difficulties of elected opposition officials to engage in constructive discussions with the government on race.
In comparison, an NMP could be in a better position to maneuver around such sensitivities. The case of Viswa Sadasivan is pertinent. In 2009, the former NMP moved a motion in Parliament to suggest the government reconsider its race-based approach to policies, as it was his belief that this philosophy represents a fundamental contradiction with the national pledge's pronouncement of ‘regardless of race, language or religion’. Several PAP MPs took turns to refute Viswa's suggestion, including Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew.Footnote 20 However, despite Sadasivan's proposals being rebutted, the refutations were expressed without questioning his intentions, and neither was he the victim of character assassination attempts. PAP MPs took turns to discuss the subject at length, such that the discussion continued over two parliamentary sittings. Despite Sadasivan questioning a core PAP ideology, the government engaged with him constructively without dismissing his proposal or digressing from the matter at hand by attacking his motives. Ironically, an MP who is not elected could be better placed to promote discussions and call the government to account than elected opposition legislators. Sadasivan was able to articulate a controversial comment that called into question a core governing PAP ideology, which is its version of multi-racialism. Instead of drawing criticisms directed at his political aspirations, he generated a lengthy discussion on ethnicity and politics in Singapore, both within and outside Parliament, especially in online forums and blogs.Footnote 21 This ability was unique to NMPs, as Faisal and Chiam's earlier attempts merely resulted in name-calling and a contest for political points.
These illustrate the roles that NMPs could perform in a democratic system. They could be more willing to champion causes of the minorities when the major parties are reluctant to do so, and they could also freely question core PAP principles without fear of being labeled as ‘anti-Singapore’ or trying to advance their political interests at the expense of those of the nation. PAP elites have been observed to behave less confrontationally and are less defensive when NMPs raise concerns.
The NMP – deterrence against elected opposition?
Some scholars are cynical regarding the NMP scheme. They maintain that the presence of NMPs could actually entrench PAP hegemony, as the incentive for the electorate to vote for opposition candidates is diminished, since non-PAP voices are guaranteed in Parliament (Mutalib, Reference Mutalib2002: 664). The scheme has also been alleged to be a PAP strategy of co-opting opposing voices: by giving them NMP positions, the PAP hopes that their views would eventually be closer to its own (Chua, Reference Chua1995: 175–6). These non-elected legislators could actually have the effect of delegitimizing the opposition parties, rendering them irrelevant (Tremewan, Reference Tremewan1995: 172–3).
However, this argument is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, NMPs have displayed their willingness to take the government on, even with regard to its core ideologies. They are not merely there to make up the numbers, and neither are they unwilling to disagree with the PAP. A case in point would be NMP Eugene Tan's refutation of Lee Hsien Loong's claim that the PM had discretion whether, and when, to call a by-election. Despite already being ‘co-opted’ into the legislature, Tan publicly asserted the PM's discretion to call a by-election is not an ‘unfettered one’, and the constitution demands that a by-election be held. He was swiftly rebutted by PAP MP Hri Kumar who repeated Lee's stance.Footnote 22 Constitutional experts sided with Tan, and the Court of Appeal eventually concurred with such an opinion.Footnote 23 Tan, like Sadasivan, did not ‘moderate’ his views to the PAP's liking and was willing to disagree publicly with the ruling party, and even the PM, in such an important political matter. Eugene also challenged MPs for absence from Parliamentary debates and from voting on a few occasions in 2012 and 2014, which eventually led to members of the public voicing similar concerns.Footnote 24
Secondly, the 2011 GE, 2012 Hougang BE, and 2013 Punggol East BE have shown that the electorate is not deterred from voting for the opposition, even though there are guaranteed opposition voices in the form of NMPs. Chua, Mutalib, and Tremewan were writing at a point in time when opposition parties could not make headway in elections, and hence theorized that part of the reason could be the presence of NMPs. However, the recent elections have revealed that this assertion is less than accurate. The public still chose the traditional route of voting for opposition parties to project their discontentment in government. There has been little, if any, empirical evidence to suggest that voters are less likely to vote for the opposition because there are NMPs. Furthermore, even if more opposition MPs are elected in the future, it does not make the NMPs irrelevant; in fact, I have argued that due to the moderating effects of the FPTP and PBV electoral systems, on top of the similarities of the core ideologies of the PAP and the WP, NMPs can have a role to play in legislature. I am not claiming that the performance of NMPs has impacted voting patterns; rather, the point of this section is to show that NMPs do make substantive contributions, which include disagreeing with the state, and thus far their presence does not seem to deter the electorate from voting for the opposition as initially feared.
Towards a comparative agenda
I have argued that NMPs could enhance democratic governance in Singapore via promoting deliberation, accountability, and representation. Nevertheless, this paper is of use for broader comparative studies. Firstly, I make the claim is that in order to ensure greater representation and democracy in new democracies, specific constitutional and electoral engineering measures might be needed (see Lijphart, Reference Lijphart1991; Sartori, Reference Sartori1994). Electoral engineering has been argued to be a legitimate tool for policymakers to ensure female (Salmond, Reference Salmond2006) or minority representation (Zwart, Reference Zwart2000), and I suggest that our understanding of electoral engineering should go beyond quotas and guaranteed representation, or conventional political choices (such as Presidential versus Parliamentary systems, FPTP versus PR). Schemes such as the NMP scheme could reinforce democratic procedures in other ways. Reilly (Reference Reilly2002) laments the lack of serious scholarly attention towards electoral systems and innovations in the South Pacific, specifically the Borda Count voting system, and argues that these innovations have genuine value for studies in comparative politics (2002). I argue, the same vein, that the innovations introduced by the PAP scheme in Singapore should be studied and located within the wider literature on political parties and systems.
Secondly, it is perhaps timely for political scientists to restudy the creative devices instituted by authoritarian regimes to buttress their rule. These tools, that were initially intended to strengthen the regimes (Mauzy, Reference Mauzy, Hsieh and Newman2002), could over time evolve and genuinely enrich democracy. The NMP scheme is only one such example. Others could include Government Organized Non-Governmental Organizations (GONGOs) in China (see Wu, Reference Wu2003, for how GONGOs had the unintended effect of widening the democratic space in China). As circumstances change, structures transform and political cultures advance, these measures could also evolve both in their form and in substance. While I do not deny that the NMP scheme has been, and can be, used to perpetuate PAP dominance, I argue that it is myopic to view such schemes as solely contributing to an authoritarian regime's continuance, without exploring the nuances involved in such schemes and their unintended consequences. In a similar vein, I argue that various electoral engineering devices used by authoritarian regimes could have competing effects on its rule.
Conclusion
I have argued that the NMP scheme, the object of much skepticism and consternation of some academics and opposition politicians alike, could prove to be a boost for democracy. NMPs are in some areas, well placed to put forth contentious topics on the agenda in Parliament. NMPs are less likely to be taken to task by the PAP for merely raising important concerns in Parliament.
Despite the successes of the NMPs that have been mentioned, the scheme can be strengthened further. Currently, there is little transparency involved in the selection of NMPs. The Parliamentary Select Committee does not reveal the applicants, and neither do they explicate the reasons for the eventual selections. If transparency in the entire process is enhanced, NMPs will become more credible, and claims of them being chosen to propagate PAP policies will be less convincing. In addition, instead of being chosen by a Committee the composition of which is disproportionately in the favor of PAP,Footnote 25 the President of Singapore could directly evaluate the nominations and select the NMPs. This would again contribute towards the perception that NMPs are truly non-partisan.
In addition, it must be admitted that many NMPs do not challenge the status quo, and have been said to be ineffectual. This essay does not argue that the NMP scheme will enhance democratic governance; rather, it argues that the scheme could do so. Whether the scheme in practice promotes democratic representation is contingent on the individual NMPs and their agency; I have provided enough examples to show that the scheme enables NMPs to contribute to democracy in a positive way.
This paper has tried to argue in favor of a specific type of electoral engineering, the NMP scheme. Extending the findings of the paper, it can be argued that, depending on specific contexts of political systems, electoral engineering could enhance democratic governance. This might also call for a rethinking of the pure ‘one-man, one-vote’ system, as, despite not being elected, NMPs can have a positive effect on democracy in Singapore, given the existing political climate. Creative measures to strengthen democratic procedures should not merely be dismissed as ploys by incumbents to entrench their dominance without due diligence and proper appraisal. Especially in new democracies, where the political culture is not as favorable for democratic growth as in established democracies, different types of electoral engineering measures could be considered, with the ultimate aim of improving representation, the process of deliberation, and accountability.
About the author
Walid Jumblatt Abdullah is a Ph.D. candidate under the Joint Degree Program between National University of Singapore and King's College London. He studies state–religion relations, Southeast Asian politics, party and electoral politics. He has previously published an article in Asian Survey (2013), entitled ‘Religious Representation in Secular Singapore’.
