Searching for ideas

While addressing the debate over rationality vs. cognition in foreign policy analysis is beyond the scope of this article (Rosati, Reference Rosati2000), the centrality assigned to ideas implies that they are assumed to be part of the foreign policy-making process (Brighi, 2007). In particular ideas held by decision makers are thought to simplify and structure the outside environment (George, Reference Giacomello and Bertjan1980), influencing foreign policy goals and means. Since the research focuses on the design of Italian foreign policy after 2001 rather than its implementation, the impact of ideas on outcomes (in general or relative terms) does not need to be assessed here.

Our search for ideas has been guided by Goldstein and Keohane’s (Reference Goldstein and Keohane1993) tripartition. For the two scholars, at the level of world views, ‘ideas define the universe of possibilities for action’ (Goldstein and Keohane, Reference Goldstein and Keohane1993: 8). Ideas of this kind are labeled ‘scientific’ as they are supposed to capture ‘how the world works’. While being aware that this label is questionable since such ideas are obviously influenced by ideology, political attitudes, beliefs, past experience, etc., for the purpose of this study it is important to be able to distinguish between conceptions of the world environment influencing decisions (the so called ‘scientific ideas’) and foreign policy goals – Goldstein and Keohane’s ‘normative ideas’.

Normative ideas ‘mediate between world views and particular policy conclusions [as] they translate fundamental doctrines into guidance for contemporary human action’ (Goldstein and Keohane, Reference Goldstein and Keohane1993: 9). For our purpose, normative ideas set foreign policy goals which can be seen as consequentially linked – even though this may not always be the case in practice – to scientific ideas posing that ‘since the world works like this, then the proper policy objective is …’.

Finally, operational ideas convey policy prescriptions related to scientific and normative ideas through causal relationships: ‘Causal beliefs imply strategies for the attainment of goals, themselves valued because of shared principled beliefs, and understandable only within the context of broader world views’ (Goldstein and Keohane, Reference Goldstein and Keohane1993: 10).

This tripartition guided the search for ideas in the speeches of the nine Italy’s Foreign Affairs Ministers and the seven Italy’s Prime Ministers in office since 2001, both from the centre-right (R) and the centre-left (L). In every speech, scientific, normative, and operational ideas were singled out. Scientific ideas on ‘how the world works’ (Table 1) have then been regrouped in nine ‘macro-ideas’, on the basis that ideas articulated in slightly different ways and with reference to various foreign policy issues or regional settings may in fact convey the same vision of the world. Prime Ministers’ speeches turned out to mostly corroborate and only much less frequently integrate the findings coming from the more focused Foreign Affairs Ministers’ speeches.

As a second step, normative ideas stating foreign policy goals have been isolated and subsequently regrouped in internally coherent sets that either appear to be expression of Italy’s longstanding NRCs (Holsti, Reference Holsti1970) or point to new ones (Table 2). Italy’s present NRCs have then been matched with the nine (scientific) macro-ideas on how the world works in order to evaluate if the overall present conception of Italy’s role in the world is coherent with decision-makers’ reading of the international environment (Table 3).

Finally, normative ideas regrouped as foreign policy goals are considered in relation to both scientific and operational ideas. If they stand alone or are weakly linked ‘upstream’ to scientific ideas and ‘downstream’ to operational ideas, stated foreign policy goals are likely to be tantamount to mere narratives directed at the public opinion, in practice contributing very little to the overall design of Italy’s current foreign policy.

How the world works for Italy’s Foreign Affairs Ministers

Italy’s Foreign Affairs Ministers programmatic speeches contain manifest ideas which, duly integrated by Prime Ministers’ views, convey a distinct reading of the international environment of the time. The recurrence of some ideas on how the world works (Table 1) highlights the specificity of such a reading, making it possible to establish whether decision makers have (or have not) integrated the transformations occurred in world politics after 2001 in their foreign policy outlook.

Regrouping the large number of scientific ideas which – although differently articulated – convey the same core reading of the international environment, nine macro-ideas stand out: (1) the international system is complex and dynamic, presenting new challenges and threats; (2) globalization creates opportunities; (3) a power shift is occurring; (4) the EU can make the difference in world politics; (5) the transatlantic partnership is a pillar of global governance; (6) multilateralism is the cornerstone of world order; (7) effective multilateralism entails state responsibility; (8) democracy fosters security and development; (9) setting priorities is crucial for middle powers.

As a first very general observation, it stands out that there is no clear distinction between ideas expressed by ministers from centre-left (L) and from centre-right (R) governments,Footnote ⁵ with a notable exception, represented by idea no. 7, ‘effective multilateralism entails state responsibility’. In fact, this concept was initially formulated by D’Alema (2006, 2007), who served in a government supported by a broad left-of-the-centre coalition (led by former President of the European Commission Romano Prodi) after the European divisions provoked by the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. This idea is therefore highly situated in that peculiar time, but it then gained ground in Italy’s foreign policy discourse.

The rather consistent reading of world politics put forward by Italian decision makers can be more effectively presented and discussed by moving from the nine macro-ideas just mentioned to four thematic subsets. The first revolves around new challenges, threats, and opportunities in the international system (ideas no. 1, 2, and 3). A second subset includes ideas on Italy’s historical partnerships with the EU and the US (ideas no. 4 and 5). The third is about international order/democratic peace (ideas no. 6, 7, and 8). Idea no. 9 – regarding method rather than substance – reflects the need to set priorities, given Italy’s limited resources (Romero, Reference Romero2016). Not unexpectedly this idea often appears in connection with the first subset, as Foreign Affairs Ministers state that middle powers cannot cope simultaneously with all the challenges posed by a complex and rapidly evolving international system.

The first subset of ideas in fact highlights the widespread perception of a changing international system, which offers opportunities but also poses new challenges and threats. All Foreign Affairs Ministers mention this mixed picture with the exception of one in both his mandates (Frattini, 2003, 2008), making it the most recurrent (albeit somehow superficial) idea with its 13 appearances. On the other hand, only three ministers explicitly refer to changes brought about by globalization as (mainly economic) opportunities for the country. If we integrate the picture with the ideas put forward by Prime Ministers in their speeches though, power shift (Letta, 2013; Renzi, 2014) and ‘globalization as opportunity’ (Prodi, 2006) emerge as significant drivers of change in world politics (Stephen, Reference Stephen2013). Indeed, this more encouraging view may be due to Prime Ministers’ wider vision on world affairs and more articulated conception of the country’s interests, which today may well entail a significant economic component.

Moving to the second subset focused on partnerships, Table 1 apparently shows the persistence of two classic anchor points of Italy’s foreign policy – namely the European Union and the transatlantic alliance with the United States. While expressing uncompromising loyalty to the European Union project and to the transatlantic alliance has been a constant of Italy’s foreign policy for decades, ideas no. 4 and 5 point to a slightly different approach to such partnerships. This is apparently due to the fact that they are now seen through the lens of effective global governance as a crucial foreign policy goal. Regarding the EU, Italian Foreign Affairs Ministers worry about the risk it runs to be ineffective if it is not sufficiently cohesive and coherent: in a more fragmented international system, this could lead to its marginalization (see for instance, D’Alema, 2007). Moreover, a weaker EU would generate a permanent power asymmetry in the transatlantic partnership, diminishing the EU role in global governance (for instance, Frattini, 2008: 8 is less concerned about US strength than Europe’s weakness). In other words, Italian Foreign Affairs Ministers do no longer appear to regard the European integration process and the transatlantic partnership simply as anchor points to the West for the country, as it were during the Cold war, but as two fundamental sources of global governance. For this reason they are no longer a value in themselves, but insofar as they prove capable of carrying out this task. So Fini (2004: 7) states that ‘Italy has the ambition and the commitment to press the EU to emerge as a global actor constructively engaging in strategic partnership with the US’ within an effective multilateral system.

At first sight, subset no. 3 (ideas no. 6 and 7) seems not to be revealing anything significant: a reference to multilateralism as the cornerstone of world order was expected, since as a practice it has been the guiding idea of Italy’s foreign policy since the end of WWII. However, again an apparent continuity masks undercurrent change since multilateralism appears to have been re-interpreted. In fact, in the speeches multilateralism is not treated as an abstract principle, but rather as a tool to devise and implement effective international public policies.Footnote ⁶ As such, it requires engagement, commitment, and responsibility on the part of the states involvedFootnote ⁷ – responsibility that Italy’s Foreign Affairs Ministers seem to be willing to take upon themselves, maybe as an instrumental move in obtaining more resources for their Ministry.

Finally, the emphasis on the idea that setting priorities is now crucial (no. 9) reflects the awareness that the increasing complexity of the international environment requires commensurate resources – an idea which has been recurrent since the beginning of the economic crisis (2007–08, see Table 1). Moreover, quite a few speeches offer evidence that decision makers realize that present challenges require an upgrading in foreign policy actions, which only regional actors like the EU can sustain. For instance, according to Frattini (2008: 6), ‘Italy is too small’: only Europe – as small as it is in front of global giants – can develop the necessary critical mass to have a say on the global stage. Six years later, Mogherini (2014: 5) stresses how thinking globally is no longer a mere option for national decision makers, since regional and global dynamics are more and more interdependent. For a country like Italy – strongly affected by events taking place in the Mediterranean space, stresses Mogherini – acting within the framework of the EU has therefore become unavoidable if achieving policy effectiveness is the crucial aim.

A final observation suggested by the whole set of ideas regards their ‘density’ in the different speeches. The richest basket of ideas (at least nine, compared with one to six for the other ministers) was put forward by the two most senior political figures: Gianfranco Fini, then leader of National Alliance, the rightist junior partner in Berlusconi’s government, and Massimo D’Alema, who served as Prime Minister and was a leader of the intelligentsia of the Democratic Party. This wealth of ideas may be due to their stronger ideological background, political standing, and longtime experience, but could also depend on the fact that they happened to serve in a period of dramatic changes and fault lines like the EU enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe and the split between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe following Washington’s decision to invade Iraq.

In fact, by looking at Fini’s (2004) and D’Alema’s (2006, 2007) ideas we can trace two partially overlapping ‘clusters’, embracing, respectively, ideas no. 3, 4, 5, and 6, and ideas no. 6, 7, and 8 (Table 1). The focal point of the first is represented by the European and transatlantic pillars of Italy’s foreign policy while the second emphasizes state responsibility and democracy promotion as tools to foster security and development, both being connected to the idea that multilateralism is the cornerstone of world order. Since they appeared in a period when American unilateralism tested the resilience of international order (2003–07), they both give evidence of the impact of contingencies (i.e. new significant and disrupting events requiring new ideas), simultaneously showing that for Italy combining effective and inclusive multilateralism was the response to these new challenges.

Concluding, while at a superficial reading speeches may suggest continuity in Italy’s view of how the world works, a more in-depth analysis highlights a significant updating of decision-makers’ vision of international dynamics. Three pillars of the country’s foreign policy – European engagement, the partnership with the United States and Italy’s loyalty toward multilateralism – are reinterpreted by incorporating the changes in terms of growing interconnectedness within the global system and rising challenges, explicitly mentioned by almost all Foreign Affairs Ministers.

Beyond world views: normative ideas and Italy’s NRCs

Among drivers behind foreign policy are NRCs. A NRC ‘includes the policymakers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems’ (Holsti, Reference Holsti1970: 245–246). In search of NRCs driving Italy’s foreign policy after 2001, we assume that normative ideas put forward by Foreign Affairs Ministers convey specific NRCs. The move is justified by the fact that normative ideas, which translate general world views into proper foreign policy goals and related commitments (Goldstein and Keohane, Reference Goldstein and Keohane1993: 9), variably include most of NRCs’ defining elements mentioned by Holsti.Footnote ⁸ This section is hence devoted to exploring Italy’s NRCs by illustrating a number of normative ideas which either confirm old ones or suggest that new ones have recently been developed.

In his seminal 1970 article comparing the NRCs of 71 countries by analyzing the speeches of institutional actors (mainly between 1965 and 1967), Holsti found that Italy took on four different roles for itself:Footnote ⁹ mediator–integrator, regional-subsystem collaborator, developer, and faithful ally, the latter being the most recurrently referred to.Footnote ¹⁰ While mediator–integrators ‘perceive themselves as capable of, or responsible for, fulfilling or undertaking special tasks to reconcile conflicts between other states or groups of states’ (Holsti, Reference Holsti1970: 265), regional-subsystem collaborators ‘do not merely envisage occasional interposition into areas or issues of conflict; they indicate, rather, far-reaching commitments to cooperative efforts with other states to build wider communities’ (Holsti, Reference Holsti1970: 265). Developers perceive ‘a special duty or obligation to assist underdeveloped countries’ (Holsti, Reference Holsti1970: 266), while faithful allies reiterate ‘specific commitment[s] to support the policies of another government’ (Holsti, Reference Holsti1970: 267).

Since Holsti includes faithful ally in the NRC category labeled ‘cold-war polar’, we might expect this NRC to be dismissed by Italy in the post-2001 fragmented international sphere. The regional-subsystem collaborator and mediator–integrator NRCs, included in the ‘subsystem-oriented independent category’, should still be essential patterns of Italy’s foreign policy, given Italy’s limited resources and geographical location.Footnote ¹¹ After all, this category applies to many countries that might ‘become involved in some multilateral and global issues through the United Nations, [but whose] chief concerns are much closer to home’ (Holsti, Reference Holsti1970: 291).

In order to establish if a country is a passive or active player in the international arena Holsti attributes a score to each NRC: from zero (very passive, like a protectee) to five (very active, like a bastion of revolution-liberator). Italy’s NRCs get a score of three, with the exception of faithful ally, that gets a score of two. Not surprisingly then, when Holsti regroups states in four sets according to their being active or passive, Italy turns up in group III, among countries we might label ‘upper passive’. To sum up, in terms of foreign engagement Holsti’s analysis hints at a country rather passive in the Cold war environment, but with a role to play as a regional collaborator, facilitating reconciliation among conflicting parties, within the undisputed framework of the transatlantic alliance.

Drawing on the analysis of normative ideas extrapolated from the speeches of the Foreign Affairs Ministers in office since 2001, Table 2 shows that, in recent years, Italy has developed five new NRCs to be added to the four singled out by Holsti in 1970, which persist. Four have been inductively created ex novo from normative ideas: effective multilateralist/responsible state, globalization surfer/economic networker, cultural power, and principled actor. The fifth, bridge, while not applied to Italy at the time, was one of Holsti’s original ideal types.

Holsti (Reference Holsti1970) suggested that, as a role, bridge is similar to mediator–integrator, but while the latter ‘implies various forms of diplomatic interposition into areas or issues of conflict, the bridge concept is much more ephemeral’, involving instead ‘a communication function, that is, acting as a “translator”, or conveyor of messages and information between peoples of different cultures’ (Holsti, Reference Holsti1970: 265–266). Given its geographical location at the center of the Mediterranean and its history as faithful US ally and co-founder of the European venture, Italy is in fact a perfect candidate to play this role. Not unexpectedly, expressions of this NRC abound, derived from a number of normative ideas such as:

As we said, other four post-2001 NRCs have been identified and labeled ex novo: let us see them in turn. The effective multilateralist/responsible state role is played by countries that conceive multilateralism as a powerful tool for responsible states to make global governance work. Since it is not an automatic mechanism, in order to function multilateralism requires meaningful engagement and responsible commitment – in terms of capacity and resources – from each single country involved. This role conception entails an inclusive approach so as to make sure that all relevant actors are on board.

The globalization surfer/economic networker NRC is linked to foreign economic policy,Footnote ¹² and involves two dimensions. First, a globalization surfer wants to take advantage of all opportunities that economic interdependence offers, wherever they come up: in order to fulfil this role, a country and its economic system have to ‘get ready’ for global competition by flexibly riding the waves of globalization and also by widening the traditional horizon of foreign policy. Second, the economic networker wants to pursue economic diplomacy (Frattini, Reference Frattini2011) to attract direct foreign investments and support outgoing investments and exports. This role reflects the adherence to the liberal vision of an open global economic order.

The NRC cultural power reflects the idea of projecting power and influence through the promotion of national language, historical heritage, movies, music, and arts in general. A cultural power is usually aware and proud of its cultural uniqueness and it perceives culture as a significant tool to be deployed to raise the country’s standing in the world, since it represents a respected source of contribution to the legacy of the humankind. The NRC of cultural power is in fact strictly linked to the NRC based on foreign economic policy, as the promotion of culture is also a vehicle for advertising products and services offered by the country – in fact in our case we think here of a possible ‘Made in Italy’ effect, recalling the aforementioned quotation in Frattini (2008).

A principled actor – the last of Italy’s more recently developed NRCs – is a country that consciously consults its founding principles before acting on the international stage. Like individuals of principles, countries playing this NCR believe that whatever decision, action, or behavior becomes an option, an evaluation of their compatibility with one’s defining values is due. Moreover, all policies and initiatives aimed at reaffirming these principles must be granted a privileged focus, even though they might look like marginal acts of ‘niche diplomacy’ (Cooper, Reference Cooper1997; Henrikson, Reference Henrikson1997).

When it comes to Italy’s NRCs already identified by Holsti (Reference Holsti1970), continuity is rather evident. Italy’s role as a mediator/integrator is confirmed by our analysis of normative ideas in foreign policy discourse after 2001. As we might expect, recent developments have actually enhanced this role conception. Worsening tensions and conflicts at the country’s door put Italy in an uncomfortable position so that mediation turned out to be almost a necessity. Such attitude is strengthened by the fact that the old system of alliances does not seem to be working properly and effectively anymore, thereby making the country feel weaker.

The most-often quoted fault lines of the system where Italy is supposed to play a mediating role concern Russia and the West (see for instance, Fini, 2004; D’Alema, 2007; Frattini, 2008; Terzi, 2011; Mogherini, 2014; Gentiloni, 2015), Israel and Palestine (Fini, 2004; D’Alema, 2007; Terzi, 2011; Bonino, 2013; Mogherini, 2014; Gentiloni, 2015), Iran and the West (Fini, 2004; Bonino, 2013). Occasionally, this NRC is framed in more general terms, like in Fini’s reference to Italy’s ‘dedication to pursue the objective of spreading peace and justice in every corner of the world’ (Fini, 2004: 4) or D’Alema’s all-encompassing vision of a combined (military, political, humanitarian, and economic) strategy for supporting failing states (D’Alema, 2006).

When Holsti was conducting his research in the late 1960s, the Europeans were at a very early stage of their integration process. The regional institutional framework is now much more complex and articulated. Not unexpectedly, Italy’s NRC as regional/subsystem collaborator has been strengthened alongside the establishment, and then the deepening and widening of the European Union (including monetary union in 1999). Italy’s participation and contribution to the European integration project is indeed always present as an underlining ‘given’ of the country’s foreign policy, even though with the Berlusconi’s governments a more ‘eurorealist approach’ starts showing (Quaglia, Reference Quaglia2007).

Ministers focus on two issues in particular. The first is the need to revitalize and redesign the European Union (D’Alema, 2006, 2007), making it more lively and dynamic (Fini, 2004), allowing it to acquire a ‘critical mass’ (Frattini, 2008: 6), with a strong euro at its heart (Terzi, 2011) and moving beyond austerity and tackling new policies like migration (Bonino, 2013) or defence (Mogherini, 2014). The second issue is enlargement. Italian Foreign Affairs Ministers apparently do not see a tension between ‘widening’ and ‘deepening’ the European Union, as the issue of EU enlargement is always viewed under a positive light and clearly supported, by leaving the door open to the membership of Balkan countries and Turkey (Fini, 2004; D’Alema, 2007; Frattini, 2008; Bonino, 2013).

From the Ministers’ speeches, we can infer that Italy still considers development cooperation a major policy objective (for Frattini, 2003 is even a ‘pillar’). Developer is a significant role for Italy to play (it ranks fourth in Table 2 as per number of normative ideas supporting it): development cooperation is seen as a tool to meet the challenges brought about by a system in flux, with poor and failing countries being sources of instability. Development cooperation involves solidarity among countries (Ruggiero, 2001) and fighting against poverty (Ruggiero, 2001; D’Alema, 2007). Sometimes it is included explicitly within the framework of foreign economic policy (D’Alema, 2006), linked directly to the empowerment of the African Union and other regional organizations (Frattini, 2008), or viewed in the context of ‘civilian commitment’ alongside the military presence of the international community in failed or weak states like Afghanistan (D’Alema, 2007; Terzi, 2011; Mogherini, 2014).

Development cooperation is justified in ethical terms, since ‘it is and must continue to be a great opportunity, as well as a moral duty of our foreign policy’ (Terzi, 2011: 8), but also in terms of economic return and prestige. On development cooperation ‘security and prosperity of our own reality, of our companies and of our operators’ depend, based on ‘their capacity to keep on being seen as responsible protagonists of global governance, of which development is an essential part’ (Terzi, 2011: 8). Of course, development aid needs financial resources, and budget cuts due to EU-imposed austerity plans have negatively impacted on this policy – at one point we learn (Bonino, 2013: 23) that resources were cut from one billion euros to 220–230 millions, equal to 0.15% of GDP, very far from the long-established G8 target of 0.7% for industrialized countries. All Ministers, being concerned about resource limitation, call for an increase in spending combined with a much needed revision of regulations to increase efficiency of development cooperation by modernizing its instruments since ‘today we do not talk anymore about the cooperation of the 1980s: the world is slightly different and I have the impression that we must also update the instruments at our disposal’ (Bonino, 2011: 23). Relevant law no. 49, dating from 1987, was actually modified only in 2015.

Finally, a few words have to be spent on faithful ally, the NRC that Holsti found as the most defining role of Italy’s presence in the international arena in the late 1960s. With the end of the Cold war, in all evidence, this NRC has become residual in the Italian foreign policy discourse, with just four quotations, making it the second-to-last NRC after cultural power, which is somehow linked to economic diplomacy anyway. Moreover, the ally is no longer faithful as it used to be. Even though the alliance with the United States is constantly reaffirmed, on one hand, loyalty does not mean supporting all American policies or abstaining from criticizing what are perceived as Washington’s mistakes, on the other, the alliance is rather seen as a mutually reinforcing complement of the European integration dimension. A few normative ideas put forward by Foreign Affairs Ministers clarify this point, explaining why we put ‘faithful’ into parentheses when we adopt this NRC for present Italy:

As mentioned at the beginning of this paragraph, faithful ally was the most passive role among Italy’s NRCs in the late 1960s. As the interpretation of this role changes, and ‘faithfulness’ somehow disappears, we might expect, ceteris paribus, to see a higher degree of activism in Italian foreign policy with respect to the past.

Indeed, considering the new role conceptions that we have singled out for Italy, all portray either a very active role (effective multilateralism promoter/responsible state, globalization surfer/economic networker, cultural power) or a moderately active role (bridge, principled actor). Tentatively, we could then argue that the combined effect of the weakening of a passive NRC, the ongoing validity of three quite active NRCs, and the development of five new active NRCs possibly make Italy move up from the upper passive group (III) to group II, in Holsti’s (Reference Holsti1970) classification, which includes, as far as policy design is concerned, ‘lower active’ countries.Footnote ¹³

On consistency: worldviews, foreign policy goals, and operational tools

In order to assess the consistency of Italy’s foreign policy design intended as a fundamental ingredient of effectiveness, one last test must be conducted on the nexuses connecting scientific, normative, and operational ideas. As a first step we shall consider the link between world views and NRCs (Table 3). When the sign ‘+’ appears, it means that the NRC is supported/reinforced by a corresponding scientific idea: for instance, the need to play the role of globalization surfer/economic networker is justified and strengthened by the three scientific ideas of complexity and dynamism of the international system, globalization creates opportunity and power shift to emerging markets, hence the number 3+ in the last column of line no. 7. The role of promoter of effective multilateralism is instead supported by change, power shift, EU as global actor, multilateralism as the cornerstone of world order, and state responsibility, while acting as a bridge is required by change and the new symmetry in the EU–US alliance.

The sign ‘−’ in its turn means that the NRC is inversely related to the relevant scientific ideas capturing how the world works. As change, power shift and global EU transform the nature and sources of both challenges and opportunities, Italy remains a US ally while at the same time looking also elsewhere for partnerships (e.g. more to the EU) and being frankly critical of perceived US mistakes. In other words, the ally is less faithful, hence the minus sign in the table.

In the overall, the high number (22+ and 3−) of links connecting NRCs and scientific ideas points to a remarkable coherence between world views and foreign policy goals. A first preliminary result, then, tells us that foreign policy seems to be rooted in a consistent reading of the international environment. Of course, we can expect that new NRCs will through time generate new world views as well as normative ideas/foreign policy goals – for instance, the NRC of globalization surfer/economic networker gave birth in 2003 to foreign economic policy intended as a tool to make the country more effective in a complex economic world.

As a final step we shall observe whether normative ideas, regrouped for this purpose around general foreign policy goals, are grounded in scientific ideas or linked to operational ideas, or whether, being weakly linked or totally detached from them, are mere narrative for the domestic political audience and the public opinion in general. Let us examine each foreign policy goal in turn.

1. 1. To work so as to strengthen effective multilateralism, making it more inclusive, and making states more responsible. This objective is grounded in scientific ideas no. 6 (‘multilateralism is the cornerstone of world order’) and no. 7 (‘effective multilateralism entails state responsibility’), and corresponds to NRC no. 6 (the effective multilateralist/responsible state). In speeches, it has always an operative declination, by referring to specific institutions (EU, NATO, UN), or venues (e.g. peace conferences, and fora), and less frequently to policies.

2. 2. To face new security threats through the promotion of human rights and democracy. It is based on scientific ideas no. 8 (‘democracy fosters security and development’) (Fini, 2004; D’Alema, 2006, 2007; Mogherini, 2014) and no. 1 (‘the international system is complex and dynamic’). It also serves as a building block of NRC no. 1 (mediator/integrator), no. 3 (developer), and no. 9 (principled actor). However, it is very much related to a single contingent case (Afghanistan) expressing the need to move beyond a purely military intervention framework, thereby making the efforts of the international community within that country more effective and comprehensive. It is generally linked to operational ideas, but some ministers (Frattini, 2003, 2008; Terzi, 2011) do not link it to any ‘means to an end’: their statements about human rights and democracy are very prescriptive and they stand alone as mere fluctuating narratives, without any concrete policy suggestions. Other ministers like Fini (2004) and D’Alema (2006, 2007) present both dimensions (operational and principled).

3. 3. To facilitate the overcoming of divisions. This objective – often expressed with references to fault lines in the Middle East, or in the Mediterranean, or dividing the West and Russia – is grounded in scientific idea no. 1 (‘the international system is complex and dynamic’) and it is a strong component of NRC no. 1 (mediator/integrator), while representing the backbone of NRC no. 5 (bridge). When it is stated it has always a specific operational side.

4. 4. To contribute to the enhancement of Europe. In this case, the line of action is clearly linked to scientific idea no. 4 (‘the EU can make the difference in world politics’) and (albeit more vaguely) no. 7 (‘effective multilateralism entails state responsibility’). The related NRC is no. 2 regional/subsystem collaborator. As mentioned, for Italian Foreign Affairs Ministers the EU ‘deepening’ – that is, increasing the internal cohesiveness of Europe through sharing more policies, beyond the austerity-infused prescriptions – is not conceived as an alternative to the EU ‘widening’. Needless to say, such objective is operationally linked to EU and EU-related policies.

5. 5. To revitalize the transatlantic relationship. This foreign policy goal is grounded in scientific idea no. 5 (‘the transatlantic partnership is a pillar of global governance’) and directly generates NRC no. 4 (ally). It is anchored in NATO activities as operational ideas. Three comments are in order here. First, the scientific idea which supports the ally role appears only three times in the speeches: its recurrence is thus modest (Fini and D’Alema, 2007). Second, its appearance is concentrated in the years 2004–07, clearly as a consequence of the damage brought to the transatlantic alliance by American unilateralism in Iraq. Third, while such NRC disappears from the scene, since 2008 Foreign Affairs Ministers and Prime Ministers (Letta, 2013; Renzi, 2014) alike have made clear references to the ‘power shift’ idea, suggesting that the transatlantic alliance is indeed becoming slightly less relevant in a rapidly changing world. These comments explain why we have argued that the ally appears not to be so ‘faithful’ any longer.

6. 6. To internationalize the ‘sistema Italia’ (Italy as a system) and to consolidate relationships with new emerging countries, also through the promotion of culture. The foreign policy goal here is grounded in scientific ideas no. 2 (‘globalization creates opportunities’) and no. 3 (‘a power shift is occurring’). As a normative idea it represents the main building bloc of NRC no. 7 (globalization surfer/economic networker), while at the same time contributing to NRC no. 6 (the effective multilateralist/responsible state) and no. 8 (cultural power). Regarding the scientific ideas linked to this objective, we can observe that they are very broad and expressed in highly general terms. On operational ideas as means to the end of internationalizing Italy, three comments emerge from the analysis. First, they are very detailed but rather focused on domestic politics, making references to institutional and bureaucratic tools, both in the internal (‘cabine di regia’, committees, and cooperation activities with the Ministry for Economic Development and with the regions) and external (embassies, cultural institutes attached to the embassies, and foreign trade institutes abroad) dimensions. Second, there is no reference whatsoever to economic or financial multilateral organizations (e.g. G8,Footnote ¹⁴ G20, IMF, World Bank, or WTO): multilateralism is always referred to as political or security multilateralism, since traditionally foreign economic policy vis-à-vis international financial institutions falls under the portfolio of the Ministry of Economy. This takes us to the third comment. Italy as a globalization surfer is set to exploit opportunities bred by globalization, but it does not even consider to invest resources in global economic governance. Its participation in the different economic institutions appears more a matter of status than the result of a real interest in its workings. The operational emphasis may then well mask a sense of impotence toward the waves of globalization while activism looks rather like a survival strategy, an attempt not to drown.

7. 7. To set priorities. This foreign policy goal is grounded in scientific idea no. 9 (‘setting priorities is crucial for middle powers’), and it often involves operational ideas, although sometimes the latter are very general. In a few cases – ‘to contribute to the overcoming of divisions’, ‘to increase development aid resources’ – priorities are indeed framed more as an attitude, or a petition of principle, than clearly focused actions. Priorities are indeed determined by geography, or by emergencies (the Middle East, the Mediterranean, Russia and Ukraine, Libya and Afghanistan), but no hierarchy among issues could be detected, with the two exceptions of the European dimension and the internationalization of Italian companies. In fact, this is not surprising and it does not undermine our general point, since the former clearly blurs the line between foreign policy and domestic politics, while the latter is a direct consequence of the economic crisis including the general belief of the elite (albeit never expressed in speeches) that, in the future, domestic demand will not be strong enough to sustain Italy’s (hopeful) economic recovery.

Overall, we can conclude that normative ideas as NRCs are for the most part firmly grounded in world views. Normative ideas as foreign policy goals too appear significantly grounded in scientific ideas on how the world works and related to operational ideas so that Italian foreign policy can be considered adequately consistent as far as its design is concerned.