Houchang Chehabi's Onomastic Reforms: Family Names and State Building in Iran is an in-depth study of one of Reza Shah's state-building reforms that usually receives no more than a paragraph or two in historical surveys of early Pahlavi reforms, namely: the introduction of state registry and family names to Iranian society. This short book (90 text pages in total) encompasses the rationale and ideology behind the reforms, the legislation enacting them, the practicalities of adopting and registering family names, a comparative analysis of Iran and other semi-colonial countries, mainly Turkey and Thailand, and insights from countries such as Japan. This ostensibly technical topic becomes a light read thanks to Chehabi's prose style, rich with anecdotes and entertaining commentary.
The book contains four chapters, beginning with an introduction discussing family names as a characteristic of “civilization,” both in Iran and other countries; a concise historical background of Iran in the first quarter of the twentieth century; and discussions linking the adoption of family names to state-building efforts (most notably to conscription, but also taxation) in Iran. The second and fourth chapters deal with the actual practices of naming both before and after the reforms. The third chapter examines the legislation that formed the state registry and enforced family names, both under the late Qajars and Reza Shah.
As suggested by its name, the book attributes the adoption and registering of family names to Iran's state-building process. This process, Chehabi shows, began before the coup d'état that brought Reza Khan to power; indeed, the cabinet already approved a law in 1918 establishing a Personal Status Registry and asking every family head to choose a family name. At the time, this law was deemed essential to the state's ability to regain some measure of centralization after the First World War, as well as vital to measures such as conscription and taxation. These further measures were similarly discussed, but not implemented, by the majles.
Alongside the administrative needs of a modern country, Chehabi brings ample evidence to the fact that these reforms were important for the modernized (self) image of Iran and Iranians. Already under the late Qajars, educated Iranians saw family names as a marker of progress and civilization, and the desire to join “civilized nations” as equals was a common argument in favor of the reform. This urge to attain the status of “civilized country” stemmed from the hope that such would increase the country's sovereignty (p. 7). Furthermore, educated men highlighted the state's inability to distinguish between citizens for various needs as a main reason the country needed such measures.
Family names became a new characteristic of the reformist elite. Indeed, the book demonstrates, Europhile, modernized Iranians already started adopting family names before the state required them to do so (p. 28). Newspapers were a place for promoting the reform, as well as where advice on and admonition of people's choice of names appeared. The press also served as an announcement board, where men published ads informing the public of their newly-chosen names. Some such ads are included in the book and, while not strictly necessary, add some “color” for Persian readers.
The dynamic of the state legislature following the practices of the educated elite is similarly apparent in other reforms of the early Pahlavi period—the most visible example of which is the male (and, to a degree, female) dress reform, where the fashion choices of the male elite became subject to state law. Chehabi shows, here and in other studies, that Reza Shah's modernizing reforms were not, in fact, a break from the Qajar past; they were based on previous debates and attempts at reform. This view strengthens recent studies aiming to shift the focus of research on this period from the person of Reza Shah to the cadre of administrators and bureaucrats surrounding him, whose role in reforming the country was no less significant.
Chehabi bases this study on a wide variety of primary sources, from official documents and newspapers to autobiographies and personal communications with Iranian contacts. This allows for new insight around the practicalities of how Iranians chose their family names and their reaction to state attempts at registration. The book shows, for example, how various people were forced to change their chosen name due to its similarity to names chosen by the royal family or senior court officers; how, in rural areas, peasants who avoided registration were assigned ridiculous family names by irate officials; and how some names preserved Qajar titles or honorifics now forbidden by law. It also discusses state measures to enforce the law.
The chapters regarding traditional and modern naming practices provide, in a way, a guide to Iran's social stratification in the late Qajar and early Pahlavi period. Illustrating the significance and origins of titles and honorifics can assist the non-Iranian scholar in navigating the personalities, positions, and professions of the higher strata of Iranian society. These chapters also provide explanations for phenomena such as the inflation of honorary titles under the late Qajars; the incompatibility of many important Olamas’ familiar names (most notably Khomeini) with their “official” family names; the existence of brothers with different family names; and the fact that women often preserved their maiden name rather than adopt their husbands’ family name, as required by law.
This book is a valuable and interesting reading for scholars and students of modern Iran, those interested in state-building processes in semi-colonial settings, and readers interested in the meanings behind Iranian family names.
