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A Servant of Two Masters: Communication and the Selection of International Bureaucrats

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 April 2007

Leslie Johns
Leslie Johns
Affiliation:
Department of Politics at New York University, E-mail: leslie.johns@nyu.edu
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Abstract

International bureaucrats must often serve multiple principals who collectively choose policy. How does this affect bureaucrats' incentives to truthfully reveal their private information? I construct a cheap talk model in which a bureaucrat possesses private information about how policies translate into outcomes. The bureaucrat can communicate publicly observable messages about this information to two policymakers, who must then bargain over a set of policy choices. I find that both the bureaucrat's willingness to communicate informatively and the choice of an optimal bureaucrat are highly contingent on the bargaining powers of the two policymakers. When each policymaker is bound to adhere to the bargaining outcome, “moderate” bureaucrats are most preferred. In contrast, when at least one policymaker can leave the bargaining table and exercise an outside option, “biased” bureaucrats can be optimal. I illustrate my findings by examining UN weapons inspections in Iraq from 1991 to 2003.I wish to thank Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Michael Gilligan, Catherine Hafer, Matias Iaryczower, Dimitri Landa, Adam Meirowitz, Alastair Smith, and the editor and two anonymous reviewers for their feedback. Previous drafts of this article were presented in the New York University Politics Department Research Workshop and the 2006 Annual Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association.

Type
Research Article
Information
International Organization , Volume 61 , Issue 2 , April 2007 , pp. 245 - 275
Copyright
© 2007 The IO Foundation and Cambridge University Press

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