Chasing Phantoms: The Political Economy of USTR

Marcus Noland

doi:10.1162/002081897550393

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Trade barriers, though usually considered welfare-reducing, are globally ubiquitous. In light of the enormous clash between what is and what ought to be, researchers have begun addressing the question of why countries so consistently pursue such apparently counterproductive policies.

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