Studies of the Hobsbawmian “Age of Empire” have, until recently, rested on overwhelmingly Eurocentric foundations. Historians have practically taken for granted the military, technological, and economic authority of Western powers over the rest of the world, while regarding colonial expansion as nearly inevitable—held back by inter-European quibbling rather than by the ability of local polities to resist a Western imperialist onslaught. Non-European powers—however formidable—were thus relegated to the roles of passive observers or, even worse, helpless victims in the European colonial scramble. When reversals did occur, such as the Italian defeat in Ethiopia (1898), or Japan's victory over Russia (1904–5) scholars interpreted the outcomes as aberrations—a sign of the weakness of the invading empire rather than the ability of their opponents to stand their ground.
Thankfully, a recent shift in perspective has transcended “the West and the rest” approach to late 19th-century studies of colonialism and provided us with a more nuanced lens through which to view the period. While European colonial powers exerted hegemony in late 19th- and early 20th-century geopolitics, they were by no means alone. To survive and expand, polities such as the Ottoman Empire, Japan, and the Qing made conscious efforts to adjust to the new political environment, strengthened their hold on provinces, overhauled administrative structures, and adopted the legal terms and doctrines of the expanding West. Mostafa Minawi's Ottoman Scramble for Africa provides a new and valuable contribution to this new wave of scholarship.
At its heart, this work addresses the geopolitical struggle of the Porte under Abdülhamid II to secure the southern “hinterland” (an Anglophone term directly transliterated into Ottoman) and enhance its legal claims and imperial infrastructure against the encroaching European colonial offensive. The monograph carefully retraces the steps of Sadik Pasha al-Mouayad Azmzade, an Ottoman officer from a powerful Damascene lineage, who emerged in this period as the empire's expert on Bedouin affairs. Through the prism of Azmzade's activity, Minawi analyzes two major Ottoman enterprises in the Sahara and the Hijaz: an attempt to secure the international diplomatic recognition of Ottoman claims to its Saharan hinterland and the construction of the Hijaz telegraph line.
Chapter 1 offers readers critical background into the sociopolitical world of Greater Tripolitania and the Lake Chad Basin, and recounts the geopolitical landscape of Ottoman North Africa up until the late 19th century. By Chapter 2, Minawi's attentions hone in on the late 19th century and the symbiotic relationship between Ottoman authorities such as Azmzade, and the Sanussi Order's leadership under al-Mahdi al-Sanussi. With the French occupying Tunisia and the British in Egypt, the Porte began focusing even more on its North African possessions—namely, on its post-1835 administration of Ottoman Libya. Bound by imperial competitors on both sides, the Porte further stepped up its efforts after the Congress of Berlin by making a conscious effort to couch its territorial claims to the Lake Chad Basin within the new framework of the Congress of Berlin. Identifying the Sanussiyya as the key to Ottoman interests in the region, the Porte dispatched Azmzade to converse with al-Mahdi al-Sanussi, and convinced the latter to act as an imperial proxy. Despite early successes and the dynamic relationship between the two men, however, Ottoman hopes soon began to unravel.
Per Minawi, Istanbul recognized that the provisions of the Act of Berlin had little value without the corresponding military power to enforce them. In its attempts to use diplomatic channels to protect its African territories, the Porte realized that European capitals only paid lip service to their professed principles, as European polities continued their expansion and colonial efforts at the Ottomans’ expense. Effectively shut out of diplomatic negotiations by the mid-1890s, the Porte transformed its relationship with the Sanussiyya into an informal military alliance. By doing so, the Ottomans sought to secure the empire's territorial integrity through its North African subjects, rather than through ultimately empty agreements made in European halls. Unable to openly challenge its imperial rivals, Istanbul strengthened its hold by actively supporting Sanussi resistance against the French and simultaneously engaging in a large-scale infrastructural project—the telegraph system of the Hijaz—to provide substance to its claim of “effective occupation.” As imperial authorities tried to overhaul their control over the greater province, however, local authorities often worked at cross-purposes, jealously protecting their power against the center.
By Chapter 5, the study moves firmly across the Red Sea to discuss the construction of the Hijaz telegraph line, a project that incorporated the harsh lessons learned by Istanbul during the Scramble for Africa. Faced with the dire need to secure communications with the hinterland, the Mahdist rebellion in the Sudan, and the unreliability of Egyptian telegraph services, the Porte took account of the conflicting imperial interests in the Hijaz. The concern with self-sufficiency led Abdülhamid II to reject a financially attractive British bid to construct the underwater cable, opting instead for an overland route that would remain under Ottoman control. This decision was prompted not only by suspicion of British intentions, but also by the positive experience of cooperating with the Bedouins of the Sahara. Underlining the Hijazi-Saharan link, Istanbul brought several officials with experience in Libya, including Azmzade, on for the project.
Despite the Ottomans’ resolve and swift initial progress, the telegraph line eventually fell short of its goals, with construction coming to a standstill after reaching Medina in 1901—never reaching Mecca. This disappointing outcome resulted from a nexus of factors, including lack of financial resources, red tape, Bedouin rivalries, and the opposition of local powerholders in Mecca concerned with preserving their independence from Istanbul.
In fact, that is my only misgiving of this book. While Minawi builds a compelling and historically fascinating argument throughout The Ottoman Scramble for Africa, the topic is just that—an analysis of the Ottoman imperial efforts to control the southern hinterland. In effect, the North African and Hijazi perspective and response to this interimperial scrabble remains relatively muted. Bedouin figures and the broader interests of both the Sanussiyya and the Hijaz are mentioned throughout; nevertheless, the main protagonist of the book is undoubtedly the Porte and its agents. Of course, no one book can do everything, and this absence does not deter from Minawi's findings on Ottoman territorial scrambles.
Furthermore, the author rightly points out that we should not approach these abortive projects through the perspective of “the blinding teleology of failure.” Even if attempts to secure the Ottoman possessions in the Sahara and the Hijaz fell short of their declared goals, they demonstrated the Porte's efforts to challenge Europe in the game of competitive imperialism, and their efforts to both use and then later subvert the rules of play. In a convincing revision of the dominant narrative, Minawi presents the Hamidian era as a period of innovation and conscious effort to adapt Ottoman governance structures to the context of interimperial rivalry.
The Ottoman Scramble for Africa is compelling and well written and its argument is presented in a clear and straightforward manner. Despite the vast geographic area and a variety of topics covered, the author manages to drive his main argument home while simultaneously shedding light on a wide variety of sources, many of them previously unpublished. Overall, The Ottoman Scramble for Africa constitutes a welcome addition to the field of 19th-century Ottoman history and is a much-needed study of the woefully understudied regions of the “well-protected domains” under discussion.
