Itamar Rabinovich's biography of Yitzhak Rabin is both sympathetic and blunt. A leading historian of the Middle East, Rabinovich served from 1992 to 1996 as Israel's ambassador to the United States and chief negotiator with Syria. He worked closely with Rabin but refrains from devoting inordinate attention to that period. The reader will find in this volume no extensive bibliography, but the author has drawn on private papers to augment his sources. The book is an examination of more than fifty years of Israeli history as tightly woven as the author's previous works. Rabinovich treats biographical writing as an opportunity neither for small talk nor speculation about his subject's psychological makeup, rendering the few comments he makes on Rabin's personality that much more effective.
Rabin's slow climb is a leitmotif of this study. He was appointed brigade commander in 1948 at twenty-six years old but chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) only eighteen years later, because the Mapai establishment long considered him politically unreliable. Rabin became a highly influential ambassador in Washington from 1968 to 1973, but struggled from 1974 to 1977 as an unelected prime minister. He served as minister of defense in the Labor-Likud unity governments of 1984 to 1990, building a new power base. Yet his road back to the prime minister's office, to which he was elected in 1992, was a long one.
The seven chapters of Rabinovich's book proceed chronologically. This review addresses three themes that traverse the author's narrative of Rabin as soldier, diplomat, and politician. The first is Rabin's fifty-five-year involvement in military affairs. The 1948 war profoundly affected both his outlook on security and postarmy career. Preparing for war was a test that in his view the Yishuv (Jewish community in Palestine) had (despite Israel's victory) largely failed. He observed the incompetence of fellow commanders such as David Shaltiel, whose attempt to save the Jewish Quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem was ill-conceived and unsuccessful. Rabin bore the encumbrance of ideological strife. He fought in the ranks of the left-wing Palmach but was only marginally involved in the June 1948 episode of the (right-wing) Irgun ship Altalena, which the IDF sank off the coast of Tel Aviv. Nevertheless, after he signed the Oslo Accords, the Israeli Right added the Altalena to his “list of sins.” Rabin had a role in expelling the Palestinians from Lydda and Ramle. Yet, Rabinovich writes of a “perspective . . . in the twenty-first century . . . far removed from considerations . . . in 1948” (p. 26).
Rabinovich's account of Rabin's rise in the IDF after 1948 includes insights into both his image and relations with other officers. General Israel Tal called Rabin “the highest intellectual authority on military matters” (p. 38), and another general, Elad Peled, cited his professionalism, calling Rabin the IDF's “Admor” [Hasidic Rabbi]. As early as 1949 Rabin and General Moshe Dayan, about whom Rabin made disparaging remarks, developed an abiding mutual dislike. Nevertheless, Dayan, as chief of staff in 1955, promoted Rabin to major general. When Rabin became chief of staff in 1964, he assembled a team still considered the IDF's best General Staff, including “unorthodox” officers such as Matti Peled and Ariel Sharon. In 1964 he rescued Sharon from a dead-end posting, the next year promoting him to brigadier general. Rabinovich describes an “up-and-down” relationship with General Ezer Weizman, who wrote in unflattering terms about Rabin's nervous breakdown during the crisis that preceded the 1967 Six Day War.
A second theme is Rabin's twenty-five-year working relationship with several US administrations. His term as ambassador began near the end of the Johnson period, dealing with a president who treated him coolly. That administration had become less supportive of Israel in the territories conquered in 1967, uneager to make good on a promise of F-4 Phantom jets, and determined to forestall an Israeli nuclear military option. Rabin enjoyed better ties with President Nixon and warm relations with Henry Kissinger, national security advisor and later secretary of state. Rabinovich notes Rabin's role vis-à-vis the government of Prime Minister Golda Meir and his openly aggressive encouragement of deep penetration bombing during the Israeli–Egyptian War of Attrition. The author conveys little of the concern this caused the Americans, even if they did want Israel to hit hard the Soviet Union's most important Middle East client. A high point for Rabin was coordination with Kissinger of Israel's threat to Syria, which invaded Jordan after King Husayn had struck at the PLO in September 1970.
A third theme is the contrast between Rabin as a weak prime minister and his political rehabilitation. Rabin's conflict and conciliation with Shimon Peres, his long-time rival, feature prominently throughout these years and Rabin's second prime ministership. As Rabinovich notes, the relationship was “poisonous from the outset” (p. 108). He weaves a skilful account of it into nearly every stage marking the last twenty-one years of Rabin's political path (and life). Thus, as defense minister under Rabin in the 1970s, Peres was sympathetic to, if not outright supportive of, Jewish settlement in the West Bank. Rabin called the settlement movement “a cancer.”
From 1984 to 1990 Rabin “flourished” as minister of defense. He oversaw a partial withdrawal from Lebanon, which Israel had invaded in 1982. He took a hard line toward the Palestinian intifada, which broke out at the end of 1987. Yet, as Rabinovich writes, Rabin did not in fact issue an order to Israeli forces to “break the bones” of Palestinians in their confrontation with the IDF. His term in the Ministry of Defense ended in March 1990, when Peres launched a failed attempt, dubbed the “stinking maneuver,” at an alternative to the government coalition. Rabin told Peres, “I am sick and tired of your gimmicks,” successfully challenging his leadership of the Labor Party. Labor won a slim victory in June 1992, and Rabin assigned Peres, cooperation with whom he could not avoid, the Foreign Ministry.
Four of the cogent points that Rabinovich makes about the years 1992 to 1995 warrant mention. First, by June 1993 Rabin was convinced of the seriousness of the Oslo talks and worried that ending the process would allow Peres to present himself as the champion of an aborted peace. Second, Rabin sought a Syrian alternative and was prepared to make far-reaching concessions. He abandoned those talks only when President Asad of Syria provided no basis for a breakthrough. A third point regards the US role. Washington was invested in the Syrian track, and its demise in favor of a Palestinian option angered the administration. Israel weathered that ire by virtue of excellent relations with President Clinton, and the United States hosted the signing of the Israeli–Palestinian agreement on the White House lawn. Fourth, Rabin decided at the “last minute” to attend the 13 September ceremony, leaving Peres, who learned of that from the radio, to deal with his own pique. Rabin, not a great orator, delivered a speech that Rabinovich describes as “powerful.”
In the final fifty pages of this book Rabinovich brings to bear his most incisive historical analyses. Egypt, for fourteen years at peace with Israel, feared it as a regional hegemon were Arab–Israeli relations to burgeon. Yet to the Israelis who supported Rabin, the 1994 peace treaty with Jordan and dramatic change in Israel's international standing gave cause for hope. Rabin's assassination in 1995 created that public's belated emotional attachment to him.
