Scholars come back again and again to the reign of Muhammad Reza Pahlavi (1941–79), and especially to the years 1941–53 when Muhammad Musaddiq, the avuncular Iranian nationalist and patriot, was most politically active. Perhaps, as David R. Collier explains in Democracy and the Nature of American Influence in Iran, 1941–1979, “history could have been so different” (p. 301). If the United States had not intervened in Iran's internal affairs in 1953, he concludes, “there would have been no coup and all that came after it” (p. 301), including, of course, the Islamic Revolution. How does Collier arrive at this causal relationship between events separated by a quarter century?

As a political scientist, he relies on two key concepts in his discipline, linkage and leverage, to analyze US–Iran relations during the shah's thirty-eight-year reign. The former refers to engagement with important and diverse groups inside the country, the latter to the degree of influence the United States could exert on Iranian affairs. Collier argues that these two factors waxed and waned over time and “only when both elements [were] present could American pressure be effective” (p. 295). He concludes that linkage and leverage were highest in the periods, 1941–50, 1953–58, and 1961–64, and thus that was when “US policy largely achieved its aims” (p. 294).

Approximately two-thirds of the monograph focuses on the years 1941–1963, when the pattern of US policy had been established. Thereafter, when the two critical factors weakened, Washington could achieve few of its objectives in Tehran.

Viewing US–Iran relations through the lens of linkage and leverage can provide important insights, helping us to understand better the nature and development of bilateral relations. This can be important, not only for understanding what happened in the past, but also in the formulation of future policies to make them more effective, “while avoiding the nefarious and unintended outcomes in these pages” (p. 294).

Collier criticizes US actions, arguing that US policymakers weighed in at critical moments to undermine and weaken nascent democratic movements within Iran. They did this in order to ensure stability under the modernizing and increasingly authoritarian shah. He comes down solidly on the side of those scholars (including myself), who judge the United States to have taken a key role in the August 1953 coup that overthrew Musaddiq's government and initiated the process of royal aggrandizement of power.

That US policymakers exercised a nefarious influence during these early years has been well substantiated. Scholars have also noted the effectiveness with which the shah from time to time manipulated Washington to attract its support, as in the case of the White Revolution. What is questionable is the degree to which the United States actually controlled Iran's internal affairs. Many scholars have argued for a blending of internal and external factors determining the course of Iranian events, but Collier goes further, attesting to the overweening importance of American linkage and leverage in determining the flow of history almost to the exclusion of Iranian agency. Thus, in referring to early 1961, he writes that the United States “held virtual dominion over Iran's internal system” (p. 207). During the years 1941–61, the Shah “had been at the beck and call of foreign powers” (p. 229). “The Johnson presidency had begun to sow the seeds for revolution” (p. 246), and thus “the Iranian Revolution was the culmination of more than fifteen years of failed US policy” (p. 288). He concludes that “American decisions in Iran . . . made the revolution inevitable” (p. 290).

It seems to me that the author's reliance on the twin concepts outlined above has led him to exaggerate the degree of US control, and thereby distracts readers from the very real contributions of his work. If US control was at its apex in 1945, for example, why then was the government in Tehran able to oust Arthur Millspaugh and bring his financial mission to an ignominious conclusion? Any assessment of factors leading to Musaddiq's overthrow must at least acknowledge his own shortcomings, an irascibility that hindered his ability to hold together disparate factions of the National Front and perhaps even to conclude an interim oil agreement. And what of the Shah, who never abandoned his requests for more American arms and his quest for more power, whether American influence was at its maximum or not? I mention these examples only to emphasize the complex mix of factors that ought to be considered.

Collier also appears to view nationalism as the antithesis of democracy, as an unhealthy movement toward “resentment and hatred of outside influence” (pp. 85, 300). He obviously intends a particular understanding of this phenomenon, which he would do well to elaborate. Readers might reasonably question whether the two are mutually exclusive in all circumstances, as the author seems to suggest.

He writes a great deal about the abandonment of Patrick Hurley's World War II plan for Iranian development, lamenting yet another blow to democracy. Yet, it is difficult to see how the plan could have become an ally of the indigenous democratic movement when, according to Collier, it would put American advisers in control of “all facets of Iranian governance” (p. 36). Are we to assume that the Americans would have known what was best for Iran?

On a more positive note, Collier introduces an interesting argument when he writes that over the years covered by his study, Iranians showed that democracy could thrive in their country “when devoid of an overbearing authoritarian ruler or an international system that rejected democratic rule.” He expresses confidence that in the right conditions Iran could make the transition to democracy more easily than most other Middle Eastern countries (p. 7). In this he may well be right.

He might also have noted that although far from perfect, even the current political system is more democratic than that of most regional states, boasting multiple centers of power, real elections, and a parliament that is far removed from the rubber-stamp variety of the Pahlavi years.

Today, US leverage on Iran is low, and linkages are almost nonexistent. Few Americans, and virtually none in positions of power, have firsthand experience with Iran or Iranians. All they can do is repeat inherited platitudes about rogue regimes. None of this bodes well for future relations. If only we could assign them this book.